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This paper proposea to exan1ina how linguistic a.nalyaia, togethor 
with ita precursor logical positivism, has provoked a rea3aeao~ent of 
tho nnturo of religious discourse. The problem is nccuratel7 stated iu 
two quostiona: (1) ~·hat are the challenges which analysis directs to the 
philoaopher of religion in the area of religious language? (2) In what 
ways do tho replies of the philosophers o! religion relate to and illu• 
mine the6o challenges? 
Delillliting the Scope 
A number of £actors limit the aaope of the study. Chronological~ 
the investigation ia reatrioted to ideational activity ot the twentieth 
century. .Jreat 3ritian, aome of the commonwealth natiou (I,ew ~aland, 
Ju.1stralia, Ca.Dada), and the United States provide the geographical bounda-
ries.1 'rhe author'd doci31on not to include curreuta o! contomporary phil• 
oaophy which are involved in linguistic problems, but are not immediate~ 
related to linguistic nnalysia or directly relevant to tho queation ot 
religious die~ourse, is also a limiting tactor. On this account the con-
tinental discuaaion ot the interrelation betweon la~ and phenoaenolo11 
l..nie pographical boundaries are roughly those ot analyaia' aphere 
of influence. The ScandilM'vian countries also, in part, enter thia cate-
goey. Austria is included by reason ot the Vienna Circle. 
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has not been an object ot research.2 For the eam.e reason the work ot 
Paul 'J:Ulich has not been examined. although it touches on religious 
discourse at maey points. Finally. the recent investigation of axiologi-
cal and ethical language, although it mq bo extrapolated from its own 
sphere into the realJn of religious discourse, does not lie within the 
scope ot the st~. 
In addition, the paper is circumscribed in that it otters critiques 
neither or the philosophical aovement known as linguistic ~sis, nor 
or the numerous theories which describe the nature ot religious dia-
course.3 On the other hand, the paper seeks to record particular criti-
cisms of individual statements or concepts when the criticisms ot other 
men are illuminative. 
It is the writer's persuasion that presuppositions restrict the 
2rus discussion includes, among Dl&D¥ others, Georg J&oaka•s ~ 
spracbl1chen G~en def Philosophie (Graz: Akadeaische Druck- und 
Verl.agaanstalt, l 2, and articles by Johannes Bapt. Lotz, 11Sprache 
und Denken. Zur .Pblncaenologie und Metapbyaik der Sprache,11 Scholuti..k, 
rn (19.56), 496-.514, and "Philo:sophie und Spraohe," Scholaatik, XL 
(October 196.5), 481-.511. The two articles deal in part with Heidegger's 
phUoao~ of language. In this regard it is interesting to note that 
the editors ot Die ReJ1e19la in Geeghjchte und Gegemrart (tubingen: J. c • .B. 
Mohr, c.1962), telt constrained to invite Ian Ru.aey, an English theo-
logian, to write the article titled 11Theologie und Philoaophie IV. Ia 
lngeldchsischen BeNich,11 VI, 830-838. Evidently the continental theo-
logians did not teel at home discwssing the iap&ct ot 11ngu1atic ~•1• 
on theology 1n Great .&ritian. 
)A we~reuoned critique at lingu18tic anaqeia is the work CJ•rttr 
is Not Enougt: Epf&.YS ip Crit.icip or Lingu:1stic~b~19!9PAY, edited by 
ll. D. LewisLandon: George Allen and Omd.n. c.i ). It. otters a varieq 
ot penetrating evaluations, aca• by an&:qata. On the other hand, the work 
ot Ernest Gellner, Woz:sl! pi Ib3ns•: A CJUctCfl Account gt Lipgp;\at1o Pb1J,fophv, introduced by Bertl'and Russell London: Victor Gollancs, 
19S9 , provides 80118 protound criticia in popular evle, but auttera 
fraa being the work ot a single author. 
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extent or arq 1nvest.igat1on. It is impossible to "sneak frca one's 
skin." The better part or wisdom is to expose the presuppositions. and 
to utilize them 1n bounding the l:1m1ts of the. study. Here are tour 
as5\lmptions which have influenced both research and composition decided-
ly. First, the writer assU111es that the question ot aeani!lg 1n language 
offers a profitable juncture at which to address oneself to the question 
of meaning in lire. Second, it 1& assumed that theology and philoaopq 
of religion are distinguishable• but not separable. A theology at least 
1.lllplies a philosophy of religion, and it there is a philosop}v' of 
religion, there is also a correlative theology. On this basis t.he 
author has included both theologians and philosophers of religion 
among those whose works are examined particularzy in Chapters IV and V. 
Third, the writer shares with JIUllO" others the conviction that contem-
porary philosophy and philosopb.y of religion are ensnared by the 
"Cartesian blight." M.nt•s Copernican revolution had its roots 1n the 
interiorizatio.u or Descartes. The modern extension of that revolut.1.on, 
including the spec1al.1zed a~ or man•a language both in philoaophy 
and religion, find.a its ultimate !'rule at reference in Descartes• 
restrictive cog1to ergo sum. The splintered world of spec1alisation 
1a Jlirrored in l.1ngu1atic ana:cy,sis and 1n the philosopt\y or relig1on 
when both disciplines llait their inwstigationa sole~ to the l.&IJguage 
ot an. In view ot tbia third unmption the author baa tried to aTOid 
over-abridging the e.vaa1nat1on ot linguistic analysis, and the dialogue 
between religioua philoaopey anc:l an&JJ'sia aa well. F1nAll7, the author 
has written an ideational account ot l.iJ2guiatic an&l38ia as it relatu 
to religious language under the uBlDlption tbat. God the Creator ie 
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active no less in the world of' hUlll&n thought than in the world ot 
nature. tJ1th this faith-commitment he takes up a diacuaaion of' l.i.ngu1a-
tic a..nazysis 1n the assurance that God reigns and mould.a all things for 
l:iis Churoh. 
A word is needed regarding recurrent tel'Dls. "Logical positivism" 
or "logical empiricism" or "poeitiviam" is gene~ understood as a 
philosophical movement of the l&te 19201& which attempted to anchor the 
ueaning ot propositions in their verifiability. 1111.nguiatic a~aia" 
is understood as a contemporary philosophical movement which vi.ewe the 
purposa of philosophy as the descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) 
ana.1¥sis of language. 11Philosophical ~sis," "logical ~aie, 11 
and "~sis" are used aynon.yaoualy with"l.iniuiatic analyaia.11 A 
third tem is "logic." It occurs especially in reference to stateaents, 
utterances, or discourse, and is to be contrasted with the "logic" ot 
rational thought. The term mq be defined as the threads of inter-
relation, often contextually covert, which bind a statement, utterance, 
or discourse into a 11.11&a111ngt'ul" unit. A tourth tel"ll is 11religious 
discourse." lt uy be defined as a group ot linguistic utterances o~ 
stato11ent& ultimate]¥ Nferring to God. Sy"noJvaoua pbraaea are 
11thoological discourse,11 "religioue stateaenta,11 and "religious 
utterances." 
Purpose and Illlportance or the Stud;y 
the concern which led the writer to this stuey was more than acad.._ 
ic. The 1.mportance and the purpose of the research were tor hi.a indi:ri.a-
ible. The purpose ot the•~ ia to answer the tvo queationa which 
.5 
compose the problem. If the first question (vlhat a.re the ch&l.lenges 
which anazysis directs to the philosopher of religion in the area of 
religious language?) is answered, the significance of the stucy may be 
said to lie in its contribution to dialogue between the Church (and its 
philosophers) and the world. lt is possible that the questions of lin-
guistic analysis are not unrelated to the challenge of Dietrich 
.oonhoeffer on the one hand, and of Rudolf Bultmann on the other. If 
the first question is answered, it~ be possible to approach with 
new freshness the problem of "old belief's losing their meaning" in the 
contemporary world. li'or while classical theology bas generally 'been 
argumentative and controversial when dealing with objections that 
Christian doctrine is either false or unproved (together with argwaenta 
that it is impracticable, harsh, and trivial), 11theologians have seldom 
encountered the charge •This is not an assertion at all,• 'There is 
nothing here that one can either believe or disbelieve.1 114 Then too, 
if the challenges of linguistic f1!1LcySis are adequa.tely apprehended, 
11God-1s-dea.d11 talk may seek its proper level of flotation. 1'he dis-
placenent of the tel'lll 11God11 as the head of a certain famil3" of words 1n 
favor of the term "religion" as the head of the same linguistic f~ 
is not a to"ta].4 unrelated problem. finally, the Church's somewhat appre-
hensive attitude toward dialogue with the world~ be exposed in all it.a 
4G. c. Stead, "liow Theologians Reason," Faith ~d Logic, edited by 
Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen and Unwin, 195:;; P• 116 • 
.5John Hick, Pffl,popb.v f. R1Ugion (Englewood Cliffs, l•ew Jereey: 
Prentice-liall, c.l J, p.8. 
• 
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nakedness if the challenges of analysis are carefull7 examined. Speci-
fically, the time-gap between the world's question (in thia case the 
question of linguistic analysis) and the Church's answer will be seen 
for what it io: a time-gap too long for proper nurture of healthy 
dialogue. 
If the second question (In what · way do the replies of the philoso-
phers of religion relate to and illumine the challenges of analysis?) 
is answered, the importance of the study may be aaid to consist in its 
contribution to dialogue within the Church. Th~ twentieth century has 
been labeled the century of ecumenism. An essential element of ecumenical 
converaation is meaningful dialogue. But purposeful dialogue is im-
possible when Coleridge's paraphrased line applies: ''Words, words, 
everywhere, and not a thought to think." It is to be hoped that con-
temporary study of the logic of religious discourse will bear fruit in 
these conversations. To the degree that the study summarizeo the con-
cerns of religious philosophers who deal with the nature ot religious 
language it will contribute in a small way to meaningful dialogue within 
the Church. 
Dialogue in the Church also involves intercontessional conversation 
in the area of biblical hermeneu tics. Contemporary biblical studies 
must necessarily take cognizance ot current philosophy ot religion, for 
when the latter addresses itself to the question of religious language 
it inevitlibly touches the sphere of biblical hermeneutics. This study 
sets out to demonstrate current activity in the philosophy of religion 
with the conviction that biblical hermeneutics may profit iro~ a dialogic 
encounter • 
? 
Dialogue in the Church also involves dialogue among her philosophers. 
If the second question of the problem is properly asked and answered, 
·the s tuuy will be valuable beoa4se it investigates the apologetics of 
current religious philosophers as they relate to linguistic acaly;sia. 
A comparison of their widely differing methods and conclusion3 will be 
both instructive and ~timulating. In fact, a rather new definition 
of the task of the philos ophy of religion emerges from the encountor 
with analyai::;, one ,1hich should riot go unchallenged and unobserved 
among the nona.nalytic philosophers of the Church. In order to contri-
bute to dialogue among the man7 philosophers of the Church, abundant 
bibliocrraphioal references have bean included. 
Finally, the importance of the study lies in part in its exposition 
of tho problem of cognition in religious discourse. If the study merely 
alerts the reader to the necessity of measuring both the assets and the 
liabilitio~ involved in attributing cognition to religious language, it 
has accomplii:h:etl :~nimportant objective. If religious language is seen 
to have, in any sense, a cognitivo element, the question ot the "meaning" 
of and the criteria of cognition immediately arises. lf on the other 
hand cognition ia not construed as an essential element of religious 
language, the relation of religious faith to the "nude facts" of empirical 
recl it~ comes to the fore at once. The emphasis on worship in the litur-
gical revival is a healthy phenomenon. But the question ot cognition in 
religious discourse invades also the Church's worahip life. 
History and Previous Treatments of Problem 
The question o! "meaning" in religious language is as old as the 
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discourse itself. Saint Paul refera to some of the difficulties in writ-
ing to the ~orinthiane: 
'fhere ure r.loubtlesa many different languagea in the world, and 
none ia without meaning; but if I do not know the meaning of 
the language, I shall be a6roreigner to the speaker and tho sp~aker a foreigner to me. 
The Christological controversies of the early Church were extensively 
concerned with the ~eaning of words. From one perspective the whole of 
church history may be viewed as the Church's attempt to delineate and 
clarify the meaning ot' key terms. In centuries since the Reformation 
it has been especially the language of natural theology that bas been 
ecrutinized. But especially in the twentieth century the problem bas 
assumed overwhelming significance. It is precisely b1:cauae the question 
of meaning in religious discourse is so intimately connected with the 
philosophy of analyaie that this study proposes to address itself to both 
aspects of the giant problem. 
Previous investigationu of the problem have often lacked both objec-
tivity and depth. Those philosophers of religion who have taken cogni-
zance of the phenomenon of logical positivism. the precursor of linguistic 
analysis, have all t.00 frequently attacked it with a war cry. Others 
have all t ·oo readily dismissed linguistic analysis itself in fav·or of the 
second viable philosophical option of current times, existentiali3m. On 
the other hand, the philosophers of religion who have earnestly endeavored 
to seek out the core and challenge of linguistic anal1sia frequently rush 
through an inveatigation of analysis in order to arrive ~ore quickly at 
an appropriate apologetics. In sum, the men who have dealt ~1th the 
61 Corinthians 14:10-11. 
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problQm at l:w.nd have frequently tonded to divide themselves into two 
~roups: if chey are pbiloaophera concernoJ 111.ith linguiatic analysis, they 
are quick to di3misa tho question of religious language; if they are 
philosophers of religion, they often ruah through a discusaion of philo-
sophical analyeis, or tako li~tlo cognizance ot the concluaions of other 
philoaophers vi religion. ~hilo there have been 11an1 booka, articles, and 
s1mposia which have addressed the ~uestion, to this writer's kno~ledge 
none .has taken really adequate notice either o! ~he impact of logical 
positivism on linguistic analyois as it affects anal1sis'challengea to 
r~ligious discourse, or o! the preci$8 natU1·e ot the analytic challenges 
to theoloi~, or ot the diver::.ity or ai;c;wera given by philosophers of 
religion.7 
Methodology and $ourcoe 
The methodology ot tho study baa been conatructed to deal with the 
two buaic queationo of t ho problem. ~hapter II u:s kn ideational-biatorical 
aurvey of logical po~itivism aa thd pre.cursor 0£ l inguistic analysis. 
~hupter III seta out to characterize linguistic analysis a~ it encounters 
theology and reli~ious laD~uage. ~wo ba3iC cha:langes el:ktrge. In the 
firat, analysis damoustrates its positiviotic parentage by d~llltlnding the 
verifiaoility-tal~ifi.A&bility ot religious discourse as a sine qua non for 
7
·ru1a state111ent do~s not aill to depreciate tiew ~S&Ja iu Philosophi-
cal 'l'heology, edited by Antoey o. N. } .. le.., and Alasdair Maolntyre (New York: 
:-1ac111illa11 ~pan1, c.1955), or work!J ot Basil Mitchell, Ian Ramsey, 
~onald Hepburn, and many others. It does indicate the need !or a !u.ll-
blown lilalmination of t he probl.t11 a:s it aatands ~ 1966, an exalllination 
both ol the analytic challenges (to~ether vith their pbiloaopili.cal history) 
afid of ropraaentatiYe replies ~o tha~e challenge~. 
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a:iud.t.t"'i:.ce to the rao.lm of r;ioaning!ul laur,u.a~~. In the attcond, aualyai,s 
ca;;;ok~ fo1· thw ''logic'' uf .1·eligioua di.:lcourmt. In thia ro-1ueat analyois 
admits the !ormal validity of religious diacourse a.s a uaet·ui ''la11guage-
gct111e, 11 or field of l an~age, because it ia found among people. Chaptar 
IV aumn.ial'iZ.'18 nine repreaontative theoriea of ~he naturo of rl)ligious 
lan~uago offered in ar.swer to the first analytic challenge. Chaptar V 
aummnrizea thirteen thoorioa of relisioua langua~e which represent typical 
aumters to the second ancll ytic challt:nge. :;nnpter VI s:11:1:;;arizes the 
eut.ir·o study and offers some tentative conclusiona. 
J.lajor sources US.¢d in tho atucly include ~ritiugs of logical positiv-
i:;ts , lin3ui3tic Etr.alyota, and hiatoriana of philoaophy, aa .tell as worka 
ot philooophers of religion. Only philosophers oi roligion who offered 
ttn explicit theory of roligious language wore consulted in detail.8 
In the OlHJe of thei:M writers, i~bo works are carefully sulllll8rized and docu-
mented. ~ho author haa takon the liberty to rearrange some sections of 
these \'forks, but every precaution :.,a.a tukeu to avoid diotort.ion. ,-iome 
parti:i not specifically sorruane to the particular theor; of roligioua 
language, -.,er& uot included in the sum,:iaries. oior;raphical inforoation 
is provided for i he r>l8D discusaad in Chapters IV and V. At tiaaos aore 
than one .,ork ot an author was consulted. All of the stuu:,•s 118.jor sou:ces 
are li~ted in the primary bibliograpb.J. 
. 
8An excellent work by id.chard Luacke, New M4tanings tor Now I3eing~ 
(Philadelphia: Fortresa Preas, 1964), deserves mention at this point. It 
is not summarized in this utudy becauae Luecke'3 theory o! religious 
language is ao well hidden in the book'3 aubstance that it would uu-
doubtecil1 suffer distortion if the present writer were to attempt to 
extract it. 
11 
The author has sought to choose his words with care. The apirit 
of ~zra vound'3 plea tor the care of ~he language hns beou an important 
methodological principlo both in rosoarch and ·,riting: 
Language is uot u mere cabinet curio or ~u3ewn exhibit. It doed 
definitely !unction in all human lite from tribal sta te onward. 
You caonot govern vlithout it, you cannot w.ake laws without it. 
Thnt 1a you make lnws and thuy becom~ aero r.1are'3 nests !or graft 
ana discussion. , ••• Printed word or drum telegraph are neither 
without bauring on ::be a gisret1ate life ot t:he folk. As language 
become a the ~ost po.rer .CUl instru:nent of perfid7, so bngua~e alone 
can rid'11.a and cut t hrough the meshes. Used to conceal ;nganin~, 
usad to blur r::ealling, to produce the complete and utter ir~ferno of 
the !)clSt c@ntury ••• ugninst vhich ~O~LY a care for langua~e, 
for e.ccurate regi s tra tion 'by language avail$. i;nd if raen too 
10113 neglect it, th~ir cn~ldren will find thall13elvoa t>egging and 
thair offsprin~ betrayed. 
9szra Pound, Literary :~sso s of ~zra Pound, edited by T. 3. i;liot 
(~orfolk, Connecticut : 1:ew Oiroctioao, 195 , , PP• 76, 77. 
~liAPl'ER II 
LOGICAL FOSITIV'ISM, 'l'HE IMMEDIA't ~ PlmCURSOR 
OF LlNGU~TIC ANALYSIS 
The Stage 
For some historians of pbil.osophy, logical poaitiviwra wa~ an inter-
ruption in the devel~pnient o! philosophical analysis. The line that ruua 
from Moore through Wittgenstein to Ryle and the other contemporary analysts, 
they contend, snappod with tbe iconoclasm o! logical empiriciam. On the 
o~ber hand, it will be profitable to exallline logi cal positivisa as a pre-
curaor ot linguist ic analysis. Cont emporary linguistic analyai~ will ciake 
as much sense as its history, and the histo17 of lingui3tic analysis in-
volves the development and flowering of logical poaitiYism, its precursor. 
Although it is ditticult to aucertain the period of greatest influence, 
the years 1927-1937 might well be co11sidered the 11Golde11 Age'' ot logical 
positivism. Birth pang~ were prolonged, and an interplay of complex factors 
give growth and maturit:, to the moveilient. 
In the late nineteenth century, Neo-Idealiats vere active in Zngl.alld 
and op . .-the cont.inent. Logical poaitiviaa aaaerted its identit7 against 
an idealistic backdrop. ?he moTemeut questioned the logic ot a etatement 
such as "Tiu is unreal." It atsked tor the sense of "Absolute .Realit7. '' 
It confronted the hostility ot F. H. Bradle7, vith his overwhel.aing con-
tempt of the empiricist tradition. G. J. Warnock cbaracterisea the Abso-
lute Idealisaa of Bernard Bosanquet and F. H. Bradle1 aa hiahl7 &lld aabitiou-
ly •taphlucal, burdened vith impreasin rhetoric, and little concerned 
l} 
with ordinary ways ot thinking.1 ~ven as late as 1939 a strained situation 
existed. In that year C. D. Broad, an idealist, published an article baaing 
the cosmological argwaent for God's exiatance oc the asoertion that some 
exiatontial propositions are intrinsically neceauary. In the face of nu.mer-
oua argumonts to the contrary, Broad publi~hed the exact salilO article tou.r-
t~en years later. 2 
It was in antithea13 to dogtaatic idealiotic philosphy that logical 
positiYism asaumed ita character. Thia antithesis, coupled with redoubled 
etforta in inductive scientific re$oarcb and phenomenal advances in 
theoreticul science, produced a nutritive environment for rapid develop-
mont. H.J. P~ton characterizes the impact of science upon the develop-
ment of logical positivism with this statement: 
It I were aaked to state in one word the r:wain impulse to all this 
new thinking, and particularly to the whole lo5l cal and liugldetic 
mov~ment o! this contury, l should take the question lijerally and 
SllY aimply that it was science (including mathematics). 
1a. J. vlaro.ock, :"'.:up;liab Phi103opby $ince 1900 (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Preas, c.1958), pp. 3, 5, 6, 9. Warnock warna tbat this rather color-
ful movement should not bo viewed as traditional on the English scene, 
!or it waa an ''exotic" alien import. · 
2Eric Lionel Mascall, tlords and Images (l~ew York: Roi.ald Press 
CoBpany, c.1957), P• 30. Rovolution in Philoso}hy, editod by Al!red 
J. Ayer (J..Ondon: MacDUL.llan and Co111p&D7, .. c .19.56 , gi vea an accurate de-
scription of the philoeophical climate preceding logical po~iti~aa, 
including the philosop~ ot Bradley and logical atomism. 
}H. J. Paton, "Fifty Years ot Philosop~, '' Cont.eaporarz Bn.tillh 
Philosophy, edited by H. D. Lewis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
c.1956), P• 352. Frederick Fer~ not•a in Langua,se1 Logic and God (First 
edition1 Nev York: Harper and Brotbero, c.1961), that the rise of in-
ductive science de1110nstrated a concern more for methodology than empiri-
cal resulta. Pbilosop~, too, ceased to concern itself vith synthesis of 
natural scientific matters, and turned its attention to a methodology 
vbich would cSim\lltaneousl.y d@~ondtrate its distinction from tho sciences 
while still contributing to them. See PP• 4-6. 
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The baoio theaoa of the complex philosophical revolution popular-
ly called "logical positivism'' or 11J;ogical empiricism, 11 dogmutic 111 
their style and iconocla.;tic in thoir contact, are al1bjects for conaider-
ation in the next PQges: 
a. 'tho function of philosophy is logical l:inalJoia. • • • philo-
sophy ha~ becorae tho logical analysis of science through the 
s,ntactical analysis of scientific language. 
b. All cognitively significant (meaningful) discourse is divisible 
· without reQainder into analytic or 01nthetic propositions. 
c. Any proposition that purports to be factual or empirical bas 
meaning oul;y if it is pos:Jible in principle to ·!escribe a method 
!or its verification. 
d. All metaphysical a suertiona, being neither analytic nor synthetic 
propoaitions, aro meaningleaa. 
e. There is a eingle l anguage for all scionce; it is aimilar in fora 
to the language of physics, and all synthetic propoaitious are 
reducible to olementary exp~riancea expressible in this lauguage. 
f. All normative assertions, whether positing coral, aesthetic, or 
religious valueo, are ecientificall;y unverifiable, and are4,;h.ere-for& to be classified aa torma ot non-cognitive discourse. 
1Jevulopra1tnta in i.i;1,gland: the Nev Logic a.nd l'..ogical Atolli.81l 
Iu philosophical u.istorJ Sngland generally resta in the empirical 
camp. But &5 an "exotic" import, the idealists ot the late nin.iteenth 
and early twentieth conturiea affirmed the validity o! reason and logic. 
Conliequent to their interest, it was first in Ensland that the "new logic" 
assumed precise form and achieved influential status. Thu dev~Wiltion of 
traciitional Aristotelian logic, and the definite formulation of the "new 
logic," "ere fundamental contributions of ;;";nglish philoaoph,y to the 
gradual developmsnt of logical ·poa1tiv1sm. 
4Albert William Levi, PhilosopbY and the Hodwrll \Jorld (.iiloomingtOD, 
Indiana: Indiana Universit7 Pross, c.1959), PP• j44-j45. 
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Since tb.e days of Aristotle, men imparted to traditional logic an 
ontological character at least of sorts. t he ! act that the relation 
between t h.ought and word was coU1mor,ly interpreted aa s. coding-decoding 
~rocess, or image-mirror picture, evidencea an unconocioum vindication 
of logic'a ontologi~al utatus. John Findlay clair:la that past philosophical 
interpret~tiona o! language have genarally asswnod that word.a wsre ex-
pressions of thoughts on t he ona band, and t hat they 1:ieant thinea on 
the other. Thoughts tte.re construed as iuvi.9ible ghostly acts .ihich .. 
could, in cert uin caaea, diapeuse ~ith spoecb.5 Even tho~ghta were to 
be "tho1.oght" in accordance with ,\ristotelian logic. 
Thero ia no need to describe how, during the nineteenth century, the 
fifth axioru of Euclidean ,:Seometry was weighed in the balance and found 
wanting as an integral element o! man•u perception and reasolling. Nor 
is there the need to cons ider the implications of this cha llenge !or 
Aristotle's logic. Our concern i s the devaluat ion of t raditional logic 
within logical pouitiviBm. '.l'b.~ continental positiviata -,ere attempting 
to tra.nalate relational acrntences into lo~ic. AritJtotolian logic was 
not a~enablo to the eff ort. ~a a consequence, tho poaitiviata quedtioned 
the validity o! traditiorial logic in the ~phere o! relatiooal s~ntences. 
Hans Reichenbach gave an exa1'!!ple of t heir challengo yaara later: 
It is tr1.1e that the sentence "Bitter iii tall" haa the 3ubjoot "Peter" 
and the predicate "tall"• But· the aentouce "Petor is taller th&A 
Paul" has two subjects, narael;y "Peter" and "Pau.111 , ai11oe the predi-
cate "taller than" ia a relation. '?he miaunderstanding of linguistic 
5John Niemayer Fiudlay, "!iome Heactiou to .Heoeut C&11bridai- Philo- . 
aophy (1940-1)," Language. Hind and Vo.l11e (New York: liuaaanities Preaa, 
c.1963), PP• 16-17. Thia article or1gima1ly appeared in Allatr alasiaD Jour-
nal of Psyeboloq and Philoaoplg (Deceaber 19401 April 1941). 
16 
structu.rea, originating from adherence to Aristotelian logic, has 
seriously impaired the science ot linguiatics.6 
Carnap isolated the inadequacy of truditional logic in 1930, explicitly 
linking it ~.,ith the Ariatotelian-3chola·s t ic ayatem: 
The desire to replace metaphysical concopt-poetry by a rigorous, 
scientific method of philosophizing would have remained a pious 
hope if the ~ystem ot traditional logic had been the only logical 
instrument available. Traditional logic was totally incapable of 
satisfying the requiromont of richness o! contont, tormal rigor 
and technical utility which ita new role demanded or it. Formal 
logic rested on the Aristotelian-scholastic syutom which in the 
course of its f urther development had been only slightly improved 
and extended.7 
The new logic was an attempt to demonstrate the ioadequaoy of Aristo-
telian logic, simultaneously constructing other logical Gystums with basic 
axioms freely posited and developed. Following Leibniz's ideas, Frege, 
Peano, and Schr6der tr.ade the first attempts at a reconstruction of logic. 
On tho basis of thctir work, Hhitehead and Russell created tho t oundation-
al work o! the new logic, Principia Mathematica (1910-1}). Furth~r attempts 
a depended wholly on their accomplishment. Russell and whitehead'a work 
"demonstrated how the concept of natural numbers, the theoey of manifolds, 
and notions like continuity and derivation can be strictl1 deduced. from a 
handful ot primitive notions and about the same number of logical axioms," 
6Batia Reichonbach, The Rise ot Scienti!ic PhlloaoPhY (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, c.1951), PP• 220-221. 
?Rudolf Carnap, "The Old and the Nev Logic," Logical Positivism, 
edited by A. J. A1er (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Presa, 0.1959), PP• 133-134. 
The article originally appeared aa "Die alte und die neue Logik," Erkenntnia, 
I (1930-31). 
8Ibid., PP• 134-135• Frege•a contribution to the development of new 
logic 'Isaccurately au,rm!B.rized by 'fl . C. Kneale, "Gottlob Frege and Mathe-
matical Logic," The Revolution in Philoao , edited by A. J. Ayer (Londont 
Macmillan and Compa~, 0.19 , PP• 2 
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while its apecific s i enificance f or positivism lay in the logic ut proposi-
tions: "the theory or logical types, ••• the logical divisions or all 
statements into true, false, and meaningless, and the diatinction between 
atomic and molecular propositiona. 119 
Immediately the rela tionship of the new logic to human langQag~ caffle 
in for question. Although the Copleaton-Ayer broadcast occurred in 1949, 
the question put by Copleston wus a question commonly raised in ·tho earlier 





My question is thia. Within a three-val11ed system of 
lo0ic is there any rula of cons ietoncy at all? (They 
have been diacuaeing such a for:r.al logicl 
Yes . Otherwise it wouldn't be a aiste~ of logic. 
Then does it not seem tbat there is at least one proto-
1:,ropoaition ~hich governs all possible systems of logic? 
LRe is re£erring to the principle ot non-contradiction.l 
No, that doesn't !ollow.10 
Huaaell 3tepped confidently and related the ne. logic to language. 
It was aussell'a opiuion, according to J. 0. Urmson, that 
a logic from which the whole uf mathecaatics with all itu complexi-
ties can be derived must be an adequate skeleton (minus the extra-
logical vocab11lary which the variables r eplace) of a languas~11 
capable of expre3sing all that can b@ adequately said at all. 
9Levi, P• 34<). 
10A. J. Ayer and F. c. Copleston, "Logica.l Positivism--A Debate," 
Modern Introduction to Philoso , edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap 
Glencoe, Illinois; Free Presa, .c.1957), P• 600. This debate occl.ll"red in 
1949 over th~ British .Broadcasting Corporation. In re!erence to ~he princi-
ple o! non-contradiction, Ernest Nagel in "Logic Jithout Ontology, 11 !~eadings 
in Philosophical Aa:ialysis, edited by a. Feigl and \l • .:ie .1.lars (l~ew York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, c.1949), PP• 191-210, contends that &fl3 attempt to 
Justify logical principles (such aa ~ho principle of non-contradiction) in 
terms ot their suppoaed conformity to a structure or facts overlooks the 
function of those logical principles aa f or mulative and regulative of huaian 
pursu.ita. 
11 J. o. Uri:13011, ?hilosopbical Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Presa, 19.56), 
P• 7. Guido KUng ot Notre Dauie University, in Ontologie und logitiache 
Acalyse der ~prache (~ien: Springer-Vorlag, o.1963), examines .i.lussell'a 
18 
Russell was convinced that his notations in the Principia embodied the 
essence of language. Where common language appeared to diverge, the 
12 
skeleton bad been in eome way concealed. Ludwig W1ttger.3tein noted that 
F. P. Ramsey of Cambridge cast the new logic in a oim1lar role, although 
Wittgenstein did not approve in his later !nveatigations: 
F. P. Hamsey bat ein1118l im Gesprttch 1nit mir betont, die Logik sei 
eine "normative ~i sdenachaft11 • Genau welche ldee ihm dabei vor-
schwebte, weias ich nicht; aie war aber zweifellos eng verwandt rait 
der, die mir erat sp8ter autgegangen i at: daas wir IUlmlich in der 
Philosophie den Gebrauch der wUrter oft mit 5pielen, KalkUlen nach 
!esten Regeln, verglaichen, aber nicht sagen. k6nnen, wer die tiprache 
gebraucht, ~ ein solcbea Spiel spielen.13 
The now logic provided n focus for poaitivistic thought. I! Ari3to-
talian l o~ic d~alt inadequately· with curtain relatioiw.l sentences, and 
if other systems were no l~as "logical ly" exhaustive , t hen Aristoeelian 
role (among others) in the i mpact of logic upon linguist ic analysis. He 
3tatea the purpoae of his atudy (p. 13): ''Auf6abe der ers"tan 'L'eila iat es, 
eine 3infUhrung in die gcrade i m deuts chen 5pra.chgebiet allzu wenig 
bekannten Denkgawohnheiten der zeitgen6ssiachen logischen ~praohanalyse 
zu geben, und inabesondere den \Jog zur zweiatelligen 3emantik der Abbildung 
zu achildern, ~Uhrend der ~weite Teil der apeziallen Frago der Abbildungs-
beziehung der PrlJdikatzeichen, d.h. der zoitgen6ssisohen formulierung der 
Univer~lieafrage, nachgahen wird." 
12
warnock, P• }3. Inaofar as the a pplication of computer-acience to 
nat ural language indicates an a pproach soraewhat paral leling Russell's, 
Natural Lan ua2e and the Com uter, edited by Paul L. Garvin (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., e.19o3 , ia an int'or,native inveat.:i.gation. liarvin 
di.scusaea the co,aputer' a role in lingui3tic analysis. H. .C:. Maron gi vea 
a logician's view of t he endeavor. ?here are alao discussions of the 
progress made in translating natural language through the comput~r. 
l}Ludwig WittiJGnstein, Philoso hiache Unt6rauchun Philoso~hical 
Investigations, tranalated by G. E: . H. Anacombe Oxford: ,:3asil_ Black.,ell, 
19.5.3), P• 38. 'l'b.e provided ~nglish translat ion reads: "11'. P. Ram ... ey onee 
emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science•. 
I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely 
related to wha t only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we 
otten compare the u.ee of words with games and calculi which have fixed 
rules, but cannot say tbflt .aomeone who is uaing language~ be playing 
such a game" (p. 38e). 
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logic served as a questionable oasis for linguistic construction. ~'Ten 
the principle o! non-contra.diet.ion \tas no H,ore tiuAn a postulate 1 The 
dissection ot language waa an inevitable consequence of the development 
of new logic. 
'l'he ne•« logic assumed philosophical dres1.J in the "logical atomisaa" 
of Bertrand ~ussell and othera. Logical atomists contended that. the world 
consis ta or au ind<:,finitely large number of "atomic !acts" to 'irlhich truo 
· 14 
atomic propositions oorraspond. It was asuwuod that if propoaitions 
were of a logical character, tho atomic facts which corresponded to them 
were apprehended only through logical propositions. In logical atomi.sm 
ware to be round the building blocka of logical positivism, for tha latter 
irait3.ted the form~r•s exhaustive di.vi:3ion of all "meaningf ul'' propositions 
into analytic and 11tmpirical. ,iarnock clarifies the situation: 
According to t he pures t doctrines of Logical Atoflli.Slll1 a proposition 
can be sta ted s i gnificantly either it there is, or could be, an 
atomic fact to which it corrosponds, or if it ia a truth-function, 
however complex, of propoiiiitione of t'iia't sort.l.5 
Ludwig \·iittgenatoin of Ca1Goricige was the liaison between develop-
ments in England nnd stirrings on the continent. In 1922 he published 
hia famed ·rractatua .Logico-r'hiloaophicua. This work wa.s at one and the 
aaiue time an i,apetua to the development or logical poait ivism on :.he 
continent, a nd a au:.,mary ot developments in ~..:ngland. It ass umed that 
14urmson, P• 16. Urmoon olaims that it is not fanciful to see a 
similarity to Leibniz.' s world o! monads here. Clustav 136rgmann, in ''Revolt 
Against Logical Atoruiam," Moaning and ~stance (Madiaozu University ot 
Wisconsin Press, c.1959), pp. 39-72, exumines critically Urmaon'3 Philo-
sophical Analysis in its account ot tho logical atowia.m ot Huseell and 
~/ittgen~tain; .9ertrand ~usaell doe a tho aame in "Philosophical Analysis," 
Hibbert Journal, LIV (May 1956), 319-329• 
15 Warnock, P• 41. 
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new logic was in some way applicable to human language. It viewed propo-
sitions as pictures. It upheld the dichotomy of statecente into analytic 
and empirical with an endorsement of logical atomism. It urged continen-
tal positivism to delineate more precisely the "meaning" of empirical 
statements. Speaking of Wittgenstein's Tractatus at home and abroad, Gilbert 
Ryle comments: 
In Vienna some of its teachings were applied polemically, namely to 
demolishing the pretensions of philosophy to be the science of trans-
cendent realities. In England, on the whole, others of its teachings 
were applied more cons tructively, namely to s t ating the positive 
functions which philosophical propositions perform •••• In England, 
on the whole, interest was concentrated on Wittgenstein's descrip-
tion of philosophy as an activity of clarifying or elucidating the 
meanings of the expressions used, e.g. by scientists; that is, on 
the medicinal virtues of his account of the nonsensical. In Vienna, 
on the whole, interest was concentrated on the l ethal potentialities 
of Wittgenstein's account of nonsense.16 
In its concentration upon the "lethal potentialities of Wittgenstein's 
account of nonsense," the continental Wiener Kreis (Vienna Circle) paral-
leled and advanced beyond logical atomiem. 
Developm.ents on the Continent: Der Wiener Kreis 
· The so-called "Vienna Circle" coagulated in the early 1920's around 
Moritz Schlick, philosophy professor at the University of Vienna. In-
cluded in the circle were Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, 
Friedrich Waiemann, Edgar Zilsel, Victor Kraft, Philipp Frank, Karl 
Menger, Kurt GHdel, and Hans Hahn.17 Most of the men were scientists. 
16Gilbert Ryle, "The Theor;y of Meaning," British Philosophy in the 
Mid-Century, edited by c. A. Mace (New York: Macmillan Company, c.195?), 
P• 262. 
~?A. J. Ayer, Lo5ical Positivi811 (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Pr~ss, 
c.1959), p. 3. Victor Kraft, Der Wiener Kreis: Der Ure des Neo sitiv-
ismua (Wien: Springer-Verlag, c.1950, PP• 1-10, presents an excellent 
historical survey of the Circle from the perspective of a participant. 
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3chlick had written his cJ.octo.ra.l. did.;;ertation ir. phy3ics; Carnap anli 
rank were theoretical physicists; Hahn, Ne~er, and GHdel ~ere :::athemn-
ticia~s; t~eu.rath waa an economiat and sociologist; and flitt0,.rnste1u, illhose 
ideao were di~cu~sed in his absence, was au engineer.18 ~ince the re-
mainder of this chapter ~ill consider in detail the philosophical position 
taken by the Viennese to6ether with their ~nglish counterparts, our 
prese~t concarn will be with the philo:sophical ancestry and the mental 
te,!lperam<:nt of thiB "circle" of Vienneao intsllectu&la. 
The Vienna ~ircle publicly recognized ito ideation.al indebtedne~s to 
Hume, Comte, Nill, Hach, Helmholtz, iioiu:ann, PoincarC:, Mn:ttein, Leibni~, 
Frege, Hus:Jell, \-Jhitohead, und ,litt.genstein in a manife15to titled. wi;5.:ien-
scb...'!.i'tliohe ,velto.u!!asaung1 Der \1iener Kreis. Excluding contea-poraries, 
Hume and ,'lach moat clearly approximated .the Circle's porspective.19 The 
empirical accent of logical positivi31D originated with l!w:ie. ~ho roots 
of :aanipulative lo3ic run back to .Leibniz, for he divided propoaitions 
into truthe of reanori and truth~ of .raot. In addition, he attempted an 
. 20 
analj·cis of tha ~ori.aer. 
The fact that tha group gath~red around Noritz ;jchlick prct!igured 
its later development. In 1918 Jchlick published Allgeiaeino a:;rkenntuis-
lehro dcQling ,.;ith, the theory of knowledge. Hany of tho views later 
18Branci lllanshat·d, ~~ea13on and Analyais (London: uecrge .Ulen and 
Unwin, c.1962), P• 106. 
l9 Ayer, Logical Positivism, p. 4. ·rhe 1J1&nit'eato was published in. 
Vienna, 1929. 
20Julius R • .-,einberg, .-t.n ~minatiou of Loijical l'ositivism (Patoraon, 
New Jersey: .Littlefield, ~dams and Company, 1960 ~riginally published 
193§} ) , PP• 3-4. 
• 
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characteristic of logical poaitiviam U!>pearod thGre in seed. 21 The 
rooetings with Schlick were ir1·egu1Ar until the group organized it::selt a~ 
the "Verei11 .8:-nst Mach" ic 1928.22 
The Moanipg of Henning, publiahed by c. K. Ogden and I. A. Richard:s 
in 1923, wus a contemporunaous in!luonce on tho Circle, at leaat upon 
Rudolf Carnap. The authors attempted to differentiate between °ea.otive" 
and "referential" uso :in.la.n.guago. 'l'hey auggoated t hat the distinction 
between the two uae3, coupled with a preference tor the !ormer, is the 
ear:sl!nce of l:iolilllntic positivi:J1.o. 23 This dichoto1111 reaasert.acl itoelf in 
the Circle's later diatinction botween meaningleos/mouning£ul. 
Logicul positivism ma.de an intercational debut before a forum of 
pbilosophic:al ~xpertu at the Seventh Intorrw.t1onal Congress ot Philosoph)' 
in Oxford.• 19}0 . Moritz Schlick diaou.:.sed "~he Futuro of Philosophy,'' 
and heralded a new era: 
we are witneaaing the beginning ot a nuw era in philosop!q ••• 
its future will be very ditterent trom its past, which has been 
so full ot failures, vain struggles, and futile disputea.24 
21 Alfred J. k1er, "The Vienna Cir cle," 'l'he Revolution in 1,lhiloso , 
edited by Alfred J. Ayer (London; Macmillan and Comp&J:17, c.19 , P• 71. 
Georg Jinoaka, Dies rachlichen Grundla n der f'hil.oao hie (Graz, Auotria: 
Akademioche Druck-u. Verlagoanatalt, l , P• ll, q·uotes Schliok'a 1925 
edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnialehre (whitre Schlick favorably citos 
~instein} aa followaz "Ineofern aioh die Sitze der Hathematik aut die 
Wirklichkeit beziohen, sind asie nicbt aicbor, und inso!ern sie sicher 
sinci, beziehen aie aich nicbt au! Wirklichkeit." 
22
w.anahard, P• 109. 
23 LeTi, P•. }76. 
2
'tJoerpn Joergonsen, '£he iJovelopment o! Logie&l &lpin.ciu (Chicagoi 
Universit7 ot Chic.go Preas, c.19;,l) • PP• 46-'•l. Thie work 1a Vol. II, 
~o. 9 ot the Iuternatioaal i ncyclopedia o! UnifiQd JoieDce, a logical 
poaitiviat work • 
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The message was the aame on the continent. Congreaaea met in tho late 
twenties and in the thirtiea. In 1929, the Circle displayed its varea 
in l'rague1 in 1930, there was a meeting in K6rdgsberg. Prague in 1934, 
Paria in 1935, and Copenhagen in 1936, the last with causality as its 
25 theme, provided a wide geographical exposure. 
The movement sought out its blood brothers at an early date. The 
Circle formed an alliance with tho so-called "Berlin Johool" (Hana 
Reichenbach and Kurt Grelling); with Scandinavian philosophers auch aa 
ilno Kaila and Joergen Joergttneen; with the Uppaala school o! empiricists; 
with the Dutch group gathered around Mannoury pursuing what they called 
"Signitica''; with tho MUnster group of logicians; with Amorican sympathiz-
ers, including Nagel and -~uine; and with British amtlyats of Tarioua 
shades, from Ryle and Braithwaite to Wisdom and r..yer.26 
The scientific. tomperaa:ent ot the Viennese indicated that the group'• 
pbilosophical stance would be decidedly empirical. The intellectual 
world vas not disappointed, for the Circle took to task th~ modernizing 
ot Comte, aimultaneoualy applying the new logic and au •mpirical criterion 
to tbo language o! Everyman. 
Kantian Heritage and Comtian Correotiona 
I1D11&nuel Kant concerned hi.mselt with tbe dichotO#IJ ot tb~ analytic 
and the a1nthet10. He dealt exhaustively with the ephere ot kllowledge. 
25Ibid., PP• 44-45. 
26Ayer, Logical Poaitinsa, PP• 5-6. That the .Scandiaanana were 
actively involved in ear11 logical positiviam iD ~vident from the histori-
cal survey ot Georg Henrik von ~right, Dell logiak.a empiria.Hn (Belaiagtora: 
ll•P•t 194}). 
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Auguste Comte'a philosophizing led him to asuert that evolutioDA17 develop.. 
ment endowed roan with an all-enoompaasing acienti!ic method. r.an had out-
grown tho religiously metaphyoicnl, and diamiaaed any yearning for treedora, 
God, and immortalitJ ap&rt from tho ~orahip of science. 
The logical positivists probed beneath both Kant and Comte, taking 
from e~ch tho ~eeded tools of explora~ion. Acknowlodging Kant•a work, 
they adlllitted his ciiohotolll)' of ~nal1tic and synthetic knowledge; but they 
advanoed beyond him with the iconoclaatic proposal that philosophy deals 
with propositions rather than knowledge. With thia conaideration the1 
superseded Comte no lesa than Kant. They contendod that science not on~ 
exhausta kno~ledge; science !rMrnes the limits of meacingtul diacouroe as 
well. \:iitll the ra.d1.cal proposal to deal onl.J with propositiona of laDgUD.ge 
the logical pooitiviata created a new age in philosophical hiat017. The1 
stood on the shoulders of both Kant and Comte, but sprouted wi11gs ot their 
o"'n• 
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Thv basic asswnption of logical pbsitiviam vau that all Qeaniagtul 
etatemonta are eithor analytic or synthetic. The dichoto~ ia exhaustive, 
out the validation of a propoaition differs in either case. According to 
Ayer, a proposition is analytic vben ita validit~ ia eolely contingent on 
defisu.tion ot its ay~bolu. A proposition ia 91nthetic when ito validit7 
28 i• determined by facts of experienao. 
?he anai,tic utatelll8nt i~ valid by definition. The rules ot thG 
27J,noalca, pp. 16-22, admirably deaoribes th• IC&DtiaA heritage 
ot Viennea. logioal poc,itivism. 
28a. J. Paton~ The Modern Predicaments A Stud in the Philoao 
aeligi.on (London; George Allen and Unwin, c.1955, P• 'J7• 
ot 
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"game" detorllline ita status \liitbin the game of logic. An analytic atato-
ment i s oithor tautological or contradictory--a contradiction is ~orely 
a tautology negated. If a ~tato~ent ia contradictory, it is logically 
"meaning!ul1' though not neceai:sarily true ("The triangle iG tour-sided''). 
Positivista oxpl~inad the lack oi novelty iu tautological, r.eoeaaary 
statoQanta in at l~ast three w~ya ; (l) they followed Kant in suggesting 
that a otatement i G analytic when tho predicate-concept i a part of tho 
~ubjeot content ("&diea aro 1:txtenciecl"); (2) the: oubmithd that a propo-
sition ig analytic becau~ it~ truth !ollowa from the meaDiog of the ter.ta 
alone ( 111' ull brotuers o! tho SDJ11e man are full brothers ot each other''); 
(}) they proposed that the cuntradictory of an analytic proposition iu 
alwa7~ and inexorably sel!-contradictory.29 In any case, the poaitivi ato 
wore certain thure waa no µo~e!bility o! aurprise 1n tautological atat•-
menttt. ; ·or thio rva.~on they claimed that analytic propo:1itiona ai·e 
barred from an: reference to "f'act."30 
For the logical positiviata the concept ot "truth" was tautological. 
Ayer conhndod th.at a reference to "truth" aclds nothing to tho logical 
aenso of a statement. To say that a statetaent is "true'' is to mal<e a 
tautological atater.ieut: 
Thia indicate8 that to ask \4hat is truth? i:> tant.at1ount to a :ikiua 
\-Jhat is thtt anal.yoia of tho $0Utence "p is true"? where the valuea 
29Blanahard, PP• 257-258. 
30Blanahard argues tbat it ana.lytio propositionl.S, according to the 
positivists, say nothing about "fact," it is ditticult to evaluate the 
positiviatio argument that analytic propo$1tions are in!ort:J&tivo in I"Qf-
erence to li~istic ,u,a.p. It 11.3lue i:.s a color" in.licat•~ that people 
do not use the fir~t element in sitWltiona whore the1 rotuae to use tbe 
second, thi& tautolog.Y aa.10 uowethill$ . ••tactual." }:eunwb.ile, thll) ~ poai.tiY• 
ist& aasert that all auch arAlytic at~to~ents are tautologous. ~•• P• 260. 
I 
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of pare propositiona. out it ia eviJ~nt ~bat in a sont~nco o! 
the f'o1•r.1 "p io true'' or "It ia true that p0 the reference to truth 
never add:.J f:illJ thing to t ho 6enae. 1£ I aay that it ia true that 
~1hakec.peare wrote Ha17tlet, or that tho proposition "Jhakeupeare 
,-1ro'te lla:iilet" is true, l a m Sb.yin~ no mora than that 3hak8apoure 
wroto Hamlet. • • • this show» that the words ''true" a.nd "false" 
aro not uaed to atuud for anything, but function in th~ :Jentence 
merel1 as assertion and negation signs. ~hat iu to say, truth aucl 
tals~hood. are not gonuine conceptu. Consequently, there~ no 
logical problem conoarning the nature ot truth.31 
Analytic statements are valid by definition. The othur elaau ot 
state,11ents are ''meaningful" tactual propo~itiona "hich 1Are empirica.ll.)r 
veritiable.32 Synthetic statements ar~ tt1eaningful to the degree they are 
"experientially" possible. 'fhe so-called "verification principle" arose 
to teut und validate the menning of synthetic atate!:'ienta. 'rhe veri!ie&-
tion principle, in sum, atatod that the meaning of a proposition i a tho 
P?aoibility of tho state of affairs which it represents.}} Moritz Uchlick 
defined ~eaning in term3 of verification in l9.36i 
·r hus, whenever we aek about a sentence, "What does it :!lean?", what 
we expect ia inatruotion ad to tho circumstanceo in \fhich the 
suntonce is to be used; we want a description ot thu condi.tioua 
un~er which the sentence ~ill lorm a true proposition and of thoae 
~hich will r:..ake it !alae •••• Statiiii'"tne meaning ot a sentence 
a~ounts to stating tiie°rl.llea according to which the sentence is to 
bu used, and 1;hi:, ie the sat0e ns stating the way in which it can be 
verified (or falsi!i~i;l). '.l:b~ u:eaniDIJ o! & proposition is the i:ctthod 
or its varification.~ 
\ie shall diacuaa thia principle in greater detail below. 
}l Allred J. ,\;fer, ''The Criterion of ·rruth," Philosop~ and Ana).yaict, 
edited by !•largaret HacOonald (Oxfordc Be.ail Blackwell, 195), P• 238. 
32Ayer, Logical Positivism, P• 10. 
33~einberg, P• 178. 
34t-torita uchlick, "Meatning and Verification," Philoaophical ~Tiev1 
XLV (July 1936), J39• 
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Logic~l positivism t,eldeJ toglither tha Y.,d1tian heritago and the 
Co:utian spirit as it advuriced beyond both in an exa1.1inution of propositions 
rathc,r than knowled3e. 35 In dividing all moanin0ful propo$itiona into 
analytic and aynthotic, it defined tho senae ur weaning 0£ a propoaitiun 
in tt:11·11·,s of the mathocl of its vorificat.ion. "Vori!ication'' of ~nalytic 
ata tewenta occurred in de!inition; the sense-weanin6 of an analytic atate-
ment is t&utologoua . 11Veritication11 of aynthetic atatemeuts diaplayed 
ituttlf in the 1>ciences, that ia, tbrou.~h empiricia:4; the sense-meaning 
of a aynthetic atutement ia "empirically verifiable. '' The tlenning o! a 
proposition eviaonoea itself either in definition or in verification. 
It through the former, the m~aning is neoe~sary but tautological; i! 
t hrough tbe latter, the meaning i a oontingont b\l·t wholl;y empirical. 
?iaa ning thl'ough definition had been widely accepted in the philosophical 
world, fo1.· thia waf.l the raethod cf ,ua thematio::i. But on the other hand, it 
logical poait.i vis ts cla i 1ued to liroit meaningful contingent statemonts to 
the empirically verifiable , -chu burden o! delineating t he precise charac-
ter of the veri!ica tion principle rested s~uarely on the shoulders of the 
positivist a. 
't'he Verification !)rinciple and th• Burden ot Precision 
the positivi~tic cl~rification ot thd varification principle, neoeas1-· 
tated by the exhaustive synthetic-analytic diohotoffl1, was improcioe, 
variable, and axiomaticall;y incorusiateut. The fact that James' pragmatisa 
35Logical positivism differed from Comte speciticall1 in vie~ing 
metaphysics not ad false, but aa meaningless. 
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contributed to tho estnoliahi1ont of ~he principle:,6 suggeats that ou~-
ccptibility to multitudinous val'intion~ was an inborn liability. On the 
other band, througliout tba complex development from atringent er.ipirical 
11verifiability11 to principlod "confirr,iability," the poeitivis ta held to 
two thesea un~averinglyi a factual proposition refers to empirical tact 
alone; t hi.:J ! act i .s always whitt its asaertor would regu•d as t he bei,t 
1\larra nt for the truth of his a so&i-tion. }7 It " ou.: d bo imprecis e to 
mea6ure logical poaitiviam solely bJ the:: vel'ii'ica tion principle, but 
an exa:uination o! the priuciplu'a ro&turation will loa d to an understand-
ing of t he devolop1'Jont and eveu~uol disintegrat ion of tho rnove,:ient. vie 
will distinguish five atageo in the develop~ent of t he vori!ica.tion prin-
ciple, and then consider ho~ so1oe of the principle's oonstituent ulo!!Mtnta 
contributed to a relaxation 0£ t.htt original i."orr:iulatior.. 
The init ial formulation of t ho vorificution principla waa probably 
the work of Ludwig ia ttgcnotein. s~lthough he andoraed lcg1cal atoraiom 
with Hus6ell, he conce1·ll0d hi mself with the relation of atomic foct to 
atolllic propoaition--later called the probleo oi' verification. In hie 
Tracta tus \littger,otein interpreted the situation with the abandon ot 
aolipiern. He lir.iitod mea ning in a !actual proposition when itcd only 
363ilbert !lylo, n Introduction, 11 Tne iievolutiou in Philoao , ed.ited 
by il . J. Ayer (Lo11cion: r4.acuaillan anJ Ooi:1pa117, c.19r: , P• 9. 'r. a. Kiles• 
auirJtiarJ of positivis tic ''operational d$f1Ditions11 in Heligion and -che 
Scientific O~tlook (Londoni Allen and Un'din, c.1959), P• .20, d•moustrateo 
a de!ir.ite pra~matic orientation in the movement. In the procedure ot 
••opora.tioi.al d~finition.11 the miHlnillg o! a term ia explained by tho opera-
tions involva.:1 iu deta:r!.!ling whether th;i, gta t:.ement containi ni;t i;be t81"1l 1a 
true or tal~<-. Thus "l~'' ie de!ined in terma of a pttrson'a pertoraaa.ce 
on an intelli~ence teat. 
}?Blanahard., P• 20!). 
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when, aa .Blanubard says, "it refers to what is given within the set of 
sensible facts comprising 'one self. "'38 It is obvious that \:iittgenatein 
waa heavily indebted to logical atomiam at thia time. In fact, his formu-
lation is so imprecise that :-18.Xitell Charlesworth re!uaes to asaociate him 
with the logical positivist.Eh He contends that although Wittgendtein 
subscribed to the verification principle, he held "vurification'' to a.ean 
different things.39 There ia room for discussion her~ but little profit 
in pursuing the question. 
The second developmental atage wRa Moritz Schlick's "consistent 
empiricism" of 19.}2. Schlick held that to pronounce a synthetic propo-
sition ''meaningful" was to guarautee ita verifiability in nrinciple to 
40 
one person. A "meaningful" syuthetic statement ia not limited to the 
realm of past empirical exp~rience, but it must be capable of empirical 
verit'icat ion in principle. :..;chlick argued that "verification in principle" 
moant, in fact, ''conceivable." Thua the proposition "There i:, a mountain 
of a t111ight of 3()0() meters ou the othor side of the moon" made sense even 
though in 1932 aoiance lacked the technical means of verifying the propo-
aition experientially. The verification remained couceivable.41 
38
a1anshard, P• 200. 
39Maxwell John Charlesworth, PbilosophY and Linguistic Analysi31 Vo. IX 
of Duquesne Studies (Pittsburg: Duquesne University, c.1959), PP• 99-100. 
R. B. Braithwaite, in "An Empirioiat•a View of the Nature of Religious 
Belief," Existence of God, edited by John Hick (Nev York: Macmillan Compa~, 
c.1964), P• 252, argues that the first explicit statement of t~e verifica-
tion principle was Friedrich Waiamann's in ErkeDDtnis, I (1930), 229. 
4oBlanshard, P• 209. 
41Koritz Schlick, "Positivism und Realiaoi," Logical Positiri.sm, 
edited by Alfred J. Ayer (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.~959), P• 88. 
The article was originally published in Erkenntnis, Ill (1932-33). 
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Schlick further limited meaningful propositions to such aa were veri-
fiable in principle by a single person. The synthetic proposition was 
restricted to one rd.nd; in thio rebiard $chlick' a for1nulation was no 
advance beyond Wittgenstein's. 
The second stage gave way to a third becauae of 5everal deficien-
cies. The verification principle aa formulated in stage two outlawed 
sentences of univeroal form including statements (!tven of scienc!) expreas-
i ve of general laws. 42 Again, :3chlick' s ''verifiability in principle" vas 
liruited to appearance in person or at first band ot such empirical evidence 
as was necet:5aary or in principle possible. 
Th~ third atage signo.led the acceptance of verifiabilit1 in prin-
ciple by aD.Yone. Conver1>ely, stage three relegated only atate.:senta of 
logical imposaibility and tautologies to the realm of the "meaningless" 
stahment.43 tJrinson characterizes the "strong" verification principle, 
which appears to be stage three, with this statement: 
Any statement, to be digl'li.Cicant, n1ust be, in principle, capable 
ot being conclusively verified or falsified; every propoaition 
42earl G. Hempel, "~mpiriciat Criterion or Meaning,'' Logical .i?ositiv-
!2!, edited by Allred J. Ayer (Olencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1959), 
p. 112. The article originally appeared in Revue International• de 
Philosophie, r.v (1950). Miles (p. 27) makes reference to the problem of 
generalities a.a it appeared in sentences dealing with atoms and electrons. 
The positivist found himself in a dile~ma: tellow-scientisto introduced 
"atom," "electron," "proton" as descriptions o! effects; but these terms 
stood for something permanently unknown, and properly should be jettisoned 
aa "meaningless." The problem resolved itself in a reformulation of the 
principle which allowed a sentence to be considered meaningful if trans-
latable into other sentences which referred to what was (in principle) 
observable. 
43Blansbard, p. 221. J'oergensen notea (p. 4o) that it was approxi-
mately at thia time, after 1930, tbat logical positivists preferred to be 
called "lugioal empiricists," thereby etro:ssinb tbat they did not consider 
themselvea tied to a poeitivistic view in the more narrow and dogmatic 
sense. 
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is a truth-function of a set of simple statements all of which 
could in principle be chocked nnd the truth or falsehood o! the 
proposition thua conclusivel1 establiahed.44 
Schlick also made the change from the second to tho third stage. He 
allowed for speculation about immortality, and argues that such apecu.la-
tion was within tho confines of the vorification a3 defined (verification 
in principle by anyone). Ria auggeation aroused the indignation of other 
positivists, including Ayer.45 
The fourth stage of development was in one aenae a reversal. 3tage 
four dealt with "falsifiability'' rather than verifiability. Karl Popper 
augce3ted in Logik der Forshung (1935) that falsifiability was the only 
proper mothod of deraaroating betw~en statements cf the empirical sciences 
and all other otatements. As early as 1919 ?opper was forced to examine 
the traditionally empirical approach to the verificat iona of theories. 
He recalls his thinking of the summer of 1919 in these words: 
The most ch&raoteristic element in tho situation seemed to me 
the incessant stream o! confirmations, o! observa.tioll8 which 
"verified" the theories in ttuostion; and thia was the point 
constantly emphasized by their adherents. A Marxist could not 
open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence 
for his interpretation ot history •••• The Freudian analysts 
emF,hasized that their theorie:J were daily, nay, hourly, verified 
by their "clinical observations". And as to (~ltre<!J Adler, I 
~a3 much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I 
reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, 
44 
. Urmson, p. 111. 
45Blaushard, p. 223. For a comparison of Ayer and Jchliok's views 
on the possibility ot meaningful statementd regarding immortality, see 
Virgil c. Aldrieh "Meaera. Schlick and Ayer on Immortality," Readings 
in Philoaophical ~nal.ysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (Nev York: 
Appleton-Century-Crotts, c.1949), PP• 171-174. The articl•/irst appear-
ed in ?bilosophioal R~view (1938). AntoDY G. N. Flew, in Can a Man 
witness Kia Own Funeral?" Hibbert JourDMl, J;IV (April 1956), 242-250, 
challenges Schlick by suggesting the.t Gchlick'a imagi~tion ot his funeral 
ia not equivalent to imagining or describing a world without a body. 
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but which ho found no difficulty whatever in analysing in tarms ot 
his theory ot inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen 
the child. J lightly shocked, I asked him how he could 'bo ao su.r~ 
about all thi,~ "Because of my thousan<liold experience", he re-
plied •••• 
As early as the winter of 1919 Popper claim3 to have settled on talaifia-
bility. lie determined that it was rttlat.ively easy to obtain contiraa-
tions, or varifications, for nearly every thaory. He concluded that 
confir1t1ations ahouil:cl count only if they were "risq," that is, if they 
were unenlightened by the theory in quoiltion. Every "good" scientific 
theory is one which forbids certain things to happen; "the more a theory 
forbids, the better it ia. 11 Irrefutability is a theoretical vice, not 
a virtu~. Popper's thinking of 1919 can be suuunarized in one atateraent: 
"!al~1£iability1 or re!utability, is a criterion of the scientific stutua 
of a tneory. 1147 
Popper argues that the problem he attacked both in t lla early twenties 
and in his Logik der Forahung of 1935 was neither the problem ot meaning-
fulnesa or signi!ioance, nor the problem ot truth or acceptatility. ~1th 
the criterion of falsifiability he claims to have been "drawing a line 
(as well aa this can be done) between the statements, or systems ot state-
ments, of the empirical sciences, and all other statementa--whether they 
are of a religious or of a Qetaph3sical character, or simply pseudo-
acientific.••48 
46Karl R. Popper, ''Philosop}q ot Science: 
PlliloaophY in the Mid-Centu~, edited by c. A. 
CompaD1, c.1957), PP• 157-l • 
47mbid., PP• 159-160. Italica are hi3. 
l+Sibid., P• 162. 
-
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The positivists of Vienna assumed that Popper's criterion of talai-
Eiability dealt with meaning, not demarcation. Popper attempted, in a 
letter to the editor or l!;rkenntnis in 1933, to depict the Viennese con-
cern with meaning as a pseuQo-problem compared with his problem of 
demarcation: 
my contribution was classified by-membera of the (y1enl3!1 Circle 
ask proposal to replace the verifiability criterion of meaning 
by a falsifiability criterion ot meaning--which etfectuall7 made 
nonsense of my views. My protests that I was trying to solve, not 
their pseudo-problem of meaning, but t he problem o! demarcation, 
vere of no avail.49 
Although the pooitivista did not interpret Popper's intentioDS 
correctly, they used his criterion ot falsifiability in their attempt to 
clarity the verification principle and arrive at a theory of meaning.50 
The falsifiability of a statement provided the meaning of a statement in 
delimiting a speci~ied area which, by contradictory empirical falsifi-
cation, was ruled out of bounds. Conversely, only synthetic atateroents 
capable of falaificution were deemed meaningful by the positivists. 
Findlay discusses the falsifiability criterion with this comment: 
words do not mean by virtue of some raysterious internal property; 
they only do so because the man who utters them is prepared in 
oomo situation, actual or conceivable, to apply them to something. 
49Ibid., p. 165. Erkenntnis was a jourcal established by the logi-
cal positivists in Vienna. Blanahard (p. 228) appa,.rently sees Popper's 
contribution as a criterion of meaning rather than demaroation. 
50Popper insists that his intentioDS were miareMd by the positivists. 
Referring to the shifts and modi!ioationa which were introduced in ~he 
positivistic diacu~sion of senso and nonsense as a nsult ot hia talsi-
tiabilit1 criterion, :Popper remarks ·( 11.f'bilosopby of Science,'' Briti8h 
Philosoplq, P• 165), "l wish to repeat that although I onatad this oon-
tusion, I nH'er participated in it. Neithttr falsifiability nor testa-
bility were propoa.d by me aa criteria of meaning, although I may plead 
guilty to haYing introduced both terms into the discussion; bllt, croas 
141 heart, not into the theory of cneaning." 
It, no matter what situation turns up, he still refuses to say 
that this is what .he meant, it he persists in aaying that he :neans 
•something different• or 'something more',we may rightly question 
whether he means aD¥thing at al1.5l 
Alasdair Hacintyre ~efers to the criterion in terms of asaertiona: 
It we make any assertion we declare that some state of affairs ia 
to be found to the exclusion of others. The occurrence of that 
atate of atraira verifiea, the occurrence of the excluded states 
of affairs falsifiea our assertion. An assertion which excluded 
no state o! affair~, the lll8.int~ining 0£ which was compatible with 
the hap~ning ot anything and evorything would not be a.n assertion 
at all.~ 
One beneficial aspect of !alsifiability for the positivists was that 
it allowed the inclusion of scientific laws as "rneaning!u1. 1153 But 
according to Blanshard, there was a difficulty involved. The disjunction 
which Popper used aa hie fulcrum (the conditional distinction between 
universal and pPrticular propositions) vas his Achilles• heel. It is 
true that one can fnlsify, but not verity, the proposition that all avans 
are white. But while one can verity, he cannot faloity the proposition 
that !2!!. swans are white. In such a logioall.J-particular proposition, 
the particular can be contradicted or falsified only by the establish-
ment ut a universal proposition; this is impossible under empirical 
methods.54 This difficulty necesaitated a more precise, but less stringent 
51Findlay, P• 2j. 
52.uasaair 1'iacintyre, "~he Logical Status of uoligious Belief," 
Metaehyaical Beliefs (London: SCM Preas, 1957), P• 180. 
53Blanahard, P• 228. 
54 Ibid. Throughout Blanahard 'a diacuasion, J)opper' a intention in 
propoai~alsi£iability (nwnely de~roation) has been ignored in favor 
of the positivists• use o! the criterion. Popper :says ("Philosop~ ot 
Science,". British .PhilosophY, PP• 165-166) in reference to the criticism 
of his taloi!iabilit1 criterion, "Criticism of my alleged Tiewa w~ 
wideapread and highly successful. I have yet to meet a oriticism~of ~y 
views." 
35 
formulation of the principle, reinat~ting it in tho sphere of verifia-
bility. 
'l'he fifth stage wae Ayer' s in his book Lt=mpta~, Truth and Logic, 
first published in 1936. Ayer distinguished between stron~ and weak 
veri!ication.55 ;jta0e five .signaled a transition from "verifiabilityn 
to "confirmability": ''A proposition is significant if there are some 
obaervutiona which >1ould be relevant to its truth or falait:,.".56 The 
stringent demand.a of .,chlick dissipated ill the allowknce for univeraal 
and general sentences, although the poaitivistic tempera~ent remained.57 
It is extremely difficult to characterize the verifiability principle 
in stage five. The principle abandoned some of ita earlier dogmatism 
and with that its clearly diatinguisbable cbaracteriatios. Ayer, in com-
paring the final stage of the principle with its embryonic for1uulatiou, 
paints a miuty pioture of the fully developed principle: 
Because of this and other difiicultida the view which came to pre-
vail au1ong the logical positivists waa that the demands that a 
statement be conclusively verifiable, or ti.lat it~ concluaively 
!alsit'iable, were botll too stringent as criteria. o! meaning. They 
choae instead to be satiafied with a weaker criterion by which it 
5c: ;.,Blanahard, p. 229. In the second edition Wew York: Dover .Pub-
lications, n.d.) of 1946, Ayer de~onstrated a concern for a reatate~eut 
ot the verification principle. Although he relaxed the principle some-
what, he adhered (p. 5) to the 1936 atate~ent of the principle with the 
comment, "I still believe that the point of view which [the 1936 editiofil 
ex,resses is aubstan~ially oorrect.r1 Two articles in A Modern Introduc-
tion to Plli.losophy, edited by Paul ~wards and Arthur Pap (Glencoe, Illi-
nois: Free Press, c.1957), are reprinta of discussions arising from 
Ayer' s first edition. W. T. Stace's "Hetapbyoica and Meaning,'' PP• 565-
.575, was originally publiahed in~, 1935. A. c. Ewing's Meaning-
lessness," pp. 576-585, which challenges Ayer's position O\.ltrightly, was 
origirw.lly publiahed in Mind, 1937• 
.56urason, P• 11}. 
5? Levi, P• 373• 
• 
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waa required only that a statement be capable of being in solle degree 
confirmed or diaconfirmed by observation, 1! it were not it~elt an 
elemttntary staterr.ent, it had to be auch that eler.iontary statements 
could support it, but they did not n~ed to entail it or to entail ita 
negation. Unfortunately, thia notion of ~flupport11 or confirmation'' 
has never yet been adequately formalized.'° 
Blanshard claims to find a particular rr.Knifestation or stage ~ive in 
America. Carnap, for exaraple, argued that the disputes about "meaning-
fulness" and verification redolved theUlselves in "ideal language." But 
it was apparent that the solution was merely a maaked formulation of the 
problem, !or the battle front was moved to a delineation of the boundaries 
of "empirical" language.59 
The Ayer-Copleston debate of 1949 exemplifies the difficulties which 
stage five encountered. Copleaton asserted that the proposition 11we both 
have immortal souls" was capable of future veri!ication. In the light of 
auch verifiability, he adked, was the= statement meaningless? Ayer replied 
that a predictive statement ~s only· a predictive sense. ~he atatement 
merely indicated the possibility of further religious experiences; it 
fou~d no "meaning" in the present by aimple virtue of its future 
verifiability.60 
58Ayttr, Logical Positivism, p. 14. As late as his iaaugural address 
at Oxford in November, 1960, A1er had "no wieh to disown the verification 
principle, though it sutlers from a vag11enese which it has not yet been 
found possible to eradicate. I doubt, however, if it is a ~holl~ effec-
tive means of distinguishing queationa of aaalysis or interpretation from 
question of fact." .:iee bis "Philosophy and Language," The Concept of a 
Pereon and Other ~ssays (New York: ~t. t-iartin's Presa, c.1963), PP• 20-21. 
David Makinson, in "Nidditcb's Definition of Verifiability,"~. LXXIV 
(April 1965), 2Lto-247, arrives at a redefinition of vorifiability, but 
tails to satisfy himsel£ with it. 
59Blanshard, PP• 23}-2}4. Carnap posited an ''ideal language'' in 
"'l'estability and Meaning," Philosophy ot Science, III and IV (l9J6-3'7). 
6oA;yor and Copleson, "Logical Pooitivism--A l>ebate," Modern Intro-
duction to Philosophy, P• 614 • 
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The iconoclastic nature o! the verification principle was clearlJ 
evident even in the principle's imprecision. Ito claim to be a touch-
stone for every "meaningful" statement \fas both its ~eakness and its 
strength. Ian Crombie notes that the "doctrine that unverifiabla !State-
ments are ~eaningless is lika the doctrine that cara are fast; not entire-
ly false, but blanketing so many important distinctions as to be use-
61 bao. " In the following eection of t he chapter we will examine the 
disarray which tho verification principle crs~toa in tho sphere of meta-
physics. At present our conc6rn is with di!!icultie3 integral to the 
principle's Iormulatiou. 
!hat the verification principle waa an attempt to put teeth into the 
analytic-synthetic dichotomy ia apparent from the above description ot 
ita evolution.al formulation. But even for the "common man" the fully-
developed principle fell short o! r•quirement because it allowed no osten-
sive verification tor the common 1118.D'a statements about the existence ot 
some thing or other.62 
In addition, experiential statements generally lack conclusive veri-
fication. Friedrich \iaismaon, a charter member of the Vienna Circle, 
challenged the principle on this ground: 
An experiential statement is, as a rule, not conclusively verifiable 
for twc ~ifterent rsasons: (l) because of the exiatence of an unlim-
ited number of ~estsJ (2) because of the open texture of the terms 
involv~d. The3e two reasons correspond to two different senses of 
"incompleteness." 'l'ho . first is related to the !act that I can never 
61ran M. Cro111bie, ''The Possibility- of Theological .:itatements," ~ 
and i.ogio, edited by Ba~il Mitchell (.London; George Allen and Unwin, 1957), 
P• }3. 
62 . Blanshard, P• 226. ?or exaciple, "The clock ia on tho untel.'' 
conclude the description of a material object,, or of a situation .. 
I may, for instance, look at my table from ever new points in space 
without ever exhausting all the poss:fi·bili ties. The second (and more 
exciting one) is due to the fact that our factual knowledge is in-
complete in another dimension: there is always a chance that some-
thing unforeseen may occur •••• (a) that I should get acquainted 
with some totally new experience such as at present I cannot even 
imagine; (b) that some new discovery was made which would affect 
our whole interpretation of certain facts.63 
Waiemann•s reference to "open texture" isolates an intrinsic weakness of 
the verification principle. 
The logical status of the verification principle was questioned from 
the beginning. Was the principle a verifiable statement? Was it a tauto-
logy inapplicable to contingent experience? Was it a persuasive defini-
tion? Carl Hempel defined its logical status in terms of a pragmatic 
referent: 
As a. consequence, the empiricist criterion of meaning, like the 
result of any other explication, represents a linguistic proposal 
which itself is neither true nor false, but for which adequacy is 
claimed in two respects: first in the sense that the explication 
provides a reasonably close analysis of the commonly accepted mean-
ing of the explicaudum--and this claim implies an empirical asser-
tion; and secondly in the sense that the explication achieves a 
"rational reconstruction" of the explicandum, i.e., that it pro-
vides, together perhaps with other explications, a general conceptual 
framework which permits a consistent and precise restatement and 
theoretical systematization of the contexts in which the explican-
dum is used--and this claim implies at least an assertion of a 
logical character.64 
c. L. Stevenson, on the other hand, suggested that the verification rrin-
ciple was a "persU&sive" definiti on of meaning. This factor, in his 
63Friedrich Waismann, "Verifiability," Logic and Language, edited by 
Antony G. N. Flew (First Series: Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), P• 124. 
Paul van Buren in The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: Macmillan 
Company, c.196;), pp. 111-112, suggests that his use of the word "secule.r" 
in the book's title is an example of an unfolding "open texture." 
64Hempel, "Fmpiricist Criterion," Logical Positivism, P• 125. 
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opinion, did not detract from the principle's importance, but alerted one 
to different kinds of language exemplified persuasively.65 Blanshard 
contends that the verifiability criterion was caught in a three-way self-
destruction: (1) it laid down a universal negative, but admitted the im-
possibility of investigating all statements in order to verify that no 
statement which failed to conform had meaning; (2) the principle could 
assume no status in the positivistic theory of truth since it wa.s not 
empirical, a priori, or conventional in nature; (3) it could give no 
account of the verification process.66 
Men also questioned the verification principle because it failed to 
deal intelligibly with the an~ous questiona--mc.taphysical questions--
which continued to haunt even the man of positive outlook. The principle 
involved itself in quandaries from which it escaped only by flashing the 
"meaningless" sign. Consider Copleston's question to Ayer: 
I don't want to assume the mantle of a prophet, and I hope that 
the statement is false; but it is this: "Atomic warfare will take 
place, and it will blot out the entire human race." Now, most 
people would think that this statement has meaningJ it means what 
it says. But how could it possibly be verified empirically? 
Supposing it were fulfilled, the last man could not say with his 
last breath, "Copleston•s prediction has been verified," because 
he would not be entitled to say ·this until he was dead, that is, 
until he was no longer in a position to verify the statement.67 
We now turn to the positiviatic treatment of metaphysical questions. 
65urmaon, p. 170. If Stevenson's suggestion were accepted, it 
would invalidate conclusively the claim of logical positivism. 
66Blanshard, pp. 239, 242, 245. 
67Ayer e.nd Copleston, "Logical Positivism-A Debate," Modern 





Monism without Metaphysics: Hetaphyaical and Theological 
Statements and 3yatem::J under Logical Positivism 
Perhaps the most striking feature of logical positivism wao its 
iconoclasm. Thia feature earned for the movei:1ent both its odiuc and its 
popularity. David Hume atte,:11pted to d$:Jtro:, the ot ructure o! ,,1etaphys ioe 
t hrough empirical reasonings 
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity, or school ~eta-
phyoicB, !or instance; let ua ask, Does it contain any abstract 
reaso~ing conoernin~ quantity or number? No. ~oes it contain any 
experimental r oaaon1ng concerning matter of tact and existence? 
No. Commit it then to ~he !lataas: for it can contain nothing but 
sophistry and illusion. 0 H 
The logical positivists took another grip on the bull's horna--at the 
point of proposition. They viewed philoaop}q solely as analysis : the 
clarification ot language and tho categorizati on of propositions, in-
cluding the metaphysical, into meaningful/meaningless. 
We have invostigated at length bow poaitivism divided meaningful 
propositions into analytic-tautological and synthetic. Thia proposition-
al dichotomy neceaaitate~ a mental dichotomy as well. Ludwig '.:ittgenstein 
in his early years dichotoutized thought when he 
bifurcated all true utterance3 into the brutall7 ompirical, on 
the one hand, and the emptil-y tautological, on the other; by 
impliaation, he divided our thought-shifta into those justified 
b1 tautological transfor~tion, on the ono hand, and by aug~ented 
experience on t he othar.b9 
\Jhen CarrJap applied the criterion of a1111bolic convuntionall311 (conven-
tion by simple deoiaion) to analytic stater..ent3 and the oriter.ion of 
68Dav1d Hume, An Enguirz ..;oncerning Human Under s t anding (Chioagoa 
Cpen Court Publishing Compa111, 1930), P• 176. 
69John 1aemayer Findlay, ''The Methodolog of liormatiTe Ethics (1961)," 
La.nguage1 Mind and Value (New York& Hu.maldtiea Preas, c.1963), P• 248. 
• 
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confirU1ability to synthetio statements, he provided criteria for the mental 
processes of man no less than fr,r hia propositions. 70 
By definition a dichotomy of the whole leaves nothing in exceas o! 
the two parts. 'I'he positivistic bifurcation of thought bad its effects 
also in metaphysics: 
The ultimate consequence of' liume' s theory of causality anu the 
discovery of non-Euclidean geometry is the rampantly anti-
metaphysical bias of the scien~ific philosophy of contemporary 
positivis~. This bias is all-pervasive, even axiomatic •••• 71 
Carnap stated categorically that what lies beyond possible experience aleo 
lies beyond poosible expreaaion: 
We have seen earlier that the meaning of a statement lies in the 
method of its verification. A statement asserts only so much as 
is verifiable with respect to it. Therefore a sentence can be used 
only to assert an empirical proposition •••• If solll8thing were 
to lie, in principle, beyond possible experience, it could be 
neither said nor thought nor asked.72 
Even Kant suffered at the hand of the verifiability criterion in that it 
is the "logical tool'' by which empiricisl!l ovorca.r.ce the supposed dichotomy 
between "things of appearance" and "things in thernaelves. '' This tool 
elimioated the "things in themselves" becal.lae it "makes it meaningless to 
speak about things which are unknowable in principle.n73 
The positivistic aearch for a Hunified science" epitomized the im-
pulse which drove the poaitivists to mental-propoaitional bifurcation 
70 Levi, P• 370. 
71Ibid., P• 335. 
?ZRudolt Carnap, ''The ,ii;liminatiou of Metaphysics Through Logical 
Analysis of language," Logical Pos1tivi8111, edited by A. J. AT•r (Glencoe, 
Illinois: Free Press, c.1959), P• 76. The article originally appeared as 
"Oberwindung der Metaphyaik durch Logische Anal,Yse der jprache," 
Erkenntnis, II (1932). 
?}Reichenbach, P• 259 • 
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and subsequent anti-metaphysical biaa. One of the primary objocth·ea ot 
tb.e Viennese positivists waa to establish a unity of science, a "l!lonism 
freo from metaphysiaa. 1174 If, a.a Carnap charges above, ono can neither 
apeak nor think nor seek what lie3 "beyond possible experience," a "monism 
free i'rom metaphyaics" t8.ltas the field by aimple default. 'l'he mny aciencea 
give way to one: 
with t he aid of the new logic, logical analysis leads t o a unified 
science. ~here are not different sciences ~1th fun:lamentally dif-
ferent methods or different sources of knowledge, but only one 
science. Al l knowledge fincla its place in this science an,l:-Tnde4td, 
is knowledge of basically the same kind1 the appoaranc$ of fundamental 
differences between the sciences are the deceptive result of our using 
different oub-lunguages to expres3 them.75 
The equation of the experiential with the propositional in unified 
s cience neceesitated an elimination of anything "beyond possible experi-
ence," that is, what is neith~r analytic nor synthetic. Conse·.;,uently 
a necesaery (tautological) statement has no dealings \11th a contingont 
propos ition. The Ayer-Copleaton debate shows this to be true. In 
Thomiatic fashion Uopleston po~its metaphysics as a cecessary explllna-
tio~ of the world's exietence. Ayer rules the ~ove invelid ~ith the 
contention that is meaningl~as to discuss anything "outside" t he \o'orld. 
He arguos that a necessary proposition is r.ot auto~atically a contingent 
propoaition.76 There is room for the synthetic and t he a priori, but not 
for the synthetic a priori. 
74 Joergsnsen, P• 76. 
75oarnap, 1r.rhe Old und the Nett Logic," Logical .Positivism, P• 144. 
76Ayer and Copleston, ''Logical f ·ooitivism--A Debate, 11 'Modern I r.t~o-
duction to PhilosopbY, pp. 589-596. J. N. Findlay, in uean God'a ~s-
tence by Diaproved," ~ E:s says in .Philosophical 'l'heoloQ:, edited by 
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One cannot easily rueasure all the ramificntions o! the positivistic 
attack on r.;etaphysical state:.::en+..a. Pe:-hapa C. ;;;. ~1. Joad found all 
rotten egg!l in tho one basket wi',;h hid e·~aluation: 
Under [1ogioal pol:3itivism''!J influence young men and women coni'i-
dently affirm that there arfi uo absolv.t~s , t.ht.it metaphy.;;ics is 
uons en1>e, that the acientii'ic is t he only ma_thod which reaches 
·1alid re:3ulta a nd t hat t he ord1.::.2:· of rea lity 1-l!'lich science studies 
ia the only order t hat t here is.77 
While perhaps the impact of logical positiviam was not au drar,intic as 
Jood ,1ould lead on~ to believe, its iconoclasm did indeed rattle the 
~icrlds of philosophy a nd philosophical theology. We turn no-_ to the 
explicit po3itivi3tio attitude towards m~taphysical and theological 
'J.'ho claim of logical pos itivis m WD.S that metaphysical a x.d tileological 
,-..ntony G. l'i . Flew !lt !d .1'\lasdair t·lacintyro ( New ·iork: Mac:nillan Company, 
c.1955), PP• 47-56, contsnds that t he theist's dsfinition of ''God" makea 
the notion or ideu of the sa me "m~c~'w sary.'" HEJ than rominds th~ theist 
tha t logical ana.lyaia has demonstrated logical "necel3sity" to be found 
onl y in tautological-o.ual ytic l3tate ,;er.ts, not in t he synthetic. As 1t 
result, God'a exiBtence aa a contingent force upon t he world (with whi ch 
the theist' a aynthatic r:1tatements deal) is inconclusivoly d.amonstr&ted. 
On tho other hand, in an article titled "Reflections on Necessary ~istence," 
Froceas ancl i>ivinity, edited by i.: . ! ... Reeso and E. Freol!"an (LaJalle, 
Illinois: Open Court Publishing Compa~, c.1964), 515-527, Findla1 sug~esta 
that Hartshorne haa raopened thG lin:Jolr.1ic question o! t.he "necessity" ot 
God's exist ence with forcefulnoss . ~e l:SSYS (p. 516); 11 I have moved tar 
f rom wy aimµle ~ ~ nd lfow .;ssayiJ 'disproof' o! God's exi::;tence, and 
:i cannot, say how far t11 om each othd1- we ollall ultitt1atel7 i'ind ourselves. 
I :.w.ve been powerfully moved by i:-'rof essor liartshorne 'a .sug~a tion, so 
atrange to theological i;radition, that it ma.y be f'easibltt tc recognize 
bvth a necesaary ,.md a contingent 'side' in God • • • • " 
77 c. i~. r.;. Joud, A. Critique 0£ 105ical Positivism (London: Gollancz, 
c.19.50), P• 10. Joad's opinion of logical positiviam her~ expreased 
~rallele a letter to (. h~ editor o! Philosophy written in :-lo.y, 1935. and 
published in Vol. X (Jul11955), 259-263, in spite of a fifteen 1ear 
s pan. 
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statements flow from a misapplication of worda.78 Carnap contended that 
originally every word had its own meaning. A word frequently changed 
meaning in the course of historical development, or lost its primary mean-
ing in the course of historical development, or lost its primary meaning 
without acquiring a new one. In this way "pseudo-concepts" arose.79 The 
"pseudo-concept" is a fundamental misapplication of words. A word assuming 
the form of a syntactical subject is not necessarily a valid conceptual 
subject, although it may claim and appear to be. Carnap discusses the word 
11God" as an example of a pseudo-subject. Not even the firat requirement 
of logic is met in the case of this word, namely the requirement of syn-
tactical specification (the form of the word's occurrence in elementary 
sentences). An elementary sentence would necessarily assume the form "x 
is a God." The metaphysician either rejects this form entirely without 
substituting another, or if he accepts, he neglects to indicate the syn-
tactical category of the variable x.80 But Carnap claims to see a different 
motive in the positivistic challenge when compared with the challenges of 
earlier anti-metaphyeicians. Positivism isolates logical conflict as the 
difficulty of metaphysical statements. Metaphysics is not a false fairy 
tale; it is a meaningless sequence of words: 
78The positivistic insistence that religious discourse is by defini-
tion metaphysical was itself an alienating factor. For an interesting 
discussion of the relation between metaphysical and religious language, 
in which the historical particularity of Christian language shows itself 
inimical to metaphysical theology and language (as in Hegel), consult 
D. H. MacKinnon, "Metaphysical and Religious Language," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, LIV (1953-54), 115-130. 
79Carnap, "Elimination of Metaphysics," Logical Positivism, P• 62. 
It is possible that Carnap's view of the origin and development of language 
betrays an evolutionary presupposition unbecoming a positivist. 
8otbid., P• 66. Carnap includes among categories "material things, 
propertr;;'"ot things, relations between things, numbers." 
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The difference between our thesis and that of the earlier anti-
metaphysiciana ahould now be clear. ~le do not regard :netaphyuics 
aa "mere upeculation" or "fairy tales''• The .st_,.terr.ents o! a fairy 
tale do not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they 
are perfectly rneaningtul, although f'alae. Metaphysics is not 
"superstition" ; it is poasible to believe tru.e and false ~roposi-
tions, but not to balieve raeaningleas aequencea ot word3.Bl 
To r~legate metaphysical or theological stat ement~ to the sphere ot 
"pseudo-statements" was a negative process. ·rhe positivists were not 
satisii<:td to delineate the logical inado•1uacies of these statements; 
they also isolated the ;1positive" o.spect of p:Jeu.do-statements. 'l'hey 
assured all who would listen th.at the Ue~pression of some emotioaal 
attitude" may certainly be a "significant task." In their appraisal 
they created 1a. place for metaphysical and t heological statet1.:ents within 
the re&lm of emotion; 
analysis sho1,o1s that these sentences do not say aeything, being 
instead onl;y an exproseion of some eraotioual a t titude. To express 
this may cortait:il.y be a ::.ignificant task. However, the ade'iuate 
means for its exprussion is art, tor example, lyric poetry or 
music. It, instead ot tht.1 .-;e, tha linguistic dress ot a theory is 
chosen, a danger arioes: a theoretical content, which does not 
exist, io feigned. If a metaphysician or theologian wishes to 
rtttain the ueual form of language, he should understand thoroughly 
and explain clearly that it is not represent~tion but expression; 
not theory, information, or cognition, but rather poetry or myth. 
If a mystic asserts that he haa experience~ that transcend all con-
cepts, ha cannot be cballengQd. But he cannot speak about i t , 
81Ibid., p. 72. i.'"ried.rich iia1srnann, a charter membe1• of the Vieuraa 
Circle."a1;";';. not diamiss llietapbysics with such rapidity. Ill ''lfow I See 
Philosop.bJ," Logical Positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, I1U11oia1 
Free Press, c.1959), P• _3l10, he aays, 11To aa.y that inetaphysics is non-
senae is nonsense. It !ails to acknowledge the onormouB part played at 
bast in the past b7 those systems •••• Metaphysicians, like artists, 
are tho antennae of their time: they have a !lair tor feeling which way 
the spirit is mo-Ying." ·daismanu' s article firs t appeared in Contemporary 
.Britiah Fhiloaop!_f• edited b1 H. D. Lewis (London: Gdorge Allen and Unwin, 
c.1956), PP• 447- 90. 
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since speaking means grasping conQepta and roducing to facts which 
can be incorporated into aoience.~2 
Carnap leaveu room for expression of ono'a 11baa1o attitude" in life, but 
arguos that art ia a much more adequate medium than '-'letaphyaioal statell8nts: 
we find that metaphysics also &rises from the need to give expres-
sion to a man'a attitude in life, hia emotional and voliti0nal 
reaction to the enviro11111ent, to society, to the taska to which he 
devot~s himself, to t.he r:iisfortunes t hat befall him. • • • ',lbat 
is here e~a~ctial for our considerations is only the tact ths.t art 
is an adequate, 1.1etaph?1:1ics an inn<ie'-iuate means for t he ~xpre~aion 
of t he basic ~ttitude.<53 
It wa u noted above that positivism advanced beiond Hume in oouaidering 
propositions rather than empirical reaaoning. Ayer seizes this uuppoaed 
advance in his atte1.1pt to vindicute the positivi3tic condemnation of eieta-
physical utterancel:j. Logical poc.,itiviw, he claim~, waci ori~iual in making 
the i wpoasibility or metaphysics riepend not ~pon th~ natur" of what could 
be k~own, but upon the nature of what could be said.84 .?rom thie perspec-
tive ~er viawa the pooitiviatic-linguiatic challenge to t heology aa far 
more radical than earlier epiaternological challenges. He will not allow 
the positivist1c challenge to be called "atheistic!! or 111:1.gno.stic": 
82 Joerganaen, p. 5. 'l'hi.s translated paragraph comea from :Iiodan-
dCha!tliche ~eltauffasaung: Der ~iener Kreia (VieUPa: Yolf, 1929), PP• 16-
17, tha Vienna Circle'G official poaition-stutel'llent. a. H. Price, in 
"Logical Positivism and Theology," Philosophy, X (Jw.y 1935), 313-3.51, 
diacuseed the effect of logical poaitiviam upon theological otat<it1:1ents. 
Re argued that it the conditions prescribed by the positivists are accept-
ed, theological statements aro meaningless and non-aensicul. But he 
charged that the positivista bad delimited experieno• to acllieve their 
purpose. 'rllere ia roor;: 1 he argued, for "religiou::1 experienoe
111 through 
it theological statements can be verified or refuted. 
83carnap, "Elimination of Metap~sioa," P• 79• Ben Kimpel auggesta, 
iu .Language and auligion (New York: Philosophical Library, 0.1957), P• ?, 
thM.t a philosophy about lan&uage in religion presupposes a philosophy ot 
religion. Honce those who auggeat that roligiou3 language is punl.y "•motive" 
assume that religion is totally ooncera.ed witll experience and experiential. 
84 Ayer, Logical Poaitivism, P• 11. 
1+7 
our view that all utterar.cea about God. are nons<tnaical, so tar 
from being identical with~ or avon lending any aupport to, either 
of ·tht>$8 familiar contentions , is actually incompatible with them. 
For it the asaertion that thare is a god is non3ensical, then the 
atheist's s.:;sertion that there ia no god is equally nonaensical, 
since it is only a 3igni!icant proposition that can be significantly 
co~tradicted •••• 
In the same train of thou.gh't;, Ayer continues, 
'rho point which we wish to e1:1tablish is that there cannot be aey 
transcendent trutha of religion. ?or the aentonce6 which the 
theist uses to expre~s such "truths" are not literally signiticant.85 
For the positivists, theological statements are meaningleas ouly when 
they are put in propositional form. :from tho beginning the positivists 
86 
allowed for mystical experience. On the other band, they endor8ed 
Dr. Johnson's statement referring to Jacob I3oehme•a mystical experience, 
11 lf Jacob saw the unutterabltt, Jacob should not have tried to utter it. 1187 
~hen discussing the varification principle, the positivists restricted 
''possible experience'' to the i.ttorable. 1fhey disallowed both l;he argument 
that a conting1:tnt sta:t;ement could serve a.a a necessary statement and the 
argument that empirical and supra-empirical statements could bo md:xed. It 
i.s all the more surprisiDg, then, when Ayer claims that the field uf ''possible 
experience'' is not limited to the utterable when deall113 with ·the realm 
85Alfred J. Ayer,~ Truth and 1o c (Second edition; New York: 
Dover flublioatil)DS, n.d. 9 , pp. 115, ll7-ll8. In another place, 
Ayer says that belie! in a aupermttural deity serve::, three intellectual 
needs: it explains the world's existunce and nature; it assures ono that 
lite is worth living; it anawera the que:-stion of how one ought to live. 
Conaiderfid logicall1, ho claims, belief dOGe not fulfill a~ of these 
functions. See Alfred J. Ayer et al., Religion aud the Intellttctuals: 
A :3;ympoaium (l,ew Yorka (:PartisanHuvio~, c.19.50), PP• .31-:54. 
86see Joergenaen, p. 51 see also supra, P• 46, n. 82. 
B?Nacintyre, P• 178. 
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of "Godn: 
we ore not setting any arbitrary boundaries to tha field of possible 
experience. As an illustration of this let us consider the ca~o ot 
the man who claim~ to have an immediate, non-aeneory experience of 
Goel. ;:;o long as he uses the word ''God" simply as a name for the 
cont~nt of his experience, l have no right to disbelieve him •••• 
I can at least understand that he ie having aoiile experience ot a 
kind that I do 11o't have. And t his I may readily b1~lieve. • • • ,~t 
tha !lame tima it muat be remarked that "God," in this uaage, cannot 
be the name of a trunsc~udent being. For to aay that one waa iura1e-
diat~ly acquaigted 1ith a trunscendent being ~ould be aelt-
contradictory. 8 
In sum, the po~itiviet ha~gs the theist by his own rope. If the theist 
allowa that it is impossible to define God !ully in intelligible terms 
(as all theists allow), the theist is simultaiwously allowing, argues the 
poaitiviat, that it is impossible tor a sentence to 'be both siguif.icant 
an<i ''about" God. 89 The po~itiVi$t says, "Ii' a mystic admits that the 
object of his vision id $Ometbing which cannot be described, then he wuat 
also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it. 1190 
i;Jith thii:; state1,1eut he challengtta the theist to answer on positivistic 
terms. He invites the t i.~iat to enter his syat1u1.1; if the theiet does so, 
he must either limit God to the mysticall7 ''unutturable" or biud Him oTer 
to the 11empirioal" of the naturalist. 
3ome theologians are slow to dismiss the positivistic fra1t1e of ref-
erence. '2homas 2-icrherson, for one, contends that the positiviatic position 
is not without merit: 
88.Uf'red J. Ayer, "Verification und 3xperience, n Logical Positiviam 
(Glencoe, Illinoi~: Free Press, 0.19~9), P• 239. ?h$ article appeared 
ic Proceedings ot the Aristotelian !:iociet:r;, 1936-Yl• 
89Ayer, Langua,:e, Truth and Logic, 2d ed., P• 118. 
90lbiil. 
1iha.t to the Jews was a stumbling-block and to the Greek.a foollab.-
nese ia to the logical positivists nonaeuea. There i3 more to be 
learnt tp>m thia tiu:l.n ba11 yet, I think, been realized by- mcdt theo-
logiuna .. 91 
.I8 it poaaible, he a.Jka , that logical pooitivism is a "friend" ot religion 
in its allowance f'or t ho inexprusaible? If otto's Idea of the Holy sought 
to recover th~ osseutial element o! rcli~ion iu its non-rational aspect, 
doeu po::Jitivia1u differ 3reut ly?92 .McPher son de rnoncstrntes hia ca~e fro• 
.:ittgenstein's oarl:J tre 1>tise. R~ grants that at ... tec:ients int.he ·rraotatus 
( "l,ot ~ the worln i a , is th(! laystical, but l!!!i it is, 11 6.44; "?here is 
indeed the inexpressible. 'l'hia s 110\tS itself; it is thu mystical, 11 6.522) 
leave no room for the rnyotical question. But• he argues, Wittgenstein's 
conclusion--that in religion one i e a3kiog questions that cannot properly 
be a sktld when ho i~ asking questions that cannot be anawered--is !llors apt 
than any other could bo.9j 
Logical Positivism in the .Larger Jontext 
One arrives with difficulty at ~he role of logical poaitiviam in the 
history of philosophy. ~ithout a doubt logical positiviiilll served as the 
9l.l'homaa HcPherson, "Religion as the Inexpressible," New ~says in 
Philoso hical i'heolo , edited by Antony G. N. }'low Qnd Alaodair l'..a.clnt,re 
}lew York: .14.acmillan Company, c.1955), P• 134. 
92Ibid., P• 139. HoPheraon•s emphasis is not without parallels in 
the theology o! Karl Barth. 
9.}Ibid., PP• 138-139. Robert Calhoun, in 11'1'he Place ot Language in 
Heligio~Philoao v of Holi 011, editod by George L. Abernethy and 
Thollllls A. Langford New Yorks Macidllan Coinpan,, c.1962), P• 302, rellliDda 
the myistio that a tremendous affirmation underlies all hie negationaa 
that God is transcendent, incoai.r.1ensurable with all that is infinite; 
"hence, unles5 one is to keep wholly silent, avoiding even negative 
assertions, it s ~ems necessary to probe !urther after some groUDd tor 
affirmation." 
immediate precursor ot contemporary lin3t1istio analysis. But froa another 
perspective, logical positivism was an unwelcomed interruption in the deTel-
opment of linguistic anal.yais. Il'lBofar as Wittgenatein and Moore differed 
from Carnap and Russell 1n allowing for a consideration of the sphere ot 
ordinary language and not solely an analysis of symbolic logic,94 one can 
argue that logical positivism was a Qo~entary freak in the eTolutioD&17 
development of philosophical analysis. Logical positiT1511l froze a method, 
and made it atandardz n•ro uae the words of a recent anal.yet, it tended to 
'freeze the philo~ophical method of Moore and Wittgenstein into slogan and 
dogma. 11195 Logical poaitivism srew out of embryonic linguistic analysis, 
but in tho end proved itself inimical to a.na.lysia. Logical positivism 
waa at the same tira~ parent, child, and prodigal son. Wittgenstein, .for 
example, contributed in his early y~~a to the development of logical 
poditivism. But his major contributions, as will be demonstrated in 
Uhaptor III, 111ere to the fi-,ld of ling,.dstic analysis. It is not surpris-
ing thure!ore that stringent logical positivi5al did not long remain a 
viable option in the philoaophioal world. Once its conce~ns were Yoiced, 
it was absorbed by a more inclusive movement, philosophical anal1sia. 
Urmaon explains vtq logical positivism-empiricism, at tho end of the 
1930'a, was forced to alter itself. It bad conceived language as a clear-
cut truth-function structure. But "indefinite statements," auch aa the 
reductive analysis of the word "nation," or the chllllenge to otter a 
phenomenalistic analysis of statements about material objects, were not 
easily explained. Supporters were driven to the cornera 
94 Levi, P• 443. 
95 Cbarleaworth, P• 127. The anai,st is Stuart Haapshire. 
Such a viow of language had seemed eDaer.tial to empiricism, since 
it ahowed how the edifice of our knowledge was securely baaed on 
experience; to give it up involved as raciical. a change ot view aa 
the abandonment ot ·the view that all our conceptual apparatus vas 
built up out ot aimple ideas would have meant for Locke. ~uch a 
def~nce of analysi6 ••• was therefore impossible for the allB.lysta 
since in employing it they would have abandonod their whole concep-
tion of the purpose and nature of analysia.96 
'l'he positivist~ knew that it' they deserted their original purpose they 
would abandon the truth-function view of language, and with it the appeal 
to ~~piric~l v~rification.97 Urmaon clai~o that a decisive disavowal of 
logical poaitivism-ato~.ism was first linked with an endorso~ont of lin-
b"Uistic analysis in John .iiaclom's article "Philoaophical Perplexity," 
publiohed in 1936. 98 This ar·ticle viewed language as "orciinary" lauguage 
rather thau a.a u torm of syro'bollc logic. "In philosophical method it is 
far more siruilar to present-aay work than to a111thing which bad preceded 
it."99 
It 1$ safe to conclude that ~tringent logical positiTiaa baa run its 
course. rt is not ~t present a viable option in the field of philoaoplq 
although itu influenc~ io !slt within contemporary lingui~tic analysis 
96
urmson, P• 159. 
91 
~., P• 161. 
98Ibid., P• 173. John ~,iadom•s article, 11Philo::1ophical Perplexity," 
appearedin Proceedings of tb.e Aristotelian 3ocietz, XVI (1936). Urmson 
recognizes the ditticulty involved in isolating any one specific point · 
such as the one indicated. 
99Ibid., P• 178. Warnock (p. lo6) qU!llitiea tJraison•s historiograplq 
111ith a remind.er that as early as 1931 Gilbert Ryle had suggested that 
11philoaoph1oal analysia" might be the "sole and whole tunotion of philo-
sopbJ. 11 Ita goal was to be 11th• detection of tb.e sources in linguistic 
idioms of recurrent misconstructions and abaurcl theories," said Ryle 1n 
113ystemat1cally t.,ialeading Expressions, 11 Proceedings of the Arii:stotelian 
~ociety, XI (1931). 
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and tha modern acientitic method.loo 
Aa late as 19.50, however, C. E. M. Joad delivered an impasoioned con-
demnativn or the movement in A ~ritigue of Logical PositiviSffi.lOl ~en 
in 1950 stri ngent "logio~l poaitivism" cui pictured by Joad waa no longer 
a brea:~hiug philosophy. In upite of Ayer'tJ second edition of .Language, 
'fruth a nd Logic in 19'+6, by 1950 the movea;snt ha d di.:3.sipatad c1nd entered 
the .:lt rea1n of philosophical a oalysis.102 Joad. ahoweci little familiarity 
with t his tre.nsition. As a conaei1uonce he attacked l\ straw r:ian who might 
po6sibly have adorned tho Vienna Circle, but who cortainly \:lould not have 
welr.od tho Oxford campus in 1950. His wrathful and i mpa~sioned attack 
waa "er .. otive" at best. l03 
100Frederick Ferr, saya in "Verification, Faith, ~nd Credulity," 
Holigion in Life, XXXII {i~inter 1962-63), 461 "Logical !Jositirlsm, a 
favorite object of theological fury for nea~ly a aeneration, has expired 
as a movement and scarcely anyone can be found to mourn. Theologians are 
quite understandably triumphant ••• and philosophera, even the most 
'tough minded' eort, are now at pains to diesociata themselves !roe the 
brash excesses of t,he Vienna Circle anJ Ha sympathizers of the 1930's•" 
C. A.. \ adir, in"Contemporary l:uilosophy and l<eligion," Internatiozwl 
Philosophical ;$uarterlz, V {.>eptembar 1965), 365, notoa that evec iA 
Pakistan, with an ur.d.erstand&ble cultural lag, logical positivism ia 
largely a spent force. 
101c. is. M. Joad, A Critique or Loe;ical Positiviam {l.ollClozu Victor 
Gollancz, c.1950). 
1020. J. i'larnock, in "Analysis and Imagination," ?he I<evolution in 
Philosophy, edited by Alfred J. Ayer {London: Macmillan and ~ompauy, o. 
1956), p. 124, olarifiee the aaalyata• view of logical positivisms ''I 
should. like to ®1 in V'4ry plain terms that I am not, nor is aay philo-
sopher of my aoquaintanc~, a Logical Foaitiviat. Thi~ is worth saying, 
obvioua though it must be in tho light or this series ?f ~oct~~, . be-
cauae thl:lre has seemed to be a current belief that Logica.1. Po.nt1v1sm 
is somehow the official doctrine of contemporary philoso~. There ia, 
in fact, no such offioial doctrinei and it id even more certain, if 
possible, t1'.at Logical Poaitirlsm is not it. 11 
103,. 4 ->Upra, P• }, 11. 71. 
On tile other hand, Burllhnm Beckwith' s Heli;,ion, r~hilosophy, and 
;,;cience: ttn Introduction to Logical Positivism, publiobad in 1957, attempt-
ed to recroate tho pp.ilosoph1 of Comte within the forlllBl ~tructuro of 
lo3ic~1 poaitiv:l.sm.104 .iilthough written in 1957, the book took little 
cognizance of tho ;:;t-ausitional clif'.ficulti~.:; o! thu verification principle, 
or for that matter, the relaxation of the principle. All me·takihysical 
staterr.euta reI;Jainad oor.aplet.ely uiaaningleaa !or Beckwith. It iu obvious 
that this Aracuican itork divorced itaelf !rom 3ritish developments, for 
it i'ailed to appreciate the logic of any "language gauw" other than the 
rough-and-twublo a~gby or logical positivism. 
Logical poaitivian1 left its imprint within linguistic anal;yais 
althvugh it loot its iclontity. The relationship be·cween the tvo ::iove-
rnent::S is cocaplex. The influence of the former within the latter will 
bacoma more apparent as we investigate linguistic analyais and the status 
o! religious Ul\nguag~ in it.. 
lo4Burnham P. Beckwith, Reli ' on Philoso h knd ~cience: Au Intro-
duction to Logical Positivism New iorki Fhiloaopbical Library, ~.1957 • 
CHAJ!.l'r~t< III 
Tlli LO!{:i; OF THB PAitl.': Lil'iGUIJI' IC Ai~ALY:.a s 
Linguiatic Analyuia as Related to Logical PoaitiYiam 
<lithin the :scope of thia study it is impossible to iuvestigate all 
of t he cowplex ancestral, social, and ideational interdepondenc:ies be-
t~~en lo~ical poaitivium and linguis tic ana.lyaia. But that ~here are 
cemented &.lli&ncea is a pparent. It ...,ill be our taak instead to exat.:iiu 
tho eGaenti&l Cotlnactivo links bett1een the two movements in discussiug 
ph1loso1,hical analya13. A brie! surHy of the work o! t1t10 bridge-builder&, 
George ~ . Moore and ;\l£red J. Ayer, vill provide a good begianing. 
Brari.d 31.anahard canouizeis Georgct E. Hoore as t he ''patron saint" of 
linguiatic analysis. ,,round hill both poaitiviata and later atllllyate 
rallied. liis iuturest .. woro theirs: he uhared a common disiucllaatioa 
towarda .~etap~sics; nia was an intellectual integrity which eTen the 
most destructive respectedJ his was a diatate for rhetoric, and a prefer-
ence tor simple language. La3tly, 
ho gaTe to th8 'philosophers of ordicary language• the sugge.11tioa 
that started tham on t heir way. He a~geated that co:JJ11011 sense 
and its language supplied to philosop~ both its main probler.u1 1 
and a touchstone by ~hich ita epeculati-nt claiaaa might be checked. 
Hoore•s work ia !!lore fully described. by G. J. Warnock. Moore con-
cluded that philosophical writing was infected with bAetiDess and confusion. 
Philoaophera arriYed at answ•ro before considering exactl.J what questio11a 
1Brand BlaDSlwrd, Reaaon and Analysis (Londo1u <Jeorge Allen and 
Unw1n9 c.1962), P• 310. 
.. 
I 
to aak. l'iorking out these concluaions, t1oore concerned hiiMelt with th• 
problem ct saying ~hat a proposition !S!!!!l in hio anal1~~s. But ho com-
plicated th.iD6o by forcing analyaiu into a atnr.idard patturni analysis 
waa alwa,1s to couai.1t iu a. v::rba.l parapbra3o lon~or than thd ori~nal 
stutawent, uynonymous, but ~ore oxplicit. Although Moore C01ru.iitted hi,a.. 
self theoretically to a pattern of philcaophizin{!; which paralleled hia 
~etaphy~ical predaceu~ora, hio practice defined vhilosophy iu ter~a of 
clarification rather t.ban discovdry. His practice consi3ted almost 
2 
entiroly in the purauit of analy~ei:s. It ""as the practice of anal:,,sia 
which guara.nteod Hoore'a revered status in the ancaetral ranks of linguie-
ti , 1 3 o ana ... y o :i. 
\Jhile Moore's philoaophizing was Ul"(.)Cl.d enoui,h to aerva aa a rally-
ing point tor both lo0icul pouitivism and linguistic ~nal.Jaia, Alfl'$d J. 
Ayer evok~d deci~ion. Ay8r helpod to oryatalize tho objectives of liDg\d.a-
tio analy&iia in his def'anse ;)f logi cal poaitivia&A. Iieaction to his 'ltork 
wa~ an important factor in the historiet.t.l developmont ot philosophical 
analiais. In thia u.an atringent logical po3itiYiem found its most able 
~oglish proponent--and its last. Conversely, ling~iatic anal.rsi~ aaw ill 
him an Krchenemy who dauw.nded a a:ore exact de.tcription of t~e movaroent'o 
identity aa uistinguiahod !rom lo0ical positiviWil. 
On th• one hand, Ayer contributed positively to tho developaant ot 
linguistic analysis ira t:.is second edition ot .i..Angu&g.t1 Truth and Logic, 
2o. J. Harnook, Sngliah PhilollOphY Since l90Q (London: Oxfo1.~d Ubiver-
3ity Pre~, c.1958), PP• 15, 24, 27, 29. 
3Moore • s work cle11101u:1tratea that embryonic aulyai3 had a strong be• 
ginning b<tfore logical positiYiam appeared ae a reQognisable pbeDomenon. 
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19l+6, with the aul)e;estion tnat the philo3opber is concerned lilith "detini• 
tion" o! words. B.r "de!inition'' he meant aomethinG technical, nar.ael1 
11deiini~ion in use,.,.'+ '~his "definition in use'' AJer derived from rtuasell. 
l;,hilosophical "definition in u.ae11 is the defining o! n phrase without 
employing tho defiendum or any of its s;ynonyutS, while still indioat-
iug t he aignificanoe tha phrase bears in its cont;:,xt.5 :maaell had been 
led to tho thoory of deacri1Jtious, adopted by Ay&r in 1946, by a consider-
ation of tho misleading form of a state::nent Bllch a.3 "!he Loch lieaa mon-
6 
stor is a sea-aorpent. '1 Jimply because words can btt arranged syntacti-
cally dott,;. not indie&te, arguea aussell, that t.h~y havo a definition 
apart from their context. In fact, definition in U3e is tho only propor 
mode of analyaia, for it pro~eots one !rom broaching the realized dis-
crepancy between the structure of language and the actual nature of thin«e.7 
'• Blanahard, PP• 32.}-}24. 
5 Ibid., P• 325. Ian iui11.1:,ey, in Heligious La.ape (London: ~CM Pnse, 
195?), PP• 94-95, claims that John flltvldn's Horaa .:>ynopticae (1909), with 
ito strong atatiatical intereat in st~diea of the Gospels, echoed uussell's 
ideal of a sciontific language. rt aaeumed, in dum, tbat "odd" passages 
haYe no value. ~imil.arl,y, Bavkins sa.w little need for the repetition 
found in aowe sactiona vf the Gospels. .iamaey iJIJ.ys this approacll iilAY 
parallol iiuaoell Is insistence that the.·e is 110 need to haYe J! (a proposi-
tion) twice. ln a chf;j>ter titled ·':"oruial Knowledge and .wligious Glai11181 " 
aeligious Knowledge (L~lencoe, Illinoi,il: Free ~reas, c.1961), PP• 33-43, 
Paul Jch.rrddt contends that religious claims are not to be parallaled with 
the formal system of logic developed in tlltt twentieth centu17. 
6
.Blanshard, P• 332. Auto~ G. n. Flev, in bia editorial. introduction 
to Logic and Lans;uage (.r'irst .;erieaJ Oxford: Basil iUackwell, 1952), P• 7, 
notes that Wittgenctein credited to ~usaell the di~oovery that t.he apparent 
logic&l form of a proposition need not be its real form. Flew aculaima 
tb:Ls disco•eq as the central and tundamentttl discon17 of modena .aritiah 
philosophy. 
7 ill.an.shard, P• 329. 
Ayer uaed the "ti1&ory of deacriptions" or definitions in hiis ut tempted 
demolition c.,f 1aeta1Jhyaica. lt :,1a1;3 ai.:1 argument thnt th~ theory prevented 
tho extrapolation o! diacrepancy between lani~age und the nature of things 
B into an improper metaphysics. riith his in1Siatenca upon "dofinition in 
uso" Ayer drew atteutior. to a proctJdure 11hich lilt.er achieveci r~cognized 
ata·~ua in lin0uistic analy .. is. ,'ih1le he used Huasoll I a emphaaia in his 
logical-positivistic attack upon r.1etaphyaics with lit~la int~ntion o! 
extending it to tha sphere of "ordir.ary lauguagu," A1er contributed, 
porhapo unknowingly, to the employment of "use" in later analytic method-
ology. 
Cn the other hand, ,'..yar•s work aldo produced negative reaction. In 
part at leaat, linguistic analy~ia formulated its methodology to oontraut 
with Ayer•s. The aecond edition of Language, ~ruth and Logic in 1946 en-
couraged the analysts to clarify their objectives and wetbodology.9 fhe 
lesaons from Ayer's Jecond edition were not easily learned, but neither 
were thoy aa:»il:r forgotten. ii::.ierging analysiG pondered thr@e leasona: 
(1) tno failure of the v1>rificotion principle, evident in the imprecision 
of its definition, de~onatra.ted that analysis waa ueith~r to assume nor 
encourage un empirical vidw r.,f tho world; (2) the imprecioion ot the .,...,ri-
4 
tication principle showod that an attempt to base analysis on a "principle,'' 
or to characterize explicitly t.he teohni{ue of aual.yais, was doomed to 
8Ibid. 
9An i~~ication of Cambridge reaction to Ayer's new udition oi lanesuaee, 
~ruth and Logic is found in John wisdoa's revi@v ot the book in~, 
LVII (1948). The scathing review ia .reprinted in 1.1isdom'a Pbilo•ow. and 
l:>sycho-Aualysis (N1tw York: Philosophical 1.ibr,-ry, l95J), PP• 229-2 7• 
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tttchnical failure1 (3) by deduction Oxford philosophers we1·e tree to 
conclude· that each kind of propo15ition had its own "logic. 1110 In s t1m, 
Ayer contributed both positively a nd negatively to th~ development ot 
emerging linguistic aualysia. 
Jeacriptive Definitiona of Linguistic Analyaia 
I t is uo leas di!fic1.1.lt to uefine "linguistic analysis" aa ~ philo-
sophical movsment chan it i s to define existentialiam.11 .;;1nce the ad-
herenta of both existentialism anJ analysis recognize methodology aa their 
unifying bond as opposod to a body o! mutually acceptell presuppositio11a. 
und concluai ona, th~ participants rejact atto~pts to define the two move-
ments when they t uil to empb~:Jize the primacy of ~ethodolog;y. '.Ii.th thia 
caution it is advisable to ottor descriptive definitioDS--moro descriptive 
than de!initive--o! philosophical arialysis in order that the L.ethodological 
processea of an~Jysia are not alighted. 
~ven deacrintions will be difficult: 
. . 
Apart lrom a reluctunce t o s ubscribe in common to any general formu-
la, there ia a good deal of quite serious diaagree:1.ent amongst (a'D&-
l;rata] I while there is undoubtedly a •ta.m.ly rQoemblance• betwee11 
their views aud their methods l.t ~tould be lw.rd to find a descripti~n, 
however loose and elastic, which would apply to all or even most. 
The attempt to find a "oommon core o! method or conclusion" in vbat BJ1• 
and Austin have said about knowing; Pears and Paul about metaphysicas 
lOMaxwvll John Cb.arleeworth, l?hilosopb;, and Li~iatic Analysis 
(? ittsburgh: Duquesne University, c.1959), PP• 148-19. 
ll,J:erm.s such as "linguistic anialysia," "philosophical anal,raiu," 
"philo~oph)' ot language," and ''analysis" are aynon,mous and interchangeable. 
12 J. o. Unnson, .Philosophical Analzsia (Oxford& Clarendon ?reaa, 
1956), P• l64. 
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.Stra)taon and .111rnoclt about logic; Ha.rt e.bcut law; ifoldon about politics; 
Hare, 7oulmin, Urrnaon, ~.aiapabire, !And ~o,1ell-J,!lith about ethics, ia a 
most difficult aa3ie;nr.1ent. 1'he task ia complicated by thtt diaiuclinatioD 
ot the.;e philosophers to talk about what they are doing. "It they are 
asked what philosophy means for them, they are apt to IIBY, 'it ia the Gort 
of thing I am doing now' and return to thoir work. 1113 At least their work 
ia not repetitious, for a. constantly changing complexion ~races the ta.ce 
14 
of ~rutlytiia. J ince the face of the movement chan3es .so quickly, onlJ' 
a deacriptivo approach, using "descriptive datinitions," can hope to iaolate 
and Chfiracterize the ''common core" of ana.l1sia through an investigation of 
its l!1~thodoloiu. 
One description of linguistic analyaid emphaaizea especially the 
logical-poaitivistic parentage o! the movem~nt. G. i. Eughes appears ta 
pattern analytic methodology after logical p.o:iitivism when he ~ya, 
:'he technique of analyl'iing ~tutettenta into their empirical uflC:l 
non-empirical elements and then displaying the empirical elerllenta 
as contingent and the non-empirical aB non-existential, posaibly 
even aa tautologies, and o! examiniug the often intricate and curi-
ous waya in wbicb these elemonts can be combined in ontt statement--
this, I should be the last to deny, has proved a most valuable device 
in that it often throws a flood of light on the ways in wnich we 
describe the worla~l5 
lllansbard, too, de13crib&s the movuraent in term$ ot its positivi3tic 
ro~nciations. H@ contends that although the analysts have stress~d three 
13
alauahard, P• 3}9• 
1\1. J. r'aton, The Noclern Predicaoent (London: ueorge Allen anc1 U~wia, 
c.19.55), P• 32. 
15a • .il:. Hughes, 11~11 God'a ::Xistenoe be Di.s~oTed - ~." New ~says iD 
Philoso ical Tlieolo • edited by Anto111 G. l-4. 1'"'lew and Alaadair Haclntyn 
~ew ~orki Macrd.llan and Co., c.1955), P• 61. Hughes protests th~ exten-
sion o! thia methodology bo~ond. its legiti111ate sphere. 
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elements of the positiviotic tradition, they have not bound themselves 
to it by an unbreakable alliance. First, while analysis stresses the 
verification criterion of meaning, the verifiability principle has not 
become a bond of unity because of the principle's many definitions. 
~econd, while analysts generally endorse the analytic theory of the a 
priori, the analytic character of a priori atate,nenta is not accepted 
by Arthur Pap, Wilfrid Sollars, and C.H. Langford. Third, ;. .. ilc the 
emotivist theory of value seems to characterize thd analytic movement, 
one of its founders, G. £. Moore, oonatructed an ethical philosophy of 
another atripe.16 
The paradoxes which appear in any descriptive definition of linguistic 
analysis illuminate the movement's methodology in that they preclude a 
precise listing of assumptions and presuppositiona. This is the caae 
when Gustav Bergmann differentiates between two types of linguistic phil-
osophy. The "formaliata," such as Carnap, devote themselves to construc-
ting symbolic systems and artificial languages. The'~ntif'ormalists" 
probe and prune "the language we speak." Both view philosophical problema 
as verbal complexities.17 The task which Bergmann assigns to th~ formalists 
closely parallels the logical-positivistic attempt to construct a unified 
scientific language. But Bergmann's formalists are not logical positivists 
16Blanshu.rd, PP• 93, }41. In "The Philosophy of Analysis," Clarity 
is t4ot ~nou : Essa a in Criticism ot Lin istio Philoao , edited by 
H. D. Lewis London: George Allen and Unwiu, c.19 3, PP• ?6-109, 
Blanshard expands his descriptive definition of analysis in terms ot 
its logical-positivistic parentage. 
l7Gustav Bergmann, "Two T1Pf1B ot Linguistic Philosophy," The Meta-
physics o! Logical Positivism (First edition; New York: Longmana, Green 
and Company, c.1954), PP• 10?-108. 
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in the stricteot aen.se v! thu veri!ic1;tion principle. 'rheretore the dis-
tance between the foriUali3ta and t he antitormaliats iu q,uantitative 
rather than qualitative; their r1,e 'thodolos.y differs little. Bergmann thus 
offers a. descriptive d.ofinition ot analysis which &lllpha.sizes ita poditiv-
istic parentage when be makes all philo:sophical problemo "Terbal" tor 
both f or ~ lista and antiformaliat8 ancl when he emphasizas the qualitative 
similarity of methodology used by both. 
5ince i.nalysis is more a 111ethodology th.an a "school," a descriptive 
definition emphasizing its poaitividtic parentage cannot b~ wholly ex-
haust ive. Ana1yei~ is not revived posi tivism. ~il liam Blackstone argues 
that the philoaophy of lunguage, in contrast to logical positivism, does 
not allow analysis to become a reduction to constituents. lt rejects 
aa well the formulation of an ideal logic associated with reduction. 
Instead t he conoern is t9 oearch out th~ "intormal11 logic ot statements 
and concepts in their use. ln swri, philosophical analyais doe8 not use 
the method of 11translation," or other subatitutional methodu.18 
A second descriptive definition of analysis emphasizes the movement's 
intero.::1t in langua{Se "use. 11 '.l'he epi:Jtemological queat ot traditional 
philosoph,Y takes a new turn when "use11 ot lafl8uase is the point of 
departure: 
To know !or ~lato mean~ to have intimatiolU:I of the !urm~ from 
which ~-articular things deriTe their reality; to know tor Kant 
meant to respect the synthesis which the mind creates within the 
golds ot the understanding. To know in the newer torma ot 
1'h1loaophical Analyaia is to ha.,. tO&atered the machi11ery ot 
discow-M, to bave subjugated the Ncalcitrance ot gra:uE!IU' 
18w1111am T. Blackstone, The Problem ot ~eli oua Knowled (~l•• 
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ball, c.l 3, P• 33. BlMokstone 1 
notes that Peter .Jtrawson encouraged the recognition ot 11iatormal" logic. 
to the requireruonts ot facile uae.19 
'!o be concorned \1ith tha uae is to be concerned with induotion rather 
than deduction. An inve3tigation of language use rulea out preconceived 
cla.ssif'ica tion: 
An attewpt to ~ake clear the precise nature of tho lingui3tic pro-· 
cedures implicit in any puzzling exprea3ions wit~out a preconceived 
classification ~uch ao the principle ot ·veri!icatioiiJ is t he hall-
mark, not, ala.a, alwaya dttserved, of the newer &~>proach.20 
".Don't a ak for the maauins , uk tor t he use," and 11;;.;ver, statetl8nt has 
its own loisic," are two alogans which identity tho emphasis 11pon use.21 
Propositions are not limited to a singlo function as in logical positiv-
ism, or to t wo or threo. It 1::J a tactical error, ;;;a.ya t he anal.Yst, to 
approach l a nguage with preconcoived categoriGs , for ono thereby di.are-
gards t ho use of language. 
'lhiu de:scriptio11 o! o.naly:1is empha"izos the covelllent 'a radical dis-
sociation from lo3ical positivism. Hhereae positivism a.asumed that all 
non-tautological propositions describe aenaa-exporiences, at least in 
l9Albert ~iilliam LeYi, Philooo and the ~1odern world (lll.oomington9 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, c.19.59, PP• 45-4 • T. ]:(. Hiles, 
in ;leli~ion and the t'.)Cientific Outlook (London: Allen and Unwin, c.19.59), 
PP• 62-04, otters a healthy correct;ve to :i.Avi in suggeating that current 
analyai~ is concerned with ':.ho traditional "theory ot knowledge." Its 
queationa, ''F.ow do wo know this?" and "~Jhat arguUMtnts ara relevant to 
establishing its truth or falsity?" d~utionstrate it to be within the streaa 
ot philooopby and epistemology aa traditionally defined. 
20 Urmaon, P• 199. 
21Ib1d., p. 179. Gustav Ber5Cl'lr&11, in Meard.f. aud i;;xiatence (Hadiao1u 
Unive:r·a~of' ·Wisoonsin Press, 0.1959), PP• 67-6~ eugge:sta that in ·rol-
lowing the slogan ''Oon 't a ,lk tor the meaning, nak for the use," Oxt'ord 
(the tdl'II Berg:nann uoea to identif7 the Oxford aaalydta) slips into the 
debauchery o! 'behavioria11 which it so long avoided in psycuoloS,Y. Cixf'ord 
"propounds the psychologists• context theory as still another monolithic 
theory, ot meaning, 11 ~nd in thii:s regu1'd philo:;1opbJ.cal aoal,13!.s ia both 
bebD.vioriotic aad Hegelian, aays Bergmann. 
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principle, urialysis does nut affirm or deny this poasibility. Analysis 
rules out the possibility that all menniogtul stnte111ents 3erve a 3ingle 
purpose with ita er:aphasis upon uae. 
&lt any one doacriptive definition of analysis fails to provide a 
p1~ecise and complete characterization of the movement. Thia becor:iea 
evident in tha definition which laya special empha::.ia 11pon "use." For 
while they agree to recogt.ize varied "usea" in language, and while they 
ado,it to no proarran1:,-ed claaaification, some analysts fail to divest 
themaelves fully of tha positivi~tic insistence that all state~ant~ serve 
as seuse-uxperienco do~criptionu. ~Jbile they · find numerou3 "u3es" in 
lanc;uuGe, t huy ultimately uncovtJr one "use": that of describing a. sense-
experience that i-1 in some >way verifiable. Thus when Hollllld Hepburn 
insisto upon th~ atudy of the 11particular in:Jtance" and not the general 
22 issue, thereby offering a doucriptive definition of anal3ais which 
emphasizaG its con~orn for ''use, 11 he deceivea himself in hia failure to 
raoognize that t.he .5tudy of particular inst.ancu is not truly analytic, 
or concerned ~ith "use" alone, if tho scneral iaaue is li,rdted to the 
·empirical by implicit de!inition. 
Gilbert l~le, on the other hand, ofiera a doacriptiva definition ot 
linguistic annlyoia which avoids the subordinat'ion ot :iudOa'' to el4piri-
cal ''use." Ue views the task or philosophy as an intere3t in the ''infor-
mal logic of the employment of expressio11S, the nature ot logical howlers 
that people do or ,tight commit i! thay strung their words together in 
22Roaald \'i. Hepburn, ".Poatq and ~<oligioua Uuliet, '' lktta>?f.aical 
Beliefs, . edited by Alasdair !~cintyre (London: .;;.;H ?ress, 1957 , P• 
160. 
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certain ways ••• ,.23 
• ~tyle e~phusizoa buth po3itive nnd n~gative ele-
ruants of n concern with uue. Poaitively, an invaf.;ti~ation of thd ''informal 
logic" o:f expro:;si ons is a study or non-Ariatotelian lo6ic pre:Jent in 
certain Ltoea of lan~ua ~e. 'l'hia otudy, for .:>xnmple, might ir.iuicatt! that 
n ,':ltaternont made itl a ,~aoe of checkar.J has i t s o'lin 1'intoru1al" logic. 24 
Nogatively considered t.he concorn for uae ia t he 13oarch ror and elimination 
of "logical hoo1lera" committed by people when l;he;y switch catdgori4ita or 
"uoos" unknowingly. 
A t hi1•d de~criptive definition of philoaophical ana.lyaia entails a 
de~cription of the psychological approaoh-avoid~nco sot common to tOBny 
of its adherect:::i . This dei;cription takes s1Jecial notice of the frequent 
oc.:urronce of t hu pr onoun "we" in the wri tingr, of 3oaae analysts. P.1. B. 
233lanahard, Heason and J\nalysis, P• 353. Ryle'a words are found in 
llhiloaophicul ,iuview, IJCII (1953), 1g5. i3lanshard disagrees Bharpl.1 with 
i<yle, and viewa the taak ot unalysis with somt: disrespect. He seea little 
validity in tho analytic approach t1:) problems of philoao~, and refers to 
analysia a~ an atte~pt to wake molehills out of mountaina, following the 
uncanny genius o! •:Jittgenstein. .iee eapecially Blansbard, Reason and 
Analysis, PP• 364-365. 
24Gilbert Ryle discusses iutormal logic in ~ilemlUIUS (Cagbridge: Ulli-
versity Pross, 19.54), PP• 111-129. In reference to ir.for1al logic he says 
(p. ll'l): "Not all strict inferences pivot on tho recognized logical con-
atanta, and not all topic-neutral ~xproaaiona quality tor treatment aa 
logical co113tants." Aa an e:xamplo of iu.fonal logic !\}'le give1:1 the follow-
ing (p. 118): "If you hear on guod authorit7 that she took arselli.c and 
tell ill you will reject the rumor that she tell ill and took arsenic. 
Thia familiar use ot •and' carries ~ith it the teapor:al. notion expressed 
by •and subae ;.uently' ancl even the causal notion oxpreaeed ':,y •and 111 
con~o~uence•. Tbe logiciana• conscript •and' doea only ito appointed 
duty--a duty in which 'she took ar38nio and fell ill' ia an ~btiolute 
paraphraoe ot '1:1he fell ill £ind took araenic'•" E:xamplea ot infonaal 
logic are mlll.tiple. For a lover to aa.y, '',.jhe'a prett3 and wie•s not," 
llllkes no "aenae," but it is perhaps the be~t metb.od. to doscribo hi:;s be-
loved. Ir. the ... rmod forces tho phrase "'i.'he co~r.wu1'1er re,1ueats" i.s brack-
eted by the logic of military diucipline; the phrase indicates far more 
than a polite re~uvut. 
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Foster contends that repeated use of the pronoW1 derives neither from 
empirical observatioM nor from rnetaphyaical presuppositions. 11\-/e'' does 
not refer to an;· r::c1pirically-delimited group of men, for philosophical 
analysis does not begin with an empirical statement about the linguistic 
usage of certain historically-determinable groups. 'l'he use of "we" by 
the certain analysts refers to the whole ot marJdnd. The decision to 
include himself in the "we" is uot a decision which any aD&l.yst can aver 
suppose to have "tv.ken," or the taking would be verifiable by empirical 
means.
25 Foster includes the following as examples ot the phenomenon: 
"'L'he philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the 
physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way 
in which we apeak abo<it them." A. J. A1er, Language, Truth and 
Logic. Ch. II. 
"In ordinary language we call a person 'rational' it he is capable 
of learning froJG experience." H. :l!"'aigl in ".Logical ~piricism," 
Headings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl and Seli ars, p. 15. 
"A lull understanding of the logic of value-terms can only be 
achieved by continual and :tenaitive attention to t he way we uae 
them." R. M. Hare, Language and Horala, P• 126. 
"Philoaophera• arguments have frequently turned on references to 
what~ do and do not say, or, more strongly, on what~ can or 
cannot aay. '' G. Ryle, "Ordinary Language," in Philosophical 
Review, 1953.26 
l""'oater concludes that the analysts who include themselves in the "we"-
group are men who have moved from a timeless deduction. like Descartes, 
to a temporal study; !rom a "spiritualistic metaphysics" to "hwaani8111." 
ln !aot, these aa:Jertions are a type ot "theological anthropology. ,,2? 
2
.5M. B. Foster,""We' in Modern Philosoplq," Faith and Logic, eclited 
by Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen and Unvin, 19.5?), PP• 217-219. 
26Ibid., pp. 194-195• Italics and casual references are Foster•a. 
27Ibid., PP• 218-219. 
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l•'oster de:3cribes aual3ais in torma of o "we .. iam'' domonstrative of 
an undarlying contemporary humanis~, assuredly temporal but not empirical .. 
ly ver ifia bl~. Hi.:. ,1e s cription is oor.ic·11hat akin to Blansl.1&.1rd' s whon 
Slanahard atte~pts to iuolato a set of teudeucies, taates, an~ aversion.a 
com1oon t o a r.alysts. An a JL'iiral:ion of 3cie nco, an av~.r-,ion to motaphysica, 
a mutaul aicil i ke of a Dything pompou3 or tdgh .. flown in l anguage, s peculo.-
tion, or mor1:d . claim, Blansharcl su~ge ata, are characteristic of analy-
. 28 
S l.~o 
A des crip·tive uefinition wi.ich cielineatea mutual inclination.::. and 
av~raions run$ t he dao3er of &lyin0 little about analytic methodolot;1. 
In feet, all thl.·ee d~scriptivo definition~ here offered have this weak-
ness i n comr.1on. i·urhap3 only in examining the process o! ''analy3i u" will 
a d~scriptive definit ion or lingui stic anal y:Sis come clclan .... and even then 
i mpori'ectly. 
Catibridge Philo3opbical Analy-sifH Hetaphyaical Therapy 
J es criptiv~ definitions o!fer no pardon from th~ rigors of accurate 
hiotoriography. While a purely hietorical account of tho devulopmont ot 
analyaia does not lle \,ithin the scope of this stuC,.y;, an examination o! 
tho historical m,1u.ifeutationa of analysio i:s e s sential. It will be 




.al&nahard, wr,aaon aud htialJ;ais, PP• 93--94. Blat.allard also uottts -
the analyuta• aversion to pbi~oaophers described by i-tc::ai;0,art as the :sort 
who ''wanted to believe that t he~- ato a ~oo.:i dinner only in oruli:r to 
strengthen themdelvos to appreciate Z>ante. '' 
290xtord rtt1nains the hi.lb of ana.lJsia although currently analyots 
68 
'l'ne t.;ar,1bridge uool.1ata concerned thomaalvoa priul,E).rily with c,ot&-
pn.ys ic<il stat.e,t.ont.:s. Ji psychiatric term, "th<:tra~eut.ic~," accu.rcltaly 
~eocribes t h~ uchool' ,J activitiea. ~harlosworth includes John ,:,/ iadom, 
G. A. ~-nul, l· orris i.clzerowitz, anJ Norlllan .~lcolm awon~ tlle 11~a111bridge 
Jchool" an(;lly~tti. l'ne 3chool doraii.w.ted t.he field of analysis rough.Ly 
from 1933 to thu e1.d of .,orld War II. 30 
The Gazr.uridge "thero.piats" bo;r<1n thor.-py where a counJalor begins 
counseling--with the immediate problem. For th~m ~etaph7uical 3t~tement3 
were Vcllua~le--not neceasarily moauinglesa--preci~eli b~~au~e these state-
ments 51.,.v.a opportunity !or analytic therapy. Ayer charges that the [eam-
bridg~ logical analyata wer~ far more indulg~nt than the Viennede positiv-
i~ts. 1\lthough they opposed raetaiJhysics when it was merely "rhapsodical, 11 
uiay bo found elsewhere in Britain, in the United Jtates, in aome ~candin-
avian countri@s, in Au.stralia and Now ..:ealand, and in th\l .etherlawis. 
Berri.bard .:.rling, in :,at...ro and lliatoq (i.und: C.JK ule.trup, 1960), P• 13, 
notss t hat a ..iwede, llarald ,~ lund, u3ea anal;y.ui:i in aevtira.l of hi:3 recent 
esoaya incl:..ding :ro arturenhet verkli· het (.)tockholm, 19.56) anu Person-
li och sakli roli ionafri or .>tockholm, 1958), :~rling also men-
tion.a P• ll) that ~el Gyllenkrok'a J at~i.;atisk tuolo och veten3ka li 
metod med .ltfrakild b.Uns D till dtiken Upp:Jala: ~unde~u.eat~ka bokhandeln, 
1~59 ~ppaala. univarwitets ra~kritt 1959,2]) u5ed contemporary ih-itiah 
aualysis in arriving at its conclu~ion that ocienti!ic ~yatematic theology 
is unattainable, althougll a ::.yatematic and normat,ive etni.ctJ .:1ay bo po:sai.ble. 
C. A. ,~udir, in "~ontctraporary Philosophy arid ~ieligion, '' Inturnational 
;
1hilosophic~l "uarturl.y, V (o>eptember 196.5), 364-..)65 (M presidential 
uddros.:3 otfored betore the Pakiata.n Philosophi~al Congress in Hyderabad 
in , .. ~ril, 1964; ori.p.r.ally publisi:lod iu 1=0.kitita1& .:lhiloaophical Journal 
of July, 1964), says that no small number of younger philosophers in 
l·akistan think anll \4rite in th~ style ct ,·.nglo-1\i:actricans, and are con-
cerned with analysis ot language. 
30(;harleaworth, PP• 151-1.52. Cha1•lesworth notes that .Jisdom was 
trou1 Cambridge Universit7, l>aul t'rom Oxford, azerowitz iro• ~Iii.th (;ol-lege 
(U~A), and t-lalcolra from t;oruell. l'he wide geographical disbursement 
evidently did not interfere with ~mbridge unity. ~. A. li'arrell, in "An 
,~ppraisal ot Thoro.peutic 1'ositivia11," Mind, L'J (January 1946; n.pril 1946), 
2.5-48, l}.}-l.50, diocuases wiadom, Paul;-;ii°a Maloolm in a somewhat critical, 
but appreciative, evaluation. 
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they allowed the contention that tho "raetaphJsioia11 trJAY someti11ea be seeii.g 
the world in a fresh and interesting way; he may have good reason !or 
being dissatisfied with our ordinary concepts, or for proposing to rovise 
them." Brrora manifested in caetaphyaical atatements may be instructive. 
If Wittgenstein was right in suggestin~; that problems in philosophy arose 
because men are ~eluded by features of their lang~ge, "the metaphyaician, 
by hia very extravaganoies, may also contribute to their diasolution."3l 
Thia recognition of the intrinsic value of metaphysical statements 
is foreign to Ayer'a positivism. i'or the "therapeutic analyst," the 
poaitivist's verification principle waa simply a linguistic proposal 
valuable in ita illumination, but not absolutely true. Propo:Jala of the 
transcendontalis t~ were no l~aa valuable and illuminative. For example, 
the statement "There ia a God" is valuable in that it isolatei:l structural 
features of the cos111os. 32 
A recognition of the intrinaic value of metaphyaioal statements 
argues that when past metaphysicians claimed to construct ontologies, in 
many cases thuy undertook a tar more advantageous task: "creating nev lan-
guages witl.ch bring out certain analogies more pointedly and more system-
atically than is potssible in our current language." For the tharapiate, 
the etudy of any form of philosophy is a valuable endeavor regardless ot 
3lAltred J. Ayer, Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Il.linoisa Free Press, 
0.1959), P• 17. Undoubtedly Ayer is referring to ~ittgenatein's state-
ment (#123) in I>hiloso ische Unterauohu Philoao cal Inveati tiona, 
tranalated by G. 3. 1;. Anacor.1be Oxford: .Br.usil Blackwell, 1953 , P• 9•, 
"A ptd.losophical problem baa flle form: 'I don't know my way about.'" 
32 C.'barlesvorth, PP• 159-l6o. 
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perplexity or confueion.33 John Wisdom described the Cambridge attitude 
towards metaphysical statements in Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis: 
These untruths (.paradoxical, provoking etatementii] persist. Thia 
is not merely because they are symptoms of an intractable disorder 
but because they are philosophically useful. The curious thing is 
that their philoBophical usefulness depends upon their paradoxical-
ness and thus upon their falsehood. They are false because they 
are needed where ordinary language fails, though it oust not be 
supposed that they are or should be in some perfect language. They 
are in a language not free from the same sort of defects as those 
from the effects of which they are designed to free us.34 
From a positive evaluation of metaphysical statements the Cambridge 
analysts advanced to depth therapy. \·lisdom asserts that ''therapeutic 
analysis" is somewhat parallel to psychoanalyais: ·the patient does his 
own work guided by the analyst.35 Wisdom's handling of the verification 
principle is an excellent example of "psychoanalytic therapy." lie finda 
the principle an opportune candidate ·for therapeutic analysis. There is 
33John Niemayer Findlay, "Some Reactions to Recent Cambridge Philo-
sophy (1940-1), 11 ~uage, Mind and Value (New York: Humanities Press, 
c.1963), pp. 37-3~The article originally appeared in Australasian 
Journal of PsychologY and Philosophy (1940-1941). 
34John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," Philosophy and Psycho-
Analysis (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), p.·50. The article 
originally appeared in E!1>ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XVI (1936). 
In "The Hodes of Thought and the Logic of God, 11 The Existence of God, 
edited by John Hick (New Yorki Macmillan Company, c.1964), p. 298, 
Wisdom posits two questions for therapeutic analysis, and thereby asserts 
the value of metaphysical questions: "And yet in spite ot all this and 
whatever the answer may be the old questions ' Does God exis·t?' 'Does 
the Devil exist?' aren't senseless, aren't beyond the scope of thought 
and reason. Gn the contrary they call for new awareness of what has so 
long been about us, in case knowing nature so well we never know her." 
This broadcast, originally made over the British Broadcasting Corporation 
in 1950, is an exercise in wrestling with what Wisdom calla philosophically 
useful "untruths." Warnock (p. 93) notes (comparing \1isdom and 
Wittgenstein) that while Wittgenstein visualized a philosopher's paradox 
as both interesting and important, Wisdom allows that it is also defen-
sible. 
35charlesworth, P• 157. 
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therape1 tic value for the principle's friends no less than for ite 
enemies: 
I say that the verification principle is a metaphysical principle 
because I want (1) to draw the attention of those who accept it to 
the deplorably old-fashioned clothes in which it presents itself. 
Indeed, it resembles not only positivistic theories but also the 
worst transcendental theories by appearing in the disguise either 
of a scientific discovery removing popular illusion, or of a logi-
cal equation (incorrect) from which deductions may be made. No 
wonder our conservative friends cannot accept it. I want (2) to 
dr~w the attention of t hose who reject it to the fact that because 
they are taken in by its disguise they fail to recognize the merits 
which like other metaphysical theories it conceals. Both those who 
accept it and those who reject it do not realize what they are doing 
because they do not notice that it is disguised.36 
By drawing attention to two paradoxical, "provoking" statements Wisdom 
proposes to demonstrate the logical validity of each in its particular 
use. This type of analysis will not be decisive, but it will be infor-
mative. The Cambridge analyst did not claim to clear away metaphysical 
confusions with his linguistic analysis: Wisdom suggests that analysis 
"leaves us free to begin. 1137 
In sum, the Cambridge analysts developed "therapeutic analysis." 
In cases where metaphysical difficulties arise, analysis isolates the 
features which impel one man one way and another the other. Once this 
is accomplished, analysis demonstrates that no absolute answer is possible 
in cases of "decision.1138 
36John Wisdom, ''Metaphysics end Verification," PhilosopbY and 
Psycho-Analysis, p. 55. Wisdom continues his therapeutic analysis of 
the verification principle in "Metamorphoses of the Verifiabil:l.ty Theo-
ry of Meaning," 11!!!!!, LXXII (July 1963), 335-347. 
37Charleswortb, p. 160. 
38tbid., p. 159. Wisdom says one is left "free to begin." 
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The value o! ruotaph,Jsical stat er.ientG resides in thair proper analy-
sis. j~lthou.gh the .;ambridge ani-lyats would have denied aey purpoae iD 
analysis oth~1· thun "therap1 • '' one gets the impression that the unspoken 
goal or acalytic t.hero.py is t he avoidance of taetapbysical traps once one 
haa bean set "free to bogin11 anew. In any case, cainbridge therapeutic 
analysis waa an important historical manifestation of the anal1t1c move-
ment in itd begir4ninga. 
Oxford: the 1ogica of .Languago 
If ~he concern of Cambridge therapy lay with tho analysis of meta-
physical atatoments, Oxford ie no l~as the center of a study ot the logic 
of laneuagee--or the logics of language. cambridge therapy was distantly 
rolated to classical philosophy; the relation of Oxford analya1a to clas-
sical philosophy is more tenuous. Methodological purpose ultimately dis-
tinguisheu Oxford a nalysis f rom Cambridge therapy, and radically aeparatea 
it from traditional philosophy as well. The tranuteronce or philosophical 
1nvestig~tion from th~ sphere or human experience and thinking to the 
logics ot language signitieH that metbodology--not ontology, epistemology, 
or therapy--ia the esaence ot philosophy. In Oxford methodology Cambridge 
therapy is washed clean. To involve oneself in Oxford analysis is to 
involve oneself. in the di80oYery and delineation ot the logics of 
language~ 
The pbilosop}q ot language reached the ''term of its revolution" ill 
Oxford aoalysid. On the one hand, Oxford aDlllyttid is ulldogaatic; the 
positiviatic and 11reductioniatio'' tendency ot &Dlll.)'sia 1a al.moat vho~ 
elimiDated. On the other hand, the philosophical pretens1ona ot anal7-
a:la are IION severe~ l.J.Jlited. "ADlllysis appears now 110 longer as the 
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whole of philosophYJ it is rather an inGtrument ot philosophy. 1139 
Included among t.he "Oxford philosophers" are two principle figures, 
John Austin and Gilbert Hyle, and num~rous attendants, including Herbert 
L. A. Hart, Peter F • . itrawson, :Jtuart Hampshire, .;;tephen i . Toulmin, 
Xichard Harry Hare, ?atrick Nowoll-Jmith, and Isaiah ilerlin.4<> 
In the cuae of philosophical arw.lyois the perennial intellectual 
dependence of Cambridgo on Oxford re~ereod itself. Oxford owes much to 
Cambridge, tor it wQa Ludwig ~ittgenot~iD of Cambridge who provided the 
initi.D.l stimulus to Oxford analysis. 'While at t.:ambridgo Wittgenstein 
demonstrated the po~sibility and necessity of examining the language 
of priuciplo domaina. In his Tractatuo he endorsed th~ imprecise veri-
fication principle of logical atomism, later formulated in logical posi-
tivism. Thia endor3ement oi8Daled a re~triction of th~ function of lan-
guage to the descriptively empirical. But Wittgenstein's position changed 
radically in hia Philosophical Investigations. ln the ·rractatue he 
included inti~ations and suggeationa o~ tho centrality of language, even 
39Ibid., p. 170. Italics are Ch.arleswortl1' s. i1itb the statement 
that analyeis is no longer the "whole" of philosophy Charlesworth compares 
Oxford analysis with logical positivism. \·/hen he suggests that aDB.l;ysis 
is an ~··ustrument" of philosophy, be tails to differentiate caretull7 'be• 
tween Cambridge and Oxford. ~lbereas in the Cambridge school analysis ~a• 
an "inetrument" tor therap1 (and thus also "philosophy" somewhat classical-
ly def iced), in the Cixtord school analysis is an "ii:wtrument '' inaotar as 
"in:strument ~11etbodoloa] ot philoeop}q" and "philoaoplq" artt univoc&1:. 
4oibid., P• 168. Morris W1eitz, in "Oxford Philosophy," Philosophical 
neview, Llt1I (April 1953), lU?-23.3, givea his impreaaion (after a year's 
viait to Oxford) of oome of thQ ourlier papers ot ~trawaon, oerlin, Ryle, 
llart, and others. Auotin died in 19601 'i'ou.lmin bas been director of the 
r,uftield Foundation Unit !or th8 History ot ldeag sincv 1960; Nowell-.imith 
is at Leic~ator Univeraity; llampshire moved to ~illcoton u. in 1963; Hare, 
.R,yle, Hatrt, Strawson, and Berlin are at Oxford UniYeraity. 
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ordinary language, but in the Investigatioll!J ordinary language became 
the major them<!. 41 1./ittgenatein concluded that language consisted of 
"languages": 
Han kllnn aich leicht eine Sprache vor atelleu, die nur aus Befehlen 
und Meldungen in dar Johlacht besteht.--Od4r einv dprache, die uur 
nus Fragen besteht und oinem Ausdruck der Bejahung und der Vernein-
ung~ Und unztthliges Andere.---Und eine :3prache vorstellen heioat, 
sich ~ine Leben~form vorstallen.42 
He used the phrase 11lane,'11age-garae 11 to describo the widespread variation 
in langunge, and confedsed· to the inadequacy of his Tractatua-tbeory 
of linguis tic structure: 
Das ,/ort "Sprachspiel'' aoll bier hervorheben, da3B das Sprechen 
der J prache ein Teil iat einer TMtigkeit, oder einer Lebeuaform. 
FUhre dir die Ma nnigialtigkeit der Sprachspiele an die~en l3eiapielen, 
und aridern, vor Augen: 
8etehlen, und nach i3efehl.on bandeln-
Boachreiben oines Gegenatandts naoh dem ,\neehen, oder nach Mesaungea--
Hers tellen einea Gegenatandu r.ach einer .Beschreibuug ( !..eichnung)--
Borichten eines Hergangs-
Uber den Hergang Vermutungen anstellon--
t'11ne Hypothese autatellen und prUfen--
Oaratellen dor ~gebnieae eines LXperiments durch ~abellen und 
Diagramme--
~ine Geschichte er!inden; und lesen--
Theater spielen--
Heigen aingen-
Hlltael raten-- 1 • -
Binen 1-litz raachen5 erzllhlen-
~in angewandtes Nechenexempel lijaen--
Aua einor Sprache in di1t andere Ubereetzen--
Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, GrUssen, 3eten. 
--~ ist intere.3sant, die Mannigfaltigheiit der ,./erkzeuge der Jprach• 
und ihrttr Verweudungsweisen, die Hannigialtigkoit der :lort- und. 
.;;atzarten, mit dera zJ vc:tri;;lcticll.tn, 1oW.a -Lagiker Uber den Bauder 
411.ev1, P• 464. Warnock not•• (p. 66) that Wittgenstein's viev ot 
language in the f ractatus did not <lifter greatl7 from liuaaell'•• 
42wdwig ,-littgenstei1a, Philoao hische Untersuchu 
Investigations, translated by G. ~. M. Anscombe 
1953), P• 8. 
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.Sprache gosagt haben. (Und ~}ch der Verfas~r dttr Logiach-
l'hilos ophiachen /~bhandlung). 
He dismissed thoso ·~ho accused him of taking tne "easy way out•" 
and offered instead a challenging new analytic methodology: · 
tliar stosaen wir au! die grosae r rage, die hinter allon diesen 
I3etrachtungen ateht.--Uenn man kf:5nnte mir nun einwenden: "l>u 
machet dir'a leichtl Du redeat von al1en mf:5glichen j prachspielen, 
hast aber nirgenda gesagt, waa denn da~ Jeaentliche des Sprachsp~ela, 
und also der Sprache, ist. Was all en die3en Vorglngen gemeinaam iat 
und sie zur J prache, oder zu T~ilon der ~prache ID'1oht. Du schdnltQt 
dir als o gerado den '£uil der Untersuchun6, der dir selbst aeinerzeit 
das moiste Kopfzerorechen gelllicht hat, nimlich deu, die allfS!meine 
Form des 3atz115 und der Sprache betroffend." 
Und das 1st wahr.--~tatt etwas anzugeben, was allem, waa wir jprache 
n~nnen, gemeinaa.m ist , aa~e ich, es ist diea~n .i;;r~chuinungon gar-
nicht t.:ines gemoiuaarn, weawegen wir !Ur alle daa ;:;leiche ,./ort ver• 
wenden,--sondern oio aind mit einander in vielen verschiedonen 
,leisen verwandt. Und dieser Verwundtsclu&ft, 1ttr dieoer Verwandt-
achai'ten wegen nennen wir aio al.le 11..iprachen". 
43
,·tittgenstein, pp. ll-12. ? he provided .r;nglish tranalation (pp. 
lle-l2e) reads: "Here tho term 'lan~ge-S!!!!.' is meant to bring into 
prond.nence the fact that the speaking ot language io part ot an actiTity, 
or of a form of li!B. Heview the multiplicity ol language-games in the 
following examples, and in otbera: GiYing order9,and obeying them--
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving it3 moaauroments--Con-
atructino an object from a description (a drawing)--Reportiug an event--
·>pe-culating about an event--1'1 orcd.ag and teating a hypotheais-Pre3ent.ing 
the results of kn experiaent in tables and dingrams--Mo.king up a storyJ 
and reading it--Play-acting--~inging catohoa--Gue3aiug riddloa--Maki.ng a 
jokes telling it-..,jolving a problem in practical arithmetic--t ranslating 
from one languttge into another--Aslciag, thanking, cursing, greeting, pra,-
ing.--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity ot the tools in 
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplici ty of kinda ot word 
and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure ot lan-
guage. ( Including the author of '.r'ractatua .Logico-Philoaophicus. ) 11 
44
~ittgenatein, p. }l. The provided ~ngli.:lh tranalation (p. 3le) 
reada: "Here we come up agaiDSt thct great question that lies behind all 
these considerations.--For someone might object againat me: 'You take the 
easy way outl You tulk about all aorto ot langua.5e-gamea, but have no-
where aaid what the esdence of a language-game, and h11nce of language, 
ia: what id 001:unon to all thu.:Se actiYities, ~nd what makes I.hem into 
langWlge or parts of language. ~o you let yo....raelt off the very part of 
th~ investigation tlwt onoe gaYe you youraelt mo3t headache, the part 
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Nittgenatein realized that the criteria of meaning used in logical empir-
icism derived from aDalyziog the uae of atatements in mathe1118.tics, logic. 
and natural science.45 T~~ w~y was clear to analyze the use o! language 
This brief 3ur.unary of viittgenatein'.s work is not out ot place in a 
consideration of Oxford analysis. In point of fact, Jittgenstein exert-
ed greater influence at Oxford t han at Cumbridge. His 1nvestigatiol13 
stirred gre~ter itterost among the Oxford analyst~ than among his Cam-
bridge compatriots. Alr.iost single-handedly he turned Oxford philosophy 
to a concorn with aDh.lysis. 
Wittgenstein' $ thoory in the Investigations was a complete turnabout 
from the Tr&ctatua. His reversal sugge3ta an illuminative comparison 
betweon logical positivism and Oxford analysis. Logical poaitivism pic-
tured language as un invention of man; linguistic analysis saw it as an 
46 
organism. Viewing language as an organism diaallowed a reductionistic 
t~ndency, eapucially if it were poaitiviatic in tem~rameut.47 
about the 6eneral form o! propositions and ot language.• And thia is true.--
Instead ot producing aomething common to all that we call languagtt• I aa 
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes ua 
use the same word tor all,--but that they are related to one another in 
maey ditf'erent ways. And it is because ot this relatioruship, or these 
rela~ionships, that we call the11 all 'language'•" 
45Paul F. .5chmidt, Religi.oua Knowledge ( (Glencoe, lllinoii} : Free 
Preas, c.1961), P• 75. Jchraidt makes no explicit reference to the 
thought ot Wittgenstein at this place, but t h~ argument is parallel. 
46Frederick Ferri, Lapgua~1 Logic and God (First editions New 
York: . Harper anJ Brothers, c.l l), P• .58. 
47
cbarlesworth, P• 183. 
11 
~he Oxford disapproval ot propoaitional aoa1¥1;ic-synthetio dichotomioa 
derives from an oruu-'c vl.·ow o• langua"e• ~! 
~Q...... ~ Q ~ an expreaoion !ita into an 
or~anio whole, and if an expro~;sion nas no meaning apart from a · particu-
lar context, by definition therd are no reducible analytic statements.48 
On the other band, the po~itivistic .t·eduction of a;,nthotio atatementa 
into true/false and meaningless is no lesa unaure for t he analysts. For 
example, ''performatory" statement are perfectly meaningful and ''objsc-
tive" although properly neither true nor faloo.49 In "porfol't'Jatory" 
discourse, language is an "intervention in t.he world." Nothing is de-
scribed, nor is the aim to arouse emotion. liather, attar the words are 
spoken ("I promise,'' "I approve," "l, Nancy, take thee 0 ), the situation 
ia changed by the vary utteri~ of the words • .50 
It is evident that Oxford analysia views language as an organiem 
which may bavo "int'orr.ial logic" irreducible in term~ of formal elements. 
Lansuage is not an instrument. Friedrich \taiamann, a char ter r.lember of 
the Vienna Circle, adequately summarizes our discussion ot tho difference 
48 Ibid., P• 173• 
'+9Ibid. 
50Hepburn, "Poetry and ~9ligious Belief," Metapyisical .3eliefs, P• 
121. ~arnock notes (p. 154) that John Austin was e~pocially concerned 
with per!ormatory utterances. Auatin1s account of perturmatiYes is found 
in llow to do Thinga with Words, edited from lecture notes by J. c. Urmaon 
(Oxford: University Presa, 1962); see also John i\.uatin, Philosophical 
~apers (Oxford: University Preda, 1961). Donald~. ~ns, in The Logia of 
Self-Involvement (London: SCH Preas, c.196}), au1111111rizea Au.9tin's diecua-
dion of portormativea and proceeds to atudy Christian use of language 
about God as ~reator from that perapectiYct. l. a. Hiles, ill ttelig,µ.on and 
the Jcientitio Cutlook (London: George Allen and Unwiu, 0.1959), PP• 185-
186, suggests that "pseudo-caual." prayer language should be abandoned 
in favor of "performatoq" prayer. Thus the prayor ''Thy will be done" is 




between logical poaitiviam and ling~iatic analysis in his reference to 
the ''texture" and "logic" of strata: 
"The formal motifs whioh we have been considering all co14bine to 
impress a certain stamp on a stratum; they give us the 11eana to 
characterize each atr~turn 'from within' that is with reference to 
the st:tbject." It we caro!u:i.ly study the texture of ti1e concepts 
which occur in a given stratum, t he logic of its propositions, the 
meaning of truth, the web of verification, the sun.sos in which a 
de5cr1ption may bo complete or 1ncomplote--1f ~• consider all that, 
we r:iay thereby characterize t.ne aubject-mattar. • • • 'l'ho anal.oa 
with acience is obviou.:J. 'i'he queationll, ''"hat io a point?" "'tlbat 
is a s trai ~ht line?" have been debated for ~ore than 2000 years 
until the uolution was found in a reveri'.Jal of t he problem situa-
tion. • • • ln like ,aanner we ma.y say i;hat each stratum had a 
lo~ic of its own and that thi3 logic de~arrainea the meaning ot 
certain baf1e terma.51 
By implication ~aismann admits that language is net eaaily reduced to a 
single function, that ot do3cribing tho empirically verifiable. 
Oxford analy3L~ :ieal,3 wit' , the logics of or3anic lat1gUage. Its 
I 
methodology d.evelopod I'rom a aharpening o! :iittgen.:Jtein • s tool:, and an 
extrapolation of his initial efforts. Wittgenstein referred to language 
in terms ot the use of lanew,ige. Language was meaningful without a philo-
sophical Juatif'ication of its aense or signi!ioance • .52 riittgenatein 
defined "meaning" in terms o! word use. For Oxford analysts, tbie defini-
tion lent itself too easily to .a "behavioristic" theory of meaning: "to 
mean" consists in uaing vords in a certain way. BJ' sharpening this defi-
nition the analysts ma.de it their own. Oxford anal.7i,ia defines 1Ntaning 
5lFriedrich •:iaismann, "language Strata," Logic and Lancyae, edited 
by Antony G. N. Flow (~econd Jeries; Oxford: 3asil Blackwell, 1953), P• 
30. G. c. i:>teau, in "How 'l'beologiaws ~<eaaon," l"aith and Logic, edited b1 
3a.3ll Mitchell (:.ondon: !Jaorge Allou arid Unwin, 1957), PP• u4-115, retuna 
to make logical generalizations about theological atateh1enta because of 
their "opon texture." m, sug6'9:sts that "the theologian is cono41rned to 
state thiugo, and it may be esaential ••• that [his statement•~ 0011-
notation is not pro\liaely delimited.'' 
.52 
~harlesworth, P• 114. 
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in terms of .!!!!• not in tor,att of "oonsiating'' in tho certain uae ot words. 
This definition of meaning is a methodological rule of thumb.5} In 
addition, Oxford analysts oppooe the auggeotion that all words "mean'' in 
the same way that proper namea "mean, 1154 tl1at is, b3 ostensive definition. 
Combining this emphasis with a definition ot Qeaning in terms ot use, the 
analyeta focuaed t heir int~reat on contextwil relations. Put another 
way, dofinition of meaning in terms of use ia a definition in terms ot 
the "occasion": 
in3tead of aaauming that expre~eiona have a fixed and abaolute maan-
ing quite iudepondent of t he speaker and the context, we must admit 
that oxpressiona only have meaning in context. We muat look not 
f or t he "object'' to wllich the expression refers, but for the "occa-
~·1 which givos its uae aigni!icauce. So, Nowell-!imith sa:,s-;--
inatoaci of t ha queation, 11'4b.ut clotta thll vord 'X' r.ioan?" ve should 
always ask two queatioD8, ''For what job is the word 'X' used?" and 
"Under what conditiona is it proper to uae the word for that job?11.5.5 
53Ib1d., 170 
- P• • 
54Ibid., P• 174. 
55Ibid., p. 172. Niols Sgmont Christensen, a Jnniah analyst, dis-
tinguishes between hia own and the Oxford anal1sts• t heory of meaning in 
On the Nuture of Meani s: A Philoso hical Ana ais (Copenhagen: 
Munlwgaard, l l , P• 1.53: "for us the 1.ute or role by which ve define 
raeaning 13 only one uae, that of referring or making truths." Again, P• 
14, "the meaning ot an expression pertaina to the capacity of that expres-
aion ot being right~ produced when aud vhera, and only when and where, 
something specific of a non-linguistic kind is present, be it an object, 
property, relation, situation, or wh.at~ver it may be. The abstract entitJ 
defined by this capaoit1 ia, we maintain, the meaning of at leaat a large 
claas ot expre~~ions and accordingly the 'thing' sought by ana~io philo-
sophers wh8n raising the general queatioa. [What sort of things are meaniuas?J." 
His definition shows a diotinguishable link vith logical poaitiviam. Peter 
2.illkernapl, another Dane, agrees with much of Oxford philoaop~ in his 
Conditiona for ilescri~tion, tra~lated b1 Olae Lind.WI (London& Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 0.19 ), but he betrays asi alliance with logical poaitiv-
ism . vhea. he charges (p. 118) "that objective aoience, more than a~thing 
else, is a precise fol"lllulation of characteriaticd ot evaryda.J language •• • • 
Oxford philosophers ~ometimea seem to torget that aucb sciences aa geoaetr7 
and physica are investi(llltiollS into fundamental 0011.cepta ot our language." 
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(.)xford aoalyats aharpened not only 'IJitt,;en:Jtein.• a definition ot 
meaning, but also his handling of the interrelatiou ot language "ga11ea." 
vJhile the analyota wore no leaa aDXioua than Witt&enatein to dupict the 
preciae interrelations between "logics" or "gamoa," they have been more 
successful than he in isolating the variety of logica. Reluctant to dis-
cuas tha precise relations between gamea uf languages, Bernard ·,,illiams 
includes among the diatinguiohing marks of a lunguage ga!:18 the fo'.i.lowing: 
Cl) types of logical relation holding within languai;e; (2) subjeot-
matter; (3) ueeu of tachnical terms; (4) purposes; (5) ~ore generally, 
activitie3 with which the language is a:isociated.56 
Gilbort Ryle of Oxford prefers to .t;;peak ot "categories" rather than 
gac:ieu. liyle defines categories as ''uentence-.tactors," and contends that 
each expression belongs to a diatinguiebable type with an indefinite nua-
ber ot instanoeo.57 Ryle demonstrates what he means by category in a 
discuaoion o! ''.use" and nuaage. 11 lie diatinguishea between ''ordinary uee" 
and "ordinary usage," and apparently makes each a categor,~ lie terms it 
a philosophical "howler" to identity tho two and to pretend that actual 
11&e o! expressions is in some wa1 a criterion for significance. "Job-
analysis is not Mass Observation." He suggests that one diocovera the 
ordinary uae of an expre~sion much as he diacovera the ordiD&r,Y use of 
a tool--by manivulating ~t.58 
563ernard iiilliama, ''Tertullian' a Paradox, " J;ev Eoaaya in Philo-
sophical Theolop, edited bJ Antorq G. N. Flev and Alaadeir MacIntyre 
foew Yorkt !'iacmillan Compa~, c.1955), P• 191+. 
57Blanshard, Reu.:>on antl Aoal.yaia, P• ,i.6 • 
.58Gharlesworth, PP• lSo-181. "Maas Obaerfttion" is the Br1tidh 
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John Austin and Peter F. ~trawaon are two other Oxford aualysta who 
have taken their cue from ~ittgenstein, but advanced beyond him. Austin 
differed from ~vittgenstein botb in method and motive. In method, he dis-
sected the details of linguistic uses with leao ol a flair. Inatead of 
providing hints, olues, and pointers of a set exposition, he trained his 
ears for t.he fine nuances. ;~ittgenstein held that the purpoae of lau-
guage description was the dissolution of philosophioal problems. Austin'• 
motive cliffered. He gave the impression that there_ was aomething to be 
learned, both fror.n and about language. He did not disliliss the multitude 
of adverbs that daacriba, for example, one•a action:.'j, in order to limit 
invoati3ation to "voluntary11 and"involuntary'' action. For Austin, lin-
guiatio distinctions were informative; language appeared· ~o be a store-
house ot 1'long-garnered principles and distinctions. n59 :Jtrawson, Oil 
the othe1· hand, attompts to clarify some ot the older terms of philo-
sophical claasit'icatior-. '.41th H. ll. Price he has investigated "catego-
ries, 11• "particulars," "universals," and other tert1s. 6o 
equivale11t of the Gallup poll. 1/arnoak (p. lOl) quevtioDS .;tyle • & ~ethod 
ot catogory-anal1ais, especially in ~le's ~oncent of Hind, by a ~6orting 
tho presence of a ''ghoat'' within the a11aiysis. He finds the "ghoat of 
fi'loore'~ old programme of 'analyais', the atterapt to reduce to some 
single approved grade of basic tacta such propositiollil aa seem to cen-
tion facts of other sortsn--in Ryle'e case, a behavioris~ic interpreta-
tion. R'arnock furl;her clais:1s (p. 101) that such a method is "unlike 
tbat species of unprejudiced investigation the 3ole aim of which 13 to 
achieve a clear zra~p or th<1 concept.a we employ.'' J;yle'a ''onu-world 
theory" is criticall1 analyzed by ,.;. "• -.;ampbell in ''Hyle on the Intel-
lect," Clarit is ilot. ;;oou , e'1ited by U. il. Lewis (London: 1Jeorge 
Allen and Unwin, c.1963, PP• 278-JlO. · 
59warnock, PP• 14?-151. Austin died in 1960. ~luatio~ of h.is 
work are given by J. o. Urmaon, Norman Malcolm, ,t. V. -iuine, and ->tuart 
Hampshire in JourDB.l of Lhl.lo:sopb,Y, I.XII (October 196.5), 499-513. 
6o~arnock, P• 15'+. For a diacttasion of the metapbyaioal implicationa 
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tfa have already touched on the honing ot 'iittgenstein' a analytic 
methodology in our diacuasion ol the Oxford effort to 3harpen his defini• 
tion of ''meaning" and to describe more aJequately his lunguage games. 
3ut it tnus't ba notod. that at the hands of the Oxford &nalya tlJ -:Jittgenstail!.' a 
methodolo6Y has reuched a point of keen precision. The Oxford analysts re-
fined the "paradigm case technique" and the ''significant comparison11 in 
polishing \·,ittgenstein' s method. Analy:.sis employs the paradigm case tech-
nique in clarifying the function of diacourae. The technique parallels a 
fir~t <.:aae with a :Jaoond to understand more fully the !irat. Use.1 in 
parallelud contexto are uaea that are the meaning of the expreo~ion. 61 
t'l.e\il ro!eru to tho paradigm ca.;e in the:3e tt1rli!S: 
the ceaning of (a wordJ can be elucidated by looki~ at simple 
paradigm caaes: auch as those in which !aatidious language users 
e1aploy (.that wore!) when the madneaa of weto.pbysica is not upon theai1 
ouch as those by reference to which the expression u~uallJ is, and 
ult:iC1B.tely h~a ulways to be, explained.62 
In "significant comparison," a _phrase is compared to other !orms ot lan-
gua ge, or other activitiea, vhich accomplish an identical purpose • . This 
procesa of contraat illwaines the original phrase.63 
The search for the logics of language baa not proceeded vithout 
heckling and philosophical rebuttal. Condescendingly, John 'tJisdom refers 
of Peter .:,trawson'a Individuals: an ~aa,r ica ~eoriptive Hetaphy:tioa (1959), 
aee F. Zabeeh, ''Oxford and Hetapbysioa: a Nev Page in ~ontemporary Philo-
sophy, 11 International t·hiluaophical ,uarterly, III (l-lay 1963), }12-31'+. 
61Ferre, PP• 64-65. 
62Aaitorq u. H •. flew, "Divine OmDipotenge anci iiuman .freEtdom," ~ 
Essays, P• 150. 
63Ferrl, P• 65. 
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to the 3uggos tion that overy expression bas its own peculiar logic as the 
,, .d. 64 
1 iosyncrasy platitude. '' Charlesworth contands that ~he ~pproach sanc-
tifie3 t he status ~uo. Jutisfaction with the sta tus quo is evident, he 
cla ims, in t he coucret e work uf Oxford a nalyaia. One is .forced to pretend 
tha t every proposition has itu own logic; at t eu1pt6 to show t he logic false 
are cona truod as misdirected effortB to reduce it to an alisn logical 
!orm. 65 Blanahard' o contention that "cates;;ory-mistakea'' occur exclusive-
ly in t hou5h~ or belief, and not in oxpreasions--as ~le ~ontands--is a 
parallel cri~icis m.66 
A mor o concer t ed attuck on tha "idiosyncruoy platitude" involves. 
tra ns ferring th.:i scrim!l'W.i:;e i'rom the field of lirlguiat ic unalysi3 to the 
f i eld of epi1:»t emolo~. In au,1tte atine; that rtyle i s uot au totally con-
cern<:1d with linguiatics a;; he ad.~t ima,Iine, J3lanshard as:3ume1:1 tha point 
he sets out to prove: 
Now t he only ~ay to decide whether it ia a howler to oo..y ''thinking 
is apeaking" is to 3et clear whether thinking!! speaking. It this 
i a in truth the way to decide, then philosophy will reraain ahat 
me~ have commonly thought it to be, a reflective exploration of 
tht1 nature o! tbinl{4•67 
Blanahard's arsument parallels Cliarl9sworth's ~hen Charlesworth accuses 
the analysts of inoonsi.itctncy. 'i'ho analyst.:3 claim both that language 
ic.1 cor.apose<l of ''public words, 11 and that through inape.;tion ot ordimaey 
language difficulties ara cleared. The analysts ara inconoistent in 
64 Charlesworth, P• 182. 
65 
~., P• 184. 
66aianaburd, .aeason and '1.n&lYsi.s, P• .}36. Jee also P• ,54. 
67Ibid., P• 354. 
-
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their contention that difficulties arise out of the confluence of "cate-
gories" within , otdinary language.68 Blanshard and Charlesworth haTe diffi-
culty with the auggeution that both the problem and the.30lut1on are found 
in linguiatics. An appeal to the court of language appears foolhardy it 
it is truo that problem3 initially reside in language. Putting the argu-
ment another · wuy, Churlesworth critici~ea Oxford's attempt to scuttle all 
word-reference. rha analysts accurately argue that all words do not 
"mean'' in the .same \'la,; ua proper uames; but they are not thereby reliev-
ed of t he necessity to explain their ascription of words to categories 
such as "porformatory," 11a acripti'V'.e, 11 or 11con!irmatory." •'ihat is r,reaeut 
in a specific circumstance to make a particular utterance appropriate?69 
Answering questions like these is part ot the Oxford analysts' recreation• 
al program. 
C~llengoa to the World of Theology 
Oxford analysts r~de a brief fora1 against Ox!ord theologians in a 
short-lived periodical called Univeraity in 1950. and 1951.70 In addition, 
the analytic movement puahod itaelf into the worshippipg COIIIIIIUDities at 
Oxford and Cambridge; tho influence of the movawent was clearly evident. 
V. ll. H. Green notes that 
At both UniTeraities, though latter}¥ to a more marked degree at 
Oxford than at ~r.1bridge, developments in che treatment uf philo-
sophy could be seen to challenge religious orthodox,. Trends ill 
68 Charlesworth, PP• 177-lSO. 
69 
~., P• 175• 
7<>~ic Lionel l4ascall, ".iords 11ud Images (l~ev York: Ronald Preas 
Comparq, 6.1957), p. 14. Some ot the University cliacusaioll.l are found 
in ~ew ~says in .f'hilosopbical Theolop, PP• 96-lo8. 
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the interpretation of philoaophy, the reaction to the dominance of 
absolute idealism giving wuy to aasumptiona that were non-mentaph1sical 
and primarily linguiatic, sapped the foundations of r eligioua b~liet, 
even though their exponents theroaelvea were sometimes sincere church-
men. The •10rk of G. r;. Moore und Bertrand aussell, the.: profound if 
partial ideas of Ludwig ·.11ttgenstein ••• raised fundat.lental ques-
tion::1 about the nature of reality which by-passed religious iaoues 
aince religious oxperienoe was incapable of veritication.71 
The confrontation between analy3ia and theology was not limited to 
the skirmish between philoaophora and theologians in the University dis-
cussions, or to the aphere of corporate worship at Cambridge and Oxford. 
The challenges to t heology are more inclusive. Our investigation centers 
in t~o areas of confrontation. The first challenge of confrontation de-
rives from a restateinent--within linguistic anal1aia--of some basic ele-
1aenta of logical positivism, especially verifiability, or conversel1, 
falaifiabilit1. ~he second major challenge is the analysts' demand that 
theologians isolate and explicate the distinguishing characteristics--
the "logic" or "logica"--of religious discourse. 
Properly under5tood, stringent logical positivism is no longer a 
viable philosophical option.72 It ia true that the principle o! verifia-
bilit1, or confirmability, finda heart1 acceptance in the scientific 
method so heavily endorsed in the technica~ world, but it dould be in-
correct to equate this weakened principle with verifiability as it was 
rigidly interpreted in the earlier stages of logical positivism. Similarly, 
only in referring to the earlier stages ot toe movement may one claim 
71v. H. H. Green, aeligion at Oxford and Cambridge (London: 5CM Pre88, 
c.1964), PP• 342-34}. 
72~d.les (p. 140) isolates as the essential characteristic of logical 
positivism the tenet that moral and religious assertions are not to be 
taken aeriot.isly; in this ~use, he contends, the label "logical poaitiv-
iam" is no longer appropriate • .;jau also supra, PP• 50-52• 
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that logical positivism is l~holly defunct. But it would 'be unv1ae to 
eliminate the terr-.1 completely in 3pite ot ito imprecision. ;Je :Jhall here 
refer to tho earlier 11tu;~ea of the movement. a3 ''stringant" logical positi'V-
1.sm, anu t he latur sta,~us as ''modified" logical positivism. In view of 
this distinction, .:Stringent logical positivism is a ir.atter of hiatory; 
modified lo~ical positivism manifests itself in a variety of guiaea, 
including the scientific method and 3ome types of linguistic analy~is.73 
All this has to do with the first analytic-positivistic challenge 
to theology in tbat some contomporary atll.tlysts und anulytio theologians, 
while adopting the methodology of linguistic analyoia, have not ceased 
to bracket the totality of ''meaningful" logics with the qualification 
that ultimately all logics are empirically baaed. This apparently is the 
verification principle in new dress. ~ome of its iconoclastic nature is 
bidden, and some of ito rigid dogmatism aottened, but the principle of 
Terifiability (or falsifiability) has crept into contemporary philoso-
phical ant\lyaia as a positiviatic carry-over.74 ?hia type of analytic 
challenge ultimately puts t heology and r~ligioua language to the empirical 
test: ia the language of relicJioua discourse empirically verifiabla, or 
falsifiable, even in principlo? i!e shall conaider each eleuent in turn 
73writiD8 in tho "Introduction" of 1aith and :..ogio (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1957), Basil Mitchell mkk.es this 3tatement about logical 
poaitivi~ta (p. 4): "It ia converJbnt to reatrict the term 'Logical 
Positivist' to thoae who regard the verification principlo us the sole 
criterion of mEuuli.n~. ln thia aense of the word there artt few Logical 
Pos1tivii,ta in the fidld to-day." 
74John Wisdom carries out "therapeutic analyaio" on the verification 
principle in "i·letumorphoseu of the Verifiability Theory of Heaning, 1' !i!a, 
LXXII (Ju~ 1963), J}5-Jlt7, when he dvJAonatratea the posdibility of logi-
cal positivism's reincarnation in the mothodology ot ''use. 11 He asaerta 
that the po~itivistic dichoto!i1,J into meaningful/meaningless was atructurallJ 
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aa we characteri~e the tirat ot the two anal1tic challenges to religious 
language. 
The challenge !or empirical verification (also in principle) ot reli-
gious discourse appears in various forms. John wiadom grants that when 
a man sings of God b"3ing "in His heaven," his words obviously express 
inward emotions . But when this man writ9s about beliet in God, and his 
writ i ngs are read by young men to s~ttle their doubt31 the impression is 
not one o! rnen iiirnply conoernod to settle their doubts once and !or all. 
The disputa nts speak as if they are concerned with a matter ot 
scientific fact, ••• but still of tact and s till a matter about 
which reaoona for and againot may be ottered, although no scientific 
roaoons in th~ aenae of fiald SUJ:Yeya for fossils or experiments 
on delinquents are to thu point;/;) 
dependent on deductive consequences which could be drawn !rom verifia-
bility. Verifiability, as~ wed6-e between the meanin5ful.-moaningleas, 
"was a necessary condition ! or the mea.ningfulneois ot arq kind of non-
analytic s tatement" (337). rbe obvvrse is to suggest that 11for a theory 
to be unverifiable it ia neoes~ry that there is no possible aet ot 
initial conditions enabling a vori!ication to be deduced" (3}8). Thus 
the ,Jrinciple (theory) of verifiability presuppoaod u principle of no 
initial conditions--and its def@~e appeared to ba preposterous (}39). 
l f .. he tneory was to bu unvorifiu.ble, there uiuat be a true theory dome-
where in t.hu world o! the uame logical form (}4o). ·r he 'iueation is, 
,Jould logical positiviota be prepared to accept this? 'lhiu is ~!i sdoea'a 
reductio ud absurdum. 
rlisdom contends t bat neither can a wedge be driven betwt1en the 
meaningful/meaningless by ,ceans of an aD!ilyais o! t he "uae of'' ( ..542). 
One o! the priDlllry aime of this method of :1h1:1.ving a use" is to ''provide 
a eure basis to which to refer philosophical cstatements." But if philo-
sophy utilizes this restriction ("that what ha.a a uso irJ veritiable11 ) 
haphazardly, tho analyst's model is a reincarnation ol logical positiviaa. 
I! t he analyst doea not take this ap~roach, he porhap~ f~il~ to penetrate 
the philosophical doctrines under attack, although all too often, disde>11 
claimu, the "extre:ne horn" ia adopted (346-347). Jee also .. ~. \i. Ashby, 
"Use 11.11<1 Verification," .Proceedine;a of !.he Aristotelian ..:;ociety, LVI 
{1955-.56), 149-166, 1:1.mi ,l. B. 3raithwaite'J argument swn:,arized intra, 
PP• 119-120. 
75Jobn tJiadom, "Goda," Lo~ic ar.:l Langua,:, edited 
(Firs t ~eries; 0xford: Baail Blackwell, 1952~ P• 194. 
referring &ither to Bishop Uore or to c. ~. N. Joad. 
by Antony G. N. Flew 
..:isdog ia here 
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,iith this comment ·..:iadom a.ssumoa thf!t religious atatem~nt:.. claim a con-
cern with the cosmos . ,ihen they make such staterattnts, theologians must 
be pro pared ' '.:.o support th.)rn through empirical justification, and allow 
contrary scientific evidence to enter tho cuae a3 we11.76 
Ian Crombie parruits the :•criti c '' in hid article t o apply the verifi-
cation principle to reliGious di~cour~e from another angle. The critic's 
difficulty with theological assertions beBin.o when .:1tatementa "purport 
to be about a particular object, which it is in principle i~po~sible to 
'ir1dicate' in auy non-lin5uiatic wa:,"--that is, ~od--, tlD object which 
ia "differeut from any other particular obj~cts in whoae existence we 
ho.Te any around .for believing." The critic's di!f iculty doubles when 
t he theist clairu3 i1is statement1:J to be true, to havu a "determinate 
meaning, '' but insists that neither he nor his statements can become 
''embroiled in ocienti!ic dispute." The theiat ultimately ''claims an 
fact. '1 ln oum, 
the r ule3 laid do1·m about hou such uttaranc~a tire to be taken 
(e.g. that ''God'' ia indeed a proper m:une, but that it ia in 
principl<: impo.'lsible to sea God) ar1:S such that h~ {j.he philoaophei=l 
caunot sea oither what it~ re!erence can be (tho !ir::1t ~rplexit1J 
or what ito contunt (the second).77 
~rombie'a critic coruplain:J th.at the Christian raters his statements 
to a particular boing--God-''with particular kinds o! events, 11 including 
76u. J. f 'aton suggests in Tho Modarn Predicament (London: <leorge Allen 
and Unwin, c.1955), PP• 42-43, that the vor:1 intelligibility ot theo-
logical aaaertiono ,:,a.y be put in doubt it the "cruliely anthropol!lorpbic 
interpretatiou," which makes the aasertiooa appear aa empirical state-
ments, were abandoned. Paton advises extreme care in tha UStt of o.na~aia. 
77 Ian 14. ~ro.2bie, 11! he Po:Jeibility o! Theological ..itateNents, '' Fe.1th 
and l.ogio, PP• 39-47, 48. Crombie employs the critic's argwae11tation ~o 
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creation and juo.gment. But if the theist is queried ("Which person?, 11 
"Where is lie?," "What events are you talking about?"), he construes the 
questions as a "crude misunderstanding of the nature of theological 
language." The critic unveilo his covert reliance on the verification 
principle with these words: 
Yet if/ he Ghe theistj uses words which appear to be proper names, 
or which appear to refer to cosmological happenings, or to occur-
rences in human personalities, aurely such quostions are perfectly 
proper ones to ask.78 
Here again one confronts the iconoclasm of modified logical positivism 
in new dress. "vlhich," "where," and "what" are empirical watchwords; 
in assuming that these interrogatory adverbs are valid in examining reli-
gious discourse, the critic applies the verification principle to the 
sphere of religious language. 
H. A. Hodges provides another view of the verificational challenge 
when he describes the encounter between theologian and analyst. The theist 
raises qu~stions to ·,,hich he offers theism as an answer. The difficulty 
is that the analyst is unprepared to accept a:n.y interrogative sentence as 
a reasonable question, or for that matter, !!lZ sentence beginning with a 
causal particle as a reasonable explanation. liodges continues, 
We think there can be "idle" questions, and before accepting a 
question as reasonable we require some indication of a possibility 
of answering it. If we are not satisfied on these points, we may 
dismiss the question and its alleged answer as logically mean-
ingless •••• 79 
make way for his analogical, authoritative, self-justifying theory of 
religious language. See~, pp. 16Q-164. 
78Ibid., P• 36. 
79H. A. Hodges, "What is to Become of Philosophical Theology,'' Contem-
porary British Philoscpb;r, edited H. D. Lewis (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, c.1956), p. 219. Hodges does not endorse this position himself. 
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While some analysts insist on interrogative questions which begin with 
"which," "where," and "when," others discount the interrogatives, and 
explicative propositions as well. 
A second form in which some contemporary analysis betrays its posi-
tivistic parentage is its demand for the "falsifiability" of religious 
assertions. Above falsifiability appeared as the fourth stage in the 
development of the verification principle. Popper's theory of falsifia-
bility was used by the positivists to salvage scientific hypotheses and 
general laws.Bo Falsifiability is the converse of verifiability; the 
challenge of falsifiability is in principle the challenge of verifiabili-
ty. Those analysts who rely on falsifiability in their search for reli-
gious logic conclusively demonstrate their positivistic ancestry. 
Charlesworth puts the case succinctly: 
faced with the problem of accommodating religious language, many 
of the Analysts fall back, defensively, upon a kind of disguised 
verificationism which enables them to dismiss religious utterances 
as logically meaningless.Bl 
He further contends that only with the introduction of an arbitrary meta-
physical. assumption ("that an assertion is meaningful only if we knov 
what would count against its truth in the way in which we know what would 
count against the truth of an empirical assertion") are religious state-
ments deemed meaningless. This "truism" is in fact "identical. with the 
verification principle of the Logical Positivists. 1182 
80supra, PP• 31-34 • 
. 81M. J. Charlesworth, "Linguistic Analysis and Language about God," 
International Philosophical Quarterly, I (February 1961), 140. 
82Ibid. Italics are his. Charlesworth's statement stands in need 
ot some~ification. 
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The moat ardent falsifiability-challenge comes from AntoD,1 Flew. 
rii.;; c~~itention that theological assertions are doomed to the "death ot 
a thoueand qualificca1tions" is a precise !orn1ulation ot the faleitiability-
challenge. Flew uses John Wisdom's pa1·c.1.ble oi the gardener to make his 
point: what originally is offer~d as a theological a3sertion ultimatel7 
may disaipate throu13h t he death of a thousand qualifications. This is 
the parable. Two men discover a w~ll-kept garden. One argues that a 
gardener umda t :1e g .. ,rden. 'i'he 11Believer11 and the other mnn pitch tents 
a.:J they keep their watch for the gardener. They set up electric fences 
and train bloodhounds, but discover no gardener. The 13oliever remains 
convinced: ''But there ia a gardener, invisible, intargiole, insensible 
to electric shocks, a gardener who haa no scent and makes no sound, a 
gardener who comes aecretly to look after the garden whic.h he loves. 11 
Flew aaks, 11Just how does what you call an i ::visible, intapgible, ete:;r,-
nally elusivti gardonor differ from an imaginary gardener or evun from no 
garden~r Ht ,.tll'/1183 
~xtrapolating tha parable of the gardener, Ylew next conaidera the 
"lalsif'ication" ot theological stater11enta. He uses the principle o! 
non-contradiction as a fulcrum: 
,,ow to aaaert that auch and aucb is thv case is neces3aril1 equi-
valent to denying that such and such is not the case •••• For 
if the utterance is indeed an assertion, it ~ill necea:sar~ be 
equivalent to a denial ~r the negation of that assertion. • ••to 
know the meaniDg of the negation of an assertion, ia aa near aa 
makes no matter, to know the meaning of that assertion. And it 
there is nothing which a putative a~aertion denies then there ia 
83Anton,y G. N. Flew, 11:fheology ana l!'alai!ication," Nev Eaaaya, PP• 
96-97. new took the parable from iiiedoa•a "Gods," Logic and I.angua.p, 
First ~eries, pp. 187-206. ~isdoa•s article tirat appeared 111 £!:2-
oeedinge of the Aristotelian Society (1944-1945). 
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nothing wbich it as~erte either: and so it is not really an as~or-
tion.8'+ 
Flew•a fal~ifiability-challenge is the converse o! thi, challenge of veri-
fiability. lie poses the questior.i ut falsifiability in thi~ wayt "What 
~ould l:u:lve to occur or to have occurred to conetitute tor you M diaproof 
ol the love of, or of the exiatence o!, God?1185 The question demon-
strateo l''lew• 5 indttbtedneaa to the positiviatic heritag~. 86 
There are several logical alternatives to Flew'd challenge o! falsi-
tiability, but only two, thtt t i ,ird and the fourth, take hi14 at his l!ford: 
(l) theological statameuts aro rctlevant to !alsi!ication, but ·never con-
cluaively falaifiabl~; (2) theological statements are wholly un!ala1-
fiable because they are not aaser-tions at allJ (}) theological statements 
are a~aertiona which can be falsifi ed in principle and in practice, (4) 
theological statements are assertions which can be falsified in principle, 
but not in practice.817 Busil Mitchell accepted the firc1t alternative, 
arguing that tho tlature of taith precludes .the taking ot theological 
assertions as "proviaional hJpotheaea." .. {. .M. Hare elected the second. 
84nev, ''Thctology and Falsification," Nev Essays, P• 98. It is 
interestin6 to consider Blanshard's answer to falsifiability in this 
context. 3ee supra, P• }4. 
85Ibid. , P• 99. 
-
86Jnmes w. wloelfel, in '"Non-Mehphysical'' Christian f•hiloaoplq and 
Linguiatic Philosophy," New Theology t~o. 2·. eclitod by Mart~n E. Ma-rty .arid 
Doan G. Pear~n (~aw York: Macmillan Com!)QDY• c.1965), P• 51, refers to 
Flew as a proponent of "aJJAlytic positivism" in theae words: 11.ihat theo-
logy confronts todny in men like Antony Flew is a returbiahed and broad-
ened poaitivis1i1 sharpened by the methods of linguistic al'lalyeis. The 
verification principle reiaains t~r the newer positivist the corner-stone 
o! philosop~." V:oelfel's article !irat appeared in Scottish Journal 
ot 'fheologY, XVII (March 1964), 10-20. 
87Ferre, PP• 50-51. 
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alternative. Ian Crombie and John Hick selected t he fourth, ::.ugge:itin13 
that falsification in JJractice is i mposs ible because ultimate evidence 
to the contrary is avail~ble only in death.88 Our concern is not to 
analyze t he logical alternatives, but to recognize that the endorseiaent 
of the alternatives suggesta the serious nature of the chuller.ge in the 
first place. J oae theologi ans lay bare the very nerve of their t neology 
in the face of this challenge. As Hepburn sugJe!:.t.D, 
l'he value of t bis :!louified verification-challenge is precisely this, 
that it forces a theologian to expose the very nerve ot hia posi-
tion, to become clear with himself (and to express to other people) 
on what his theology stands or falla. And incidentally he may dis-
cover by his very inubility to do this that his theology is logically 
confused, or not at any point properly anchored to reality.~9 
The analytic confrontation of theology entails not only a restatement 
of tho verifiability-falsifiability principle. The second major analytic 
challenge more accurately mirrors tho methodological core of analysis in 
demanding the "logic" or "logics" of religious discourse. For this reason 
it is found in a variety of configurations. The first confi8uration io 
that the constructive philosophy o! analy,3ia is r,ot a speculative metaphysics 
in support of theology, but a lingui3tic re-description of the familiar.90 
~
8Ibid., pp. 51-52. Austin Farrer, in "A r,tarting-Point for the 
~-hilosophical. Bxwnination of '~'heological Belief," Faith and Logic, edited. 
by Basil Mitchell (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), P• ll, answers 
f lew 3traightforwardly. He suggests that it is impossible to take any 
single theological statement and proceed therewith to its logical analyais. 
This is the case because the sentence will be a ''parable," and to e::.tab-
lish its rnore religioue sense ia "to recover the context of very strangely 
contrasting parables in which it stands, together with tha art cf balanc-
ing parables. This is a long and complicated task. Aud it is a task tor 
believers.'' 
89Honald ~J. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox (London: c. A. ;Jatts 
and Company, c.1958), p. 12. 
90 
~., P• 9. 
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\'ihile theology has at times allied itself with philosophical i.1etapeysics, 
supportive alliance with linguistic methodology ie impossible. Linguis-
tic philo3ophy deniea that it is anything other than an analytic method. 
Fhilosophical analy:sis is far reroov0d from Kant, who would limit reason 
''to make room for f aith. 11 ~)hilosophical analysis conatructa no metaphyaica 
like i.3radley' s, which i.ot only leaves room for God but necet:Jaitatea ilie 
exiatonce. 'l'heology fears a philosophical moveuient whoso theological 
rnethodoloey, in Hepburn' s terms , iG the ai!tintS of aense froui nolla{;use. 
Hepburn' a c liullonge to theology aeurna simple enough. Ile offera t.o 
tests to sift theolo3icnl sonze from nonsense: (1) Are there othor 
wordo uhich CHll be used instead of the expression in queation? (2) How 
can you teach the expresaion?9l \ihile thooe U1ethodological questions at 
first glance appear to oo innocuouo, thoy offer a. serious challenge in 
92 providing no set metaphysics for t heology's environment. Thoy limit 
91
nepburn, "Poetry and Religious Balief, " Metaphy3ical Beliefs, P• 
15'+. 
92A recant article by ~-. Zabeeh, "Oxford ar,d Metaphysics: a l,e-, Page 
in Contemporary Philosophy,'' International. Philosophical Quarterly, III 
(¥.ay 1963), 307-320, suggests that Oxford analysis has not alienat.ed 
itself totally from a qualified metaphysics. The appearance of three 
works, P. 1. ~travson's lndividuala: an ~asay in ~escriptiTe Metaphysics (1959), K. A. Harr,•s ~heories and Tbicgs; a Brief Jeudy in PrescriptiTe 
Metaphyaica (1961), and o • .s. Jhwayder's Modes o! lteferri and Probleu 
of Univeruala: an Essa in Meta aics (19ol, validates, 28.bueh asserts 
-,,. , what ii. M. Hare recently :said about hia Ox!ord colleagues in 
11:-ichool for Philoaopheru, 11 l!!ll2, II c:~ebruary 1960), 115: "what ve 
spend mo3t of our time in Oxford doing is metaphysics •••• We insist 
only on diatinguishing betwesn ~erious metaphysical in4uiry and verbiage 
disgu13ed as auch." For tho attempt of oriti3h churchmen to evaluate 
the atatuo of aetapbysice in contempora17 British thought, a•~ the 
collection of eaaays edited by lan T. Ramsey, Prosoect tor Metapb.Ysics 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, c.1961), especiatlly the essay by c. B • 
.Oal7, 11ttetapeysics and tho Limits of Language," PP• 178-205. 
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theology · to methodology-, and the content ot the discipline to that which 
is non-transcendent. £or at time.s there are no "other worda which can 
be uaed instead of :;he expredaion," as iu the caae ot ''Ood." ln cii.sea 
like tilis, theology lay3 itself open to the cbarse ot "non-sense." 
Hc?hclr.;.on distinguisheu four typos o! "non-sense''; 
we neell only compure "''l'was brillig, and the slith1 toves i.)id 
~re and gimble in tht, walle," and ''This boo!·. is reci nnd grean 
all over, ' ' llnd ''All only every but,"· and ''Socrateoi is nuo6rous." 
~ch of th6se utterances ie nonsensical for a different reason.93 
l.inguistic analyaie challenges theology to select the ~ost appropriate 
"non-oan3e 11 as its own, or to demonstrate that its discourse iit net "non-
sen3e.11 The methodology of analysis otters little escape to the realm ot 
metupeyaics aa u justificatioa for any sort of ''non• sense." 
~iichael Foster contends that analytic methodolo~ is inirAical to 
Christian theology both intrinsically and in its correlative disincl1D&-
tioo tow~rds raetaphysics. One of the assu11tptions of philosophical ao.a.1)--
eis, he asserts, ia that all thinking--and therefore all philoaophical 
thinking--consiato in solving problems. The analyst pictures himself 
allied with the scientist in the task ot dispelling myater;y. ~~steI'7 
arises from two sources& lack of knowledge, and unclear thinking. Science 
cares tor the first; the business of philosophy is the second. It the 
task of analysia is the eradication of unclear thinking, says Foster, b7 
definition ita methodology neith.-r .1'oeters nor allows for the mysteries 
ot theological language.94 
9"1-homaa HoPberaon, "Religion aa the Inexpreasible," New ~sa;,;a, 
P• lJ.}. 
94Micbael s. Foster, !1,Tstery and Philosophy (!.o11do1u SC~~ Press, 
195?), PP• 18-22. Foster inoludea Hana Reichenbach, Moritz Johliek, and 
96 
A second methodological confrontation between analysis and theology 
which is not directly concerned with the restatement of the verification 
principlo involves an appeal to pragmatic results. The analyst challeng-
es the theolo3ian to me&·sure th& practical accompliahments ot analy$1s. 
liepburn contends that theology is uneasy ';lith philosophical analysis 
becau~e of its partial 3ucceas in "therapeutic" efforts. Even though 
succesG~s 6.r\:! infrequent, the th-toloiP,an feara the advance of analysis. 
He seea his o~-m parudoxes not as exhibita in the museum of metaphysical 
rJE11'Vels, but as candidates for dissolution.95 
, 
J. J. c; • .:,1uart atte1npt3 to achieve s1.tch a therapeutic coup d' atat 
in his application ot analytic methodology, for ho reliahes the poasibili• 
ty o! turning "metaphysical marvels'' into logically analyzed questions. 
Jmart asaerta that analysis advances the task o! theology by applying ita 
logic to metaphysical qu~al;l.ons. l'.aey tlleological quautiona are "meta-
phyaical," -chat is, confused; they must be atudied in tho light of logical 
knowledge before progreus ;-1111 show its face. 96 3u1art defines linguistic 
"therapeutic'' anal.yais as a philosophical rnethodoloQ' whoH "logic" (in 
the wide aense) ia a~ "oonceptual inveatigation. 11 Thia logic is con-
cerned with logical rather than GWtapb;,-sical queotiuns. For example, 
aoae .British aualysta (inoluding <.iilbert lqle) in this description. Ill 
the remaininB chapters ot his work Foster inveatigatea the concept of 
tOy:Jtery iu Grtiek philooopb.y, in the Biblo, in conflict with aoience, and 
in correlation with etbica. In general the book is an apologetic against 
tho aual.ytic thrust at my;Jtery, although Foster does not deal apecitical-
ly with the quedtion o! ·i,>y~terioua langu~ge. 
95Hepburn, ~hristianity and Paradox, P• ?• 
9~ J. J. c. Smart, "MetaPblaics, Logic and 'l'heology," New ~says, 
PP• 24-25. 
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"ls goodness reducible to a :iat of non-athical properties?" is preferred 
to "Is the ,'fill froe'?" ,ir11art contends thnt teohni!.iues for answering 
logical liUestiona are avail~ble; though one mJ.y not in fact be able to 
answer logical ~uo~~ions, he knows roughly what sort of an.swer i3 
required. 97 Smart u.3sllrts that ao-called "metaphysical ~ue.,tions'' will 
disappear if t he proper logical questions are ask~d. Tho following 
charuct~ristics are gauerally found in ~etaphy~ical ~uostion~: (1) the 
queution haa the ap,)eurance of being factual; (2) it is in some way 
puzzling, and one doe:;; not know how to set al)out answering it; (3) on• 
feels that it rnat.toro what the answer is. 9B As an exa:uple of theologi• 
C&.l 11therapeutic .:u1a lyeia" Jmart take.:i to hand tho lJrol:>leill ,)! evil. He 
b~51ns with th~ theological difficulty involved in positin3 tho con-
current exi::,tenco of evil and God. This metaphy.~ical '-l.uestion diuaolves 
into a logical question if' "logic" i3 properly applied. 'the clarifying 
argumentation ie complex, but logical. Firat-order evils exist, the 
theia~ might· s~y, so tlwt men might have second-order goods, such aa 
sympathy and kindness, which are impossible without them. Jecond-order 
evila provide the third-order good, forgiveneao. ~hen enters tha queotioD 
ot tree will: iJid God "buy" !rec will for man at the expense of evil? 
Why did God not make people so that they always freoly choae the good? 
5mart ultimately finds the rasolution in a logical que~tion: "ls there 
a contradiction in .3aying thzlt God could have U1ade us ~o thl.lt we alwa:,u 
freely chose right·f11 ~his ar.alytic conclusion, Swart contend~, allows 
97Ibid., PP• 14-15. 
98Ibid., PP• 15-17. 
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the theolo3ian to see a metaphysioal ques tion as it reall7 ia: a logical 
ques tion.99 It appears that Smart vindicates the analytic approach to 
metaphysical-theological 11uvstions by ~rguing that the logical ~ueution 
ia prior. While he anJ liapburn do not find absolute methodological agree• 
ment, both view t he analytic approach aa a threat to a theologian's psyche, 
if not also to his theology. 
Up to this point the theolo~ian who assumes a podition ot complete 
reliance on revelation raay count hirnuelt secure. But philosophical aaal.y• 
sis challenge:;s him aa well. The third facet of the aecond ,ajor challenge 
ia tho argument that any appeal to the self-validating nature of revela-
tory statements ia \.lcacceptable. The question of "meaning" is uot with-
drawn from thoolo~ians who retreat to an authoritative position, relying 
totally on "revelation." In fact, the question is pressed doubl1 hard.loo 
~.ascall's suggestion that theological language eludea exact characteriza-
tion because its aubject matt8r, God transcendent and beings related to 
Him, standa in sharp oontraat to eTery other concern of hwnan thought and 
diacourse101 is not exempt. The analysts• immediate reaction is the 
question, "What do you mean?" Retreat to the ael-t-validatiag nature of 
meauing in revelatory statewenta is uo answer. The anal.ysta persist in 
their demand !or t he "logic" of theological language, its rules of idea-
tion.al syntax, its points of empirical contiguity. Tiley are not content 
99 Ibid., PP• 25-26. 
100 6 Hepburn, ~hriatianity and Paradox, P• • ~ee also Hepburn's 
"From 'iiorld to God," Mind, LXXII (Januar1 196}) 1 4.}, where he links to-
gether the appeal to historical revelation and the coamolo~oal Mrgwaent. 
101Haaoall, P• 93. 
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with the answer, '''l'hua says the Lurd. 11 ll. J. Paton allows the possibilit7 
that theological dic:tcourlfJe is a form of ''ideal" language. He even inc:ludea 
thtt poasibilitt of a cJelf-vulid£ttiDi5 °meaning" as proposed by the author-
itative poaition. But he doe3 not dismiss the analytic challenge, noting 
that the ''ideitl character of a lan~uage depends 011 wluit it is to 88.7•"102 
·thu~ f1;1r we have conaidered one type of analytic challenge which, in 
its reliance upon lo15ict:tl poaitivisw, demands the Vttl'ifiability or· .f'alsi-
f'it.t.oility uf reli~ious discourae. .~. have examined, in addition, three 
facets o! the sucond type of challenge, which is mathodological in 
character. A fourth facet of the second major analytic challenge con-
corns argumenta for tho existence of God. ~nguiatic analysis has re-
stated an~ sharpened t he attack on traditional arguments for God's exis-
103 
· tence. Hapourn provides an excellent example of analytic reconsidera-
tion of ariSW!leDta for God• s exi:Jtence. Ho considers tne Tho1aiatic co3mo-
logical argument from the analytic perspective. (l) The coamolo~ical. 
argumant conclude3 that there ia one Being who owes exi~tence to Himaelt. 
(2) Among the prttllliaes of the argwnent ia tho cl.aim that J!2 'being owes 
its existence to itself. At this point, saya Hepbunl, the Thomist inter-
rupts anJ reminds him that no linit• being oweo its exiatence to itself; 
that doea uot rule out an iufinite being. Hepburn continues with the 
question, (3) How icJ the Thomiat to characterize this 11in!inite being"? 
klong other attributes, ·the theist must include that ot "owing exiateuc~ 
102Paton, P• 4J. Ninian dmart, in ~eaaon3 &nd £aiths: an Investi -
tion of Aeli ious Discourse Christian and Non-Christian London, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 0.19 , P• 200, contends that proponents ot'extreme 
revelationiam aro unthinkingly allied to those who would aadert ~bat 
rel~gioua propo.sitiona are, because unveritiable, . meaniDgleas." 
lQ';\_ 
-u:epburn, Christianity and Paradox, P• 4. 
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to itsel:t." Hepburn concludes that the theist posits an idea which cov-
ertly contains the original puzzling idea. This is tho intrinsic ditti-
104 
culty in "halting the regroI:Js of causes." In short, Hepburn roaorts 
to tha "idiosyncrasy platitude,'' the ''logic ot each expre::Jsion," to dis-
allow the ·l'homistic coa.~olo~cal argument. ·rho apologist• a ability to 
aak if t hore is any one thing in the world without a prior cause is no 
license to extrapolate the queation to tho univerao at large. 
we con roject this aucl any similar version uf the Argument by re-
fuaing to identify the nobula or atom or whatever it ia vith the 
universe. I'o identify them is to forget ••• that thing-worchs 
and words like •cosmos• and •universe' have crucially different 
logics.105 
John Findlay uses another v~rsion of thc:t ''idiosyncrasy11 platitude in 
questioning t he ontological argument ot Anaelru 
if God id to aatisty reliilioua claims and needs, ne must be a 
being in evury way inescapable, One 111hose existence and whose 
possea3ion of certain excellences we cannot possibly conceive 
away. And the views in ~iuestion really raake it selt-evidontly 
abaurd (if t hey don't 1nake it ungrat!lruatical) to speak of such 
a Beina and attribute existence to Him. It was indeed an 111 
day for Anl:ielm ~,hon he hit upon hi3 famous proo!. for Oil that 
<lily he not only laid bare somotbing that is ot the osserice ot 
lo4Ibid., P• 166. In "From World to God,"~. LXXII (January 
1963), 43, Hepburn tries to make his analysis of the cosmological 
argument one not easily di3111issed by contemporary Cnriatian apologetics: 
"I wa.nt, in fact, to aum~eat that tile Gosinological Arg\llllent-or some 
transformation of it--is not juat one approach to apologetics among 
others, ond to be diatinguisbed altogether !rom apologetics baaed oil 
historical revelation. It is an indispeDSable part o! any Christian 
apologetics whatever, illcluding those that centre on revelation. For, 
aa we have seen, at some point appeal must be made away fro~ the finite 
and historical locus ot revel.Mtion to the in!'inite and eterlllll God to 
vhom those allegedly testify." 
105nepburn, Christianity and Paradox, p-. 169. Italics are his. 
Brian ilicker, in God and Modurn Philoao (Glttn Hook, New Jersey& 
Pauliat Pross, c.1· , exaCli.nes the Thomistic cosmological arguments 
anew in thu light o! liD&Uistic analy3ia. Be concludes that their 
basic validity has not been at:teoted by the claims ot anal.Joie. 
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an adequate religious object, but alao something that entails ita 
necod.:Jary non-exiotence.1o6 
In suri1mary, t he confrontation botweeri theology autl anulyais fall• 
into two parts. First, one segment of linguistic ar.aly313 betrays its 
positivistic anceatry in chal lenging theology to provide the veritiability 
or falsifiability of religious discourse. Thie group ot analyst3 demanda 
either the empirical contingency, or tha falsifiabilitl of religious state-
ments. 1'he second 3I"oup dc:nands tho "logic'' ot roligioua discourse. }"our 
cont16urationa of the second type oi asaault were noted: the intentional 
refu:>al of philos ophical aualyaia to provide a ·nutritive metaphysics for 
theology; the generat ion of a r~arful attitude on the part ot some theo-
logians at t he l:luccessea ot therapeutic analyai:3; ~he argument that any 
a ppeal to the Delf-vnlidating nature of the meaning ot revelatory atate-
menta vas unac~eptable; and the subjection :ot traditional arguments for 
God'~ existence to new linguistic acrutiny. 
In actuality tho confrontation includes more than t hese two major 
challengeo, which hEAve a negative air about them. Analysia a:Jks theology 
to i8olate and explicate the, logic of religious discourse. Tlle requeat 
is as much a probing inquirr as a disguised trap. Viewed !rom this per-
spective, the query of analy~ia is no less an opportullity than a cball.eng9. 
The analysts have vindicated the analytic approach to maL's languase. It 
is possible that the same approach may illwai.ne the theologian'~ taskd 
l06 John l~iemayer Findlay, "Can God's ~11:Stence be i.>ioproved { 1948)," 
I.annuage1 Hind and ialue (New Xork: HW111.nities lJreas, c.196}), p.103. A 
footnote adds at the end of this quotation, "Or •non-oigniticanoe', it 
this alternative is preferred." Findla1'a article is an attempt to demon-
strate that there 111 an ontological argumeut to disprove the existence of 
God, namol,1 the wor6hipping attitude of man which do exalta the conceptio~ 
that there ie no room tor its apprehension. But see aluo supra, P• 42, n. 76. 
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and problems if pursued. Wol!hart Pannenberg uses "universal history" as 
the hypothetical framework !or theological investigation, lhldolt Dultmann 
existential historicity, und G. 1;rneat ;/right "Heil:Jgeschichte." The 
challenge of linguistic analysis may ba an additional hypothesis for 
working the mines of theological complexities.107 
For example, Robert C. Coburn, a philosopher from the Univer3ity of 
Chicago, uaeo linguistic analysis to examine the naturo of theological 
diacourse. He frames hia discussion in terms of "religious limiting 
que3tions. 11 'iJy a "limiting que;1tion" he moans "an utterance or inscrip-
tion which has the gr&mmatical atructure of a queotion, but which doos 
not do the job o! asking a straightforward queation of oithor a theoreti-
cal or practical sort.11108 He define.a a "religious limiting question" 
in terms of problems to which Christian theology' speaks: "moral" 
problefll8 (ordering ot ,values)1 problems of morale (the inabili.ty of 
aelve~ to reconcile thomaelves to illa of tho fleab); and problema regard• 
iog the "meaning" o! thingo (yearnings to see things as a whole, to find 
an intelligible (Jattern in experience). A typical religious limiting 
question is, "What is the meanina ot li!e?',109 Coburn contends ·that 011• 
of the primary !'unctions of theological language is to provide a logically 
l07William liordern, in Speaking ot God (Nev York: Nacm:Ulan Compa~, 
c.1964), p. 186, contends that two theologians, F. l!. Cleobury and~. L. 
Mascall, discover little theological value in a converuation with analytic 
philosophy because they doubt tbat Christianity can stand on revelation 
alone. liordern argues for a cordial and poaitive rel~tionship between 
theology and analytic philosophy (pp. 185-200). 
lo8 Robert c. Coburn, "A Heglected U3e of Theological 1anl)uage," Mind, 




complete answer to these questions. H~ defines the logically complete 
answer as 
an answer the acceptance ot which by the person raiaing the que.stion 
is logically incompatible with his continui~; to ask tho que..;tioni 
that is to say, incompatibl@ in tho den~e that hia continuing to 
ask tne que~tion in aome torm or other would normall1 be taken as 
showing either he had not understood the anawer which haa previous-
ly betm provided, or he hnd not accepted it •••• an anewer to a 
question ia a lo~ically complete one provided it renders a~aub-
sequent utterance of the ~uestion it an5wera lo5ically odd. 0 
A person's acceptance or the answer that "The vayo of the Almighty and 
all-wise God are righteous, thou5h beyond understanding" is, for exae1ple, 
logically incompatible with the same person•a asking the question, "But 
why w~a & child crippled by polio?11111 
Our purpoae is not to endorse Coburn•s interpretation of theological. 
discourse, but to indicate that analytic philosophy is capable o! addres.t-
ing a theological inquiry in a positive fashion. Coburn demonstrates hov 
analysio may provide n valuable hypothetical frame~ork tor the theologian's 
task. 
The two succeeding chapt~rs summarize some of the answers given the 
analytic challenges. Chapter IV deals with represe~tative Yiews which 
describe the nature of religious discourse in terms of its verifiabilit1 
or falsi!iability--the first major analytic challenge. Chapter V examines 
"logics" ot religioua discourse--addressing thu second CAajor analytic 
challenge.112 In both chapters, the analytic challenges open doors !or 
llOibid., 315• 
111lbid., 376. In the article Coburn also analyzes the explanatory 
power ott'iirs function ot theological discourse. 
l.l.2.ni1s i~qui17 does not imply that this tvo!old approach is the onl.7 
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discussion. lllanslmrd ,mticipata.s the apprehension a theologian might 
foel in addr0~sing himself to analysis ~hen he says, 
One of tho worat danger,1 in philosophical and theoloc;ical thinking, 
as in political thinking, is prof'essional sGlf-juatif,.cation. That 
a no\,t theory would find ua with our occupation gone is no argument 
against it. A groat many occupations obviously ought to go •••• 
What the philosopher is called upon to do if his methods are quea-
tionud is not to fly incontinently to their defence, but to examine 
as objectively as he can ~he propo~ls offered in their placa.ll} 
possible way to approach the answers given the challeugea o! analysis. 
~Joelfel (p. 50) dL,tinr,uiahes betwoon "metaphysical" and "non-metaphysical'' 
thinkers who have encountered linguistic analysia from tho Christian 
perspective. His "non-metaphysical" men (Haro, Hiles, Hepburn, Braithwaite) 
in part parallel our Chapter IV, while hia 1101etaphyeical'' section (es-
pecially \lhun 1aul!ley ie trumpeted) r.iay partially indicate what we have in 
mind with the 11logic11. ot religious languo.ge. In addition, Jerry li. Gill, 
in '.!The Heaning of :~eligioua La.nf~uage, '' Christianity i'ouay, IX (January 
1965), 384-}39, reviews the work ot some of theae men as -chey addresa, 
in varying rr.ethods, the following syllogism: 111. All cognitively meaning-
ful langual)e ia aith<:r definitional or er:.1,irical in nature; 2. no reli-
gious languugc is either definitional or empirical in nature;}. no 
religious language i s cognitively raeaningful langua~e." His article ia 
short and lacks desired breadth, but tho syllogiam offers another way 
to approach the answers given the analytic challenges. 
113 lilanahard, 1~eneon and Analysis, P• 259. 
CliAP1'£.R IV 
V.ERIFIAI3ILITY-.l!"'A.WifIAJ3I1l'l'Y Ill :rtt~iUE.S OF &;LIGlOUS LANGUAGE: 
AW;',~ii.:.itllm 'l'HE :~L<.i'f .ANALIL'IC CliAJ..1,.d;i~QE 
Introduction 
Chapter III s hows that tha tirst analytic challenge to theology be:-
trays a discernible positivi~tic parentage. This liraita di3cuaaion of 
the "logic" or religious discourse to the realm ot -ehe •~rii'iability or 
falsifiability ot religious language.1 Chapter IV proposes to review 
the works of representative 111en who have accepted tb4! challenge as given. 
The writers addresd that analytic challenge which is structured in a poei• 
tiviatic frame of reference. Thereby they affirm both the validity of 
the atuted que$tion and the re~trictive framework which is its setting. 
F.ach reapondont acknowledges either the verifiability or talai!iability 
of some aspect of religious language. 
There are at le~st threo ch~racteristics of the first po~itiviatic-
analytic challenge attirmed by the writers here NYiewed: (l) the dis-
inclination to identify more than one "language game11 in hWlllln languageJ 
(2) the empiriaal ancuorage of all meaningful statements; (3) verifiability-
falsifiability as the losical tool tor the apprehen~on ot meaning. Not 
all reapondunt~ equally endorde each characteristic by ~pplying it to reli-
gious di~course, but each endorsoa some ~spects ot at least two oharacter-
istica. 
1
supra, PP• 86-93. 
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A olaritication ot the thre~ ch.araoteristica which are generall.J' 
af!irllt8d proviJea au excel lent orientation to the 8\lmmariaa. The disi-
inclination to identify roore than one "language game" in human lall;.."llage 
(l) 1a a carry-over from stringent logical positivism. The men here 
diacuasad construe raligioua atat&iil&llta aa differing little !roes other 
utterances. A corollary ia t he argument that co~nition ot oorae sort is 
an eaaential element ot religious thought and language. Religious state• 
menta are not considered to be "emotive" in the logioal-poaitivistic senae. 
In reference to the empirical anchorage of all meaningful statements (2), 
the majority of the men bracket linguiotic "logics" with the empirical 
sphere; hence only one "logic" exists. ~uestions about God which are 
ordinarily interpreted aa miounderatandinga of religious language ("Which 
Person?," "\-Ibero is He?," "What eveiita are you talking abo12t ?11 ) are not 
considered irrelevant. The empirical placement ot religious language 
implies, in some of the casea, an empirical inveatigation o! the action 
said to be implied in th5 uae ot religious statement~. For othera ot 
the men here discussed, an individual's religious oxporienoe provides 
the contact between empirical base and resultant religious statement. 
In reference to veritiabilit1-falsitiabilit7 as the logical tool uaed to 
apprehend the moaning ot religious otatementa (3), 14ost ot the men asaua 
that a proposition is aigniticant if there are observMtious--eveu theo-
Ntical-releTant to its truth or falsity. :"or some the 111188 priDoiplo" 
oomes into play as a modification of the verification principle: the mean• 
ingot a religious statement io restricted to an empirically verifiable--
at least in principle--uso. ConTersel.J, empirical confirmation also allova 
tor tho admittance of contrary eYidence. Others of the DMtn a.esert that 
107 
talait1ab1lity ia the logical tool to be uaed in ~~tracting the meaning 
o! a religious uttoranoe. For tha~ a religioua aaaertion is moaningiu.l 
only when one known what counts ag9.inst the posoibility ot its truthful-
nese. Asserting "that" i9 a~so asserting "that not"-at least in prin-
ciplo. 
The ch.apter begins with a position of reJJarkable affinity to the 
mthodology of logical positivism. In turn the chapter conaiders men 
vho, wi~h inoreasiJ18l1 lesa zeal, demonstrate a positivistic bias in their-
endeavor to di3sect and describe tho nature of religious language.2 Four 
polarizatioiw emerge in the study (moving from a greater to a leaser de-
pendence on aoroe form _of verifiability): 11Veri:t'iability and Relioioua l:«-
perience," ''Verifiability and Religious Propositions, 11 "Falsifiabilit1 
and Holigioua r ropositio11a," acd "Proleptic Verification and .Religious 
2. Chapters r.v and V of this study are structurally arr~nsed so aa to 
demonstrate a rather complex phenomenon wrdch has co~e to light in ~eaearch. 
The phonomenon is this: aa decreadingly less emphasis is laid on the 
verifiable-falsifiable r.aturo of religious languaga (Chapter IV), there 
ie a corresponding need to emphauize the esoteric-peroonal 11log1c" (or 
"blik") vhich binds togt,ther the diacourae ot ruligion (Chapter V). Th\ls 
it one views the works ot tho writers summarized iri the.s~ two cbaptei.~s 
from the perspective of the !irot anal7t1c-pos1t1Tist1c challenge, the 
two chapters together~ arranged in order or decrea5ibg acceptability. 
On the other hand, if one Yi.ewa the ~orks of the writers here ew:ur.arizecl 
in these two chapters !rom th& p11rspective of the aecond analytic ch.al.-
lenge, the request for the ''logic" or 11logics" o! religious language, the 
two chapters together are arranged to proceed from a position ot least 
acceptability (the first man in Chapter IV) to one ot greatest rapport 
( Chapter V) • 
The concept "blik" originated with .Richard Hare, vho uaed it in the 
"University Discussions" reprinted in New . .u sin Philouo cal Theolo , 
edited b1 Auto~ a. 14. Flew and Alasdair ~.aclnt,r• tlew York: Maordllau 
Compa~, 0.1955), PP• 99-102. In reply to Antoey flaw's parable ot the 
gardener Mare used the term "blik" to denote the iveltansbauung which is the 
Christian's (in contrast to tho nonbeliever's). t he ~~rm describes the 
belief-complex which uuderlles and gi·Hs meaning to the C,'hriatian'a use 
ot religious language. Among othor:s, Paul van .illirea a11d William Hordern 
have used the term which Hare coined. In all probabiUt1 th• tera is a 
Gercan loan-vord. 
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Propositions." The chapter moves along a cur,e rather than along a straight 
lino. The chances are leao dramatic than subtle. In aey caoe, the sum-
maries SpGak for th~maelveo. The coucludiu5 ata.teu,ent of the chapter 
d(.monstratoa the interdependence and t he intttrveaviS16 of tb.o diverse strauda. 
Verifiability ancl Roligioua E.xperience 
John B. ~Jiluon ancl David Cox are among the philoaopher-tlleologia11S who 
address themselves seri ously to thu request for ver~fication in the sphwre 
ot religious thought l;'l.,Jd lan(;uase. .Both demonstrate an affinity to the 
logical-poaitivistic otrain in attributing a aigniticant role to reli&ioua 
experience, an affinity not found among the rest of tho men conaidered 111 
this chapter. Ultimately it ia in the realm of religious experience that 
each applies the criterion of veri! iability which he finda to be an 
integral oloment in religioua language. 
John il. ,,ileon 
. John Boyd rlilson:; provides both a tboory of general languap and a 
specific rationale for religious la~~age. In his discus31on o! gen~ral 
language he isolntes five types of stateme~ta. Imperative and attitudill&l 
statementa are not verifie.ble at all, or onl.¥ iD a trivial way. Their uae 
and meaniug are in the expreasion of a speaker's foollDgs or deairea, but 
they are valueless in argument because their conc~rn is with expreaaion, 
31111aon is an At'..glican, the son- ot an As;.slioan clergyman. .Ln 1956 
he was assistant master at King' a J chool. Canterbuq, .,;116land, and aened 
as second l!!&&ter until 1962. Be waa professor of religioua ~nowled~ at 
the Univeraity of Trinity College, Toronto, 1962-63. Cu.rrectl.3 he loc-
t1.1res in philosophy at tho University o! Sussex, Brighton, i::ngland. 
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not truth. An empiricul atatoment, tho ~econd type, provides information 
about ~n'a experience ot the 11orld. Analytic atato111ente are tautologoua. 
Valno stateu,enta are proce~1ses ot conu.'teudation; they uasign valuo. 'l'heir 
meaning depondLJ on t.hu accepted method ot axiological v<>ri:tication. For 
a :x:amplo, a ''good" kni!e ia good if it fulfills the ·1ualities of sharpness, 
veight, and othuro. Hete.phyaical ate.tements &re t he fitth t.:,pe. On theil" 
ineuning and method of verification it is difficult to agree; perhaps there 
tire none. This admi :seion does r.ot clnasify metaphyaical .stateeient.a as 
"1ne.1ninglei:l:s, J.' but :puto them in the tray labelod "waiting11 !or further 
explication. Since rnen do not know ~hat a ~eta.physical statement cieans 
or how to verify it, ''we muGt reo:Jerve judgment about whethor it is true 
or not. 115 
·,'1ilaon liats threo requirernenta ot a true statement in ordinary lan-
guage: (1) one mu:!t kno11 \that the atntement means1 (2) ou must know the 
right way t~ ve~i!1 it; (3) one must hava good evidence !or bGlieving it. 
In exaz:iining the que.1tion o! a ''true" stnter4"nt 1~ilson turns to the 
Tori!icational approaoh o! ~cience tor guidance. He contends that a 
comcon method of verificat ion in science has provided meaning tor ita 
·state~ont5. He proposes & parallel approach to metaph.:,sical statements. 
From an intensive investigation of "experiences" aoGJe exporieucea WJ.y 
emerge "which we sy all have which we should want to de:,cribe by state-
11onta that aro now clasui!ied metaplqsical. •• The reaulting atatement 
would not be ••metaphysical" (in the oeuse o! tbc preceding paragraph), 
4John •lilson, r.a~uage and tho Purauit of Truth (cambridgei 
Univeraity Press, 19.56, P• ,56. 
5Ibid., PP• 58, 60, 65, 70-73• 
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but ''er11pirical," although 1t would not be verified through ex1ierience ot 
6 the senses. 
In ~ later work, Philosophy and l,eligi,on, Wilson resumes his dia-
cus::.ion ot metapbyoical staterilents, particulurly thoae ot a re.ligicus 
nature. He brackets hia inveatigation with three questions: 1:lhat ia 
the psychologicnl connection between religious ballot aud a~,;sertion, 
and the religious \·my of lif'e? What is oupposed, by religious people, 
to be the logical aonnection between the two? What is, in !act, the 
logical connection?7 In sum, :lilson 5,.;elts a method or "verification" 
\·Illich <iemon.stri:.tes the lor;ical connection beti-,een reli~iouo assertions 
und tn~ r elisiouo ~-1?.y of life. lie distinguishes f'our types or religioua 
tts scrtiona , aach ·with its own "lo~ic": (l) assertions or e:.1piric&l facti 
(2) analytic a s sertions concerned with meaning or use of religious terms, 
(J) assertions or value; (4) a:;sertiona which "look like a~.$Ortiona of 
empirical fact, but whose subject-matter appears to bo some supernatural 
entity or state of atfair3. The author solects the fourth type 
for inveotigation becau.1»e it ie most relevant tor sociologiot, logician, 
and philo~opher.9 
\Jilaon evaluates three attempta to de~onstrate the logical nature of 
th13 toui·th type ot religious aasertion, and SWilEB-rily dism.s.ses all three 
aa inadequate. The tirat, represented by neo-Thold.ote, ro~a1·da religioU3 
6 6 ~ 
~., PP• 7, 93, 9b•97• 
7John ~ilaon, Ph1loao and R~li 
{London: C>xford UniTersity Preen, 
of !teli ious Belief 
8 
~., P• 30. 
9 Ibid. , P• 33. 
lll 
a.:.sortiono a.a :;xplam:.tions u£ the: worlcl' ~ ex~s tence.. ::ileon l abels t his 
t ypo a reten tion ~r t l4e 41iscou.:;;trued hope that t !le .supernat ural inheres 
iri r,n:.l a f foct,:j t he na tura l :,wrld. Undor the impact of r~odern oicionce, the 
and expl ic~ndum. ~ils on cont e~d3 that t hu relation i~ more ~ubtle than 
t 'll II l .1. I , lQ c exp ar.,,. .. ory' hypothe.u . .:J su5i,;C!lta. 
1'he linGt,i stic t ht,ory--the ~ecoud attampt--i,hich expl ains theologi-
cul a~J rcli~i ous a.5oc:.·tion::s a~ "self-just.if~ ing'' iu no lc.3.a i 111pre\!iae 
.:tnu ina.deq.1.ate for .lilson. If this theory arguoa that as aertions perf orm 
a job oth-:l' than Jesc1~ibing, it.l e.dhercnt.s cann1)& ;;:..>u->t l.~e rcligiouo a ,~ser-
tiono aa 6•.muine ly factual in uny way. Ueithor can .i.·eligious a s $erti oD.S 
i11f'orm "iu the wa:y ll,El] which they ,,ust if thay .ire to .ll.l;Jtain tht! fabric 
o! a nything which 1to 3hall cal l a. reli~on. 11 The underlyin.1 structural 
belief of a r eli~ion implie3 u corrolation between state~~nts of belief 
and the wo.L'ld outuide, "beti1oen tne set ol ~ymilols and t l1e thing 
aymbolized."ll 
~Jiloon i~ola.tes t ho theory o! 11assertions as derived from authority" 
as the third mi3COI13tru.cted clarification of roligioua a~ater:.11nts. '.i'be 
t neor;, io i1'complete. rt resembleo a mati:l.eIU1tical table iu that one quos-
tiona whether or net the logical ~me of religion, ag it turns out to be 
under .;;iucb an "a11thority, " is ew;;iiricall111aeflll.. ~he viow preoupposes 
that it ia logica lly inappropriate to give lo8ical reaaona for religious 
belief und asaertion. ::;specially this factor o! the theol"l, sa,ya ~ilaon, 
lOlbia.., P• 45. 
11Ibid., P• 50. Wilson incladea !<laclntyre o.nd :C'arrer in thi3 group. 
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ia de!icient.12 
Hia own explanation of religious assertions i..ilaon basea on the con• 
tention that "a statement is inforllllltive in proportion to its vulnerabil• 
ity." "There ia a ten-foot, atriped, male, lop-eared zebra in the middle 
of tha next room," is moril infor.1iative-and more vulnerable-than the 
ata.tec:ient "'rhere is something in ·the next room. ,;i., ~Uson set.a out to dis-
cover how tho empirical and the 1'1!ligiou¥ c&n make sense logicall1 when 
one a.ssumea that an aesertion•.a in!on'iative character varies in pro-
portion to its YUlnerability. To avoid poisoning the well when h• retera 
to "r@ligioua experience" during the investigation, Wilson agrees that 
the phrase need not imply an experience of aomethiug exiatiug indepeud.ent• 
ly ot tho observer. To use the phrase does not necessarily impl.7 objec-
ti l ·t 14 ve rttit i y. 
The inforr~tive und vulnerable character of a religious aosertion 
1epende upon ita cognitive nature. In consequence·, '.lilaon scrutinizes 
two aioconoeptions tnat underlie the denial o! "cognition" in religious 
belle! '1nd assertions). The denial aseume&J first "that then is a basic, 
ontologic~l difference between what can be said to exist and what cannot," 
12Ibid., P• .58. 
l3Ibid., P• 66. In "Religious Assertions," Hibbert Journal, LVI (1958), 
148-149, ~ilsou co?11C1enta reg~rding his theory of religious l&Dg1,&&ge to 
this effect: "The poaition I wish to defend begins by aoceptiag the new 
ot Professor Flew and cioat otcher·aaod•rn philoaophera regarding vhat can 
properly be said to count aa a moani~iul assertion or atatement ot tact& 
oanael,y, that such aaaertions ~ust ~ Yerifiable and talai!iabl• b1 ex-
perience, 1Jr that th~re must bo tests fiJX' assertiou to :pass. I thillk 
that it th:1.a acceptance i,~ n,~t ade, rolig:io\ls apologists ... ....,, bouDd to 
conve1 au .imnreaeiou ot continuous rotnat and evasion.••• .Ill m, 
Yiev, theref~re, the Chri~tian apologist noed not be ~onoerawd to a.aseil 
the Yiev that all assertions muat (logicallJ) be falsi!iabl•, since lllllQ' 
of bis ow ~saertiona a.otually are ... 
1
~1#1laon, Philosopb;t and rleli.p.o,a, PP• 71•72• 
ll.} 
and second, "that only perceptions or ooruse-experienca con be oogn1t1Te 
(only sense-data c&n really be data). 1115 Wilson u:ses the toolu o! a prag-
matic idealist to dissect the first misconception. lie asserts that no 
basic dif'fe1·onoe exists between a.n "exiatential'1 atate1ne11t and an 
., 1 
· exper ence-atatement" except that the latter inct.ioates the permanent 
and saneral availability o! certain experiences, while the former is not 
necessarily applicable to tho majority o! people, althougn it is no leas 
reliable. To ri1ove from an existential to an empirical statoment, "all 
we need is a certain number o! people ~,1th a common and recurrent ex-
porienoe, and some way o! dietinguishing genuine from illu3i ve experience. •116 
,,ilson' a attempt to de111onstrate tho absence of logical restriction 
in rdligioua a~sertiona is his answer to the second misconception. He 
parallels religious and aesthetic assertions in ordor to blueprint a 
testing-system for religious a~aertions.17_ One must iuclude within the 
structural asaumptions underlyi~ the logical possibility of an evaluatiTe 
system of religioua assertions: (1) the assumption that under certain 
15Ibid., P• 81. 
16Ibid., P• 84. 
17Ibid., p. 8?. Although Wilson does not epecificalJ.: refer to poetry, 
it should be noted that the relation between religio~s language and poet17 
baa come under scrutiny. w • .1-"'raaer Mitchell, in "The ~age ot Reli-
gion," Readinss in Holigious I•hilosophY, edited b1 Geddes MacGregor and 
J. 1~esle1 Eobb (Bo&ton: Houghton Mi!!lin ColilpanJ, 0.1962), PP• 392-398, 
writes as a poet who sees the language of religion aa closolJ akiD to poet-
ey. Ronald w. Hepburn, in "Poetry and Religious Belief'," Metapb,Ysical Be-
l!!!!, edited by Alasdair tfacintyre {.London: ..;c~f Presa, 1957), PP• 8.5-166, 
prosants an intrigtting study. lie states (p. 86h "I am confident of two 
thinga1 first, -that the theologian.!is appeal to poetry can perfectly pro-
perly clarit1 some aspects of hia use of lan3uage, if used with caution; 
aeoond~, that without such caution the appeal to poetry can easil.J result 




oollditiono certain people will always have certain experiences of a ki~d 
that exiater.ti a.L as:3ortiona could be constructed to incorporate tllem; 
(2) the a .ssumpcion that theoo experiences nro important enough to onsure 
c•:mtint1ecl intero~t in t he process of testing.18 Hilson furthar :suggesto 
that t he oonatructiou ot a plan through which peoplu might enter rol13ioua 
experience ie esaeutially the religious expert'a--not the p~looopher•a--
19 
task. The situational uGe of worship may be helpful, but in all caoes 
the possibility of !alai!icution must be retained, at least in principle. 
The pro~am ~ust necea!Sarily proceed without bias. i he progrjm is ea:Mtn-
tiall.Y a ''logical skeleton for t he establishment of !Bl kind of entity," 
so moot cart~inly it should a pply also in the caGe cf the relisious.20 
ln eum, ijilaon argues that basic religious aasertiona have u statue which 
philosophy can recognize, and there is a .pr.oper method of testing their 
validity in experience. 
18
w11aon, Philoaophy and ueligion, PP• 90-91. 
19Although ho does not JOO.ke Jpeci!ic refer ence to ~he t7pe or roli-
gious experience he:,re deaori bed by ~ilson, John \larwick Montgomery, 111 
"fhe Theologian's Gr£.lft, ' ' Joncora.ia Theologj.cul Honthl.y, ;ucxvII Uebruary 
1966), 6?-98, lit tempts to r..arallel t he theologian• a and the scientist's 
cratt. In contradistinction to :ilson, he argue::, that Scripture r a ther 
than roligious experience i:, tb" basis of . t he theolofSian•a craft. 13\lt 
:-iontgom~ry•s arg-~mentatiou is muddled and poorly or~anized. I t demon-
atrates the basic difficulty of his theaia which, if carried through logi-
call.7, should include an appe~l to religious experieno~s does ~ilson•a. 
20\Jilsozi, Philoaop& and l<eligion, PP• 8?-94. 1,t this point rJilson•a 
discussion cloyetailo with his earlier book's. In "Religious Asaertiona," 
Hibbert Journal, !.NI (19.58), 148-160, :<Jilaon disou.;ses in ~ ... ter cletail 
the measurelilent ot experiences which contribute to the meaning ot reli-
gious ut torancea. The parallela between }Jilaon • :s proposu.la aad those of 
H. H • . Frice in "Logical Positivism and Theology-,'' PhiloeopbY, X (July 
1935), 313-331 (8upra, P• 46, n. 82) are of considerable intorost, Kai 
Nielsen, in "'Christian Poeiti•i•' and the Appeal to ileligioua ~perience," 
Journal of Helifaion, XLII (1962), 248-261, ori~icizea wil~on'o general 
orientation &3 a carry-over trom early logical positivism. 
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Wilson admits that hie r,rogram of testing may in tact "tie down" a 
word such a3 "God" to tested e::cporieZ1ce, but he al30 poaits o sphere ot 
"oxpandibility." By a nalytic definition, "God'' can be defined as ''The Al-
mighty Father," "Lord ot tho Universe." Then too, one can 6round the 
word in exparicnces of other people past and preGent, and truat their 
a~aertiona about God when they arc reliable. In addition, one can move 
to the future by otati?lg that "God" means 11ot leaot ao-e.nd-.5o11 f'rom tested 
GXperience, but th.at the word is capable of representing much more if one 
could have the "neceasar:, experience." The tying of wurds to experience, 
as in the CEJ s e of 11God," doaa not eliminate the mysterious: 
r t is 083et~tinl that we should know what we mean by l'God" at an1 
one timEt, and this invol'f'8B basing the word firll'.ly on experience. 
But thia tloea not involve the iroplica.t i~n that we kpow all about 
God himuelf.21 
After all, the believer is correct in claiming that an experience is a 
sine qua no11 tor the full 11llleaning" of th• term "God," and ot other reli-
gious assertions. A philosopher or non-believer ia abb to define "God" 
analytically &B the "Creator 0£ the Universe," but he ia not thereby 
22 granted a !ull understanding ot the vord. 
Up to this point Wilaon claims to have dealt with the milieu ot logi-
cal clarification. He also discusses the milieu or practical decision 
which he dee1DB inevitable a3 a man chooses a particular roligion, denomi-
nation, or aect, and works it out aocording to the above logical clarifi-
cation (alwa7s open to disproof'). ·,iilson c·laima that an exa.::aiaa.tion of 
the first milieu precedes and clarities the second, ~hile tho .tJeCond 
21Wilson, Philo.soph{ and Religion, PP• 100-101. 
22 
~., PP• 104-105. 
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reinforces the first. There can be no practical d~cision without logical 
clarification. Conversely, without practical decision no lo~ical clarifi-
cation ia more than academic. 'dilaon closoo tho chapter with a plea tor 
decisive pructice.23 
'dilson auma up his theory of religiou.J language with the argument 
that throui~h relii:;ious .Jxperienoe, and not by ragilrding religious asser-
tions as explanations, sol!-juatificntiona, or authorization:J, ono can 
"rationally enter the raalm 0£ religious bolief. '' lie pu.t3 his caae suc-
cinctl7: 
The exi!3tence of such exporienoe and tha tuct that it can (loc:P,cally) 
be organized in such a way us to give aense and truth to religious 
asaertiona is, so to speak, ahe ticket or paas-,.,,ord by whose virtue 
.Hea.&on purraita us t.o en~er.2 
David Cox 
In 19.50 David Cox25 augge~ted an overhaul ot Christian doctrine accord-
ing -to the criterion ot logical positivism, the Teriticat.ion principle. 
His intention was tho restatement of ~hri$ti~n dootrino to show its rela-
tion to human exper-..i.ence. It the task ot reatate1;:ent is accompliahed, Cox 
asserted that thcologiana are left not with a bod: ot doctrino consistiag 
23Ibid., PP• 107-ll?. In Thinking with Concepts (Cambridgez Univer-
sity Pres~, c.1963), Wilson deBonatrates tne same pructical concern by 
connecting the practice of philosophical anal.1a1s to daily problems. · 
24
w11son, Fhiloaopb.J' and ~eligion, P• 108. 
25 Cox was ordained an Anglican priest in 1949, and was curate ot 
';taraop 1948-51. He nae be'ln Ticar ot All Jaints Chatham ir. the diooese 
ot aocneater since 1956. His books include ~u~ and 3t. Paul (1959), 
God and the .3elt (19oO), liiatory and M:(th (1961, and ~hat Christian 
Believe (1963). 
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ot "staternonts of f61.ct," but ~1th a number of "empirical h,pothesea. 1126 
'.L'he resulting "ornpirical bypothesea," Cox claimed, would accomciodate the 
verification principb. As a i:subetitute f,:,r the at1sertion "God exists," 
Cox euggeated "Zome men and women have had, and all may have, experiences 
called 'meeting God.•1127 
Verifiability and Roligioua Propositions 
Ben F. Kirnpe 1, Ji.chard Jl. i3rai thwai ta, Paul van ,1uren and Paul F. 
Schmidt ara no le.::.u concerned with the verifiability of religiou3 atate-
LOents tu.an ~·1ilaon anJ Cox, but in general they apply verifiability e1ore 
directly at t he lev~l of religious propositions than at the level of reli-
gious experionce. All four propoae that religious assertions are empiri-
cally verifiable, at leu.st in principle. They differ in their definitions 
ot verifiability. Ben 1r. Kimpel .straightforwardly asserts the testabilitJ 
of synthetic propositiona, including religioua propoaitiono. Richard B. 
Braithwaite afl'irms hid accord with the "spirit ot empiricism'' b:, omphaaiz-
1ng the empirical testing ot one's intentiona stated in religious propo-
sitions. Paul van Buren alters the verification principle .to the "use 
principle,'' and contends that theological statements have u• and meaning 
in their expression or an historical perspective (expressed in empirioally-
anohored words) which poaaesa empirical conae~uences. These consequences, 
in turn, are open to empirical investigation. Pal.ll F • .3chmidt :find.a the 
26
~avid Cox, 111.rhe Significance of Christianity,'' ReadiPfB in Reli-
gious Philosopb,y, editod by Geddes MacGregor and J. w. Robb Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, c.1962), P• }.58. The article fir.st appeared 
in fil:!!!!, LIX (19.50), 209-218. 
27Ibid., P• 362. 
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uae ot religious l&nguage to lie in the attitudea it producoa, attitudea 
which appear to participate in a nuturaliatic syotem. In general, this 
group of four is one atup removed from herd-oore verifiability. The 
evidence for this lies in tho tact that they deal with religious language 
rather than religious experience. neverthGle3~, in addre3sing the first 
poaitivistic-analytic challenge, the men affirm and endorse tho basio 
positivistic proauppcsitions which underlie the challenge. 
Ben ~·. Kimpel 
Ben 11'. Ki111pel 28 criticizoa the notion that religious truth is para-
doxical, and defanda the factual interpretation of taith-state~ents. lie 
accepts tho diviaion of all atate~ents (including t noological) into syn-
thotio and analytic, and suggests that "interpretationis affirmed in reli-
gious faith are synthetic propositions." A taith-statemeiit "attirms 
an interpretation of a reality believed to be other than language it-
self • • . • • ,..29 Beca.uoe he aasumes tho "realities" ot csynthetio state-
ments to be "otiutr than language itself," Kimpel supports tha teBtabili ty 
of synth@tic propositiona, includifltl aynthetic theological statements.30 
Kimpel criticizes the notion that religious truth 13 paradoxical in 
hie a~sumption that 3tatement and tact correlate. He di~cusses at aome 
length the principle of non-contradiction as it relates to the problem 
28Ben (Jamil!) F. Kimpel io professor ot philosoplq at I>rev University, 
Madi:Jon, New Jersey. 
29.Ben F. Kirapel, iansuae and Religion (Hew York: Philosophical 
l.ibrary, c.1957), P• 75. 
30 
.!!!!a•, P• 88. 
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ot paradox. Aristotle correctly demon~trated thb principle to be a neces-
sary condition J.'ur (a) thu t,Xiatenoe of realities independent of thought, 
(b) thinking about realitiea, and (c) tnQk.ing a!fira-.ations about realities. 
Kimpel conclude:J that religious utut e:aonts intentionally paradoxical in 
form are not intelligible. "!'his ia the oaso not only because a property 
cannot be both affirmed and denied a reality under the same aet of condi-
tions, as ~he modern analysts argue in positiD& non-contradiction n3 a 
logical elective freely r.oade in language; it is also true because para-
doxical properties cannot adhere to a reolity under the aa:ne set or con-
ditions, as Ariototle arguod.3l 
Holding a factual inturpret~tion ot faith-statements, Kimpel argues 
that a dif.fere11ce in the m~aning of t heolotSie&l affirmatiollS doea uot im-
ply different denoted realitba. .r,or example, a refecence to "the .1..0rd, 
the first, 11 ie u reto.rence to the &\t::ie reality aa ''the Lord, who i'llilde 
heaven and earth •• ,32 
.Richard B. Braithwaite 
.Etichard :a. Braithwaite33 eete out to determine, in empirical torma, 
what is the S!!. ot religiow, statements in a man's ralisious expression. 
He summarily dismis3ea the theory that theological. propositions are scien-
tific explanations of facto in the empirical world. This ~potheais he 
3libid., PP• 113-133. Kimpel notwithatandiDih l'.:rwin L. Lueker, in 
"Jesus Christ: Oonserntive and Liberal," Concordia 1'heolog1oal Month-
!:., XXXV (July-August 1964), 403-406, ott~r3 an excellent examplo oi the 
proper uae ot par.ldox. 
32Kimpel, P• 68. 
33Braithwaite has been KD.1ght11bridge Professor ot Moral l>hiloao~ in 
the Uni.Teraity o! Cambri.18e ainoe 1953. 
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analyzes as non-falsifiable, and concludes that "a hypotheai .l which ia 
consiatent with evory poaaible empirical fact is n<it an empirical one • .,34 
In analytic style, i3raithwaite determines to employ the "use principle" 
a 3 a modified form of the verification principle, t hereby retaining veri-
tic ... tion b:, use: 
..>inco I wiah to continue to employ varii'ication in the restricted 
senae of ascertaiuing truth-value, I >hall take t he principle ot 
iooauine in this new forlll in which th~ word "veritication11 baa dis-
appearod. But iu romovins this term !rolll tho a~te,11ent cf the prin-
ciple, there i.:l no desertion from the spirit of empiricism. ·rhe old• 
er vorification principle ia aub6umad under t he now uae principle: 
the use of an empirical statement derives from th~ tact that the 
statement is empirically verifiable, and tho lob"ica.1-positiviat the-
si:3 of tho "linguistic" ciiaracter of logical and mathet:1atical atate-
monta can be equally well, it not better, QXpreaood in terms of their 
use than of their rnethocl -of verification. !<foreover the only way ot 
discovering how a atate~ent is u59d ie by an empirical enquiry; a 
state::,ent need not itself be empirically verifiable, but that it is 
used in a purticular ~ay is always a straightforwardly empirical 
propo3ition.35 
Since he will argue that religious assertions are~ as moral asser-
tions, Braithwaite initially chooaes to diaouss moral assertions. ':"~he u.:se 
of a !lloral assertion ia to expreali the attitude of the aaserte,r. "It is 
not used to assert the proposition that h@ h.aG tha attitude--a verifiable 
paychological proposition1 it is used to show !orth or evince his attitude." 
When a ll18.r. asserts that rthe ought to do so-and-so, " be i s in fact assert-
ing that he "reaolvea, to the ba3t o! his ability, to do ao-and-ao." He 
34Rfichar~ sG,variJ Braithwaite, "An ilipiriois t•s View ot the I,ature 
of l{eliglous Belief," The l!«istence ot God, odited by John Hick (NQw York: 
Macmillan Comp&~, 0.1964), p. 232. ~he article (pp. 229-252) is a full 
reprint ot Braithwaite•s book of the ea.me title, originally delivered aa 
the &idington Lecture on November 22, 1955, and published in 19.55 b~ the 
Cambridge University Preas. The book (or lecture} itBelt is not readi~ 
available. 
35Ib1d., PP• 23.5-2)6. 
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does an action aimpl1 because he intends to do it, it possible.36 In 
sharp distinction to thoao who otter an "emotive'' theory o! ethics 
Br-ctithwaite proposos a "conative11 theory: 
The form of · e.thics without propositions which I ,;U1B.ll adopt is 
therefore a conative rather than an emotive thoory: it r~~kes 
the primary use ot' a mora '. assertion that ot expreasing the in-
tention of tho aaQ~rter to act in a particular 3ort of way specified 
in the assortion.~1 
Braithwaite asoerte that t he prir4ary use of rdligious assertions is 
to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles.38 ~he typical mean-
ing of the body of :.;hrintian ausertions ia to proclaim th~ in tention to 
follow the ''Qeapeistic way of life": 
The viow which l put forward for your consideration is that the 
intention of a Christian to follow a Christic111 way of lite id not 
only the criterion tor the sincerity oi his belief in tba assertions 
or Christianity; it is the criterion of the meaningfulness of his 
aDaertiona. Juat as the meaning of a moral assertion ia given by 
its u~e in expressing tho aaserter•s intention to act, ••• so the 
manning of a raligious a3aertion is ~iven OJ its use in expressing 
the aaserter•a intention to follow a speoitied policy ot behavior •• 
it ia tho iuteution to bobavo which conatitutes what i~ known as 
reli6ioua conviction.39 
Hraithvaittt contends that the unification ot convictional and intentional 
statements ia assured because any alternat ive produces a destructive 
36rbid., pp. 236-2}6. It is interesting to note the parallels be-
tween Braithwaite and '?. l<. Miles 'in ite.Ligion a1.td t h'- Jcientitic Outlook 
(London: Allen and Un"Win, c.1959). i3otb rsl;y on the "use principle'' and 
begin their discussion ot religious assertions ~ith an examination of 
the place o! moral a aHrtiono. :C"'or t•ti.les work, see ~· PP• 203-212. 
37Braithwa1te, P• 237. 
38 
~., P• 2)9. As early as 1935, H. H. l'rice described an "attitu-
dinarian" theory ot r ~ligious atatem~uts that somewhat preiigured 
Braithvaite•s theor;r. Price offered his suggestion in ''Logical ro~itiv-
ism and Theology," ?hilosoph,Y, X (July 19.55), 313-_;31. Jee al3o supra, 
P• 46, n. 82. 
39
.Braithwaite, P• 239. 
• • 
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situation. If religious assertions are severed from ~oral principles, the: 
asserter is aure to ba quu.:Jtioned 1:tbout tho connection between a~:Jortion 
and Chri.1tian practice. 11Unlesa religious principle3 are :noral principle•• 
it mak.eti no sense to speak ot puttic.g them into practice. 1140 
i3rait-hwaite takf::ls ;::,ains to demoll8trate that his account ot tha lo$ic 
acd meanin~ of religious state,nenta fully accords with the "spirit of 
empiricism." lie contonds that whether or not a man hau the intention to 
puraue a particular behavioral policy "can be empirica~ tee.tad, both 
by obsarvin8 what he does and oy hearing what he replies when he is ques-
t . 41 l.onad about his intentions." 
Although f$raithwaite construes religiouu assertions as moral asser-
tions, he ca reful ly distinguishes the two. Firs t, a specified behavior 
policy i~ not completely and fally indicated by ao,y one religious asser-
tion in isolation; t his prooeduro roay occur in a. r..,oral aaoartion. :.iecond, 
the conduct advocated oy raligion conc~rna not only external, but aloo 
internal behavior. It conoerne action not only ot the will, but not the 
boart. 1142 
3raithwaite hits on aatorieo'' as tile variable a nd influential back-
drop wlli.ch differentiates one ~orld-religion's aJsartions fron another's. 
4o Ibid., PP• 24o-24l. 
-41Ibid., P• 2}7. Zric Lionel Mascall, in ~fordo and Images (New Yorkz 
~onald ~s Company, 0.1957), P• .50, chargea Braithwaite with fimbigui-
t;y in his use or the word "empirical": first Braithwaite invokes Locke, 
Hume, 1,ill, and i'iusseU to du:lcribe t !'ie po::.ition that all ai~uificant factu-
al assertions ooucern sensibly experienceablo objects; but then he uses 
the word 11empirical11 to describe th,a pos ition that ull aigni!ica11t factual 
aa~ertiOD$ must be ~uch that it is poasible to bitve a aenaible experience 
o! the -..a.yin which sorneona u~.-s t hem. 
42Jlrnithwaite• PP• 2~2-243. 
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the intentions to pursue the bohavior policies,. which may be the 
flllme for different raligiona, are aaaociated with thinking or dif• 
terent stories •••• By a atory I shall mean here a proposition 
or set of propositions which ar~ straightforwardly empirical propoai• 
tions capable ot empirical teet and which are thought of by the 
religious Ulan in connection with bis reaolution to follow the way 
ot lite advocated by his religion.It} 
The ato17 "is a set of empirical propositions." Thia perad.ta tbe !,!!!!l• 
!!!5 of the etory's language to 'oe apprehended "by the standard method of 
understanding how the story-statements can be Teritied." It is possible 
for empirical atory-st~teroents to vary from Christian to Chriatiau, but 
through it all• "the interpretations will all be in terms o! empirical 
propositions. 1i44 Braithwaite tind.s the importance of stories not in 
their "truth," but in their '~meaning": 
For it is not neceaaary, on my view, tor the aaaerter of a r~ligioua 
asaertion to believe in the truth ot tho sto17 involTed in the asser-
tions: what ia noQes&ary i.s tAat the stcr,r sh"uld bo ontertained in 
thought, 1.e. that the atate;aent of tho ator,r should be understood 
aa ha Ting a meanin0• I have aacund tlu.s4 bY requiring that the stor, should consist ot empirical propositions.:, 
43Ibid., P• 244. 
44Ibid., p. 245. Hascall (pp. 55-62) criticizes Braithwaite !or re-
fusing to aee that tbe 113torieo" ot Christianity are ot differing Tarietiea, 
not all similarly ali18na.bl@ to his division of interpretation. lie suggest• 
that Braithwaite otters no reason for choosing Christianity over, tor ex-
ample, Buddhism. Braithwaite refuses to admit tho relevance ot so .. 
Christian stories even thougb the1 haTe empirical tacets (as in the caae 
ot the birth ot Christ). Mascall concludes that if one starta where 
llraithvaite chooses to begin, he is lik•lJ to end where he ends. 
45Braithwa1te, P• 246. Paul van Buren, in The Jeoul.ar Meaning of th• 
Gospel Cllew York: Macmillan CompanJ, c.196}), P• 145, ol.ai.P that 
Braithwaite is inada:-iuate iu his explanation because he haa tailed to 
do Justice to the historical aapeot of the Gospel, and had completel.1' 
negleoted the peculiarit.)' ot the "aster EYeut." ~e intra, PP• 129-
131. 
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Paul van Buren 
Paul van Buren46 endorses linguistic analysis as tho most suitable 
approach to the problem which Bonhoetfer and l3ultm&nn addressed on the 
continent. Two consideratior.a, the fact that empiriciam ia traditioJJal. 
and that industrialism and technology are a way ot lite, recommend to 
him the analytic over the exi3tentialist approach in the ~ngliah-speaking 
theological worlcl.47 Hore explicitly, "The problem of the Goepel in a 
secular age ia a problem of the logic of its apparently meanincless lan-
. 48 
auage, and linguistic analysis will give ua help in clarifying it.'' 
Van Buren i,!jolates a 111odifled 'feritication principlta, the "use 
principle," ae the heart ot lingui:;Jtic analysia: 
If a statement bas a tunc·tion, so that it my iu principle be 
verified or falaitied, th~ statement i~ ~eaningful, and tUlless 
or until a theological statement can be submitted in aome wa7 to 
verittcation, it cannot be said to haYe a meQJliag in our lallg\lage-
game. '+9 
This approach neceaaitatoa a thorough examination ot the context ot 
faith's language becaQse function and precise meaning will vo.ry with the 
context.50 Van Buren•a ~odifioation of the Toritication principle .. eka 
to !ind "what sort of things would count !or an assertion and. wbat sort 
46:rn 1963 van Suren taught at the ~pisoopal Theological Seminary 
of the douthwest in AWJtin, Texas. Currently he teaches in tho depart-
ment of religion, ~emple UQi'fersity, Philadelphia, Pa. 
'+7 Paul ftD Buren, ?he 3eolllar H-.ard of the Gos· 
Analysis o! Its Langu,a.e Httw Iork: Macmillan Comp•Jl1', 
16-17. 
48Ibid. 1 P• 84. 
-49loid., PP• lo4-105 • 
.50Ibid., P• 10.5. 
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of things woul d count aguinst it. 1151 The modified principle contributes 
to a re-evaluation of t heological statements. It indicates that theologi• 
cal statements, meaningless when interpreted as straightforward ausertions 
about the world, have use and meaning in their expreaaion ot a historical 
per:;;pective. The historical perspective gives rise to far-reaching empir-
ical consequences in a rnr·m's life because the stating of the perspective 
is tho declaration of an intention to live a certain lite.52 In sum, 
the verification principle limits the nature of cosmological assertions 
in tho aphere of religious dis cour66. Conversely, questions about "God" 
are answered only insofar as they are addressed to the history of the 
Nazar~rno. 53 
Van Buren admits his debt to the analytic traditions of rlamaey, flare 
and Braithwaite. He contends that theological employment of linguistic 
analyaia l1a3 centered primarily on eighteenth century theological prob-
lems, with a concurrent failure to apply analytic methodology to problems 
of contemporary theology concerned with the kerygma and biblical studies. 
Van Buren comraends Ian Rarttaey for his application of analysis to biblical 
theology, and admita his reliance of Ramsey's di::.cussion of the "odd" 
51Ibid., P• 15. 
52Ibid., P• 199. 
53Ibid., p. 148. Langdon B. Gilkey, in "A New Linguistic Madness," 
New Theoiogy ~o. 2, edited by ~.artin Marty and Dean G. Peerman (New York: 
Macmillan Company, c.1965), PP• 39-49, summarizes and reviews van Buren's 
work. He concludes that van Duren grossly distorts his material in apply· 
ing analysis. Gilkey's article first appeared in Journal ot Religion, ~LIV 
(July 1964), 238-243. Similarly, Hugo Meynell, in "Gospel Without God," 
Theology, I.XV.III (August 1965), 361-366, criticizes van Buren both theologi-
cally and philooophica.lly. Eric Lionell Mascall, in 'l'he ..;eoul.ariaation of 
Christianity (London: Darton, Longman, and ·.rodd, c.1965), PP• 46-105, gins 
both a summary ar:).d a critique of van Buren's work trora the Anglo-Co.tholic 
perspootive. 
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logical behavior of certain ~orda.54 In addition, van 3uren notes three 
agree1:ients with H. M. aare and .R. B. nraithwaite. '.L'he first ia that 11s111ple 
literal thei::Jtr.11 is \'iron[$, and "qualified literal theism'' 1Maningleas. 
Literal t heism 13 :nythological, homele3a in the Glociern world, und dis-
credit~d by modern 3Cience.55 ! he ~acond oon3ensus is that the ''language 
of faith ho.a meaoing ••• it haa a !unction whioh may be clarified by 
liugai::stic analys is." The actua l function ,::it ,1ords provideo the key to 
undor8ta~ding faith's language.56 Third, even though a strai3ht!orward 
use of tha word "God" is to be abandoned, "the language o! :t'aith has 
moaning \-ihen it 1~ ta.ken 'to refur to the Christian way of lite ••• •" 
'"l'he lo.:t" is thus o. central element of van Buren•s liugl.litStic inte.rpreta-
tion.57 
Van Buren choosea a non-cognitive, "blik" conception ol faith as 
methodologicall1 tundarnental.58 Logically, to find "me~ning in hiator7" 
54van Buren, pp. 88, 104-105. !a.u11:.cy diGcusaea e.speciallt the oddneaa 
of "l"; ••• infra, pp. rn5-186. 
PP• 99•100. 
PP• 100-101. 
57Ibid., P• 101. 
58Ib1d., P• 97. At thia point a reader might question the methodology 
of thia atudy and ask: Ia it proper to include van Duren ill Chapter IV 
rct-eher than Chapter V, eopooiall)' ia view of hits espou&al of the 11blik11? 
In &ddition, bow does hia emphaai3 on the non-oognitive oharacter ot tai~b 
(pp. 98-99) fit into the etruoture of Chapter IV? Th• present author haa 
included van Suren in Chapter IV of this study for throe reasons: (l) 
van l:3uren emphasizes the 11uso principle" llS the analytic equivalent ot 
the verification principl_, and endorses it~• dUCh (pp. 104-105, paasill)1 
(2) he states that the function ot theological language is the articulation 
ot an historical perspective vith far-reaching empirical oousequencea 
(p. 132), oonsequeucea which one would auppose to be empirically Yeritiable 
or testable (even as all .etate=::euts r.nast ''be submitted in sollft way to Yeri-
fication, 11 p. 105), althol.l~h Tan Buren doos not d.ra'ti this concluaiozi as 
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is to have a "blik. '' To have a "blilc" is to intend to behave in a certaill 
w_a.1 in connection vitb tho "entertainment'' ot specified backdrop stories. 
"Meaning" iu this contex:: signifies commitment, u clf}cieion which occura 
in relation to a situation of discernmeut.59 Van Buren s~locts a non-
cogni.tive, "blik11 conc~ption of faith becau30 he diatruats a cognitive 
conception built one. "natural uense of the: divine." ':'he cognitive con-
ception of i"uith itJ rr.erely a wilderneua road in that it ieolutes a dis-
tinct seg;neut of experience £113 "religious" and leada inevitably to a 
60 defensive pooture. 
\lith thase ground rules, van Buren prepares to analyze the Gospel •a 
lunl)'Ua0a. i'hat is, hu endeavors to aacertein the !unction of theological 
lan~uage. lt to have a "b11k" is to have an intontion to behave in a 
certain wo.y in connection with the ''entortaincient'' oi s pecific backdrop 
storie:..1 an acaly:Jis of tho t,oapel I s langus.ge begina \lith the:, ntory ot 
the tiazare~o: 
\./hen tho langua3e ot the (]oapel is analyzed so as to reveal ita 
logical meaning or function, the history ot Jeaua ot Nazareth proYea 
to be indispensabl~ to it; it this histor1 ia pushed into the back-
ground, faith r:ay be a perspective, but it is either not g1storical 
at all, or it iu arounded in soiae other piece ot hi~tory. 
doea his ~entor, R. B. Braithwaite; (J) van .t3uren emphasizes atrongl.7 the 
need to restrict "God"-1.anguage to man-language (p. 103), thereby ruling 
out, to all appearances, any consideration o! the transoendent (or the 
:a,yaterious) which is found almost without exception &llODg the ,~n considered 
in Chapter v. 
59illg_., PP• ll}-11'+• At this point van Buren• u debt to ffare, 3raithwaite, 
and i<amsey b~co~es eepeoially evident. 
60
Ibid. t PP• 98-99• 
61 
~., P• 196. Van Bl.lren appears to attack !31.lltmann•s perspective 
ot historicity at tllia point. 
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It ie imposuible to opeak ot a "'sheer cliscerrament," for aonveraion to the 
t,'hrist1an historical perspective " depends in part upon some acquaintance 
with tho history of Jeaus. 1162 But van Duren giveH a itarning to avoid the 
pitfall ot supernatur~l language: 
With the parti cular empirical attitudes which are reflected in the 
WIA.1 we have chosen to uae tho word ''history, '1 we can only apeak 
histgsiaally of Je~us by using words with whic~w. speak of other 
men. 
Van Buren empbasizea t he "troadom0 ot Jesue of Nazareth as a cbarac-
teriatic which does .not break these strictures. Jeou::1 vas "free" because 
"He trusted in the Ood ot love." Thia atateraent 1a best related to state-
enta such as "He loved men," and. ''He wt.a lllilliDJ to die." The phrase 
''appears to have • cash value• in the realm of human conduct. 11 In the 
sense tbat "freedom" tor the Christi.an means that the Christian "trusted 
in God, 11 or ''loved men'' and was ''willing to die," Tall Buren concludes 
that freedom is not the "consequence ot faith," but rather the "logical 
meaning" of taith.64 In another place van Buron showa how words used 
about Jesus were essential~ words uaed ot other .. n. The emplvssia ot 
olaasioal Christology on the human ••uture" lies coatextuall.7 a the 
sphere of "language appropriate to thQ histo17 of a tree man."65 In 
aulllling up hi.a diac11a1.Jion of Jeaua ot Nazareth, the author argues that 
62 Ibid., P• 144. 
63Ib1d., P• 124. Compare Harvey Cox, 'l'b.e Jecular Citz (New Yorks 
Macmillan Company, c.1965), P• 255: "We apoak of God politioal.17 vhell• 
eYer we gi-.e occasion to our n.eighbors to become the respouible, adult 
agent." Cox qu.otea Gerhard ~baling to th1B effect (p. 255): "worldl.7 
talk ot God is godly talk ot the woi"ld. 11 
6lt ftD Buren, PP• 12}-124. 
65Ibid., P• 168. 
-
the Chriatian fa i th was not and is not the dir~ct result ot seeing Joaua 
aa a. h1dtor1cal figure. On the other band, the Chriatian faith i! baaed 
on history. The Geeming contradiction ia due to t htt intervening "aster 
event." "E'aith io not baaod simply on a picture of the historical Jeoua, 
but the hiljtorioal Jesus is indisponsable for faith. 1166 
Van Buren previously stated that the functions 01' theological state-
ments include discernment, duty, and comudtment. These !unctions should 
not be mixed with atutementiS which purport to give "!actual" intorma-
tion;67 tho distinction is eapecially important in discuasing the "Baster 
event•" Peter's ata tement ree&rding tho Hisen One, "~le appeared to me," 
is a record of tha aftnaation ot appearance which s11ggeots the "objective" 
character ot the image. thia or siaailar statements ot aell!ie-content can-
not be verified by common-aense or empirical methods. "Only 'I' can re-
cord what was •on the mirror of lll1' mind.'" The s tatement ot sense-oonteut 
is verified by ascertaining whether the worda and actions ot the a~uerter 
contorm to it: 68 "The teat is one o! consistency. 11 :rom the senae-
content statement, a second assertion might conceivably follow: "Jeaue 
ie risen. 0 It through empirical verifioation the aecond assertion is 
de110natrated !aloe, the di!ticulty lies not in the sense-content state-
ment (the impression is atill real), but in drawing a conoluaion which 
69 
appeara empirioall1 verifiable. The improasion is not invalidated. 










Actually, the diacipleB' use ot the stntoment "Jesus is risen" ruled 
out any notion of empirical verification. 1:then tho disciples asserted 
"Jesus is risen," they atatod an exceedingly odd linguistic assertion: 
The word "Jeeua" is a proper name, and we may assume that it tunctiona 
ae any other proper name would !unction. 1ogicall7, it would be ia-
proper to use the word "is'' ot anyone who had died. • • • '?he word 
"riaelJ" wa0 at home in the context ot such phrases as ''Kingdom of 
God" ar.d "a now heaven and a new earth, '' which were used to point 
to tho end and goal ot all existence. The assertion ''Jesus ia risen" 
takea the t@me of a historical 111&11 and aa1s that he va:s ot the real.la 
or "tho end. ,,70 
Van Bunn furthP.r contendu that words which point to the "end and goal ot 
all exitStence11 find their moaning in their use. Their uae ia "to 1Dtor11 
the hoarer of, or to oo,umend to him, a certain attitude of the speaker." 
The attitude expressed is verifiable through an investigation ot the one 
who spoke.71 In aum, the atater:.ent 11Jesus ia riaen" does not signify a 
change troci t he aense-content statement, "He appeared to me," to an 
empirical a ssertion. "It ie a movement to an •end-word' statement, which 
is voritiod by the conduct of the llllll1 vho uses it."72 In con~quence, 
nn !3uren refuses to uee the word "'fact" for tile &uster event: 
Aa hiatoriana, and ind6ed aa proper users of the i nglish language, 
we would prefer not to speak ot the ~ster event as a 'fact• at 
all, not in thG ordinary yse of the word •••• All we can say is 
that something happened.7~ 
Vau Buren interprets the function ot theological language to be the 
artica.ilation of au h11Jtorical perspective, or conversely, the cleclaration 
~Ibid., PP• 130-l}l. 
71 
~., P• 131. 
72Ibid., PP• 131-132. 
?}Ibid., P• 128. 
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of the intention to live a certain life. '£his functional theor.Y manifeata 
itself both in hia discuasion of the historical Joau.s a~d in his considera-
tion of the 11.E:aator event. 11 A third area ia tl.J.e language or the k.erygma. 
If the 11~ster faith wa~ a 1,ow perspective upon life ariaing out ot a 
situation of discernment focuaed on th& history of Jel3u.s, 11?4 witnelia to 
the new per~pective rnight well manifest a similar logi~l analyuis ot 
language. Van Buren equates a discuu~ion of the ker,gma with a cozwidera-
tion ot today's problematic underatar.ding of the Goepel. The problem ot 
underatar,ding the Gospol ia the difficulty in findinfS v.ey meaningful va7 
to speak of God: nthe problem now is that the word 1God • is dead. 1175 ti.au 
-
has only man's language: 
It uo family reuerAblancea -.1ere allowed bet'-'een the language ot thu 
Gospel and t ha w11.1 in which wo upeak of biting loved by another human 
being, we should ~veto abandon all hope of understanding what 
the Uospel meaua.7 
Contomporary a?JB.lyseo ot theological langllage have translated "<lod-
statements" to "man-atate10enta111 this is no great loaa. ti.an 1a involved 
in a multitude of language-ganwa. ".;jtater3ente about h\lman existence" are 
not on the same level throughout. 
74Ibid., P• 132. 
15Ibid., PP• 102-103. ~'ti.chard R. Caenuaerer, in 11Current Contributiou 
to Cbri~n Preaching," Coc.oordia Theological r~ontb),,i, XXXVII (January 
1966), 38-4'1, wreatleo indireoti, with the problem as he applies the ill• 
oights of analysis to the task of preaching. In "Christian Education~ 
Mortem l.>ei," Religious ;:;ducation, ~X (Januar,-r'ebruaey 1965), 4-10, van 
.Buren wir-avttl8 'the rami!icatiou of hia tbeais tor Christian education. 
Ian uaaasey, Gordon Kaufman, David li\lllter, Frederick F.ir~, and Bernard Cooke 
re'Yi.ew the article in turn. They agree that the article is provocatiTe, 
but recognize the need !or further constructin restatement ot theological 
foundation.a, a need not tilled b1 van Bu.ren's article. 
?6 
van Buren, P• 199. 
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To confine our:Jelvas to the languago developed by men (and what 
other choice is available to us?) appears to confine our subject 
to the realm which is at least in principle open to humo.n investi-
gation, but that doea not exclude th~ richness and '9al'iety within 
this human realm.77 
In view of his re ... din~sa to trarlill.ate "God .. statements" to "man-:statoments," 
van BIU'en•a discussion of prayer indicates the direction hia keryguatic 
analysis will tuke: 
'rhe r11eani11r.; of interceimoey prayer ia ita use: it begins 1n re-
flection upon tho situation in the ligb.t or the Christian perspec-
tive and leads to appropriate action.78 
In cases where nothing can be done, as in an internatiom.il situation, 
"holding the situation up to God11 is basically reflection vithin the 
historicnl peropective of the Chrietian.79 
Discus3in3 th~ langua3e of the kerygraa is discussing the contemporary 
understanding ot the Gospel. It ia unwinding the difficulty in .speaking 
of God. H '10od-atate,uents" aro to be translated into the language-
gamea ot man, there is no better place to enter the logic o! keryg,aatic 
language than with Jesus ot Nazareth. The exclusive, particular CMraoter 
ot kerygmatic language is evident, says van Buren, 1n that ''it cl.aia the 
univeraal significance ot a particular, hiatorical individual, Jesus of 
Nazareth." His .f'reedoci, when discussed, 1a the exclusiTe element. 
Although no empirical grounda exiat to justify tu argument that a similar 
11freedom"-experience is not po~s1ble tr-011 any other "free man," it is 










the a~serter expresses t ho tirmne,,:; of his conviction. Bo 
'.t'he pa1~ticularit:, of kery~tic languo5e ia thus balanced by a 
universality. Kery()rr.atio lan~1:tge "clairas that in the history of Jeaus 
of Hazareth something univeraal, etltr11al, absolute, something it calls 
'God,' waa manifested. '1 '£he univerool aapect includes a perop1tctive of 
all that there ia, a certain understanding of oelt, man, history, ani the 
world. The universal perspective bau its norm in t he histo17 ot the 
Nazarene and the 1::aater ovent.81 The universal perspectiYe indicatea 
that the perceiver waa ''taken hold ot," that ''something bas happened to 
the believer, rather than that he has done aoraething." But 111ore, the 
rettporu;Q is tho act o! .a free man: "the new discernment and ita acoo11pa~-
ing commitment to a way ot life is ex1.ierienoed as a response." Properl7 
speaking, the language of taith ia the "recommendation to his listener 
to see Josuu, the world, and himl$elf in fihe uew perspective J and to act 
accordinglJ. 1182 Van Buren swna up thG uuiversalitJ and particul..arit7 ot 
kerygmatic language with reference to the complex logic of "blik11 : 
It ilS one tlting to say that Christians have al"aya taken the hist017 
of Jeaus to be indiapentiable and de!initive for their faith, but it 
is quite another to think that this "uniquenaljs" can somehow be 
proTed •• •• Clain.a o! "!iiuility" are siaply the langua.ge appro-
priate to articulating a historical perspective. Tu• logic of these 
claima c~u be illwainatad by aetting the• alonoside tho stateaent 
"I'm I. 1~3 




82Ibi.i., J>• 141. 
S}Ib1d., P• 155. 
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Paul F. :icbaidt 
Pa1.1l 14". Schmidt84 concludea that ethioal atatomeuts r~either specifi-
cally concern ~oligious beliefs nor exha1.1st th8 totality of raligious 
assar,;iona. In spite of this ooriclusinn, he counts th1;1 rela.tionahip be-
tween religious assertions and ethical concerns a~ important !actor in 
any con3ideration of religious utterancea: 
Our discussion indicatea that any adequate account ot the meaning 
ot religious asuar-tions must do Juetioe to tblt lrequent connection 
of ethics nnu religion.85 
Cloeely approximating Braithwaite. Schmidt holds that the "primary pur-
pose ot religious language ia to produce certain attitudes ill ouedelt aud 
in others. 1186 ~pelling out this axiom, Schmidt argues that the !unction 
ot CO$mological religious atatementa is to recol!llnend oertain attitudes 
toward nature &nd man's 'behavior relative to nature. Historical religious 
ataterr.ents are r.1eans of ~xpreGsing attit~dea toward a;Hscial evarnts ancl 
per6ona in historJ. Theological otatements, in their religious rather than 
their metaphysical function. express attitudes counected with Uod/god. 
Sthical atatemants in their religious !unetion refer to behavioral diaposi-
tiona toward other people. Finall1, devotional. 3t~ter.enta rocoQD18nd 
oertain teelinga f"or a ·•way or life. 1187 
84Paui Frederick ~chllidt has been associate proreaaor of philosopbJ 
at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, since 1958. 
85Paul F. ::ichmidt, Religious Knowledp ( [a1enooe, Ill1110~: Free 
Preas, c.1961), P• 71• 
86 
~., P• ??• 
87 Ibid., PP• 91-94. 
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Although ~ohmidt doea not otfer the suggestion, it ia possible to 
conclude from his atud1 that tha logic ot religious stateo~nts, which 
functions attitudinally, n,tcosaitatoa tllo verifiability ot tho statements 
in an empirical testing ot tho stated intentiona and attitudeo. 
l!'al3ifial>ilit1 and Heligioua Propositions 
'.:Jilliam A. Christian a nd william T. Blackstone are one more step 
reooTed from the atri~gent criterion of verifiability in their endorae-
Qent of fe.lsifiability.. Falsifiability eusanti&lly weakens the nritioa-
tion principle by a raothod of convoraion, but doau not di!fer mteriall7 
from it. 88 •rhilo Braithwaite, ·.-;ilson, and van Buren endorsed talai!ia-
bility as an integral tool tor the appreherioion of moaning in religious 
diacourse, thoy did not posit it as the aole criterion of meaning, as do 
Christian and Blaokatone. In their utilization o! ial~ifiab1lit7, both 
Christian and Blacketone affirm the empirical placement o! religious lan-
guage (at least in principle), butt.hey do so i,,ith less thooretical clari-
ty and co111mitment than tha nen thus far considered. 
t"lillia11 A. Christian 
89 William A. Christian sets out to demonstrate that, together with 
the functions or contea8ion a~d injunction, religioua atatezcenta expreaa 
geuuine "truth-claims." lli.s is an ex&J!lination of conditioiw under which 
truth claims artt poGaiblo.90 Hio concern is with "propoaals for belief" 
88
sue;:a, PP• 31-.}4. 
S9Chriatlan is professor of philosophy at Yule UniTersity. 
90w1u1am A. Chri:stian, Meaui.y and. Truth in lleligion (Princeton, 
Mew Jerae1: Princeton UDiTeraity t"'reaa, c.1964), P• 1. 
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which appear in the setting of oustaincd 1nquiry.9l Only in this setting 
can genuine disagreeoonts about 11propoGB.ls for bolief" arise. Arise tbey-
must, for if no genuine disagr8aments are possible among thoao who offer 
proposala for belief, ~ignificnut truth-claims aN impossible in reli-
giou~ language.92 
In discussing t he poGsibility of disagreoment3 Chris tian distinguish-
es bet\'ieen ''doctrinal propoaula11 and "basic proposalo. 11 ~iorld religions 
are ablo to disagre~ on a doctrinal propo~l if thG ~ubject, through 
extrapolation, is broad enough tor both parties to accept as C18an11J!tful, 
and if the predicate i s untrue for one or the other. A second type ot 
1,ropo:w.l allows tor more ai gnific&nt disagreement. ·rbe "bl\sic proposal" 
di!!era from tho doctrinal proposal in logical form. In tho case of the 
ba6ic propoaul, the predicate is assigned by both participating groups, 
but to di!! erent aubjects.93 Since his atudy ot tho cognitive uature of 
religious diacourse is pri,narily concerned with basic propO$als, ChristiaD 
seea fit to lis t th~ dis tinguishing ~rks ot a basic propoG&l: "its subject 
term oxpre:;ses the centr-cll concept of some schenre"; and "ita predicate 
expresses the basic concept of aome inguiq. 1194 He chooaea to di;Jcuse the 
91Ibid., pp. 12-13. Christian asaumea (p. 3) the posa1b1lit1 ot a 
generi,l logic or inquir1 ''which becolll8s specified ill wrious wya when 
apecitic interests (for example, scientific, 1:1oral, or religious intereate) 
prompt ua to ask questiona of various sorta." 
92Ibid., P• 24. 
93Ib1a., pp. 15-19. Christian contends that a doctrinal proposal 
preauppoeea ao~ basic proposals because the latter «1ve the point and 
importance of cioctrine. The doctrinal proposal (p. 21) "depends on a basio 
proposal tor explanation ot its context in experience and discourse." 
94Ibid., P• 21. 
137 
basic ~ropoaal because it is an easier t ask to isolate disagreements in 
the area of basic proposals than to locate common logical subjects to 
which uoctrines of different religions give reference in doctrinal 
proposals_95 
Before discussing the predicates of basic proposals, Christian dis-
tinguishes four conditions which nominate a proposal a a a candidate 
truth-claim. These four conditions are here summarized: 
a . The proposal must be capable of self-consistent formulation. 
b. The proposal must be liable to significant disagreement, for if 
something cannot be negated consistently (falsifiability), it 
has no significant con~equences. 
c. The proposal must pP.rmit a reference to its logical subject. 
The term used as logical subject must mean something in acer-
tain way. 11'l'his condition requires of the proposal 'mis F' 
t hat t here should be additional information about m, beyond say-
ing tha t it is F." '!'he proposer must find some fact or other as 
a starting-point for his reference, e.nd then connect the fact 
with the logical subj~ct of his proposal. It must be logically 
possible to accept the fact without accepting the proposal. 
d. The proposal mus t permit some support for the assignment of its 
predica te t o its subject. "It must be p_osei ble to give some 
reason for saying t hat m is F." Giving a reason involves "bri.ng-
ing up aome fact or another according to some principle of judg-
ment." Each proposal, with its o~ predicate, formulates its 
rules of judgment in this matter.9b 
In examining the construction of a basic proposal, Christian holds that 
the predicate must be f ormula ted so that its applica tion is not restricted 
to one lo~ical subject, although it may be true of not more than one. 
Thia type of predicate is educible from a general theory of religion 
borrowed by philosophy from the phenomenology of religion. The general 
theory muat fill the following conditions: it must yield a predicate 
directly applicable to the religious object and not to the religious 
9.5 ~ •• pp. 23-24. 
96Ibid., PP• 24-34. 
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person experiencing the object; it must not. designate a lo8ical subject 
tor basic religious proposals (thus r'-llilli, o\.lt "Religion i:J ~orsbip ot 
God"); it must have e. reanonably wide ranGo of itpplicati on; it must per-
mit reaaonable inte1•pretations of the word 11religion."9'i' After evaluating 
several thoories o! religious predication, including ~ch.liermaoher's, 
Kant's, and Otto's, Christien o!fors his own. In brief, .. ,. religious 
1ntoreat io an intere~t in something 1noro important thein anything else 
in the universe." Ghri atian contends that his formiuation allows tor the 
creation of basic propoaala in that it is a auftici~ut predicate.98 
Christiania led by Braithwaite•s account ot religious language to 
di~cw.s tha relation of rdligious injunctions and confessions to btlaic 
propooala. He challenges Braithwaite "1th a question taken !rom his 
~eneral theory of religion: "When does a moral policy have religious 
i~port? Ordinarily, ve would say, only if it ie relatedrto something which 
ia roligiouoly valued." Christian suggests that religious valuationa (in 
Braithwaite's case the "storiea") not only tell w~ s011ething ia to be 
done. t he religious valuation is an integral element ot that kind ot 
injunction, and diutinguiabes tho religious from the non-religious: 
A religious inJunotion depends on a basic proposal for its aigniti-
cance. !';o, it ''Qod i $ love" i s a religious utteruoce by virtue ot 
some policy it enjoins, the policy is oonneoted with something• 
to ~hich soQe basic religioua predicate is implicitly applied.~ 
91Ibid., PP• 57-58. Ninian Slll&rt, in Heasons and Faiths (London: 
rtoutloclgeund ltagan .·aul, c.1958), p. 197, .:liscounta the auggeotion that 
there can be any aingle definition of religion in terms ot content (e.g., 
11man•3 relationship \llith the divine" ) such as ~hriatian here suggeata. 
See intra, P• 174. 
-
98Chriatian, p. 6o. Christian here follows .Luther's definitioa of"• 
god" in the latt.er' ;, explanation ot the First Commandment in the larp 
Catoohiu. t."hriatian's reliano• on 'lillich al.ao seems to ••rse at thia 
point. 
99Ibid., PP• 140-141. 
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Religious utterancea that are "conteasions" also involve an element rela-
tive to a baaic propoaal. "Religious atctoa in,;olve ra.'arentinl attitudeu, 11 
for a roligiOUI:$ con!~ssion "include3 un implicit or explicit r '3ference to 
something,!, other th11n t lld emotional state of t he apeaY.er, to which ha ie 
related in a religious way." In this way rali$ioaa Cvi.lfeasion also pre-
supposes a ~sic religious propo63.l for its aigr.i!icance. 100 
Christ ian ia uov, in a. pos ition to exar11ino the 11judg:aents11 needed to 
ovaluate tho ~ruth-claims of religious utterances, although he concedes 
that r eligious Judsmenta may be only reasonably cert~in and atable.101 
lOOibid., PP• llt2-143. 
101 
~., P• llt6. In ri,gti.rd to "truth-olairna," r eference 3hould be 
r!lado to a Roman Catholic writer, Hugo A. Meynell, wh":se ilonae, Normanse 
and Chrintianity ( London a nd New York: Sheed and •.Jard_, 1964) was unavail-
able to t hi s writer evon after a t horough tsearch which includod tha facili-
ties o! t ho Pius XII Library of Jt. Loui s University und the Library ot 
the Catholic Univeri,ity of America. Me;ynell grant:s a differttnce in degree, 
but not in kind, bottieon analytic and aynthetic ataternenta. Nevertheless, 
he is concerned to exumine t he verifiable nature of faith-statements, and 
offer~ a diocusaion of "truth-conditions•r in his study. Ho contends that 
hiato~ical statements or faith are at present verifiable and talsifiable--
at lea.st in principle. Eschatological stateinents are only verifiable or 
falsifiabl~ in the future. ~eacting to various torma of theological 
"reductionism'' (hiu t erm), rlt1ynoll limits the importance of pro~ent 
experience (and utterances) iu traditional Chriatian belief. 11.t~eduction-
i s tio" t ,le ologiea i nve1·t tho proportion among truth-conditions o! tradi-
tional fai th (where pa.at and futura !itots were tbe necessary conditioa.s) 
anti present experiontial ! 1:.tct.;3. 'l'hreo reviews 0£ :;enae 1 l~o113ons e and 
Chriatianity appoar in Appendix A. It the work could ba c·aretull.7 anaJ.¥-
zed, it uppaaro to t i:1is writer that it would fall in the cunGiderations 
ot the present chapter. 
As far a.s the preuent writer could discover, use or disavowal of 
liuguiatic analysia on the part of Roman Catholic writers h&a been rathe~ 
limited. Yaxwell J. Charl~sworth, a ~oi:iau Catholic, uas invedtigated the 
_history ot aDalysis in Philoso h and Li etic Anal aia (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University, c.1959, but has ! a iled to tnce tho theological iasu~s 
squarely. Joseph M. Bochenski'& The Logic ot Heligion (New ~ork: Now York 
Univeraity Press, 1965) was not available to this writer. C! tbia work 
Theology Digest, XIV (dpring 1966), 65, says in a brief NTiev: 11A dis-
tinguished Domir,ican ochol(ll', the president ot the University ot Fribourg, 
Switzerland, attempts •to u~ modern mathematical logio to establish a 
general losic of religion applicable to all grE1at rsligiona.'" 
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The first argument which enters a judgement o! religious truth-claill is 
the arguatent of consistency and ooherence. In tbia argumentation the 
important matter · is that no aingle general theo17 of religion (and der1Ye4 
trom it, a basic religious question to replace all others) can be sought. 
"But it is fair to ask for some queations to be stated, ao ve could under-
stand the point of the proposal and thus see more clearly how its various 
parts contribute to making this point. ,.1°2 
Dialectical arguments are the second type to be offered for or againat 
a truth-proposnl. This argument corresponds to the second condition of a 
truth-proposal. It investigates how well the proposal. compares and con-
trasts with rival propooals; it evaluatea the proposal's power to inter-
pret alternatives. i'ihile it is alwaya proper to ''try to show bow SOll8 
proposal conserves, and expresses in a more consistent and coherent va7, 
the Yaluea of another," Christian urges an exhaustin oomparison between 
each of the rival proposals.lO} 
The third type of argument which enters the judgment of a truth-
proposal is argumentation concerning the adequacy of references permitted 
b1 the stated truth-proposal. Christian suggests that logical aubjecta 
ot predicates modified by the references under diacuaision include the 
following typea: qualities, relatioDS, particular natural entities, 
particular hwaan individuals and groups, nature, mankind, pure forms, 
104 pure being, and transcendent actin being. It is in diacuoaing the 
retcrenoea which modify these types of logical subjects tbat ChristiaA 
102 Christian, PP• 148,153. 
lOJibi.d., PP• 156, 160, 161. 
l04Ibid., P• 169. 
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examiuea the third type ot argwaentation involved 1ifith t~• judgment ot 
• truth-propoaal. Aa exRmplea of the queetiona 111h1cb. gin rise to dif-
ferent types ot references, Christian otters the following queries: 
Will you give me an oxa01ple of it? i'ihat does it do? What are its 
ettocts? Am I acquainted with a111 ot ita:partsor iaembers? Is it 
related in some other way to anything in 'l1tY experience? It it is 
beyond IJJY experienoe,. how is it beyond rq experience?l05 
He liete tive r....tthods by which reference to logical subJeCtd ot basic 
reUgioua proposals is possible. (l) "OstellSivo reference" ia used only 
in referring to particular natural entities, particular human indiTiduale, 
and groups ot logical eubjoct. ~he difficulties involved in isolating a 
particular subject may be elillinated partially by adopting a a,mbol tor 
the propoaed .iJubject. (2) "(living examplea" beat provides referential 
moditioation for qualities, reltttiona, and pure torllllS • ./bile the first 
two types of logical subjects (qualities, relations) are susceptible to 
exemplitica~ion 'becaude the1 involve qualities and not an "ideal," pure 
lol'JIIS are not referenced as easily by exemplification. They are better 
exemplified in aaalogJ, or in the via negativa. (}) "Aasigui.Dg regular 
efteots" is an apt reference to uature and to a transcendent aatiTe being 
when either of the:38 ia che logical subject. The ditficulty 1ifith thia 
tn,e ot reference ia that, tor example, the farther the meaning ot "oause" 
ia extended and t11e more aaalogical.11 it ia used, the more clittioult it _ia 
to uae the concept "cause" to reter to :something particular. (4) "Aaeip-
iog extraordiual'J eftecta'' does not neceadllril.J involve "miracle," but it 
ay, expeciall.J in the oaae ot a private event. Thia type ot reterence-
method is very useful in mod1t1ing the transcendent actin being aa a 
105 
.Ibid., P• 198. 
-
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logical subject. Uttur transcendenoe need not be i•plied, !or it it i• 
the ef!ect~ of the tra.n:scendent being are likely to be imperceptible to 
historical judgment. (5) "Interpretation" ia a deduotiTo reforence vhioh 
demonstrates hQw the predicate is related in some way~to the logical sub-
ject. It differs trom causal refol"ftnoe in that its goal of reterence 
occu.pios a different ontological level.l06 
Christian alao providea guidelines for the uae of theite fiTe 1111Jor 
modes ot predicat·ing reference. In arriving at references to logical sub-
jects of religious proposals, it is best to remain aloof from superlative• 
or CODlparatives.107 Christian argues that it is "fair to make an isiterence 
from the kind of reference a proposal uses to the nature of the logical 
subject of the proposal, that which is bei11g proposed as the religious 
object." He continues1 
The reason ia that there are logical 11111.tatiooa on l'llAking reterenoea 
in religion •••• Jo if a proposer seriously meana to u.ee a certain 
reference, then this can tell us aomethillg about the proposal he ia• 
in eff oct, making. ::Je can pose a dile1e'1111a; eitheir hi:s propooal ia ot 
a type fQr which the mode of reference 1a admisitible, or the reterenoe 
fails.loo 
A reference can tail (a) if it ia baseleaa arid otters no tactual starting 
point (tho difficulty with ouporlatives); (b) it it is misconatructed, 
for it may use catogoriea inappropriate to its tactual :starting point; 
(o) it the reference is insufficient, beoauee references in one mode of 
109 










1091bid .. , i>• 208. 
on faots (a), Christian contends that hie theory ot meaning is, in a weak 
aenae, empirical on two accounts: roferencea to logical aubjeots begin 
with facts ao their star ting point, both private and public fucts; sec-
ond, !acts "can bo adduced in eupport ot a claim that a basic predi.cate 
is true of aome logi~l aubject. 11110 He summarizes the procedures used 
to support the predications of basic proposals 1n this way& 
The general requirement is that it ia possible to formulate, in the 
!ra1ne of the predicate in question, ruloo of relevanoe tor ~ppoals 
to tacts, a procedure for judgment, and nol'tlls ot judgment.11.l. 
A1'ter this digreaaion, which dealt with different modes of predica-
tive referonce and different types of logical $~bjecta (allot which 
concerned the t~ird type of argument involved in the judgment ot truth-
propoaals), Chri~tian turns to the tourth major argument involved in the 
judgmflnt ot truth-proposals. Thia argument deals with the possibility or 
ioposaibilit7 ot truth in religious propositions. It serYes as a SW1l!111lrJ 
statement or the book's thesis. 
In the course of developing the fourth argument Christian exami1aea 
three factors integral to the charge that there can be no possibility of 
a true religious proposition. (1) The opponent contends that certainty 
is not possible in religion. Christian agrees to the impossibility of 
obtaining absolute cortainty both a priori and from experience. He 
counters witn the contontion that no human knowledge is certain in tbia 
sense. Nevertheless, sure knovlodge ot "augge•tions" (which illwainat• 
one's lite) in religion is poasible, although thia does not assure absol~t• 
llOibid., PP• 210-211. 
llllbid., P• 236. 
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certainty about propoBitioM derived !roa trur.tworthy suggestions. "For 
our fundamental orientation and baaic guidance in life we rely on experieRce 
which cannot be funded into propositional meaning without relllliiinder." 
Similarly at an even deepar level, one raay accept truoted "basic supposi-
tions" without being religiouB in the i:JellH that a "suggestion" ia religious. 
Proposi~ions derived from baaic 3Uppoaitions are reasonably certain, their 
trustworthiness varying with availability of relevant tac~s and urgency 
of decision. (2) At this point Christian's opponent counters with the 
suggestion that religious questions are not decidable. This argument 
depends, says Christian, on thu assumption that judgment is not poeaible 
in religion. His whole book has demonstrated the oppoaite. (J) In the 
third place the opponent charges that claill1ng tr.1th !or religion in'Yolwa 
inaenaitive, intolerant, obsessive, or idolatrous exclusiveness. Christian 
eta.tea that in regarda to insensitivity, when one aaaerta a propoaition )?, 
he ie not aeoerting that only R is true. Christian further sl.lggeats tbat 
tolerance dooa not imply akepticiuw. And finally, in the light of Chriatian's 
thttory of religion, the opponent's charge of idolatry permits tbe otating 
ot no religious propo6ition.112 
In concluaion ~hristian at~tes that it has been ~s purpose to. ~throw 
light on aome of the ways in which we do (and migbt) th1Dlc: and speak when 
we are prompted by religious intereat." His examination of the problem 
waa not restricted to the diac!.lssion of meaning and t ruth, and thl;l criteria 
ot significance and tr~th, required only for religious diuoourse. Bia 
taak involved the generalization o! the3e concepts in order that th• theory 
112T1..~d., ~~Q26~ 
.u.,,, PP• '7J- ~· 
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is "powerful enough to oxtond in an illuminating way beyond the domain of 
its origin."ll} 
Williaa T. Blackstone 
ll4 
~illiam T. Blackatone approaohea the question of religioua dia-
oourae from the perspective ot religious knowledge. He ~sawaea that an 
investigation of relib"1ous language does not conui~t in describing its 
uaea. Correlatively, he deems it necessary to evaluate criteria of oog-
nitivity applicable to religious belief and language. lie inai3ts that 
prior to an investigation of reli~ious langWl3e one must ascertain what 
religious hnguage ia, that is, what its limits are. It ia his sugges-
tion that religious language concerna a belief which provides an object(s) 
of devotion and presents a pervasive orientation-!rame.ll5 
l'ho ana.l.yats huvtt done well, says filackstone, in drawing att@ntion 
to meaning in use, but they have not re3olved the problem of religious 
"oognition. 11 It ia ultimately nucesaary, in apite of all the "logic" of 
religious language, to establiah criteria which delimit what ia and ~hat 
is not cognitive language. Simple description o! the me.ny wses ot reli• 
sioua language ie no substitute tor an anal1sia of thu crit@ria ot its 
cognitive aigni!icance.1l 6 Blackstone reject• the conolusion of 30 .. 
llJibid., PP• 263-264. 
114BJ.ack3tone bas been asuociate professor of philodop~ at the 
Universit7 ot Georgia since 1961. 
l1SY1lliam T. Blacksto11e, The Problem of Religious Knovledp (~ngl•-
wood Cliffs, ~ew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, c.1963), PP• J8-J9. 
ll6Ibid., P• ,54. ln thi~ regard it is interostillg to compare an 
editorial in Christianity Todaz, IX (July 1965), 107J, which dismisses 
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analysts that it religi ous asaortions are non-cognitiTe they are autolllll-
tically emotive. He uraea the proposing ot apQcilic ~riteria tor oogoi-
tion. The criterion offered by those who aee r~ligioua l.£lnguage as 
emotive--a criterion of cognitive meaning which eliminates metaph1sics--
Blackatone views as inaul!ioient.117 Ho aubmita, in o:sdence, that the 
falaitiability test ia a proper crit~rion ot cognitive aigniticance in 
religious discourse. 118 :CC view of this protferad criterion, Blackatone 
will not allow ''religious experience" to aorve aa a justifying ground tor 
supposed objective i~port in religious sentences, 
All religious aentences ••• which purport to have objectiTe im-
port and which have as their justifying grounds merely "relii;ioua 
experience" cannot be classified a3 knowledge. This includes not 
only the claims that God exiata, but that Christ 13 his eon •• •• 
And to the oxtent that any religious sentence based on th1o appeal 
cannot be given aome olear m~ani.ng eo that tho speaker and tbe hear-
er can know or find out what tl..le sentence is about and the extent 
ot the claim being tt1ade about it, the issue of the cognitivity of 
these sentences ariae~ again.119 
Blackstone includes in the category ot cognitiTe religious state-
ments aasertions that are predictive, descriptive, historical, explana-
tory, and those which make autobiographical olaima.120 All are 
the "linguistic theologians," although they validate religious beliefs 
aa working modola in the acientitic world, because the~ do not reoolve 
the queation of "truth." 
ll7•illi.D.m '!'. Blackstone, "Religious language, Emotivism, and Cog-
nitivit1," Iliff Renew, XVIII (Jinter 1961), 41-44. 
118Bl4lck8tontt, Problem, ot Heligioua Knovleds,, P• 54 • .Blackstone 
somewhat imprecisely offers this suggeation, stating, e.g., on P• 55 that 
the predictive stateiant achrist will return" ia eaaily testable and 
falsifiable. 
119Ibid., P• 144. 
120 
~., P• ,56. 
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falsifiable, at least in principle. He notes that analogical religious 
statements are aomotimes set forth ae cognitive, but are not to be inter-
preted lite~ally or treated as atraight!orward empirical hypotheses. The .. 
analogical otateroenta cause no ond ot difficulty.121 Religious sentences 
which olnim to impart knowledgo, but to which no falsifying evidence 
appliea, create a complex problem for one con9erned with the question, 
"Is religious knowledge possible?" Such statements are aupposed to bet 
true analogically or aymbolioally. }:Ven more disconcerting, it i3 often 
this type of sentence, and not the "deacriptive, historical, or oxplana-
tory sentences,'' which fulfills tho appropriate functions of toouaing 
attitudinal orientation and providing an object(s) of devotion. Jince 
Blackstone apportions t he degree ot ''attitude of ballef11 aocording to tho 
criteria ot cognitivity, he holds that sentences which appeal to aoalogy 
und ~ymboliam are not candidates fvr an attit~de of belief since they tail 
to fulfill the criteria of cognitivity.122 
Blackstone argues that his conclusion (regarding cognitive criteria 
and the necessity of cognitivity as a basis tor r~ligious bolief) does 
not imply that analogical-symbolical statements have no value in the 
lives of people. His conclusion dose imply, however, t ha t the 11cognitive 
statue and knowledge status of a belief are at least partially inde-
123 pendent of the pl:i;rch.ologioal and pragi:1&tic import ot a. boli•f. ' ' 
121 
· · ~., P• 62. 
l22 . Ibid., p. 167. ~mples of analogical or oym~olical utterances 
include "God created the world," "God is a: .loving heaTonly tather, u and 
"Christia th8 son of God," according to Blackstone. 
l2jibid. • PP•. 167-168. 
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l'roloptic Vorification and liellgioua Propositions 
John Hick 
John liick124 ia the solo repreaentative ot proleptic veri£ioation W40a 
this 3tudy will consider although others, including Ian Grombie, haTe en-
doraed the proposal with laa3 zeal. Hick onliste the principle ot V'1ri-
fica t ion to deocribe the nature of religious diaoourse, but the veriti-
cation ia eachatological. lle straddles the border bet1'1e&ll thinkers of 
this chapter, who adcireas the potiitivistic-analytio challenge, and thinkers 
who attempt to deacribe the peculiar "logio11 of rt3ligio\1s di.scourae in 
non-positivistic terms (Chapter V). 
Hick e1.S:iu111o1J that religious faith (and religious language) share a 
"common epistemological structure with cognition in other fielda. 11 Thia 
atrl.lctl.U'e involves both a "aiguificance" and an "interpretation" which 
are viable also in th0 theological reaim.125 
The epiatemological atructure which has worked with success in other 
fields is verii'icational in nature, aays Hick. He defines the "essence 
of veri:Cication" as tho "<txcluaion of rational doubt. 11126 At another 
place he contends that the core of vorification is nthe removal ot 
124
n1ck, an ordained Presbyterian, was asaiatant professor of philo-
sop~ at Cornell UaiTersity from 19!» to 1959. Since then he has been 
Stuart Professor of ~hriatian Philosopby .t Princeton Theological ~eiaillllrJ. 
125John Hiok, li'aith and Knovled a a Modern Introduction to the 
Problem ot Religious Knovlede Ithaoa, Nov Yorlu Cornell Universit7 
Preas, 0.19.57), p. 164. It is likely that tor Hick "significanoe" 
denotes "meitning. 11 
126 
~., P• 161. 
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ignorance or uncertainty concarning the truth ot aoma propoaition. 11121 
Verification is o!ton related to predictioDJJ wni.ch are cond.itionai.128 
Placing theological aasertiona in tho rea.lm ot cognition, Hick suggests 
that a predictive, conditio?lB.l verification is applicable also to reli-
3ious u~sertions. It is throufib eschatologic~l verification of religious 
129 aseertion3 that the asaortion-atatus of religiou3 language is protected. 
Hick treats the verification of t neological atatements as a ''logico-
psyohological r~ther thD.u aa a purely logical concept. 11 Viewed thua, 
a. propoeition caunot bo verified unles:, someone is preaent to verif7 it; 
the verb "verify'' is act.ive rather than passive.130 
Hick uets out to protect his th&ory against the charge that since 
it is not falsifiable, it fails to guarantee the meaning ot roligious 
aosttrtions. He argues that verifiability and falsifiability are not al-
ways symetrically related--aa two sides of a coin. For example, the 
proposition "There are three successive sevens in the decimal determina-
tion of 11," may one day be verified if it is true, but it c~n nevor be 
falsified if it is false. 'L'hi3 argumentation applies, says Hick, to 
127John Hick, "Theology and Verification," '?he t.ixistence o! God, 
edited by John Hick (New !ork: Macmillan Compan.1, .o.1964), P• 25}• 
This chapter reprints an article firat published in Theology Today, 
XVII (April 1960), 12-}l. 
128 
~., P• 259. 
129 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, P• 152. I. M. Crombie, in "'l'heolos, 
llod 1''alaif'ication," New 1:;asaya, p. 126, offers a similar suggestion in 
stating that for the .:;briatian, "the operation of getting into position 
t~ decide" whether a given claim is true or falae "is called dying• • • • 
~ this test, then, roligioua utterances can be called statements of 
fact. •••• " 
l30!1ick, "Theology and '/eritication," ~stence of God, P• 254. 
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eachatolo~ical verification ao well. The hypothesi3 raay be false, but that 
-131 it is false can never be a fact which Qnyono experientially verities. 
A second attack on e3chatological verification otfera a substitute 
hypothesis. To those who argue that present ux1lerionce is 61if'ficient 
verification of the validity of religioua aasa1·tioua, Hick saya: 
In other worda, our imagined objector has pointed out not that the 
existence ol God .Dakes a difference within huraan experience, but 
only that belief in the existence of God mak~s such a difference. 
And to snow that belief in a proposition E baa certain causal eifecte 
is not to show that l? itself makea some verifiable claim about the 
nature of the univer3e. It appears, then, that wo caW1ot aubatitute 
f.or the concept of eachatological verificatiof~ reference to the 
Chriatian's prese~t experience of a naw lite. 
lliok snarpen9 his hypothesis of esohatologicu.l verification by examin-
ing in turn s upposed logical posaibilities which would invalidate eacbato-
logical. verification. ~hat if attar })h¥sical death one's conaciouanesa 
persiats and crttates its own world, in a prooesa similar to dream- · 
construction? ~he traditional Christian under such circumsta.nceu ma1 
experience ilopressive divine judgttent with subsequent aaiaery or bli.ea, 
each according ·to hie conscience or theology. All this might occur in 
a universe with no Uod. The aeem.ng verification in this can wow..d be 
illusory. Another poosibilit1 is that thu !uture world will be essential• 
17 a continuation ot the present, and raligiously no less atGbiguoua. 
Suppose this naw world is capable of either & theistic or nontheistic 
interpretation. ~uppoS4t there w~r• no conclusive experience either to 
validate or invalidate thoislll. How would the eacbatologi0'6l verification 
l3llbid., p. 258. Mick is espeoiall1 concerned to anewer Anto~ 
Flew•a objection at this point. See supra, PP• 91-92. 
132Hick, Faith and Knowledge, P• 154. 
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ot Chriatian faith fare in thoGe ciroumstancoa·l33 
As answers to these logical diaclaimere Hiok' a e;:irlier \-lork ot!'ered 
the .dQatific Vision and the l)ingdora. or the ltttter ho auys: 
·./o huve no inforrnation that would enable us to visualize the Ring-
dom. But ita apprehended aignificance wiJ.l be the direot expression 
ot tho divine purpose, so that: at every point the oitizena of the King-
dom are con3ciou:3 ot being in the divino µresence. Given this ex-
perience, &theism and agnoaticisro, while rcr.iaining logical poaaibili-
tieu, will have bocorne dead option3, of no greater plausioilit7 than 
is solipsiara now. l~e shnll have \that in ~ll other spheres we describe 
as knowledge, P.amely r a tional certainty.13'+ 
In a l at~r work Hick io mure explicit. He isolates t ·,io developments in 
t he Beatific 1/i:;Jion which would concluaivoly verity tho existence ot 
God. '.rho f i rst ia '1an experience of the i'ulfillment of God' a purpose 
for our:Jctlve:i, as this has bEten di~cloaad in Christian revelation." Thia 
f'ul1'illciant is not ca.pa.ble of fabification, but noitlu,r n~ed t he !Jhriatian 
know tho concreto f orm t h~ fulfillr:iant will asswae. The exi Gtence of God 
will 00 verified, second, 11,.,ith an experience of collltllunion with God aa he 
has reveulod himself in tho person of Chriat. 11 The stipulation "aa he 
baa revealed himaelf in th~ person of Ghrist" provide~ a solution to the 
problem of knowing bow or that one baa encountered vod, for experiencing 
the reign of the ~on ~ill surely assure encounter with God.l35 
133Ibid., PP• 154-155• 
134Ibid., p. 162. IilaolcfiJtone (p. 114) sug39sts t..at Hick'a attempt 
at falaitiibility in principle through eachatologioal veritication ia 
argumentation inn circle. Hiok asau~os the assertion-status ot reli• 
giouu beliefs (kingdvm of Ood, immortality) in order to prove th8 possi-
bility of esohatological verification. 
l}5Hiok, "Theology and Verification," ~iatence ot God, PP• 269-2?1. 
a onald r1. iiepburn, in Christianity aud Paradox (London: c. A. vtatts and 
Compa~; 0.1958), p. ?9, opposes the position ot the "Christologiets'' 
who attempt to point to JedU$ (tbe man) aod aay, 11'.i'here you !ind God, it 
you're looking," with this statement& "'Has not Chriatology fllllde it 
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Hick clairas that esohatological verif'ication provides a cogllitive 
dimension to theological assertions • .Out r.1ore, the Christian's positing 
ot a future experience rendero the present choice between tneinm and 
atheism a real--not an e~pty or verbal--choioe. 136 
Interweaving the Strands 
'l'o avoid an impreauion that the matter diacuasod in thia chapter is 
aa aiaplo as its four categories indicate, a aummary statemQnt ia attachod. 
Each ot the ,aen considered i ::. a thinker in his own right. lio amount of 
categorization oan eliminate individuality. Jtill, although the dtrands 
of thought aro multiple, they interweave in a surprioingly co~idtent 
pattern. 
Christian, 13raitll'.raite (in the "stories"), Blackstone, and Hick coa.-
t8nd that in some way religioua assertionu are ''cognitive," but cognition 
ia variously defined. Christian, Blockstone, and Hick provide for the 
cognitive judgment of religious assertions. Braithwaite, :;Uson, van 
Buren, Christian, and Jlackstone look to fal5ifiability a3 one lo~ical 
tool through which r eligious 3tateraenta receive cognitive "cash value." 
'fJhile Christian :3peaks o! a "factual" starting point for the r3ference of 
· religious lan!)uage, and Kimpel assumes that stater.ient anJ !act correlate, 
"dilson aeleota an e1.spirioal basis for metaphysical iltatement.s 'by endorsing 
impossible for itaelf to aasort its moat important clai~--the claim that 
the relation between God, men and Jeaue is what it says it is?' For it 
that claim is taken seriously, it implies that ~en are uot in a poaitioa 
to kllow whether it is well founded or not." Hick examines Hepburn's book 
in "A Philooopher Criticizeo l'hsolot31, 11 l.otAdon .,uarterJ.;, aod Holborn 
.iutView, CLXXXVII (April 1962), 103-110. 
136uick, 11·l'heology and Verit'ioation," ;~ietenoe ot God, P• 261. 
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"religious experionce:t as the seedbed of religious assertions. Cox 
agrees in paI-t wi·th ~·:ilson by referring to empirical hypotheaos. Hick 
and .Blackstone explicitly rule ou.t religious experience as tho ~antor 
of religiouo cog~ition, bu.t both plaoe religiou3 language within thu total 
realm ot human lanijUAJe, act do van Buren, Christian, and Y..impel. Hi.ck 
prefer6 to upeak of eachatological verific~~i~n (as opposed to falsifia-
bility), while Kir.apel promotes tllo cause of testabi.lity. Braitil11ai.te ~nd 
van Burt1n choose to spekk o! tho "uao principlo" rather than veri.f'i co.ti.011 
as such, but Blackutone insists that a mere functional analyuiu of the 
"uae" ot .religious l:ltatemente:i is ins11ff'icient. 
Along with the genera l ompbasis on the verifiable-falsifiable nature 
of r ~ligious laugua0e ther~ i s a common t endency to relate roligiouG aaaer-
tionu to the attitudinal-ethical sphere • .Schmidt, ChriBUan, Braithwaite, 
van Buren, and ,Jilaon relate religio11s adeertiona in somo way to the 
aphere of ethic~. jcruaidt and ilraithwaito assort that the purpo~ of 
religioua atate~ents is to evince attitu~ea. olacksto~e agreea that some 
religious statementa serve to produce nttitudes, but contends that none 
of theae lw.va cognitive valuo. ,fore speoif'icall.y, Braithw11.ite and van 
Buren argue that r eligiou8 &asertions function to expreas allegia~cea 
to aet moral principleB. Inj ecting the verification principle, Braithwaite 
and van Buren suggest that empirical toetiug of intuntioll8 is possible 
and ueceaaary~ (P.~rbapa Schmidt doea the aa.me.) Van ll1.1ren supports the 
empirical touting ot intention.3 b~oause ho view~ roli~ioua assertions as 
expression~ of an historical per~pective ~ith tar-reaching empirical 
consequences. 3raithwaite ~nd van 3\lren also agree in the need for 
underlying backgrounli "storied," but their agr-ieaent i u som•wi111t 
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superficial. Chriotian argues that a religious injunction depends on a 
ba1:1io raligioua proposal for Ha significance. 
The rnen oumml:U'izad iu this chapter agreo in salooting verifiability-
fnlaifiability as t ho yoint from which to proceed .in a description of t he 
nature of religious discourse. ,ihile some con·tend uorv ViGorou.,ly !or 
the cognitive value of roligioua language in l;erms of ita verifiability-
falsifiability than othara, all agree to the neo<l for an empirical place-
tt:eut or anchorago of reliHiouo languag8 aG detormiuative of ita lo~ioal 
n:ea1.1nc . In thi:J roop~ct all the men uddress the first of the tuo major 
challenge;,. of ltnguistio o.ualyaia, the challenge born of positivistio 
parentage. 
CHAl?J$U V 
Tllii; "LOGICS" OF llll:LIGIOUJ L/JiGUAQE 
Introduction 
Linguistic anal;yois otters two major challenges to the philoaop~ 
of religion. ?he first challenge demo119trates the poaitiviatio parentage 
ot analysio in ita demand for tha verifiability or falsifiability ot reli• 
gioue language. '?he second challenge flows from an anal7ais "oome ot 
age." It asks theologians and philosophers of religion to characterize, 
it thoy can, the conceptual framework, the rulea of thought, the syntac-
tics ot interrelation in the roligious langw;.ge game. In short, it 
inquirea into the "logic" ot religious laDgLt~. The current chapter deals 
with answers to tho aeoond challenge. 
The thinkers represented in thio chapter address theauselves to the 
question, "What ie the 'logic' ot religious language'l" Most--exoept the 
analogista--endorae the illlplicit methodology of the second analytic chal-
lenge. They dismiss philosophJ from the task of constructing a supportiTe 
metapti,eics tor theology. The7 have read soae coapleted analyaea, and 
ooapli .. nted the responsible aiialyat. They have listened carefu~ to 
the sharpened attacks 011 traditional argu .. nte tor God's existence. And 
each hao accepted the challenge to describe the "logio" ot religious 
laDgUage. 
What features other than the mutual enoounter with the second a11al1-
tio ohallenge characterize the thinkera represented here? Generally the7 
endorse the notion ot a apeoitic "logic" of and !or religious language. 
Some employ the "u0e principle" to validate a apeciticully religioua lan• 
guage game. The an.:i.logiate are not so quick to accept a sui doueri.s 
language game in religion. And yet, although they emphasize the uue of 
ordinary language in religion, they endorse implicitl.1 some type ot reli• 
gious "language game" in their insiatence that the a"1bject ot religious 
languasc deten.:ineo and qualifies th~ use of analogy • .Recognizing the 
individual singularity o! the varioua acalogists, it may be &aid that the 
men ot thin chapter listened 010.,.ely to the annlysts' challenge, and 
responded with descriptioua of tho ''logic:" ot roligioua language. 
A second teature which characterizes tbe majority (again excepting 
the nnalogista) is a strong emphasis on individuality and personality. 
,.'hile the men represented in Chapter IV re!erred to the meaning of reli-
gious lang,..iage in terms of contiguity, confirmability, verifiability, or 
falsifiability in the il.'orlcl ot "external" realit1, the men of this chap-
ter arguo, in ~neral. that .. any "verification" ot religious lall6"'Wlge take11 
place in the milieu of the homo loguens. Almost to a man thase illritera 
propose that it ia the "blik, 11 the ''onlook, 11 the lite-orientation adopted. 
by the speaker which v~lidates religious language.1 
A third feature which }lelps to identity t.heae men (except for the 
analogi~ts) ia their apathy toward cognition in religioua language. Al-
moat to a ll'JaD thoy dupreciate th~ cognitive element of relicJious languag~. 
A correlative is the widospread acceptance ot radical relativiam. Once 
1 One geta the i11pre:ssion that lJJa'D:J of th1t 11onanalogiata in this 
chapter have their roots in nineteenth century idealism, via exiatential• 
ism. On the other hand, the men of ~hapter IV vere influenced. to a ~reat-
er degree by the realistic empiricism ot the early tventieth ceotUl"J'• 
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Cognition 1o no part ot roligioua language, the relativism o! belief 
which aupporta 1•eligious language (or "blik') io virtually assured. 
Thtt chapter bot5inis with the analogiilta. In one sense they straddle 
the two major challeugea ot uualyais as they rely on the logic ot author-
ity to detSoribe the nature o! rdigious language. In general they argue 
that it io the ~ubject llla.tter Yhich properly qualifiea ordinary language 
and moulds it into roligious la~uage. the second group is described with 
the caption, "Logia of »ituation." Both men in this group olaim to !ind 
the logic of religious language in its phenomenological context. The 
third group clei'inea thu logic of r~ligious discourse a5 logically "odd" 
1u that it parallels the logic of personal la~uage (as when the word 
11 I 11 i a the aubj6ct o! n atat~nient). the !ourth ~roup describes the logic 
or religiouo language in terlllS of the expressive charactor ot religious 
language. ~he men ~naly~e the logic o! religious language with reference 
to th~ lit.it-orientation which lieo behind. the language and which, in turn, 
the language expre3aed. At the uame tim9, great caution iG indicated, aud 
the placing or men into groups is uot meant to erase the individuality ot 
each, as thv conclu5ion of t he ctuipter dvmonstratea. 
Logic ot Authority 
Alasdair l-1aolntyre, I.an i~cBattie Crombie, and ~io Lionel Maacall 
de~cribe the logic ol relision discourse in tenrus ot the aubjoct it dis-
cusses, n&Qely God. Natural theology proYidea at le&JJt the blutio rationale 
tor talk about God. &it more, as each ot th.t •11 WU'&Vela hia theology, 
he o!!ttrs llis particular theor1 ot the a1athorizatio11 tor raligioua 
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language: from Hac!ntyre's awe before the myater1 of worship, to Crombie'e 
authorizing Christ, to Haacall's intelligible God apprehended in ICJ'Ster,. 
nlasdair Haclntyre 
Alasdair Viacintyre2 offers <;1. critical corament to the interpretation 
ot theological languuga propoaed by Karl Barth's followera. This school, 
says Hacintyre, holds that religious language (including the .Bible) be• 
cowea meaningful only with a apecial mir~cle ot grace1 in any other case 
it i.s meaningless. l-iaclnt;yre contends that since moat roligioua language 
utilizes familiar words with fllcid.liar meanings (his buaic asswuptiou), 
ito sense it. eque.lly appai:·ent to believer and unbeliever.3 In addition, 
l·lacintyre disa:vp.c-oves of theologians who attempt to deflate the analyst's 
case by udud.tting that tl1oological language is eoaentially 11nonsanoical," 
2 Ala.atlair A.lexaudt:r Chalmers MacIntyre was on the ataff of tll~ Univer-
sity of Manchester, bDgland, in 1955. In 19.59 he be~m• lecturer in philo-
aophy at thH University o! Ltteda. Although Maclntyre reckoned himaelf a 
Christian in th~ editorial introduction (p. ix) of New Eaeaya in Philoso-
J2hical Th1tology (New York; f.!ao111illan J0111paey, c.19.5.5), James .i. "4'oeltel 
not~a in '"?:on-Hetaphyaical' Ohriatian Philosophy and Linguistic Philo-
sophy," How '-'h~olo;g :i,o. 2, edited 'o-:f Martip. E. Marty and Dean G. l'eerman 
(New York: Macmillan Co1t1pa~, c.196.5), P• 61, n. 6, that MacIntyre is no 
longer~ pro!osaed Chri.stian. liow thia change atfec~a his 3tahd theory 
of religious langWige is not readilJ apparent. 
3Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Logical .;tatua of !{eligous Belief,"~-
phyaical Bc,liefa, edited bJ' Alaud!lir Haolntyre (J.iOudon: .:>~t·: ?rttas, 1957), 
PP• 175-176. ;iillia111 T. Blackatone, in ?he Problem of !~eligious Know-
ledfS! (~nglewood ~li!fa, ~ew Jersey, Prentice-:Iall, c.1963), P• 164, 
argues that Macintyre 1.s reliance on authorit1 as the ultimate justifica-
tion tor r~ligious lani~ge is the logical equivalent to Barthial'lism. 
Ha0Int7N is led (says Blackotone) to the concluaion that religious beliefs 
are untalsitiablo, find that it is logically improper to argue in their be-
half, because for him r"ligion consists in unconditional belief and free 
choice. By tili.s assumption MacIntyre indic~tes that if one were to cite 
eTidence, he would be treating religion hypotheticalll, and not uncondit1on-
all)'. Basil f;ji,tchell exam.i.nea H&cintyre'a cited article in "Juat1lication 
of Religious Belief," Philosophical ::W!J:terlz, XI (1961), 21,-226. 
1.59 
or that religion deals \11th ''what cannot be said." The difficulty ia 
that these t heologians us e the phrase 11nonaensicul" in a 'flo.y ditferent 
from the ai,alysts. 4 
It iu Maclntyre' s claim that worship lies at the heart o! the dis-
cussion of theological diucourae: 
In worship 1"e do not talk a!,out God, but to him. • • • In formulat-
ing doctrine we aro trying to say what we do when we pray. So the 
lclncuago o! liturisY i Q ut the beurt ot the r!:atter.' 
The lauguago o! wors hip is it3elf naystematicully unclear iuiu reticent 
about the object of worship." Five featurea in tho lan6uage or liturgy 
co_operate to creattt t hi~ effect: (l) use o! the vocative i::, fre,.1uent; (2) 
epitheto occ1.lr io the gerunaive, or hover between t oe gerundive ~nd the 
uescriptive; (3) met~phora used in wor3hip expre~s our hopes from God, 
our praise o! iiim, bl.lt not a doacription of Him; ( 4) God' a greatness is 
suggested by using ,~etaphora of ihe worshippers, not of God; (5) the tact 
that worship ia not limited. to auy particular .3it@tion 1J18kee the expres-
siona of worship impracise.6 
Macint1re 'a diucuaaion of God's "existence'' further clarifies hia 
theory of thu self-justifying n,,.ture of religious discourse. It i~ his 
conviction that no nonruligious concept apvropriatel:, elucidates the 
notion ot ~od. Tiu.~ is especially tu~ oase with ,hd nonreli0ious concept 
"existence": 
4 l4acintyre, "The Logical $tat\.ls of it-,ligious Belief," Metapbyoioal 
Beliefs, p. 178. McPherson (supra, P• 49) may be a caae in point. 
5 Ibid., P• 188. 
-6 
~., PP• 188-189. 
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~ither one speaks from ~ithin religious. language, as it verez in 
which oase "God oxiats" would be a pointless oxpreaoi on; or om 
speaks from outside; in which case "God exists'' has no determin-
ate meaning.7 
In aum, !'iaclntyre assorts that religious la11guag" has a selt-jurstitying 
character. His description o! religious language is inherently imprecise 
bacause it can unfold only aa the language ia used. 
Ian NacHattie Croinbie 
Ian NacHattie Crombio8 attempts to use t hu paradoxical natlll'e ot 
theological lan}~age to provido a rationale tor religious discourse. The 
paradoxical feat ure~ of thoological statements do not demonstrate the ill-
possibility of meaningful theological atatements. Rath~r, these teaturee 
contribute to a meaningful apprehension ot theological statements in their 
"partial characterization of [th~ subject." The r.aradoxical teat urea 
demonstrate that theological statelll8nta "are made about no object which 
falls within our normal experience." Crombie sum:;lllrizes his argument 
briefly: 
the inquirer ma::, learn from the paradoxical !eatures of theological 
state~ecto, that, it they are a~thing, they are about a myste17. 
If he requires further specification ••• he must seek it from tvo 
sources. Firstly from the attin1t1e6 and relationslu.ps ~hi ch exist 
between theological statements and utterances of other kinda (tor 
7Ibid., p. 203. William T. Blackstone, in ''il.acint7re'e Analyai.11 ot 
Religion, " llitf RoYiev, XIX o ~all 1962), 27-'32, accuses Hacint71"e of pre• 
scribing rather than daacribing the uaea of religious language, and con-
. tends that MacIntyre• a view doea not r amovel,dittioultb.3 which concern 
the ta~tual meaningfulness ot religious assertioua. 
8
crombi&, an Anglican, is a fellow of fiadham College, Oxford. His 
worka include All Examination ot Plato's n."" .. :; ::.ne, Vol. I, l:'lato on Ha11 
and Jocietz (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), and Vol. II, Plato on 
Knowledge and Aoality (New York: Humanities Presa, l96J)a and Plato& 
The Midvite•a Apprentice (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965). 
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example moral judgments1 to do tho will of God io our supreme 
duty);and secondly by oonaidering whether a aenae ot l!IJ'&te~ aeema t() 
be the appropriate rosponse to any part of our experience.9 
It is apparent that thv ''formal properties" ot theological otatemente 
(the eyntaotical rules of their relationa to other statements ot other 
kinda, and the hermeneutical rules ot their interpretation) must be in 
some senoe Mutually contradictor;y it theological statements are to per-
form their task.lo For Crombie, the formal properties ot theological 
atatelll8nta aod tba undergirding theology of the statements appear to be 
one and the same. It one wishes to apprehend a theolosical statement 
together with it::s intended Jlleaning, ''it is e:Jsential to do equal Justice 
to each of three propositiona. 11 He continues, 
First that the theist believes in God as a transcondont being, and 
therefore intends what he says about Him to be raterrod direct~ to 
God and not obliquely to this ~orld; second that the theiat genuine-
ly believes God to bo transcendent und therefore beyond our compre-
hension; and third, that since on the one hand God is a m;J'&tery, 
and since, on the othor hand, if a me.n is to talk at all he musi 
talk intelligibly, therefore he only talks about God in 1-.ges. 1 
Crombie !inda no direct inference from the paradoxioality ot formal proper-
ties to the meaninglessness of theological statements. While it is true 
that t hu critic bas a probable inference to that effe~t, the theist also 
has a probable case. The theist contonds that he is under obligation to 
12 
use language governed by paradoxical rules tor the expression ot his belieta. 
9I. M. Crombie, "The Possibilit1 of Theological ::itatements,.'! Faith 
and l.ogic, edited by Basil Mitchell (Londona George A1.len and Unv1n, 
1957), PP• 3}-34. 
10Ibid., P• 39. 
u 73. lbid., P• 
12 
.50. ~ .. P• 
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Crombie divides a statement about God into two parts. The "subject," 
or whatever it ia called, is Uod. ~his ~ord has no other uae; it ia 
''playing, so to apealt, on its Home Ground.,.!} The "logical usother" ot the 
~ubject, "God," C.:rombie calls "undifferentiated theism." Religioua belief 
haa two parents in 1t3 logical structure: undifferentiated theism ia the 
logical mother, and "theopbanic revelation" the logical tather.14 
,'\gainr:St th6 critic who charges that theological stator4enta cannot 
be meaningtul bccauae thOy employ a proper name ("Ood") which seews to 
be logically incapable ot pr~ciae reference, Crombie posits the sphere 
ot natural theology. He uaes the word "God" to define a sense in which 
one!:!! mean inconceivables. "God" is used to denote the postulated, 
though unir:1aginablo, absence ot limitation.ts or impdrtections which dog 
mon•s steps. la thia way "God" beoomea the touchstone of theological 
atateir.ents for tho critio.15 Undifferentiated theism is neoeeaariq the 
l}I. M. Crombie, 11'.t'heolos, and Falsification, 11 New ~aaya in Philo-
sophical Theology, edited by AntolJT G, N. new and Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Hew Xork: Y.acmillan Co£1paey, c.1955), PP• 110•111. 
14 
~., p. 111. The "undifferentiated theism" appears to be ~rombie'a 
retere~ce to natural. theology, for he discoUAts any diacua~ion of God with-
out a thought of God. Crombie•s argwaent tinds a parallel in Gordon D. 
Kaufman, "'l.'wo I'iouels of Transcendernce: Au I1~quir7 into the Problem of 
Theological Heanins," ~he Horitage of Chriatian Thought, edited by Robert 
E. Cushman and .i:gil <'xrii:slia (Nev York: Harper and Row, 0.1965), P• 1861 
"~• shall have to ahov that the aaning of words like 'God' and •transcen-
dence• is aimilar in some re::3pecta to certain types ot ordi'D&r1 meaning 
vith returcnts in finite experience, and that theue latter types of mean-
ing can aerve as analogues in terao of which the thttological meaniug cau 
be apprehended •••• Inasmuch as this ia a general philoaophical task 
dealing with tho Yory foundations of theology and faith, it can be regarded 
aa the legitimate heir of natural theology tor our tiae." · 
l.5crombie, "Poaaibility of 'l'heological .::itatementa," ~aith and Lo5io, 
PP• .56-67. God is not, sa,ya Crombie, the "reference point" £or the 
Christian, whose every thought of God. ie one of worship. ~illiam P. Alston, 
in "Elucidation of Religious Statements," Process and l>i'dnity, edited by 
logical mother of religious belief and theological statements in that 
Without her we should not know whither statements ~oncerning the 
word (God] were to be referred; the subject in theological utter-
ances would be unattached. All that we should }mow of them is that 
they were not to be referred to anything with which we are or could 
hope to be acquainted •••• 16 
The second part of a statement about God is the predicate. The pre-
dicate normally consists of ordinary words put to unordinary uses.17 
Crombie describes the character of theolgical predica tes by comparing 
them to analogical transfers from one field to another in ordinary lan-
guage. ~wo factors are involved in daily analogical transfer: (1) there 
is a certain "appropria teness" in transferred words; (2) one can isolate 
particular circumstances in which a word is used or withheld in a trans-
ferred sense. Crombie suggests that a similar 11feel 11 is present with the 
18 transference of par abolic predica tes in theological statecents. 
William L. Reese and Eugene I!'reeman (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court PubliEh-
ing Company, c.1964), pp. 430-431, disagrees with Crombie at this point. 
He argues that it is incorrect to imagine that in a sentence about God one 
can first attempt to explain the subject-term, and then the key predicate-
terms. Only if one could teach someone who God is other than through des-
criptive phrases would this be possible. 
16 Crombie, "Theology and Falsification," New Essays, p. 116. 
17Ibig., PP• 110-111, 
18Ibid., PP• 120-121. Crombie argues against Flew (supra, PP• 91-
92) that it is the "feel" which prevents Christians from "qualifying" a 
theological assertion out of existence. Alston, Process and Divinity, P• 
442, emphasizes the positive aspect of analogues rather than the necessity 
of a restrictive "feel": "By drawing analogies we get a picture, with ta-
boos against using it in familiar ways. \\'hat is needed is a positive de-
s:::ription of th~ ways in which it is to be used." He includes the follow-
ing among the uses to which the "theistic picture" is put: explanation of 
facts in the natural world; for prediction of future course of events; 
expression of feelings; imaginative presentation of moral ideals; reports 
of perception in religious experienceJ guide to worship. 
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Crombio ia not content to posit theological predicates as something 
of a parallel to analo3iea in duily language. He asaerta that no one lesa 
than Jesus enabloo the Chriatian to use parabolic predication. The predi-
cate of a theological statement 1a essentially a "parable" spoken on 
Ohrist's authority. Just aa ll~ spoke in hu111an language with parable, 
"s t . owe oo speak of uod in ;:,arable--authoritative parable, authorized 
parable; knowing that the truth ia not literally that which our parables 
represent.1119 
Eric Lionel Mascall 
Eric Lion~l ~.ascall20 begins hia studl of religious diaoourse with 
a critique of A. J. AJer'a criterion or meaning. He sums up his argument 
concisely: 
It is, I would n.1&intain, clear to anyona ••• that the fundaciental 
criterion ot meani11ofulnesa is not oenae-veritiability but intelligi-
bility, tb&t i3 to say that in order to know whothor a otate~ent has 
meuning you ahould see whether it is possible to understand it. 
Tnis stateme~t ia of course a tautology, and tborein lies ita 
strength. For meaningfulnesa is a prilla17 notion, which ca~not 
be described in terms of anything else.21 
In describing religious language Mascall endeavors to construct an alter-
native to both ideulism and atnpirici::sm. At the aalile time, the altornatiTe 
ia to be o.s empiric6ll aa Ayer's "in toe seuae that it ass~rta that all 
19
crombie, ''Theology and !lalsitication," t~ew .t::~says, PP• 122-123. It 
appeara that Crombie's appeal to the parable• of Jeaud as beatowiiig aignit1-
cance to theological discourse ia a type ot alllllogical approach ultimately 
depe11dent 011 a strong incarnational theology. Also, <,;rombie __., bo ahow-
ing his Platonic bias with this statement. 
20Ma.acall vaa ordaiuttd an Anglican priest in 1932. From 1947-62, h• 
vaa lecturer in philosophy ot Religion at Oxford. He bas been profeaaor 
ot historical theologJ, London UniTersity, King's ~olloge, since 1962. 
21Eric Lionel Mascall, ~ords and Images: A Study in iheological 
Diecouru (l~ev Iorka l<c>Dllld Presa Coapal:l1', 0.1957), P• l}. 
16.5 
the knowledge that we can have of reality is baaed upon our personal ex-
perience," but "re!uaea to limit exporience to aense-9xparience or to 
11!.Qit aenae-exnerience to the mere awareness of ssnse-~henomena. 1.22 
. . 
Mascall poeea his criticism or Ayer in terms of three propositions: 
'l'he first criticism i.s that sense-experience itaolt ma:, consist ot 
something moro than the oxperieuce of sense-objects. The second is 
that experience rnuy consiat ot something more than ~ensa-experience. 
~\nd thu third it> that there rtJay be experionce which is not expres-
sible in sentences at alli or which is expressible only in sentences 
of a very peculiar kind.2~ 
In the first criticiaw Hascall endorses what ho calls the Thomist-
Ariatotalian tradition of apprehension. Ilia 3econd aud third defend the 
possibility of mystical kuO\~ledge. 24 
The author views as erroneous the argument of modern philoaophera 
that the S8ll$8S perform all apprehension while th6 intellect merely reai.sona. 
lt is his primary contontion that the intellect not onl1 reasons, but ap-
prehends aa well. "It h~s, af.S its object, not only truths but things.tt25 
A discussion of the mind'a apprehension is .essential to clari!ic:ation ot 
the religious apprehension reterenc•d in religious di~courae~ In opposi-
tion to a "sensatioaali$t" position derived tro11 De.scartes• uiaxilll of "saf-
ety .t'irst"--a poaition obsessively seeking ol.arity and sterilizing itaelt 
in glacial frigiditJ--Mascall form'-llatea a three-pronged theo17 of appre-
hensioni (1) the esdeuoe ot perception is not senae-a.vareness, bl.It 
22 
.!!!!s!•, P• 30. 
23Ibid., P• 31. 
-24Ibid., pp. 39, 42. Maacall contends (p. 44) that it is possible to 
deacribe ar.d diacusa mystical experience ~bile remaining intelligible. 
25Ibid., PP• 63, 66. 
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intelloctuoJ. &pp1·ohenaion: "the intellect uses the sensiblo pheno11enon 
as an object um . <1,uo, through which it paasea to th& apprehonaion of the 
objectum guod which is the intelligible trans-sensible being"1 (2) the 
intelligible object i :3 grasped through isensibl~ phenomena, not deduced 
from or conatr11ctad out of them; (3) an attitude of "involvelllent, con-
templation, and penetration'' is a prerequisito tor penetra~ion boneE.Lth 
senaiblo phenomena to the "real intelligible things'' ::Jupporting theaa. 26 
The sense of mystery is important to the structure undergirding 
Hascall' s description of Nligious discourse. !•1)-stery ia an object in-
viting contemplation, urging penetration in conte~plation; it i3 not a 
question d~mar~ding an answer. 27 As mystery is contemplatad a background 
of receding depth appears. Remaining it3elt obacure, the mystery illumi• 
28 natos its 3urroundinga. In ew.i, the nature ot ma~1.J appr<theusion o! 
trana-sanuiol e autitie3 ie essentially obscure in ite contdmplativo pene-
tration. But through th~ method ot apt'rohensi.Jn, pby:,ical objectu, per-
sona, a~d supremely Jod-transceud~nt can bo gl"a.:iPQd.29 
~ita thia supportive apprehenaion-thoory ot sensation, Masoall 
proceeds to examine analogy as ~he most appropriate method of religious 
discourse. He is convinced that language i.s not a mere codinb-d•coding 
process. It is a meano o! cowmuning by ~hich two minds enter a cor.imon 
intellectual lifa. The furm11las of language, tbon, are neithe: the 
26Ibisl•, PP• 10-71. 
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objecta guae of corornuuication, nor are they more or leas accurate "atruo-
tural replicas of t nought. !,30 l1E&call justifies the comuiunicative tech-
nique of ,>t. John 1Y! i;he Cross, ""ith its particular descriptive method, 
not by a "conformity to a predott1rmined criterion, but ita siClple c;,.~city 
to get its stuti:' across ." A cur1·ent exaciple ia the frequent uGe, in dog-
niatic theology, of imat illB.l al.8.logioe to expound theological truth or 
mystery.3l 
Nascall hail.::J the use of analog_, atJ proper in the iuce of the cllarge 
that one therebi ref er8 to an object outside the sphero o! aecsation. It 
ie of thtt uatience of theisia to udwit that Clod io infinite and supra.sensible. 
1'leverthule3o1 "God cau be knew and thought and de~cribed, however obdcure-
ly and imp\!rfectly, on tho basis of our experience · of thi; ,iorld in which 
we !ind our.:Jelvea, the world ot aenaory experience." The ultic:iate purpoae 
ot the doctrine or aoa.logy is not to provide the podsibility ot theologica1 
thou~t or discourue, "but to explain how such a priu:a tacie unlike~ acti-
vity is possible." 'l'hougnt a.nd kuowledge o! God precede discourse, !or 
mania rulated to Him in creation.'2 If analogical. statements about God 
are possible, using word&I -whose primary 6ipplication is to finite beings 
apprehended throut,;h senses, "there 1nu.st be a certain atfinit;y between God 
and finite beings ~hich ia not excluded by the radical ditf~reno• which we 
have seeu to charii.oterize t ileir existeutial status •• ,}} In sWD, Ma11C&ll 
30Ibid., P• 92. 
31Ibid., P• 95. 
J2I~ict., p~. 102-103. 
-3)lbid., P• 105. 
-
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adds little to the traditional Thomis~ic doctrine ot analogy, 1! indeed 
he adds anything at all. 
~.a5call contends that images as well as words have an epistemologi• 
cal character inexhaustible by descriptive coding-decoding • .;4 He argu~s 
that 
the image or the image-complex, like the word or the word-complex, is 
an objootwn quo, by the entertainment and contemplation o! which the 
mind i s able to enter into intiraate cognitive union with the reality 
of which it i s a manifestation.35 
Christian imagery, thought, and discourse are anchored in two realms, both 
controlled by Gou: t ha natural world and the Ghuroh. '.rhua, ''rooted though 
it i s in the natural order, \#heroin th~ \.,,ord or God is tha light that light-
uth every man, " imagery is understood only in ita fulfillment in Christ, 
the ,foL·d mo.de f'leah. God gives the great ima,ses to thtt Ghu.rch, and 
in our thought and speech about him a3 in all el~, God does not 
des troy the powers or our r.ature but confirma t hem and validates 
them, evan in the act ~1 which he makes them the rav material ot 
3Upernature and grocG.}() 
Logic of ~ituatioD 
'~he two men hore considered claim to discover the logic or religious 
language in its phenomenological cont~xt. Thdy move back one step trom 
self-validation of religiouo l.auguage in natural theology (as in the aDM-
logiata) by centering coDcern on the phenomenological formulation ot 
a~pportive religious beliefo. ~onveraely, they move one step closer to 




~., PP• 125-126. 
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the "blik, 11 or religious "outlook," as the validating taotor tor reli-
gious language. Both illen admit a unique logic in religious la115UB.6e. 
Both contend that a contextual situation providej thd validation of r eli-
gioua lant;Uage, or that it is at least in terraa of tho r eligious situa-
tion that one approaches the question ot t he logic of r eligious la.Db'"Wloe• 
Nillian J mart 
~illian j ma.rt3? attempts to describe, through linguistic analysis, the 
ioiµc ot religioua discourses ot the world.' s major religiona. AasWliag 
that linguistic analysis p6rmita one to appro:1ch religiowt statement• with 
greater neutrality than any other methodological approach to the history 
ot religioM, ~ma1•t describes his work as "an investigation of rsligtous 
concepts in a spirit of higher-order ·neutrality. 1138 
"mart pretors th4t term "language frame" over ·,taiamann' s ''stratum" 
or •,iittgvnatein' a "language game," and sots out "to exhibit the style ot 
propooitiona in the spiritual traaae."39 He hesitates to call his a stucq 
ot "religious language," for he conaid.ars the context of spiritual state-
ments to be ot great importance. As a conaequence, be limits his study 
principally to the conaid.eration of roligious act'ivitiea which surround 
37Roderick Ninian Smart was Lecturer in Hiator;y and Philoao~ of 
lutligion at the Ul11:~ersity ot London, King's College, 19.56-61. He has 
been the u. G. ~.ood Professor ot Theology in the University of i3irmiag-
bam since 1961 • 
.38l{inian Smart, Reasons and 1',aiths: an Inve11ti tion of lu.li ioua 
Discourse, Christian and Non-Christan Loudon: lioutledge and Kegan Paul, 
c.1958), P• 4. 
39 
~., P• 10. 
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spiritual language.lto ~he variety ot religious activities in world reli• 
giona indica te a situation of widely divergent discourses. 3mart viaualizes 
not only "macroaoopic" di!ferer.cea between the language of spirit and other 
l .::.uguage-frumes; he 1.ilso diatinguishes "microscopic" divergencios ~ithin 
tho former. An investigation of the divergent 11atrands" within the 
la~uage of spirit is ~s easentinl ns the acrutil:13 of various language 
frar.iea. 41 In sum, the comparative ~tudy of religions appears to offer tho 
moat appropriate methodology for isolating tlla logioe of religious dis-
courses. with this approach JCllal't hopes to protect himself against the 
supposition that any one faith provides the "correct" picture of religious 
disoourse.42 
::imart concentratoa on three major religious strands: the "numinous,'' 
the "mystical, '' and the "incarnation." '.Cheae three strands do not exhaust . 
the totality of roligious di6courae. Uowever, they peraiit an inveatiga-
tion ot the: major s trands of impo.rtance. 'l.'he author examines Brahmanism 
(which he call8 a nuniioous strand) to determine how proposition.s about 
the Creator, the object of worship and praise, are established. He aua-
ruarizea his study in this way: 
holineas ia not a straightforward empirical property, for propositions 
aboQt the divine express a bumble reaction to t h~ glories and mysteries 
in the world, which 18 directed at a divine target said to lie beyoDd 
tho worla, tor thereb1 its dread .tll1'steriousness is w~ll delineated. 
This Power's nature i~ aaid to contain sentience, parti, bocause the 
emergence of th~ world from tho dark Toid seems chosen. And Brahman 
is not only boyond all this but far, !or herein is signalized the 
great gl.ll.t fixed between the sinful worshipper and the pure ancl 




42Ibid., PP• 6-7. 
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resplendent object of worship.43 
In t\lrn, Smart retleots on the fashion in which propositions of m:,atioal 
clauw are confirmud. Hinayana Buddhism, he claims, malliteata the mysti-
cal experience in iaolationi 
we may say not too misleadingly that HiDayaua ia built round the 
Ul1'Stical path, even thpµgh there are extraneous manifestatiou of 
theism and polytheiem.'t'+ 
The prec~nditiona for attaining nirvana, and the type ot experience vhioh 
culminatoo in the Fath, have their effect on religious discourse. 
First, the intensity of the bliss is auoh that it is best, albeit 
inadequately, expressed by tSaying that it ia "indescribable'', 
"inettable", etc. ~econd, the mystical state does not involve 
having i::iental images or perceptions (and th11s in the Upani¥-ds 
ia compared to dreamless sl~ep), and ao there ia nothing about 
it to du.scribe (and thus it is unlike clay-dreaming and visuali-
zation in general).45 
The mystical experience is a transfiguration, and the man becomes a "holyt1 
!llln, a "raau transfigured. 1146 
At thia point ~mart indicates that language of doctrirual strands--
such as the nwninous and myatical--is not precise. Its imprecision is 
•Vi.dent in the reluctanoe ot theologians to drnv definitiTe conceptual 
lines unless forced by heresy. Laxit7 in precision is the child of the 
loose use of ·expressive language which accommodates varying spiritual 
exproasiona. I'- addition, n ''pretence of precision" say lead to the loaa 
ot religious wonder1 faith without wonder has no essence. In~ case, it 
4
'Ibid., P• 53. 
44 
~., PP• 57, 59• 
,., 
Ibid.,. P• 71. 
46 
~., P• 76. 
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ia preci~ely the lack of precision ~hich allows the int&rweaYiDg ot diTer .. 
strande to occur.47 ~mart contends that 
the atrand or discouroe abo11t Brahman, express1Te ot a reaction 
to the mysteries ot reality, ia related to the 1,~~uage about the 
Atman, expreasive ot inner ~stioal achievement.'tt:S 
'?he similarities between Atman atid Brahman, between that realized in 
m;yistical experience and the reality behind phenomena, Smart collates un-
der three pointa: (l) with roference to formal oharacteriatics of the 
tll,1Stical experience (timoleosnesa, imperceptibility, the tran.eoendence 
of nirv~na)1 (2) with reteronce to the type o! doctrine prominently associ-
ated with niysticiom; (}) with referonce to certain conaequenoes ot 1111sti• 
cal attainment.49 He concludes that 
The identification of Brahman with the Atman serves, then, aa a 
prominent exau:ple ot the kind of veaving tog~ther of different 
stranda of discourse in a doctrinal scheme • .50 
Having discussed the lQJ&tical and 11Uld.Doua strands ot spiritual dis-
course, .adlClrt turns to thtt ''incarnation" strand. Thia strand includes, 
among others, the Christian faith. Incarnation preauppo:aes the e.xiatence 
of an extra-,aundane deity. The ostabli8h11ent ot a claill ot divinity inter-
locks propositiona about a holy Teacher with propooitiona about an object 
ot worship. i'!odes by whioh this propositional union ia effected area 
Ca) a formal resemblance (as manifeated in ~iraclea) ia posited between 
the incarnate deity and the object ot worship, as for exaaple, an analogieal 
~ . 
47Ib1d., PP• 79-80. 
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similarity in purity and holiness; (b) a verbal displa~, of the Te~cher•a 
omniscience demonstrates hia power to save, and this brings hill close to 
Ood on the principle that the holy constitutes a eource ot ealvation1 (c) 
"his lite includes some gesture or gestures which ba"te the effect ot 'bring-
ing salvation to mankind: tor this to happen he must either 'be God's..,.~ 
special instrument or God himself"; (d) Messianic prophecies are coutrued 
as foreshadowing the union of Teacher and object or woreb1p.5l 
Smart•s diacusaion ot doctrinal priorities and his consideration ot 
epistemolog-l~al queations are ot little concern here, but his examination 
ot moral beliefs ia illuminating. He regarda moral beliefs as represent-
ing an independent strand of diacourse subsequently combined with other 
spiritual etrands.52 He puto his case concisel1: 
it seems not inappropriate to treat moral propositions as logica~ 
independent of religious ones, except in the sense that by becoming 
incorporated into doctrinal schemes they acquire th• status also of 
being religious propositions. Renee, from our point ot view, they 
may be conaidered as oonetituting a separate strand ot discourse. 
within doctrinal achemes.5} 
The numinous strand incorporates the ~oral strand through superimpoaitioDJ 
the whole ot life becomes worship of God.54 The relationahip between the 
~atical and the moral stran~s ia more oomplex. In the ~atical, the 
prized goal of human behavior is union with the dirine. ,\ttaiuent of 
this goal generall1 requires at least moderate aaceticiam, and !!IOral rules 
appear to be valuable training in selt-oontrol. On the other hand, the 
.5l ~ .. PP• 12.5-126. 
.52 




54 ~ .. P• 18}. 
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quietiatic ideal of the moral judgments engendered within tho mystical 
strand leans toward such principles as ahimsa, or .non-injury.55 The re-
lation between the incarnation strand and the moral strand presupposes an 
extra-mundane God. The incarnate deit1 is likely considered to be the 
supreme example tor daily lite. The incarnation strand shows not merely 
how well moral conduct meahes with religious actiY1t1, but alao what makea 
ooaleeoenco possible, namel1 the merciful goodneas o! ~od.56 
From this study of the religious activities which surround religioua 
discourse of the three spiritual strands, S111&rt concludes that no single 
analysis o! relisious language eraerges. iioligioua language is "logicall1' 
variegated. 1157 'l'he rationale !or examining separately the divergent 
strands of religious discourse is to be found primarily in the diYerging 
doctrinal schemes which underlie the propositions • .58 
Unwilling to make a theoretical statement about all religious dia-
oourse, in the and Smart does not hesitate to suggeot that one can isolate 
types of grounds through which the olaim.e made in different strands of 
religious diacour~ are validated. He concludes that there a.re four wa7s 
throli.gh which the claims of the nwd.nous, m:atioal, and incarnation atl'&llda 
of religioua discourse validate themaelves. (1) BIi.sic justi!ioatiou 
-
appeal directly to some supportive aspect ot the discourse itsel!. In 
the nwdnoua strand, for exa14ple, appeal is iraade to the l!llll"Velouo ucl 
55
.Ibi~., P• 192. 
,56lbid., PP• 192-194. 
57Ibid., P• 197• 
.58Ibid., P• 179. 
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•..,•-in.spiring features ot the world through which the Hol1 Being reveala 
Himaelt. (2) The formal ground parallels the correspondence theory ot 
truth, or rationality. In the mystical strand, tor example, a formal 
appeal for confirmation is made to the 1117stic's behavior and utterances, 
to his lite, and to the lucidity of hie spirituality. kgain, the sillplic-
ity of monotheism is a formal advantage over the multiplicity of pol.7- · 
thoiom. (3) Organic ju5tificatio11 appeals to analogies and aimilaritiea. 
This type is especially active in the incarnation strand. (4) Finally, 
aupport for tbe doctrinal utrand is claimed through priority decision, 
that ia, through "preterentinl" juatifiaa.tion. In this aathod (a varia-
tion ot formal justi!ioation), different doctrinal schemes are supported 
by varying the strength o! b~sic ingredients because of pragmatic consider-
ations and nuctuating base strengths. This mode ia used espeoi.all7 in 
inter~eaving the strands.59 
These four types o! claim-validation, evident in the preceding exam-
ination of religioua discourses, make it apparent that blind acceptance 
of religious thinking d.oea not agree even with r~ligioua practice. 5x-
treme revelationista, insistent on separating reason and taith, are d.ia-
tantly removed from the practices of religion: 
For this reason, proponents of extreme revelationism are unthink-
ingly allied to those who would assert that religious propositio:u 
are, because unverifiable, meaningless. But it should ot course be 
remembered that the type of reasoning emplo7ecl on behalf of religioue 
clsiu is of a spacial nature, and is ot courseJuite unlike that 
which ia exemplified in mathematics or p~aios. 
Smart Vindicates tbe title ot his book, Reasons and Faiths, in co11olucling 
59Ibid., PP• 198-199, 12?. 
6o Ibid., P• 200. 
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that each spiritual strand of religiows practice, inseparable from an 
attendant religious discourse, provides a validation tor ita own proposi• 
tions. Form this persp@otive, r$ason(s) and faith(a) are complementary, 
not antithetical. 
Peter Munz 
Peter Munz61 locMtea his study ot religious statemen·ts between two 
antitheses, naturalism and too traditional interpretation of religious 
utterances. Hi.a attempt to validate the status of theological discourae 
bas a double purpoae: 
Firatly, it serves to tree religioue knowledg~ from tha clutches ot 
the naturalists who would r~duce it to something else •• •• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Secondly, it becomes a criticism of the traditioaa.l juetiticatioDS 
ot religious knowledge •••• The old accowits accord a priTileged 
position to some religious statements, and the naturalistic treat-
ments deny statue to all religious statetAenta. As againat these two 
approaches, tho philosophy of religion should show how and why reli-
gioua otatements are acceptable; and that no religious ~tatement can 
claim a privilepd position in regard to its meaning and truth other 
than thtt one accorded to it by general reasonablenesa and pl.&uai• 
bility.62 
Munz argues that the relatiouhip between belief and behari.or is the 
direct opposite of common interpretation. He contends that the emergence 
of myth and ritual is explicable without explicit reference to prior 
belief. Re posits thtt symbol as the direct, immediate consequence of a 
"feeling-state." Once the dependent relat1011abip between belief and be• 
havior is eatablishecl, "the road is open tor an explanation ot belief aa 
61 In 19.59 Munz vaa ~enior Leoturer in Hiatol'J at Victoria Ulliftrait7, 
Wellington, New .:Aaland. 
~eter Munz, .Probleu of ~ligious Knowledp (London& ~CM Pre••, 
c.19.59), P• 29. 
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a belief or a theory about ritual and SD¥th•"63 
I1unz seoks to ascertain what the theologian,' s role is if the nature 
of the relationship between myth and belief is as be baa doscribed it. 
Traditionally, behavior lu>.a been viewed aa action subsequent to belief. 
The theologia.n's taak wao on&- of deduction. liut now the tables are turned& 
According to the argume~t of the present book, the function of theo-
logy is to give a description ot the symbol picture in the same Y&:¥ 
in which the physicist deacribea another picture of the world we are 
living in. '1.'he theologian is to treat the symbol picture as his 
subject-matter. He has to think about~ and oboerve certain rulea 
of thought, just as the ph7siciet does. 
In conoiduring the place of symbolism in the theologian's new task, 
J.iunz concludes that the theologian may evo.de both anthropomorphism and 
agnoaticiam if he remembers that aymbols represent nothing trans~endent: 
they ure enda which describe the world or worlds in which r.w.n finda uia-
selt. Thia approach to symbolism delllOnstrates the invalidity of analogy 
as we11.65 The theologian must remain convinced that the only element of 
certainty in religious thought resides in the picture symbol. Through-
out the procees of "theologizing, 11 the symbol must alwa:,a remain open to 
hypothetical interpretation, dogmatic hardening o! interpretation 13 not 
to be al.lowed.66 In sum, theology- io a theor, about the symbol picture. 
The truth of theology can be tested only against the s1111bol picture. ~'hen 








66 17.5. Ibid., P• 
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to bel:i.eve in the truth of theological statements. 6? In this "new" theo-
logy propositional symbols are not "first principles" from which theology 
can be deduced. Propositional symbols themselves are the "subject matter" 
of theological thought.68 
Munz interjects one material qualification for the work of the theo-
logian. The theologian, by the very nature of his vocation, must utilize 
the concept of eternity in his analysis of symbol • 
. He assumes that the concept of eternity has a defiuite meaning and 
then proceeds to the elucidation and interpretation of the symbol 
picture with the help of that concept.69 
The theologian chooses to uae the concept of eternity under the knowledge 
that detection of eternity is the "only proper therapy for man. 1170 
~'here remains for Munz to discuss the environment within which the 
symbol picture is best cultivated. The most healthy environment is one 
in which the symbol picture contributes to an eternal therapy for man: 
"This is the sense in whi.ch I would say that the maxim extra ecclesiam 
nulla salus is true. Without the cultivation of the symbol picture we 
cannot see eternity • • • •1171 Munz emphasizes the importance of the 
worship situation as a atiroulua for the symbol picture: 
A Church is a community of people who have decided to cultivate 
a certain symbol picture. Hence the basic principle that lex orandi 
is the lex credendi •••• For the lex credendi is merely an inter-
pretation of and a speculation about the lex orandi.?2 
6
.?Ibid., P• 175. 
68Ibid., p. 124. 
69Ibid., P• 128. 
?Oibid., P• 129. 
71Ibid., P• 130-131. 
72Ibid., p. 1?6. 
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Logic of Particularity in ftoligious Language 
The third group ot men describe the logic of religious lalliJU8.{5e aa 
"odd "--Ian •.r. ~<amse:,' s term--in its own special way. l'hey !eel that the 
particularity o! roli~ious language parallels tho logic of "personal" 
language, that ia, language which discusses peraons. rihile those 1:1e11 
favorably compare the peculiarity of the logic of religious language with 
the peculiarity of peraonal language, they disagree on the elements ot 
personal lancuage which moot acc_urately parallol the logic of reli&'ious 
language. Ramsey contenda that the moY~ment of language from eopirical 
anchorage to a situation of discernment-commitment (the religious situation) 
ie best described in terms of. the logic manifested in the uae of the word 
"I." }'rank H. Cleobury merely refers to "per1:1onal" language. ,iilliaJI 
Rordern isolates eeveral aspects of the "personal language game" which are 
par.allel with the logic of religious language. Donald D. ~vans emphasizes 
the aelf-i~volv1ng and ~er!ormative factors of personal language as the 
fi&rallel to the logic of religioua language. As a voup, all cont and that 
the special character o! religioua lariJUage re.sidea in th~ particularity 
of its logic, a particularity which in some ways parallel3 the logic ol 
personal atatemonta. 
ls.n Thomas RB.mae173 endeavors to demonstrate what follows "from 
73aamsey was ordain9d an Anglican priest in 1941. He has been Canoa 
Theologian o! Leicester Cathedral since 1944, and Nolloth Professor ot the 
Philosophy ot the Christian R~ligion in tha Uni•ersity o! Oxford, as well 
as Fellow of Uriel Oollege, since 1951. Th• writer did not haYO aoceas 
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grounding th~ological words and phrases in what I have called a oharaoter-
iatically roligious ait11ation. ,,74 l~maey acts with the oonri.ction that 
contemporary analysis provides a novel insight into proble11a and contro-
versies of theology, "illuminating its claim and ro!orming ito apolopt-
ic.n75 
Utilizing an analytic approach, Ramsey moves the empirical anchorage 
of theological words to "discernment," that is, to a religious :situation 
through which men are aware that they are more than their public behavior.76 
As meaningful parallelo to the aituatio11 of "religious discernment," he 
.:lirocta attention to situations in which phrases are UIMd in a peculiarl7 
unusual way. He refers to situations characterized by such phrases as 
"the ice breaka," or "the light dawns."77 The religious empiricist is 
sure to !ind features which parallel· "diacerDlll8nt" in situations described 
by existentialiats as "authentic existence," or "involvement."78 On the 
other hand, the characteristically religious situation is not merely 
"emotional.," that ia, subjeotive. A religious situation has u ''object1n" 
reterenoe in its occurrence1 it is "aubjeot-objeot" in structure. There 
to liamse7's latest work, Christian Discourse& Some Lo cal E.lx oratiou 
(Oxford: University Presa, c.19 5. 
74
ran 'I:. Hamsey, Religious Layuap: An liapirioal Placing ot l'heo-
lopcal Phrases (London: SCH Preas, 1957), P• 10. 1, . 
Ibid., P• ll. 
76 
~., p. 1.5. Ramsey appeals to Joseph Butler's 'l'he Aualop: ot 
Reli ion 1'atural and Hevealed to the Constitutioa and CourlM ot NatUN 
1 th century- in selecting "discernment" as the aharaater1atio situation. 
'l1Ba.maey, 1leligioua Langwas,, P• 17. 
18 
.ill!!• ' P• 22. 
181 
ia an objective "depth" which emergea.79 Raaiae1 ie set Oil describiq 
"discerwuont" br,causa it ia his conviction that 
when theological phraaes ••• are seen a:s spooaoring Buch a sit-
uation, they oan tllon be given such a logical atruoture as by-paaaea 
many traditiow:il ccnt1.1siona and controversies which are in tact 
trom thia s tandpoint mere brawling.HO 
Ramsey is not content to describe the empirical anohorage ot 'religious 
language with mere reference to discerDlll8nt. In addition there ia a con-
comitant 11collll1itment" involved in the religious situations 
Uow it is such a total commitment, appropriate to a "queatioD ot 
great col158quenoe," a commitment which is baaed upon but goes beyoDd 
ratiollB.l considerations which are "matters of specu.l.atioD"I a commit• 
••nt which ~eed ill a situation all that the understanding can give 
ua an~ more; a commitment which is Afemplified oy conscientious acticn 
building on "probabilities" •••• 
The Commitmvnt is a situation upon which diacornment focuses; man discel"D8 
the situation as 111ak1ng a claim on hia. 82 Iu,ligioua coJlllllitmttnt is tied 
to key wordd. Their logic baa tho peculiar nature of r-c:aembling words 
which cha.raottsrize peraoual loyf4lty as well as words ot mathecstical 
axiom.s. The co'41ilit111Unt•worcla helve a logic which combines teaturvs of 
both, for they are "key-word.a suited to tho whole job of living--'apex' 
worc1a.118) 
If religioua language haa o.a ita purpoae to speak about situations 
of di1.1oernme11t and cOlllllli.tment, religious language will be "object laiaguap 
79Ibid., PP• 27-28. 
8o ~ .. P• 26. 









which exhibits logical peculiarities, logical impropriet~. 11 fheological 
lau~~e will uae words which are rocognizablf "straight-forward," but 
''strained" in some way to tell the tale of discernment and commitment. 85 
In addition, theoloeical lan1uage will include certain tautologies whose 
function it will be to commend thl;l "key words,'' the "ultimates ot explana-
tion. 086 
'l'heoloUY is concorned to uae aud qualifJ obaervational language so 
that it ia suitable currency tor religious lausuago--tor what in part ex-
tends beyond observational language • .Ramsey- selects the word "I" as a 
word whoae characteristics are not exhausted 111 "object" language. He 
aum~esta the.t it is enlightening to par,i.llel this word with "God" in con-
sidering the religious situation, tor 110od11 too participates in a aphero 
apart from the "object;," "87 More torcefuU,, 
our conclusion is that for the religious man "God." is a ke1 word, an 
irreducible posit, an ultimate of explanation expreaeiTe ot the kind 
ot commitment he profeasee. It is to be talked about in terma of 
the object-language oTer whioh it presides, but oJU.1 vhen this objeot-
lQu~-uago iu qual~tied1 in which case this qualified object-language 
booomae also currency for that odd diaoerllll8nt with vhioh religious 
commitment, when it is not bigotry or fanaticism, will necesaril1 
·be associated. 88 
In sum, religious language tal.ke of disceZ'DJINtDt with which a total colllllit-
ment 11:l associated by way ot responoe, but it speaks ot tbia disoermaent-
colZlllitment in ter ms ot a qualified objact-laneuage preaided oTer b1 the 
84 38. Ibid., P• 
85Ibid •. , P• 39. 
86 4o. ~-. P• 
87Ibid., P• 38. 
88Ibid., P• 47. 
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key word "God." 
Ramsey next turnu to tho se-,·eral ways in which object-language is 
qualified for religious use. He investigatos three methods ot transter-
once through which word$ with empirical mooringa become descriptive ot 
tbe roligioua situation. The firat ia the Mthod o! negatiYe theoloQ• 
'l'he use or lan5uage in t1egat:ive theology is the attempt to describe God 
at the cost of emphasizing Hie diatauce from certain elomenta of percep-
tual languuge. The merit of negative statements is that they are primari-
lf evocative, and provide a technique tor meditation.89 In the second 
method, tho "method of contrasts, 11 puzzlement over certain words uaed in 
r~ligioua diacourse (unity, aimplioity, perfection) is graduall1 elilllina-
ted by poaiting opposite wordo, and then contrasting the two. The con-
traating comparison is E!.!!!: halted so long as one can go on striving to 
remove thu diveroo element (that is, until tho experience ot disoernmont). 
With tho method of contrasts, one always begina with a situation ot em-
pirical anchorage.90 Ramsey's third moiie ot dbtinguiahing the logiQal 
behavior o! religious language is the 11Hodel~uali!ier." '!'he qualifier 
prescribes tha apecitic mode by which the model is to be deToloped. Thia 
process encourages movement in aocordance with the qualifier's nature. 
"First Cause" is an example of the Model-~ualitier method. The qualifier 
S9 Ibid. , P• 5 ~. 
90Ibid., p. 5.5. Vladimir Losslq, in The Mystical Theolop ot the 
Eastern Church (London: James Clarke and Company, 195?}, PP• 25, 37, 39, speaks 
ot "apophatioism'' (the method ot negations) and "oat&pbaticim" (the meth-
od of attirnlationa) as two modes used to reduce mystery when an attempt 
is made to comprehend God. The former is Eastern, the latter Kestern (in 
the Church). They present something of a parallel to the .. thoda Bamae7 
has thus tar considered. 
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(in this case "First") pursues the model until it confronts commitment. 
At commitment there is the ultimate of explanation. At commitment the 
Qualifier-Model may indeed have a grammatical similarity with the point 
of its inception, but no logical parallel is present.91 These three 
methods of qualifica tion--from empirical anchorage to discernment and 
commitment--provide Ramsey the conclusion that all words, if suitably 
qualified, can lead to the religious situation. Put another way, this 
is the claim that God can be seen in all the words of His oreation.92 
At this point it seems wise to interrupt, temporarily, our swnmary 
of Ramsey's Religious Language in order to doraonstrate from others of his 
works that all words, if suitably qualified, can lead to the religious 
situation. In Freedom and Immortality, Ramsey shows the empirical anchorage 
of two metaphysical ideas (and words) which are related to theology. He 
~osits as a basic linguistic aa6Wllption that "no situation at any given 
time will ever be exhaustively covered by object language. 1193 For ex-
ample, when ordinary language refers to a "decision" in complex terr.us--
as it often doea--it demonstrates a diversity which allows that some human 
91Ramsey, Religious Language, pp. 62-65. In "Towards the Relevant 
in Theological Language," Modern Churchman, VIII (October 1964), 46-58, 
Ramoey examines the process of choosing relevant phrases from empirical 
situations which may be properly qualified. 
9
~sey, Religious Language, p. 80. After discussing two contempor-
ary approaches to the Scripture itself, the historical-critical and the 
Bultmannian-existential schools, Ramsey concludes (p. 1o6) that both demon-
strate the validity of his arguments concerning theological language, even 
biblical language. The Bible cannot be made to conform to public language. 
It speaks of the same discernment-commitment situations which are the baees 
of contemporary religious language. 
93Ian T. Ramsey, Freedom and Immortalitl (London: SCM Press, c.1960), 
P• 93. 
behavior in "decision" eludes complete deaoription in aciantitic terms. 
'L'he l oornp exity iuvolved in th-, word "decision" provides Rn argunient tor 
the existence of free ·.~ill. 94 
Hamsey argues in a 3imilar pattern in his consideration ot scientitic 
landuago. ~cientific evento give rise, in discloaurea, to all kinds of 
invariants.95 From invariants the scientist deduces empirically verifiable 
faotors. The scientific words which doscriba invariants ditler in logical 
character from theological wordo. There ia a vast logical difference 
between t he bohavior of theological and scientific I.fords. "From theo-
logical aa:;ertions no verifiable dechtctiona can bo 1:ia~le; from acionti!ic 
onos they can anu 1l1ust be. 1196 
?here is a point, however, at whioh the acienti!ic and the personal 
interlock--at the poio.t ot tho word "I. 11 The aosertion "I exiat" g!.vea 
no opportunity, through a proceas o! rigorous deduction, tor a detailed 
aasortion about r.;e. Ou the other band, all sorta ot acienti!ic asaertion.e 
entail 11I ~xist." For example, 
~/hen tha t".athemtician sayo of r.ie, "He is executing circular motions 
with such and auch angular velocit1 and with a centrifugal force 
on his partner which raises her feet 45° to the wrtical"-hia 
e.saertion will entail (i:l I am on the dnnce tloor) "I exist. 119? 
From this one can argue that the diversely logical areao ot aciance and 
94Ibid., P• 149. Rl.111887 adda "duty'' and "obligation" as additional 
situations not w~olly deducible into object-lan5uage, and as arguments 
for tree wiJ.l. 
951.an :-g. Hamsey, lutli ion and Jcioncea Conflict and .i nthesi.s Jo• 
Philosophica~!lectious London; s. P. c. K. Presa, c.l , P• 7}. 
96Ibid., P• 75. 
97Ibid., P• 74. 
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theology ''can be unitod together on tho basis ot lo~oal clues :supplied b)' 
behavior ot the word 'l. ',.98 Th.- oaae ot God is parallol. i:'rom "God 
exists" nothin~ verif iable can be deduced logicali,, tor the ·-orld is 
not neceauary to God . But ''God exists" iu a preauppouition ot all sc1en .. 
tific, verifiable agaertiona.99 In fina.l -analysis, 
religious languugft i ::l g.rouncl~d in the pe:r:Jonal ••• the persoaal 
:'.s not only a categ,,z·y which ia never wholly reducible to aoientitic 
terms, but ••• interlocks with all the diverse languages ot acience 
to unite them ao a conit.1on presuppoaition.100 
Hal!I.Sey attempts to discover how the thoological aasertion "uod. exists" 
sorves aa t ha preuuppoaition of all scientific empirical assertiona. 
C~ithout explicit statement he is demonstrating how all words suitabl7 
qualified can lead to the religious situation.) In sum, this is his argu-
llent. The scientist needs, in work and theories, "invariants" (such aa 
· particle ar1d maas) which are neither men jingles nor descriptive labels. 
'the inTaria~ts arise in one wa.y or another from-and witness to-a dis-
closure or insight. The acientist is careful not to construe hi• invari-
ants as descriptions, although b.e may neglect Qiomentarily the cliaclooure .. 
bacJia of bia central concepts. Ue 1& torced b7 his scientific objeotiTe 
to participa t ·e in ded.ucti ve Terifia1:1.tio11 which is ruled. out in ·theolos:, 
(for language about th@ cosmic disclosure, t1God exists," is 110 less capable 
of empirical veritioation than the phraae "I exist"). Hove-.er, the Tery 
particularity and peculiarity which attaches to the logical character 
98Ibid., P• 75. Ramse1 discuases in greater detail the queBtion ot 
the "I," or self-identit;y and per.toaalit7, in ''Peraou aud Funeralaz 
What Uo Person \•iorcis Mean?" Hibbert Journal, LIV (Ma7 1956), :,30-338. 
99Bamae7, .iwligion and ~cieno•, P• ?4. 
lOOibid., P• 76. 
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of "God exista" permits thies phrase, without generating the "nonaense ot 
category-confusion," to b~ linkod with all empi:'ioal as3ertiona as a prew 
euppoeition of aaid aaaertiona. ''Here thc,n, 11 Ramsey ea7s, 
is a synthetic vent~re which tries to do justice both to the diTeraity 
and to the ultimate interlockiDfS of aciontifio und tneological dia-
courao; both to the experimental method in ac:f.eucf: 1 and the ground-
ing of ec~entific invariants in disoloaurea tha~ aro ultimately 
theoloc;ioal.101 · 
"God" in thia persiJOctive names that invariant "which is anohor~d objectivew 
l;y in a disclosure situation, \-then that situation involves tho whole uDi-
verse.11102 
At the point of coomio disclosure we return to tha aumr.w.ry o! Ramae7's 
f<eli:5iouo Lan1:~U/:l.f$8• The three methods of qualification have as their goal 
tho situa~ion of discernment-commitment. \faother the "light breaks" or 
not is a matter 1-1hich man himself cannot control. l03 There ia the poasi.-
bility that if man conj~ctureo himself to bC3 in control of n discenuaent-
producinG power, ho would oon3truo hima"l! maator ot the myateriou3. 
I<ar.1sey warns that while an era1pirical nppruach to rell~ioua language 
ascertains what logical placement the truditional pbrasea ot Christianity 
have, the ei:i1>irical approach never imagines lan5U8-ge to be ar.i exact "Teroal 
photograph" of what it talko about. There is the mysterious dioclosed ill 
101Ihi~. 8 -8 8 
~, PP• l 2, 3• 
102 
~., P• 73. In Freedom and Immortality, PP• 99-lCX>, Ramsey criti-
cizes the idealists, especially Bradle1, tor remoTing tue objectivity pre-
sent in cases ot "disclosure." In the awareness that one is ''tr&nsoendiDg" 
Pllblic behavior, one is also aware of acme "transcendent," tor no experi-
ence can be 1.tttorly subjective; nit ever there were afll purely su.bjeotift 
expitrience it would be be1ond our keu ud beyond our lallglMlge to talk ot 
it." To eoe how Hau.aey visualizes a situation of disceroment-commit•nt 
in th.- ieourrection, an ''odd" situation of more than purely au.bjeot1ft 
experience, see his "Logical Character of llesurrection•bctliet," Theology, 
LX (May 1957), 186-192. 
103
.Haause:,, Religious Iapguap, P• 79• 
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the discernment-comr.iitment situation, and it is neTer fully exhausted in 
the empirical placins of :oligious languag-1.l04 Ultimately it is to the 
worship situation that one must r~tire tor [5Uidanoe 1n plotting and 
mapping theological phrases: 
Here then ia a method by which not on.ly al"e pt'oblttrlUJ overuome, but 
where at every point we plot &nd map our theological pbra13es with 
roterence to a characteristir.ally relibioua eitUH.tion--one o! wor3hip 
,,onder, awe, ,Jithout such an ecipirical anchorage all our theological 
thinking ia iu vain, and where there is controveray and argument we 
nre to look for their ro...olution where they are fulfilled: in 
worship.10.5 
.Fr!lnk Harold Gleobu~ 
Frank Harold Gleobury106 proposes in Christian i<ationaliam and Philo-
5ophical , nalysis to refute 13raithwaite's thesis: "'t he contral argu.ment 
of this book is in effect a refutation of Braithwaite'a thesis. 11107 
Gleobury, an idenliot, is un~illing to capitulate to tlhl realist which he 
claims to find behind the facade o! philosophical aDalyeis. iio addresses 
himself to the queetion of language in idealistic philoaopby b;r dividing 
language into ''personal" and "impersonal." Impersonal languase cunaista 
in sentences whose ~ra11m1atical subjects are material-object or scientific-
object nouns.108 3entencos of pe~sonal lao.:,"'Wlge have a direct relation 
l04Ibid., P• 171. 
l05Ibid., P• 89. 
l06Cleobury was ordained an Anglican priest in 1951. He hka been 
rector ot llerti~!ordbury, Uiocese of :.;t. Albans, since 195.5. 
l07Flran!il li ~old] Cleobury, Qhriatian Rationalie!Jl and Philoaophiaal 
Aualysia Uondon: Jamaa Clarke 1tud Compazq, c.19.59), P• 17. 
l08Ibid., P• 66. 
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to an obJectiye aituation not claimed in sentenceacof illperaoaal language. 
Correlative~, personal nouns can be 11reitied," but impersonal nouu oan-
11.ot.109 
Cleobury assorts that sentences with "God" &3 subject occupy a poa1-
t _ion intermediate between the two extremes. As reg..:rds their grammatical 
subJect, the word "God," th" sentences more nearly approximate personal 
la~ge. But aa reg,Jrds their predicates, "the1 arust ••• be interproted 
as elliptical references to our own experience.,,llO 
Through idealistic argumentation Cleobur, Yindicates man's right to 
"roity'' the word "God" by hits abilit1 to distinguish between perception 
and imagination. 'l'he thought of Goel is essential to da.11.y perceptual 
experience becau3e it is lie who can guarantee the "World-tor-the-Standard• 
Obsener. 11 Thus r1hile the total subject of a theological statement can 
be "reitied, '' the predicate must be interpreted ai:ialogicall7, and Justified 
with re!erenaea to human oxperiences.111 
William Hordern 
William liordern112 proposes to examine theological communication as 
he converses with analytic ph1loaop1>¥.11' It ia hi.a contention that 
l09Ib1d., P• 101. 
llOibid., PP• 101-102. 
111Ib1d., PP• 102-1031 see alao PP• 39-lt<>. 
~ordern was proteasor ot religion at .Swarthmore College, 1949-5?• 
He beca~e proteasor ot theology at Garret Theological deaaiDAr7, ~"'YaDaton, 
Illinoia, in 1957. Hord81'11 ia president-elect of J.,uther Theological 
Seid.nary, Saokatoon, &iak. 
ll3William Iiordern., 3 ot Theo-
logical Languap (New York, , P• '9• 
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theological languago tor/AB Q distinguishable language game.114 aeeding 
VittgeD&tein'a awnmou to thlj stu~ ot context, llordern insists that "to 
analyze a language is always to analyse a co111111U.Dit1" because enry lan• 
guage hels a communal context. Acoor'1ingly, tha paradigm oase ot theo-
logical a£firUW1tiono is !ound in their ud J..11 the Church.ll5 
liordern viaualizea ~ convictioWtl eleaent in moat language games. 
In each bP8.me the riipea.ker witn.taaea to his conviotur in such a '4aJ that 
the hearer apprehends th~ oonvictor tor himseit.116 B11t it mu.ut be remem-
bered that in the de8podt auuee one does nvt choose hia convictora arbi-
trarily, or in any other way: "we are chosen by our oonviotora.11117 
Within thio convictional argwnentation liord•rn equates religious and 
conviction.al stato~ents, 
B~t, logically apeaking, ultimate religious sta tements can be claaai-
fied with other statements where man can olll.7 refer to the evidence, 
trusting that tho evidence caD. Juatit1 itself. They are convi.ctional 
atateuients that point to their convictor.118 
It is self-evident that an appeal to reason c1UULot neutralize oontlictin.g 
oonvictional claims because the evidenoe allowed by reason depends on 
prior conviction to begin with.l~9 
114 
~., PP• 81-84. Rordorn cites aa rarks which distinguish lan-
guage sames: use, different vocabularies, untraualatability .of basic 
terms, ditf8ring methods of nrification, and differing "connctional" 
toundatio~. T:1.ological language is a game because its uae relates to 
religious life, esoteric voaabul.ar7 is untranslatable, and its .erifica-
tion depends on conviction, SIJ.38 liordern. 
115Ibid., PP• 9.3-94. 
116Ibid., PP• 102-103. 








Theological language points to a convict or known as myeteq. 120 The 
chief characteristic of mystery is its numinous transcendence: 
The principal mark of a mystery is not that it tills us with a sense 
of ignorance; on the contrary it tills ua with awe, wonder anc:l 
reverence which quite frequently increase as knowledge grova.121 
Since theological language deals with a transcendent, revealing God, 
analogies which are proffered are "eroded" b7 qualiticatioua. This pro-
ceaa is no occasion tor lament, especially among those who know the struc-
ture of a language game. Thus even paradox is legitilllatel;y use.d to re-
mind one of the encounter with mystery. 122 In aJQ' event, the use ot 
analogy in Christian language is guaranteed in God's revelation of Him-
aelt.123 
Since theological language is convictional and somewhat mysterious, 
one cannot hope to understand it without apprehending its roots in mystery. 
"~uite literally, the man who has not worshipped cannot know what theo-
logical lunguage i3 about •••• 11124 The question, "WhJ is there some-
thing, and not nothing?" ia not a logical queation because it does not 
formulate a problem soluble by knowledge alone. On the other hand, it is 
the beginning of worship in that it expresses "a sense of awe, wonder, 
125 and reverence before the mystery of existence." 













125Ibid. 1 p. 119. Hordern argues (p. 122) that Hutchinson's dia-
tinction 'between "roligious" and "theological'' language must not be pressed. 
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Hordorn deems it necessary to examine in greater detail tho game ot 
personal lan13uage. lie contends that theological language has more in 
comt110u with the personal language game than with any other language game.126 
He discusaes first tho ooncept "person" in ordor to clarif'7 the meaning of 
the peraonnl language same. Awareness and knowledge of' self as .self tlov 
from the n\led to make dl!ciaions. I.a.nguage about "I," the know self, is 
''odd," tor tha ordinary aubjeot-object division ot other language is 
absent. Following knowledge o! salt there arises the neoeaait7 of reveal-
ing tho self to othera, and with the revelation, the distinction between 
authentic and inauthentic actions. Knowledge of other persona ia otton 
not scientific knowledge, but it remains "verif'iable" in ito own game. 
To be known as a person, a man must reveal himself through words and 
actiona. In addition, the listening man must reapond in rapport to the 
apokon ''word" if tho speaker is to be know. Knowledge of another selt 
implies trust and love, because to know another person is to know a 
uuique individual.127 The gaae of peroonal anguage tito the ache1111 ot 
the "peraon. 11 The meaning ot a personal statement is never wholly under-
stood without a full description of the context. 1D personal language, 
intention and purpose, not causation, are uaed in explanation, persona 
are agents with motiTes, intentions, and purpoae. 1D swa, ''The vords ot 
peraot1al language will not haTe the preoieioD of the technical words ot 









PP• 149, 151, 148. 
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In a detailed dis cussion of the overlap between peraonal language 
and th l oo ogical language, 11ordorn u.rgea Christiana to "reinatate the 
reality of pereonal knowledge and lan~uage" within theological lauguage.129 
Just as it w~s not impossible to analyze tb~ context or personal lan~wige, 
so it 1~ not impossible to a nalyze the logic ot tho faith which ia the 
context of theological languago.130 Go~ demonstrated in revelation that 
the key to s peaking about Hi~ resides in the sphere ot porsonal language.131 
All pers onal. rola ~ions re4uire aomo sort of revelation. ~ven so knowledge 
ot God, tho mys tery, dapencis upon revelation. He revaala lii1nsel! through 
historical situations in the rev~latory biblical events. The Bible's 
concern is not the reportin6 of history, but the mani!estat ion ot the 
per~on ot God throu3h histor,r.132 Tho particularity of biblical revela-
tion i ~ a stumbting-block only to those who approach it thinking in terga 
of :scientific knowledge. If God is a person offering a per son-to-person 
rolatioD..Ghip, He can work only iu particularitJ o! revelation. Conaequent-
~ • moaningtul ata cements about God can be made by the believer onl.7 when 
129Ibid., pp. 158-1.59. i~ooald J . :iopburD, in Christianity a.ncl ~aro.-
dox (London.: c. ,\. i·Jatts, c.19.58), PP• 56-57, oontenda that thu "men ot 
encounteru try to r etain at all oost~ tho I-Thou encounter with Go<l with-
out distortion. This pushes thom towards tho dXOluaion ot Jescriptive 
elements in the word ",1od." Hepburn argues that they are giTing a.n illu-
sion of immediacy 111 oaaillating between "deecriptive and. proper-name uuea 
ot the word ' God•." He continues: 11..io evvn if one grants that you haTe 
encountered a Thou in prayer, we shall still hD.vo to turn to reflection, 
perhaps to p..'iilo.:iophi2l t heology, to set about eatablishing the truth 
or !alsit7 ot the statements that this is Ood the ~reator, the Int!nit•, 
S!ter-nal Ground ot &lin0• 11 
130Hordorn, p. 98. 
131
n.id l 4 
~·, P• 3 • 
132 
~-. fl• 161. 
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he bogina with particular events of special revelation, and not with the 
whole or hiatory.133 
The personal relntionship between God and man iapliea a similarity 
between t he theological language game and the personal language gar.ie. 
By oxarnininl! the personal relationship between God and man, Hordern ad-
vances his theai~ ru~ardincr tho personal character of theological etate-
menta. v/hen God offers e. personal relat ionship with man, a response is 
derr.andttd.134 In confrontation with God, a true Person, a man's distorted 
persollhood attnina wholenass.135 In wholeness l'lltln responds with prayer, 
Conf'escsion ot !.lins, v1orahip, and n life ot obedienoe.136 
;,;tate,::enta in tho ga:ne of peraonal l.Anguage are "verified'' onl~ upou 
entering a par 3onal relationship with the person referred to in the state-
ment, aaya llordern. ::;i r:!tilarly, a personal relation is nocesaa17 in the 
case ot God-statementa, although thia doee not rule out the necessity of 
history in the Goapel'a proclamation. A persoaal relation9hip vi.th God 
presupposes a prior revelation in certain concrete historical eventa.1-'7 
Veriticatiou of theological statements proceeds r..arallel to a veri.tioation 
ot peraonal statements: 
To verity a peraonal statement I must introduce you to the person 
involved and believe that in your relationship with the peraoR 7ou 
will find the statement Teritied • .:;imilarlJ, to nrif7 a theological 
statement, the (;hurch oan do no more tban introduce a man to God in 
133Ibid., P• 164. It appears that !tordern baa rellloffd any posaibilit7 
of natural theology. 
134Ibid., P• 167. 
135
~., P• 169. 
136
.tbid., P• 170. 
lJ?Ibid., P• 175• 
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the faith God can verify himself in the rtlationahip that will 
then be formed. As convictional langu.ge th'3olc,SY has t o have the 
confidenoe that ita convictor has the power to convict.138 
fo avoid the argunhlnt oonc~rning a cognitive element in tho verilioa.tiou 
ot theological statements , liordern ohooi,es to speak of "knowing" God iD 
te.rms ot Barth's definition of knowledge. Knowledge is "that oontirma-
t1on ot human acquaintance with an object whereby ito trueness beco11es a 
<letermin5 factor in thtJ existence of the man 1tho knowa. 11 39 
Donald D. ;..'vans 
DoD,tild D. ~vans140 accepts many of tho m~tho<lological procedures of 
138 
~., P• 176. 
139 lbid., PP• 180-182 • .t:arlier (pp. 155, 157) llordern distinguish•• 
his position from Buber's: nbecause man doeo have personal relations ancl 
knowa othera aa .persons, be can speak about these relations in the appro-
priate language iltithout slippi~g into I-it language." He concludes that 
ther@ ia a legitimate way, in peraonal language, to apeak "obj-,otivelJ" 
about God, tor personal language describes events that occur indepenclezitl7 
ol tho dell. 
l4oDou.ald D. Ev,.a,.; W.UdJ.1 iuruishod thia writ•r with his ourriow.wa 
vitae. He was born 21 septem~er 1927 at Ft. ~illiam, Ontario. After 
reoeiYing a B. A. in 19.50 from the UrdYerait1 of Toronto, he worked under 
Gilbert Ryle at Balliol Colleg~, Oxford, and received the B. Phil. 1D 
1953. theological studies were pursued at Balliol College, Oxford, 1951-
52, and McGill University, 1953-55, under Dr. o. B. Caird. He receiTecl 
hia :a. u. at McGill in 19.5.5. h'vall.8 min.isteNd to fl co~re~tion of the 
United Church ot Canada, 1955-.58. He conducted reeearch in philosop~ 
at Balliol College, Oxford, under J • .1.,. Audtin awl J. o. Urmaon, 1958-6o. 
His doctoral thesis in philosophy was accepted by Oxford in 1962, and he 
noei·Yed the o • .Phil. degree that year. I. '.r. Namaey and A. M. ~toll 
were the examinora. From 1960 to t h~ summer ot 1964 Evans served as aaaiet-
&Dt professor o! Philosophy of Religion 1a the .1t"acult7 of JJiTinity, MoGill 
University. Since 1964 he haa been asaociate protedsor of l"hiloso~ at 
the Univeraity of f oronto, teaching episteaologr, etbioa, and philoaopq 
o! religion. His current interest is in. the area ot agnosticia allCi 
faith, ua book, 11 aa .r..'vana describes it, "on tbs ratioaal• of faith1 thi• 
will be a new philosophical theology which makes use of insights 1D both 
•Dal.Jti.cal. awl existential philoso}ml." i.wu • boolca illOlude The Logio 
ot .S.lt-InYolveraent (infra), and Communist Faith nnd Christian Faith 
~Toronto, l<;yerson, 1964). 
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Philosophical nnalysio. But ho explicitly, raJects th~ aaouaption that 
the .''1osic" of u.ny lanetuage gamo guarantees that ol(ID& 'u validity by the 
mere fact that poople opaak in a. certain way. To adopt the latter view 
in reference to "talk about God" is to eliminate the GrguU10nt that there 
1 19 no God boca11ae . p:r·oponr.rnts ot t ho Gou-talk language game neither open 
it to outside attack nor deem it in neo~ of outside justification. Says 
Evans, ''I reject the philosophical view of language aa something to be 
divided up into language-gamea which are each selt-juatitying and 
autonomous. 11141 
~vans posits aud ex~mines three usoo of language: pertormative, 
cauual, and expressive. In discussing t he par!ormat1Ye uoe be notes his 
indebtednea i to John Austin's How to Do Thinga with tfordG and 1:hilosop~-
cal Papers.142 After discussing r,erforniative and causal uees of lan~age, 
., 143 
~vans draws t hia "language-map": 
Performative language 
which uy be 
~xplicit or non-explicit 
~elf-labeling or uttered 
in Yerb other than first 
pers~u indicative proseng 
pure or autobiographical 
(j>urely pertorlllltive, or 
referring to self and 
reporting on mental stat~ 
141Donald D. ;:.'\rans, ·rho Logic of' .:ielt-Involvemont: A 1'h1losophioal 
$tu of h'yer da La with $ cial tleterence to the Chriatian UH 
ot Lanf,uage about God aa Creator \London: J ~M Press, c.19 3, PP• 22-24. 
In view of this approe.oh, it is not aurprieing that ETana insists (p. 17) 
that biblical lazieuage i s the inceptive point from which aey ana~aia ot 
Christian language must proceed. 
142,. 77 6o ~upra. P• , n. • 
1
~
3I have supplied bracketed intormation with material troa other 
part3 of the book in order to provide an adequate sw1m1u7 of the material. 
Up to this point Evans ba11 diacuaaed pertormatiTe lauguage, iruplioatiou 
and commitments , conditions for entailment, and uses or languaga. Th• 
ateriala not bracketed are taken direotq troa PP• 71+-75. 
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f'all pure porforaiatives aro explicit, but. not all explicit 
perfort1£Ltivee are pure, for aome are autobiographical, 11 
P• 45) 
can be classifiad ~a: 
Constntive 
Verdictive 
[class i!lclud.es state1J1enta, e.g. "I 
warn 7ou that Brown ia daagero11e1!) 
@lass includes Y3rdioto~e.g. "I 
value your ring at i ,;oo•!J 
(!.n exeroise of a~thority, e.g. ''I 
appoint you governor ot Kenya•!) 
Exercitive 
Commissive •• 
li,oGlmieaive ia more-than-verbal J 
comlllitment, e .g .• 11I ])lodge ra, 
loyult;y and auuporttiJ 
r.: • jj4thabitive • • 
l!lebabitive concerns social be-
havior, e.g. ''I apologize tor Df1 
behavior'!) 
Implica tions 
&ays in which apoaker :nay 
i mply inter.tion~, attitude!} 
Indefeasible (!i1 com,nend .;n:ith 
tor being submissive~ 
Prima-tacie: 
(a) .:ip~aker-independent Eamith 
ia loyal a nd honest.!!) 
(b) .Speaker-dependent ~that_ia 
a vory valuable picture~ 
Contextual 
(a) Occasional (3peuker s1tt:J 
impliaationa asidiJ 
(b) ·rraditional C°'Biuith is sub-
misaive and reatrained11 (in 
a eulogy]] 
•• self-involving {i..e. the 
speaker implies mental states 
other than or in addition to 
beliet, and/or oomints hia-
s&l! to future patterns ot 
behavior; aomathiug more 
than mere tactual content 
is involved) 
Comm.tmunta 
{Eertormativee aa oommitment!J 
Indefeasible (2ornmitroenta 
where it is impossible to 
deny a commitment ,~ di) 
h1.ma-tacie 





Conditions tor ~ntail.Jlent 
ertormative foroe 
,;ntailments depend on 
Abatractable oontent 
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Uses ot Language 
Pertormative tp.rtormative use of language 
gives meaning1 "Jones is treach-
erous" said in order to van) 
Causal loauoal use ot language is no 
part ot meaning; utterance~ 
as a means to a particular end1 
e.g., "Jones ia treacheroua" vhen 
said in order to •l.arlO 
After diacuaaing performatiYe and causal language, Evans turns to 
expreasive lan~uago, the third use. He distinguishes between expreasioJUI 
ot feeling, and expressions of opinion (Colllliasive)/expressions ot inten-
tion (Behabitive). He notes that language is self-involving in BehabitiTe 
and Commissive performativea and when used to expres3 teolings.144 Although 
there is an intimate interrelation among all three, Comrd.aaive and Be~bi-
tive expresaiono differ from expressions ot feeling in tbat they reside 
in the sphere ot pertormative language. Evans oorruaente, 
An expression ot feeling differs from a report of feeling, but it 
can be uaed as a report ot feeling; that ia, it can be used as an 
alternative to a verbal report, as a code-aign.lJt~ 
Expressiol18 of feeling are the third major use ot language, but 
separation ot language into "uses" doos not signify the mutual exclusion. 
ot usea. Consequently, one may ask three distinct questions of any utter-
ance: Ca) What is its performatiYe force? (b) ~bat teeling doea it ex-
preaa? (c) ,'ih.at et:tecti, does it havd in people? 'l'he so-called "emotiTe" 
theories ot religious language fail to aohieTe clarity if the three dis-
tinct uses of language are ignored.146 




llt6Ibid., P• uo. 
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In hie conaidertition of oxpreaai'H language,, ,;i;vau cliacoyers a dis-
tinction which is o! great importance for him. It is so-called "rapportive" 
language. Happortive language is language resulting from one's underat«Dcl-
ing ot the words or actions of another. When an utterance with re!erence 
to another'a aotion is underatvod onl7 in the degree that one baa rappm.•t 
and affinity with th0 agent of the action , it is termed "rapporti Ye." 
!'Actions typically call !or 'rapportive' utterances when they are expres-
sive or when t heir rationale is profound." ~ rapportive utterance ia 
clu~aed according to understanding, uot according to uae; the three u3es 
of language reat1ain. HapportiYe utterances are usually self-revelatory; 
they may or may not be aelt-involving.147 
'to thia point .i::vans has concluded that Behabitive-perforiative, 
Co11111iasivo-perror~tive, expressive, and soQe rapportiYe language is self• 
involving. By s elt-involveUJent he means that the speaker implies mental 
atatoa othor than or in addition to belief, and/or oollllli.ta hi muelt to 
future patterns ot behaVior; something more than mere fc1ctual content 1a 
involved.148 Uow ~vans exo.ad.nes in detail the situation which givea 
genesis to self-involving language • 
.:>el!-ir.volving lunguage is the case where one "looks on x as Y•" 
£Taus coins the word ''onlook" to suggest what it ia to "look on x as 
1 • ••• 11149 11An olllook 111 not merely :speculatiYe, eubjootiYe, or 
147Ibid., pp. lll-lllt. Italics are Evans'. 
148Ib1d., PP• ?4-75, 258. 
1
~
9 Ib1'1. , PP• 124-125. .e.'vallS auggeats that "Yiew•• 1a misleading ill 
its proximity to "opinion"1 "conception" is too intellectual, and like 
"outlook" a ud "per s pective," it lacks t he ctloment of ooiamitment. 
200 
fancitl.ll.." Rather, onlooks are "practical, putatinl.y-objeotive and . 
sorioua." The combination 0£ Comz:iiseive and Verdiot1Te aspects in the 
expression of an onlook is important. Both committal to polio~ ot be-
havior and registry of a proper and appropriate description are presenti 
the utt~rance of onlook combines under8tanding with judgrnent.150 
Ma~ onlooka are literal. Oth.irs are 11011-literal ("I look on Renry 
ae a brother"). r;ome non-literal onlooks are "~rabollo''; the7 indicate 
a aimilarity (look on x as y) in terms of an appropriate attitude. On 
the other hand, somo non-literal onlook.s are "analogical"; they aeaert 
a a1m1l.arity bet~~•n x and y independent of any oimila.rity ot appropriate 
a.ttitude.151 
Evans suggests that hia study of performative language baa signifi-
cance both for the biblical language of creation and tor wan'o responaiYe 
language in t he "onlook" of creation. The word of God in creation had 
an Exorcitive force in eutablishing the subordinate status and role ot 
the creature, a Verdictive torce 1n. determil11.Dg the value of the creature, 
and a Couuaistsive force as a word ot prolli.ae in which God comid.tted Hiaselt 
to pre3erving the created order. In 3WI, God's vord in the uorld's crea-
tion waa no less pertorcsative than was His word in th8 creation ot the 
laraalito nation.1.52 Man replies to the performativ~ word ot God in 
creation with selt-inv~lving per!ormativea correlated with hia aoknO\il-
leclgement of Qod'a action, that is, trom vithin an onlook ot non-literal.9 
150Ibid •• PP• 12?-128. 
151Ibid •• PP• 129-130. 
152Ibid., PP• 145-1.51, 157. 
· 201 
parabolic signiticance.153 
Evans next considers the impressive and expressive element of the 
action of divine world-creation, utilizing the concepts o! holiness and 
divine glory as typoiogical models. He seeks to appl.J his diacuaaion of 
expressive languaae to the biblical atatoiuents which correlate holineae-
glory with creation. lie concludes that divine glory and holined8 are 
"impresaive'' in that they evoke a correlative bwnan !ealiDg and rapportive 
acknowledgement, but they are "expressive" in that they are "c®nected 
with the inner divine quality in somevhat the swne sort ot way that an 
observable expression of feeling ia connected with the feeling which it 
expresaes."154 
Continuing hie discussion of expressive langu.age as related to orea-
~ion, .Evana views a t1an•u utterance that "God ia the Crvator ot the world'1 
as rapportive because tho 
world-Creation has aa its profound rationale the 11new creation" of 
man in the likeness of God, sba.:.· ir.g in the divine love and unit7 
~nd glory •••• 5eooud,'world-Creation is an impreoa1Ye-expreas1ve 
action which re~uires an affinity witb the Agent it it is to be 
understood.15.5 
Man•e rapportive utterance regarding God aa Creator ariaea from the onlook 
153
.!R!s!•, PP• 1.58-160. 
l54Ibid., PP• 1?4-175• In another plaoe (pp. 209-2ll) .t'vana relates 
impressive and expr•asive glory to QQd's self-revelation in Jeous Christ. 
It one underatanda God'a gloey as expressive self-revealing behart.or, he 
can understand the meaning o! three claims which Christians make about 
Jesus, (a) Jeaua is irnplaceable, tor no mere report ot glor1 oaii. re-
place Him; (b) Jesus ia unique bocauae He is the criterion ot expreaaion 
ot divine glory; (o) J•aua is divine. God's glory in Jeaua is understood 
in its impresoive eigni!ioance in5ofar as one is impressed; one IBU6t 'beooae 
like Jesua in ord~r to appreciate iepreaaivelJ the glor1 He reveala. 
155Ib1d., P• aa·. 
-
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which is his, an orilook ot "profound rationale" and "affinity with the 
Agent." The rapportive stntement is conoluaivel1 selt-reveal1ng and 
self-involving, and its meaning is clear only from within the "onlook," 
~'vans alao discusses the third uae of language, the causal use, as 
it relatea to creation. Causal language in cra~tiou does not serve the 
same purpoae as it does in dail1 lite, vhere it notes and r~porta onl7 
causal action in an utterance neither selt-involviD8 nor rapportive. 
Evans holda that 
"causal' ' language conoeruing Creation can be interpreted in terms of 
parabolic onlooks, so that this language too is selt-inYolving and 
rapportive. Compariaon.s which seem at first to be straight-torward 
analogies between hwaan and divine causality turn outj to be compari-
aons of attitudes, expresaed in par.bolio onlooks.156 
For example, the causal language of th8 potter in creat ioD i s obviousl7 
parabolic.157 
In his J.a3t chapter, .::vans raises iDtriguiag questioua about the 
interrelution botwuon self-involving language and the aelt-involvoaent 
of r<tl1g1ouo corArllitment. He suggests that the method of applying the 
logic of selt-1nvolve1118Dt oould pro!itabl7 be used in areas ot Chrieti.an 
concern other thun the language ot creation.158 
&cpreasive Logic of .r..ite-Direation 
Thomas Hile3, li'z'ederick l!"'err~, John A. Hutciu.D3on, and t1ille11 F. 
Zuurdeog duscribe the logic of religious languag.t in teraa of the expressive 
l.56Ibid., P• 219. 
l57Ibi.d., P• 228. 
158 
~., PP• 253-268. 
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character of the language, that id, in terms~! tha underlying lite-
diroction to which the language gi~es expresaion in ~aligiows utterance.1~9 
The 1118n especially stress the dynamic character ot the operutive mind aa 
it moulds a religious perapective which validates religious language. 
Miles posita "qualified silence'' aa the supportive perspective1 Forre, 
conceptual activity and metaphysical synthesis; Hutchinuon, an oxistential 
life-orientation; and Zuurdeeg, the homo loguons. For all, the logic ot 
religious l anguage ia anchored to a base which expresaea life-direction. 
Thomaa ilichard Miles 
Thomas ,d ohard Hiles16o utters the "uae principle" as a crucial modi-
fication of the v~rification principle, a modification which is very 
helpful in distinguishing e~pirica.l assertions from other asaertiollS.161 
The verification tool, modified through a large-ecale abandonment ot the 
word "meaningless " and tempered with the admission that past metaphysiciana 
were not ~riting nonsense, is a valuable philosophical asset: 
It3 value, I would suggest, is threefold. (l) In the first place, 
it forces us to make a distinction between those a~sertions which 
are factually significant and thoae which ars not. (2) $econdly, 
it serves to expose assertions whioh appear at tirat glance to be 
factually signitic:ant but which can be seen on examination to be 
meaningless. (3) Thirdly ••• it belpa to recogniae a widespread 
159It i~ to be admitted that the difference between thia group and 
the "odd-logic" group (supra, PP• 179-203) is one of .degree~ An inte~ 
change of persoUDel between the groupa ia entire~ feasible. 
l6C>When Miles wrote the work under oouideration in 195? (!!£), 
he was in the Department ot PhilosophJ, UniTersity College of North wales, 
Bangor. 
161T (homasj Ji (icbarc!) Mi.lea, Reli on and the Soiantitio Outloo 
(London: George Allen and UnwiD, c.1959, PP• 2 -29. 
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mistake which hae arisen over the usage o! the words "exist", "true", 
and "f'acts.nl62 
Hiles ~l ecta to use tne phrase "factuaU, eignificant" in his explana-
tion of the use principle. But he counters the charge that his eelection 
ot this phrase disguiaGs a motaphysical assumption ot empiricism with the 
contention that the modified verification principle would haTe achieTe4 
little in its attack on metaphysics if this were the case. He holds that 
his analysis of such terms as "exist," "t~e," and ''facto" demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the attaok.163 
Miles admits that an objector can lodge another complaint against hill: 
"To say that the only assertions which refer to what reall1 exists are 
empirical ones ia a thinly disguised form of atheistic materiAlism."164 
Mi.lea argues that some idea of "absolute existenoe11 underlies this objec-
tion. The objoctor errs in thi1lking that existing things form a class 
distinguishable by special characteristics trom things that do not exist. 
What methods, Miles asks, can be constructed to give judgments about ulti-
mate conatituents of the ulliverae? Statements or asaertioua abo~t ultimate 
oonatituents are o~t of place when one attempts classification. ~bile it 
is true that sometimes metap~sical questions can be rephraaed as "aecond-
or<ler" questions of "thing-worda," the:, remain meaningless it asked accord-
ing to "firat order." To inquire about "absolute existence" ia to ask a 
162 
~·• P• 32. Miles sees (p. 25) his book either as an attack on 
early logical positivism, or ao a defense of an extromoly modified verai.on 
of the same. 
163Ibid.., PP• 36-}8. 
164Ibid., P• 39. 
-
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question independently o! tho context that gives it meaning.165 In anaver 
to the objector, Miles ookoa no excuoe tor equating "factually significant" 
with "empirical." rt he ia accused of begging the r,1uestion (that is, of 
assuming that the empirical is what "really is"), he insists that he has 
beg3ed no question since tho question ia a meaningless one. He challen~a 
the objector, in turn, to say what he means by ''raally exist. 11166 Mi.lea 
concludes hie introductory diacusaion with the statement that "the main 
arguments of thi~ book will be based on the a3aumption that sentences 
involving reference to 'abaolute exiatenco' are moaningles.3. !,l67 
In quick sucoeasion the author deals with literal matorialism, beha-
vioriar.1, und deterrd.nisra aa examples of the "absolute" error. Claims ot 
literal matorialism are claima about what "exists" in the "absol"1te" sense; 
those claims, as demonatrated above, ar~ to be dismias~d as meaningless.168 
Similarly, behavioriora and determinism pose no threat to traditional. reli-
gion because they participate in an "abaolute" mistake. On t he other band, 
neither does psychical research serve as a detensiva apologetics !or reli-
gion.169 
165Ibid., pp. 39.43. Niles says (p. 44) that analysis of "true''and 
"fautual "rlll show the same with these terlll8. 
, 
166
rbid., P• 44. Mil.es of!era no commitaent to e111piricism in the sense 
of aoco~ding privileged atatus to empirical trutha, for ho claims (p. 45) 
that no aosertion is more important than another. 
167Ibid., P• 46. 
-
lGSibid., P• 67. 
169Ibid., p. 102. Miles' co11ment regarding pa1ohoana.lyais (p. 1,,> 
is enlighteniug: "aa tar as the central religious notio1111 ot repentance, 
forgiYeness, commitment, and dedication are concerned, there is nothing 
in ps,cho-analytic theory-an, moN than in 6113 othfrr taotu.al inYeatiga• 
tion-..to prove or even r:mke plausible the 'liev that such ideas are 
2o6 
In the fashion or Hraithvaite, Miles diacuasee moral assertions prior 
to analysis or theological discourse. He distinguishes no grounds tor the 
outright diemisool o! moral assertions in viev of tho uae principle. Moral 
aasortiona have a "per!ectlJ legitimate !unction," although it is not tor 
the analyst to prescribe morals.l?O The truth or !alaity ot moral asser-
tions is in last resort a matter of personal oonYiction rather than a con-
clusion of rational argumentation. Most emphatically, Milon contends, 
moral assertions are not validated by deducing a set of "'ought'-aentencea" 
from a set of "'is'-eentenoes. 111?1 
Hiles limits himself to a consideration of sentences which contain the 
word "God'' in hio disousaion of theological discourse and religious language. 
Here ao in other realms of human discourae, the modified Terifioation prin-
ciple is a valuable tool. It serves to expose sentences which appear to 
be factually significant, but which are in principle unfalsifiable and 
unverifiable.172 The use principle aida in -answering modern philoeophy'a 
question of theology, ''To what list does the word 'God' belong?" Milee 
seeks out a trame ot reference tor the astjertion ''There is a God," dis-
missing in turn the "mathematical," ''moral," and "empirical" frames. 
Aasu14ing that "God" cannot exist in an "absolute" sense independent of 
a reference-frame, Miles argues that the man making assertions about God 
unimportant, or that a lite which gives expression to these ideas ia the 
wrong sort ot lit• to live." 
l?Oibid., P• 53. Miles demonstrates a reliance on Braithwaite both 
in his preparatoey discussion of moral assertions and in the use principle. 
l7libid., PP• 60, 57• 
172Ibid., PP• l,S, 141. 
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needs to isolate the valid trame and indicate what methods are employed 
in the frame's argumentation.17' 
Betore preaenting his own poCJition regarding the "theistic" reference-
frame Miles sets about to examine and dismiss other suggestions. He re-
jects "theism without teare," a view which anchors theological diacourae 
emotively.174 ·l'he second rejected interpretation is the language of 
"simple literal theiam." It language about God is taken literally, it 
involves empirically verifiable assertions about a n.aible and tangible 
god. The language of ''simple literal theism," though meaningful, is 
obviously talse.175 Third, "qualified literal" theological language ia 
meaningless. It i~ a masquerade appearing to be genuine, but unfalsifiable 
and unverifiable upon examination. ~hen the assertion "purports to gift 
tactual information," there is eTeey right to expect Terifioation or 
falaification.1'76 The d1fticult1 inTolved ia the "absolute" mistake, 
If we agree that the word ''God" indicates something invisible and 
intangible, there are just no criteria tor deciding whether God 
intervened [at Dunkirk) I and in the absence ot such criteria it 
ia as pointless to aaoert that he did interTen• as to assert that 
he did not.1'77 
Miles rejects as meaningless, for example, the assertion "God answers 
fretitionaryJ prayer," and construea it as an assertion ot qualified 
l?}Ibid., P• 144. 
l74Ibid., PP• 1.52-153. Miles says that the title "theism without 
tears" deacribea the inability to abed tears oTer the problem of the "cau. 
value" of theological language. 
17.5 
~., P• 146. 
176Ibid., PP• 147-148. 
l'7'7lbid., P• 149. 
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theism. ·i he stntement augaeeta the activity of an "extra ent1t1," but one 
is at a looa to list ompirical criteria by whioh the statement could be 
verified or falsified even though it has the appearance ot an empirical 
aaeertion.178 Miles otters to campaign against the language of "qualified 
literal theism, '' especially when it detinea God in terms ot ao• ''para.-
physical" entity.179 But he ia not prepared to diam.as religious language, 
or treat it diaparagingly, or auppoae it leso important than the language 
of scientific investigation, when it concerns itself with the question, 
"How ought I to live'1"l80 
In his theory of thoological lan(sUage Miles admits the inautticiency 
of merely attributing "cash-value" to theological statements. To do .so io 
to remove all mystery from talk about God.181 He prefers instead to dis-
cuss the ''way of silence," silence qualified by parables. He selects th• 
way of aileuce deliberately: 
A person who insists on linguistic grounds that sentences containing 
the word "God" eannot be understood literally is not committed to 
accepting the theistic parable; but he is not committed to rejecting 
it either. It he accepts, ae I do, he oan no longer adopt ••• 
a ''prosaic" silence; he 111uat accept what I call "the way of silence"--
& phrase which I have deliberately chosen on account of its religious 
l7Slbid., PP• 181-184. Miles turthor contends (pp. 185-186) that "it 
'God sends rain in answer to prayer• is a pointleaa form of words, then 
•o God, please send some rain' is po1ntles3 also," and calls for an abandon-
ment of this "pseudo-oau.sal" prayer language • .By contrast, sa1s Miles, the 
so-called "pertormatoey" pro:Jer rr.r1q will be done" is a commitment and a 
dedication, and thuo a valid prayer. 
l'19Ibid., P• 163. 
l8olbid., P• !)4. 
181lbid., p. 1.58. While Miles does not com~ent exactly to the point. 
to attribute "caah-value" apparently is the ''absolute" mistake. 
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overtones, audits affinitiea with traditional religious thinking.182 
He contra3ts nis interpretation of qualified silence with the theologian'a 
assortion that God i a a rnyateryi 
God, to you, is u mystery; to me even the word "mystery" has an em-
pirical t a int, and is misleading. You say "l do not known and tq 
to talk; I say "I do not know" and remain ailent. You admit that your 
talk ia not literal; I qualify my silence b;y telling parables. Ia 
thore really all that difference between us?l83 
Having int·roduced the "parable" as a taciturn qualification. essential 
to theism, liilea diaouaaas the parable in greater detail. He lists three 
characteristice of 3oriptural parables which are alao oharacteristioe of 
theistic language when it qualifies silence. (1) The question of literal 
truth or falsity ie unimportant in a parable. rhuo, in conuidering the 
theiotic statement, "In the bctginning God created the heaven and the earth," 
whether the account ia literally true is unimportant. Literal talk about 
"creation by God11 is meaningless because man has no experience again.at 
which to measure "creation" by God. (2) "Parables contain, for th• most 
part, assertions that are empirical; and we know pertectly well what states 
of atf'airs would constitute the •cash-value, ot these assertions." 
Similnrly, the literal meaning of words in the creation account are per-
fectly clear. (.}) :Parables convey a aieusage, give a new "slant" or 
orientation to lite. Similarly, the doctrine of creat ion !orcea the recog-
nition that eveey event is part of God's purpoae; the whole of lite ie 
182Ibid., P• 162. Miles retera (p. 169) to the "dootr1ne ot creation 
by an al'woving God" as the "theistic parable," and suggests that inatead 
of' the question "lJo :,ou beli<tve in the existence ot God?" the question "Do 
you accept the theistic parable?" should be asked. 
lS3Ibid., P• 163. In discussing mystery (p. 164), the connraiDg theo-
logian aaki,Milea it puables are true in the sense ot having objeotin 
validity-." Milea replies that it makes no diffctrenoe one vay or another. 
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affected by a message taken seriously. 
Miles considers methods by which parabolic languege is identified. 
In the case of aom6 theological aasertioll8, only the QOJe ot expression and 
the speaker's attitude determine whethor words are parabolic, or the lan-
guage of qualified theism. "God intervened at Dunkirk, 11 or "God made the 
world," may or may not be paro.bolic. The ruore closely the language in 
question relates to <hlily life, the higher the probability that it i .s lan-
guage of qualified theism. In addition, language used about God is gener-
ally parabolic in nature when it is not ordinarilf used in retere~ce to 
people.185 
Inevitably the question of ultimates arises. Miles doea not avoid 
consideration of the sort of arguments used to support ono parable against 
another. He rejects thll suggestion t?lat &tJ1 one parable is "objectiveq 
valid" or "true" with two arguments (which aro really- one): either one 
can say that it makes no aenae to aak whethttr a theistic parable is valid 
(the "absolute" mistake)1 or one can '38.'J that it makes sense to ask the 
question, but one is at a loss to know what conatit11tes th.e answer. The 
second alternative i:J to moTe from not sa1ing anything to saying"! do 
not know." Neither argument is a radical departure from the "way of si-
lence." On the other hand, neither ansver allows tho selection ot parables 
to become a matter of personal preference. The conclusion that one parable 
is better·;;than another is protected, tor it ia possible to refer to par-
ables aa "good," "appropriate," "important," and ''plausible." In final 
184Ibid., PP• 166-169. 
185Ibid., PP• 173-174. Hiles cautions tbat neither criteria is iD• 
fallibly reliable. 
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anal1sia, not rational argument, but personal conTiotion detormines the 
evaluation of a particular parable; argument nev~r settles the matter oon-
oluaively.186 It ia true that consideration o! ~opix1cal tact influences 
the choice of lW,rable. 'fhere ia alwayo the possibility that 
those who are impressed by the advances or a particular ocience may 
come to r egard a particular religioua parable aa unnecessary or in-
appropriate, and that those who are concerned with preserving trad-
itiorial religious parablts a,ay I'Oi~ard the gi"owth of a particular 
ocience with suepicion.lij? 
In addition, parables aro open to influence on moral grounds. People may 
choose a parable because it 111akes aonae of their exiatiua mora-1 beliefs. 
But in final analysia, the decision about the vortb o! a parabla ia a per-
oonal deciaion.188 
The fact that decision ia involved in th~ selection of parable indi-
cateo t he presence oi conversion and change of outlook. There is no spoci-
fic factual know~edgc available to believers and uDB.vailable to unbelievers. 
It thore were, the aelection or parables would be "empirical. 11 Just as 
the acceptance of the theistic parable involveo the believer in action 
and commitment, ao also the parabolic acceptance o! a purposoless, indif• 
ferent world involvea commitment to lite thus interpreted. "It follows, 
186Ibid., PP• 1?0-171. 
187 Ibid., P• 219. Thia statement ia to be balz:u1ced by another (pp. 
218-219)--rii'°which Miles remarks, ''To inaiet that auch language is para.bl• 
and not literal truth is to ascribe a recognizable and legitiC1ate function 
to a group ot basio religious assertions, and the result is to supply a 
permanent guarantee that theae assertions cannot be refuted by the finci-
ings of science." 
188Ib1d., PP• 172-173• Earlier in the ~ork (p. ,,> Miles delineates 
between moral atieortions and parable.assortiona: "In gen•ral we ma, say 
that no moral aaeortion n8ceasarilJ entails a parabl•-a~aertion, but moral 
a~sertiono cnn be tho col18equence ot parable-assertions, and parable-
aasortio11S can therefore be cited as the reason for particular behavior.'' 
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in our present use of the word •parable', that the question is not whether 
to tell parables but \that parables to tell. 11189 
"' d , 
.i! re erick lferre 
Frederick Pond Ferr~l90 endoraes contecporary analysis in his search 
for the meaning of language in its contextual use: "Shorn o! its social 
matrix, as Wittgenstein baa ohown, language ceases to~ and ot necessity 
loses its intelligibility. 11191 Ferre finds the most compact and impor-
tant selections of theological discourse in the worahip situation. The 
utterances of the worship aituation aim to formulate and maintain an atti-
tude of adorntion. The utterances of faith lead tha worshipper to adora-
tion because the utterances ot worship, by their evocative nature, bring 
about the attitudes which support adoration.192 But Ferret cautions 
against over-reliance on analysis of worship discourse. If' theological 
189Ibid., PP• 176-1?9• 
190Fer~ iu the son of Nels Ferre. He was assistant profosaor of 
religio11 at Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mases., 1959-62, and asso-
ciate profeaaor of philosophy at Dickinson College, Carli.ale, Pa., 1962-63. 
Currently he is professor and chairman of tlle department of philosophy 
and religion at Dickinson College. In "Paul M. van Buren's A-Theology of 
Christian Education," Religious .&lucation, LX (Januar,-Februa.J7 1965), 211 
Ferre says regarding his religious situation: 11I aQ bJ practically a~ 
standards a pretty thoroughly secularized man: I proadntly belong to no 
church and I find tho dogmas of' Christianity, if propoaed tor literal 
acceptance, oo tar beyond belief that there really is no inclination on 
my part to discuss the reasons tor my rejection." 
l9~~rederick Ferre and Kent Bendall, Exploring the Logic ot Faith: 
A Dialo • on the Relation ot Modern Philoso to Christian Faith 
New York: Association Preas, o.l 2, P• 7. In thi~ chapter the ref-
erences taken from r:.«~oring the Logic of Faith vill deriYe froa seotiODS 
ot the book uhioh Fer baa written. 
192 
~., PP• 54-55. 
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statements serve a ''worshipful" function, it is noceasary to ullderatand 
what it is to worship in order to approhond the logic of r.:ligious lan-
guage.193 
The ~tudy of language proceeds on three fronts: (1) the atudy of 
relationships among verbal signs ( 11syntactics11)1 (2) the study ot the re-
lation:Jhip between language and u3er•interpreter (''interpretics''); (3) 
the atud;y of the relationship between la~--uage an:i its referent ( 11sean-
tica'') • Con!uaion in the study of theological language has resulted in 
part because of tho failure to distinguish these three dimensions of the 
"si3ni!ication-situation." J. L. Mackie interprets theological discourse 
solely in torm~ of the fir.a·t relationship, B. ll. Braithwaite and ~nald \:I. 
Hepburn in terma of "interprotica," and those ~ho emphasize falsifiabilitJ 
in torm~ of the third relationslu.p.194 
In con:sidering "syntactics" Ferre divides theological discourse into 
"systematic language of aoademic theology'.' and "religious language of liv-
ing faith." Syntactic adequacy in the religious language of' faith is eval-
uated with reference to "internal language-norta:3, '' namely Scripture, 
church traditions, creeds, aud other authoritative stateraents. l?eligioua 
lanlSuage is coherent in ao far as it repeats, in its faith-utters.noes, the 
"faith ot our fathers, living atill." Canons of tormal logic do not apply 
between 1·1uttarances which are the protocol-atatemeuts' of raligion.~9.5 
l93Frederick Ferro, Language. !.ogic and God (First ~dition; New York: 
Harper and Brothers, c.1961), P• 137• 
l94Ibid~ • PP• 1'+8-149. In bis latt1r work, .alxploriy the Lod.o ot 
l!aith, p-:--$5, Ferro diatinguiahes three "dimensions" within which the 
language ot Christian taith oper&tes: the dimension of emotion, couation, 
and cognition. 
l95Ferre, 1angu.age1 Logic and God, P• 151. 
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1'he syntactics or systematic theological discourse, the "aystea:at1o lan-
guage ot academic theology," are not based necessarily and exclusively ou 
der.iandf3 for "ayate1natic coherence," tor systeilllltic pronouncements may be 
mirrored "in the vary creeds which judge the language ot living faith," 
religious language.196 
l'he language of syatematic theology exemplifies syntactics of both 
formal and "informal" logic. The formal ruleiS of syntax have a descrip-
tive content with no ''c2sh-value"; syntax is composed of logical connectives 
such as "and, 11 "not," "if ••• then." The informal rules of syntax, on 
the othor h~nd, are not distinct from and independent of the content-
matter being diacus:ied (~s in tne case of the rules of formal logic), ''but 
are ope~ly dependent upon the definitions that oatablish inference~~-
in the language of a given subject matter," in this caae theology. As 
Gilbert Ryle says, "Not all strict inferences pivot on tho recognized log-
ical constanta. 11197 Although at times the rules of inioruw.l. logic oppose 
tuoae o! formal logic, they may serve as an "incentive to increased 
conceptual procision. '' "She's i,ret ty and she's not, 11 ''He's likable and 
he's not,'' are statements that require further refineClent ot the conoepta 
"pretty" and "likable" before an adequate non-paradoxical atatement is 
possible. In a similar way, a paradoxical statement about God indicates 
196Ibid., PP• 154-155• 
l97Ibid., PP• 1.51-152. Italics are.his. Arthur Carl Piepkorri, in 
"what Does • Inerranc;y' Mean?~;,, C)ncordia 'I'heologioal Monthly, XXXVI (Jep-
tember 1965), 5'77-.593, examines some ot tho ditticultiea involved when a 
term (inerranc1) ia loaded with connotatioDS from outside ito tield. His 
suggestion that "inerranc1" is 'ln "eccleaiaetioal term ~bJeot to detim.-
tion by usage" ('j'77) is something o! a parallel to Ferro a suggustioD tbat 
informal synt&Ut ia determined by the subject-matter being dieouesed. 
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that ita concepts are due tor turther investigation even though they are 
related through informal logic.198 Ferr: agreos with proponents ot in-
formal logic when they suggest that before a word is taken into the exac-
titude of formal lo&'ic, it must be refined: 
Judgment, imagination--even intuition--muat go into the determina-
tion of the syntactic powers of every central theological concept 
before formal logical operations with it become profitable; it is 
precisely in this preliminary determination that t he living iesuee 
lie.199 
Discussing "interpretics," tile relationship between language and 
, 
the user-interpreter, J!'erre distinguishes between a "passive" and a 
"reapon:Jive" significance. The "passive" concerns the affect of the lan-
guage in t he interpreter. In this realm the emotions are active, and the 
langu@ge can be termed "emotive" by conventional association. This lan-
guage also has a "reactive" signif'icance. 200 The ''responsive" significance 
of' interpretics refers to things and events "which are theuelves the sym-
bols demanding our response.'' In interpretica, to speak of' a responsive 
significance is to speak of' worda which deal with e7mbola of "grea.t 
potoncy. 11 Not the words or phrases, but their content is of the greates~ 
concern: "much of what is most characteristic of theological. meaning ia 
best un<lorstood in these terms. 0201 In reference to tbe reaponaive-a.otiTe 
198 , Ferre, Language, Logic and God, P• 153. 
199 
~., P• 154. 
, 
200Ibid., PP• 15.5-1.56. In J<~plorigg the Logic of Faith, PP• 57-.58, 
Ferre suggests that the emotive "dimension" of language includes the 
"reassuring" function ot religious language in that it produces and ex-
preeaea an attitude. A "judging" function is also found 111 the eraotion-
dimension, tor utterancea of' faith may evoke and express emotions of 
humility, guilt, and unworthiness. 
201F•"°'• 1..anguap, Lope and God, PP• 156-157• In the schema of 
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significance or interpretica, Ferre reminds hie reader that man is the 
moulder and master ot discourse. Pre-linguistic oocial interests and 
activities give birth to language. But even after birth language is not 
independent; le.nguage-torms are oren to gro~h and transformation because 
ot man's moulding. Word, thought, and purpose abide, 88.'1& Ferre, but the 
greatest of theae is purpose. So also theological language ia a child of 
human purpose, and it is within the Christian community that the syntactics 
of Christian discourse are tormed.202 
·.rurning to "semantics, 11 Ferr; is able to consider the role of cog-
nition in theological diacourse. In the relationship between language and 
its referent (semantics), tho "facts" to which theological statements make 
reference are not the aame as those referred to and discussed in the empiri-
cal sciences. And still, "there seem& no escape from the conclusion that 
the intended semantic reference of theological discourse is to •metaphysi-
cal fact• o! some kind." The metap~aical "tacts" which serve as referents 
are not given independently of the creative powers of intelligence, but 
are dependent on the "conceptual activity of the mind." .from this premise 
Ferre concludos that "the nature of metaphysics ••• is conceptual syn-
thesis." Since a metaphyaical system providos coherence tor all "the 
203 tacts," a metaphysical fact playo a key role in the tsystem. Ferri 
refers to the "cognitive dimension" ot theological diaoourae as the meta-
physical function of theological language, that is, that function of 
Exploriy the Logic ot Faith, P• 6o, the "challenging" function ot emotion-
dimension (where 11oalling" or "mission" ia embedded in the language of 
Christian ta1th) seems to be the parallel teraa. 
202- , · 
-i,~erre, !.anguap1 Logic and God, P• 158. 
203 
~., PP• 16o-161. 
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theological language which has metaphysical !acts aa referents and concepeo 
tual synthesis as ita goal. Metaphysical statements in thoological dis-
course ··tare not scientific in function, but their intended roterence, like 
scientific atatements, is to reality," reality aa a whole.2o4 
The conceptual synthesie ~ctuated by theological speech is bound up 
with man's personality: 
Theological speech projects a model of immense responsive signiti-
canoe, drawn from "the tacts," as the key to its conceptual syntheaili. 
Thia model, for theism, ia ma.de up of the "spiritual" cbaracteristice 
of personalitys will, purpose, wisdom, love, and the lik•t.205 
It indeed t heological discourse is in some wa1 concerned with "the facts," 
then to seek the relationship between theological language and its reter-
enta (the task of semantics) is to aearch tor a 'better understanding of 
the \'iorld under the light of one's own theological discourse. In &DJ 
case, a cnan cannot avoid the decision to choose one or the other meta-
2o6 phy::>ical view, and ilith it, the l anguage of decision • 
. , , 
~erre contenda that tho conceptWll synthesis created by theological 
diocourse needa aome aort of modified verification. The comprehensive con-
ceptual synthesis allows for verification by cseaauring the power ot the 
synthesis to integrate and illuminate: 
204Ferr:, Exploring the Logic ot Faith, P• 73• Ferre attirnia (p. 
9?) the close relation of cognitive to tho "emotive-conative'' climensioii 
of theological language so as to avoid the impression that ~anChriatiaD 
can, ~ithout losing anything essential, abandon all claims to (or even 
interest in) truth or falsity." Italics are bis. 
205Ferre, Language. Logic and God, P• 164. Ill "Happing the Logic 
of Models in Science and Theology," Christian 3cholar, XLVI ($pring 196J) 
9-39, Ferre examines in greater detail the proceaa of arriving at what 
appear to b& synthetic-,etaphysical models. 
2
~erre', Language. Logic and God, PP• 165-166. 
& 
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In thio process of (!oditie~ verification, at last, the complicated 
connection botween empirical (e.g. scientific) assertions und non-
empirical state,:.ents is evident. All properly warranted empirical 
statements themselves become data tor synthesis and intolligible 
organization within the framework provided by the theological 
conceptual scheme. The propositional elements of the latter do 
not logically entail or imply any of the former propositiona, and 
in conaequence the latter ••• cannot b8 simply refuted by <lia-
oovering the falsity of the former; but a theological syntheeia 
which cannot bring intelligibility to the propooitions ot science, 
history, and all human knowledge is to that extent a ~eak synthesis 
and--as a vhole--faila, to that degree, in its verification.207 
Jlerre ur(Ses theologians to use the altered verification principle to 
full adva~tage. Theologians are prepared, with the modified principle, to 
isolate tho lo1~'ic ot specific utterances and cot11pare the ditforent logics. 
'l'\,o expressions with different logical types ot meaning 11cannot in azcy 
oimple way contradict or support one another ... The verifi cation principle 
certifies that some aaaertions are empirical, and thua removea them from 
the realm ot theological logic. The coJ111ectio11 cannot be "unidimensional." 
A corollary o! thio et11ployment of the verification principle is that it a 
theologi~n rnakea statements which concern any empirical state of affairs, 
his statements are open to proof or' diaproot ewpirically. Conversel.3', "the 
acceptance or rejection ot nonempirical elements in theologr cannot hang 
on the acceptance or rejection of associated empirical elementa.,.208 
John A. Hutchinson 
John Alexander Hutchinson209 distinguishes sign, symbol, and image. 
207 ' li Frederick Ferre, "Veri!icatio11, Faith, and Uredulity," Re gion 
in Lite, XXXII (Hinter 1962-6.}), 57. 
2081bid •• 50-51. 
-
209liutohinaon was professor of religi~n at ColWAbia University, 195.5-
6o. Since 1960 he has been professor of philosoph7 and religion at Clare-
mont Graduate School in California. 
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A sib"ll ia a term, and ita primary purpode ia referential. A s111bol is a 
term, and its significant purpoae is expressive. ~ymbols aro Kpprohended 
with iwmediacy becauoe they are emotively-charged terms. They participat• 
in the reality they symb~lize and pos~ss a wido variet7 of meanings. In 
210 the symbol-situation, contextual meaning proponderatos. An image, on 
the other hand, ia any "immediate datum o! human awarenesa. 11211 
In reference to images Hutchinaon chooses to describe the "objective 
imagination," the peculiar c14pacity ot the hucian mind for imaps. Rely-
ing heavily on Kroner, a neo-Kantian, Hutchinson develops a theory which 
definea the objective imagination as the mind exploripg and encountering 
212 
outside its own borders. The inatrwaent of motaphor ia the basic tool 
of the mind as it lays hold ot the world'a manifold character. Metaphor 
is "a kind of growing point of the mind's life in its responses to the 
ever-changing and new character ot the world.11213 1'he m1Dd also deals 
vith ideas. The distinct feature o! an image is its immediacy ot appre-
henoion, but an idea conaiats in tho ob~erved similarity between two or 
214 
more images, a similarity which the mind abstracts. 
In consideration ot the stated definitions of sign, S)'mbol, and image 
Hutchinson views his theory ot language to be in essential disagreement 
210John A. Hutchinson, La ua and Faith• Studies in Si 
and Meaning (Philadelphia: ~estmineter Presa, c.19 3, PP• 37, 
211Ibid., P• 74. 
-212Ibid., PP• 76, 8.5-86. 
Zl}Ib1d., P• 91. 
-214 Ibid., p. 87. Hutohill8oD ar8Ues (p. 89) that "we think in terms 
ot ideas'iaiid we act by means of imagea." 
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with much of modern ~nulysis: 
To approach language first of all as an activity is admittedly a BWll"P-
ly different view from that of muoh analytic or selll8.ntic philosophy. 
And to regard it as a kind o! activity that expres~es or articu.lAltea 
a human self• or aignifioant aspects of aolfhood. is to be doub~ 
controver8ial. Yet this iu precisely what is propoSt!d.215 
Be denies that his approach rules out all test of authenticity in language. 
?wo standards, or cognitive ruleu, of utterance roll.l&.i.u: (l) conformity ot 
the ut·tereci statement to attitudes of ti1e whole selt'; (2) confor1111t7 of 
utterance to the real self in its encounter with the world.216 
Having conatructod a gonflral theory ot lapguage, Hutchinson moves 011 
to draw tho consequences !or religious language in specifics. He vieva 
religion as total lito-orientation. The eaaence of"total lite-orientation" 
includes the noeds of man: identification, purpose, and meaning in life. 
Drawing on phenomenological resoaroh, Uutchinaon aaaortu that the lwaia.-
ous and powerful imagus of religion provide the precise lite-orientation 
which man needa. Man .. eceives a "convincing and o.uthorite.tive statement 
of who he is and what he is living tor." lie receives a set of values 
that provicio goals, that engage and fulfill his pewers. Put another va1, 
"faith and ito symbolic expreasiona may be regarded 111.a expreaaions of the 
human will to live."217 Religion is total life-orientation, and according-
ly, religiouo or faith stc.:tements are "orientation stateaenta. ,.2lS 
215Ioid., p. 47. f!utohinaon claims (p. 48) that aelfhood is illposaible 
without self-articulation, but he denies that this approach equate~ self• 
articulation with selthood. aegarding .bis contention that ~sis seldo111 
Yiews language as an activity, see supra, PP• 76-71. 
216Ibid., p • .51. 
2l?lbid., PP• 101, 122, 124. 
218Ibid., P• 101. 
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Hutchinson chooses to speak phenomenologicall1 ra ther than theologicall7 
in offering a rntionale for religious discourse: 
Hy theaia is that religious language, or, as l would prefer to saz, 
faith language, may be characterized ae symbolic or exfreosive lan-
guage used !or the purpose of total life orientation.29 
The author deals phenomenologically with the poaaibilit7 ot cognitive 
religious experience and statement. He records a wide variet1 of usage 
in the so-called cognitive words (including "true," "false," "meaning"),220 
ancf. proposes t o extrapolate the ideas of truth and knowledge from the 
sphere of propositionail. and ref'erontial knowledge to the fields of "ex-
preasive statement," including religious statements. He contends that the 
"language" and "statements" of tho expressive !ield (art, science, philo-
sophy, religion) provide parallels with the language of propositional and 
referential knowledge which are not easilJ dismissed: the1 have the intent 
to communicate; they have a sort ot "consistency" and coherence similar 
to the propositional; the degree to which the expreesive stategents claia 
to deal with reterentG determines the degree to which the criterion ot 
221 
adequacy appl ies in the detormination of the otatement•a credibility. 
The nature of truth and knowledge ia connected to the lite ot actioa. 
Hutchinson argues that in the lite of action tho duality ot essence and 
existence, self and world, is disaolved. Actioa is a logically primitive 
2l9Ibid., p. 13. D. ll. MaoKinnon, in "Death," New Essays in Philo-
sophical"Thoology (New York: Macmillan CompaDJ, 0.1955), PP• 261-266, 
aeensa to argue that the logic of religious language _is existential in 
nature; he urges that especially language about death and i111111ortalit7 
must be traced to ite human source. 
220Hutchineon, PP• 127•132. 
221 
~., PP• 142-145. 
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idea not susceptible to dissection; it is the "widest oategory ot human 
aelthood." Accordingly, "existential truth may be defined as the adequacy 
ot esaenoe to existence; and existential D1eaning 'fIJb.Y be detinod as possible 
i 222 ex atential truth." Within this oxiatential context religious statement• 
are no leas cognitive than tho statements of other experiential realms. 
In three successive chapters Hutchinson examines the expressive language 
ot science, art, and philosopbl, emphasizing that each discipline is related 
to the common life and to the common existential problem.223 
·1n a ·:more precise examination ot religious discourse, Hutchinson uaea 
the metaphor o! a "religious-theological spectrum" to isolate the distin-
guishing features of two forms of religious dioouurse, "faith statements" 
and 'a,;heological statements. n224 The primary terms in tirat-order faith 
statements are images. Images are expreasiTe in torm; their purpose and 
function ia the straightforward expression of religious experience.225 
Hutchinson lista seven recurrent foru through whioh 112 n traditionallJ 
communicate their ultimate concern:· (1) confesoion or witness (which 
expresses the meaning of exiotence for the speaker); (2) prayer (direct 
and personal appeal to ?ower in expressive language); (3) ritual 
222 
~., PP• 152-154. 
223Ibid., PP• 158-226. Hutchinson differentiates (p. 65) betvee11 
primary language and derivative languages (including art, aoience, philo-
sophy and religion) • .Each derivatiTe language has a certain coramon ex-
perience and common language as its basis, but deTelopa apeoifio cate-
' goriea tor the communication ot particular aspects of bwan experience 
about which·it is particularly concerned. It appears that little is left 
for the primary language other than- the "life of action." 
224 
~., p. 2.36. Hutchinson carries through his earlier suggestion 
(p. 91) that metaphor ia the basic tool of the mind in hie use of the 
spectrum-metaphor at this place. 
225Ibid., P• 2.2?. 
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(configuration ot expressive image i~ word, aot, or other media, repeated 
at sat times), (~) myth or sacred stor7 (expression of values by which 
a man lives and declares life meaningful); (5) commandment (moral impera-
tive which consists ot presoriptioaa tor human aotion)1 (6) homily or 
sermon (communication of direct experience from person to person); (7) 
scripture or aaored writing.226 While direct religious experience may 
contain a rational structure, the cognition therein contained ia appre-
hended and e~pressed in terms ot image& rather than ideas.227 
On the other end of the spectrum are second-order religious atatelllente, 
or "theological" statements; 
Second-order religious statements, or theological statements, are 
conoeptual rather than expressiTe or symbolic in tor&lj their main 
tar.ms are not images but concepts, and their purpose is not direct 
expression but the understanding of religion •••• theological 
statements are the linguistic vehicle tor the study and understand-
ingot religion.228 
l'he clear emergence and predominance of "conceptual terms in the J.ansuage'' 
distinguish first-order religious language from explicit theological. 
utterance. Theological statements are osaentiall1 a teol111i.cal language, 
a "linguistic vehicle for the study of religion. ,,229 On the aetaphorical 
spect~a between the two polea of first and aeoond-order religious state-
Mllta there are overlapping areas. Creeds, tor eX&llple, are partq faith 
language and partq theological language.230 













P• 241. In hie final chapters (pp. 248-29}), Butchinaoa 
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Willem F. Zuurdeeg 
Willem Frederick Zuurdeeg231 ia convinced that the analytic method 
is the appropriu.ta rnethodology in the philosophy ot roligion. It providea 
both a conception o! the philoaoph7 of religion as analysis ot language 
and a disqualification of at0taphyaics and ontology.232 lie sete out to 
analyze the lanbruage of theology, hoping thereby to conatruct a philosopn1 
of religion ~hich takes proper cognizance of pbilosophic~l analysis. 
~uurdeeg andoraes analysis' classification ot indicative, analytical, 
and tautological discourse. Indicative language appears in crude form in 
daily language, and in purified form· in the language o! empirical science. 
Analytic language ia the language o! philosophl, a language "not interest-
ed in tacts but in moaning3." Tautological language is the language of 
logic and mathematics.2J3 
But Zuurdeeg takes exception with the ana.l1tic philosopher as be · 
uaes his concluGions as an hypothesis to array the world religions, par-
ticularly Christianity, along tha metaphorical spectrum. But Hild.an 
jmart, in Reasorui aDd Faiths (London: aoutledge and Kegan Paul, c.19.58), 
P• 1.5, opposes the suggeation that there is &'fJ.1 one inclusive language 
frame for the multitude of spiritual discouraea in the world (e.g., 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity). 
231zuurdeeg was ordained in a Dutch-Presbyterian church, the .aemon-
otrant Brethren, in 1934. Sau.grating from Holland to America, he taught 
briefl1 at i:;lmhurst College near Chicago, and then in 1948 joined the 
faculty of McGort:1ick 3eminary in Chicago. In May, 196o, he was elevated 
to prof esso1• ot philosophy of religion. His .first major vork vaa L!!-
search tor tho Consequences of the Vienna Circle tor Llthica (Utrecht: 
Kenirik, 1946), Zuurdees diei .December 3, 1963. 
2
~il:i..t.m F. Zuurdeeg, AD Analytical PhilosopbY of Religion (Hew Yorks 
Abingdon Pr&ss, c.1958), p~ 17. 
233 4 Ibid., P• 4. 
-
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describes him. Ho contends that "convictional" language deals with "reali-
ty" no leas than does indicative language. 'lhese two types ot language 
view reality dit'forently; it is the task of the a nalytic philoaophcr to 
prescribe what is "real" and what ia not when it co111es to references of 
234 these lan,;uages. 'lhe philosophy or analysis errs in that it !ails to 
recognize t he existing unity between tho man who speak.a and the lansuage 
he speaka. t uurd~eg commits hiraaelt to an investigation ot this convic-
tional unity aa it concerns theological discourse, His primary aasumptioM 
isolate what are for him tha vulnerable a.speots of current analysis. 
a. the general [analyti<:"J position omits a language which is not a 
specific language but the language which underlies both the lan-
guage of common life and t he specific languages, namely convic-
tiorial language. 
b. Convictional language i a not given full justice by terms such as 
"use" and "function"; it shows a unity of word, thou5nt, and per-
son; it ia t he person in his relationships to himself, to others, 
and to the '!world. 11 
c. .le are analyzing not jua~ ~ords or sentences but J.anguage in t he 
aenae o! man-who-speaks.~3~ 
Theological language is not a direct parallel to convictional lan-
guage. '1'he language of thaology is neither "is-language" (convictional) 
nor ,:use-lc:mg..iaga" (indicfttive). However, the lan3uage ot theology is 
akin to t he former in its attempt to express the "personality center'' in 
mattera of "ultimate i11porto.noe. 11 At the same time, it is aJd.n to the 
latter in that it "implies an element of distance, of reflection." 
Zuurdeeg chooses to call theological language 11emplo7-language": 
It makea some sense to ll8.Y that is-language is spontaneous, and use-
language artificial. Emplo7-language cannot be easily characterized 
234Ibid., P• 45. 
235Ibid., P• 19. 
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in this way. The laborious work ot a thoologian is neither the apon-
taneoua approval of an aot ot generoaity; nor 1B t neological language 
artificial in the wa7 in whioh chemical terminology de3ervea tnat 
name. The "giving aooount ot" which oharaotetlzea employ-language 
can be called "rofloctive," or "meditative. 112:,0 
Employ-language differs from is-language in its retleotiv• ele14ent; it 
differe from u:se-language in that it does not operate "according to strict 
rules" preucribed by !!Specific purposes. 
Because the employ-language of theology is somewhat akin to conYic-
tional language, Zuurdeeg discuasos in greater detail the structure of 
oonvictional language. While indicative, analytical, and tautological 
lan1.;-uage each has a "logical structure" ot aorta, thore is no parallel 
in convictional language: 
~le should t1.dmit that co11victional language d04tu not poaaea3 this 
''logical1' structure, and that therefore logic cannd.t serve as its 
metalanguage. That ia to say that the metala~ge of oonvictional 
laU{~age must possess a nonlogical atructure.2}7 
Because convictional language baa no specitio logical structure, Zuurdeeg 
prefers to speak of "situational analysis" rath~r than "logical analysis" 
ot convictional language.238 If it is accepted that "a man!! his conTic-
tions, hie word," and if "when we speak of 1language' we mean man hiuelt, 
man-who-speaks, homo loquena, 11239 the only analytic poasibilit1 is''ait-
uational analysis." A philosophy ot religion which uses the aual)?tio 
approach to language must be qualified 




2Y1Ibid., P• 63 .• 





person who communioatea1 b) the collllllUnit7 within which the language 
functions; c) tbe (subjectively) objective references of the lan-
guage(sJ; d) the '\torlde" within which th.tse elem11pts are related; 
e) the historical backgroundo ot tho3e elements.2't0 
Unity in Uiversit1 
The men conaidered in this chapter t ake up the second major challenge 
of analysia, the challenge which demands an explanation of the apecitic 
"logic" o! rBligious language. 'l'his brief reoW'il8 is appended to show both 
tho collective unity and tho individual diversity of the views here brought 
together. But in no sonae is this recapitulation a substitute for the 
expanded expositions. 
t he oecond challenge of analysis assumes implioitl.¥ that there is a 
specific logic of r eligious language. The men who address the second 
challenge accept the assumption as valid. The analogiats locate the spe-
cial character of t he logic of religious language in tho justification for 
the uae of analogy. fliacintyre arguee that the use or analoo- is validated 
in worship. Crombie augg&ata that the paradoxical nature of theological 
language qualifies t he use o! ordinary language tor religious o.nalogJ. 
He adds tha t the ultimate authority of parable-analog)' is Christ Himaelt. 
Mascall anchors the peculiar character ot the logic o! religious language 
in the mind's apprehenoion o! mystery. Tbe non-analogists are les a con-
cerned with authorization for specific logic than with the particulal"ity 
of religious logic. :.imart speaks in terms of a "spiritual frame," and 
within the frame, different strands o! religious aotivity which contribute 
to the logic of religious discourse phenomenologically. Munz plaoea the 
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concern with "eternit1" at the core ot roligiouo syabol. Ile argue8 that 
the only element ot oertainty in religioua thought resides in tho picture 
symbol. In this way he looates the logic of religious lan3uage in. the 
sphore 0£ picture 3ymbol. !<aruuey ref@rs to the "odd'' logic of religious 
language., a logic which parallels the logic of "!''-language. Cleobury 
placoa Ood-aantences midway between parson.al and impersonal language--in 
a unique logical status. Hordern contondu that roligioua language is a 
distinguishable language game which parallels the pergonal language game 
and evidences a convictiorial element in its logic. Evans does not propose 
an autonomous language go.me for religion, but argues that religi.oua lan-
g~ge contain.s aspects of per!ormative, causal, and expressive language 
insofar as these aspects are validated in the speaker's "onlook. 11 
Hutchinson refera to tho special logic of religious utterances in terms 
of th1tir use as "orientation statements." Zuurdeeg locates the peculiar-
it1 ot religious language iu ita .function:..,as "•mplo1-language. 11 Hi.lea 
and Ferr• both poeit a modified use prinoipl~ as th~ logical tool vhich 
isolates t he spocitic logic of religious atatttments. Miles proposes that 
the modified principle brings to light the "absolute mistakes" pre:ient 
in pseudo-religious utterances. He definea religious language as silence 
qualified b;y theistic parables. Ferre suggests that the modified prin-
ciple permits one to distinguish the logic of religious utterances froa 
the logic of acienti!io utterances. 
With the e~ception of the analogista, the men str@ss the importance 
of the individu~l persoWllity in the formulation and use ot the logic ot 
religious lnn(51.lage. '?his characteristic receives alight emphasis amoq the 
analogists. Jmart, on the other band, endorses the importance of the ill-
dividual in tho question of the logic o! religio1.1s langua~e by implication 
229 
when he contends that the strancl's religious activities, carried on b7 
individuals, support the logic of a utrand. Kunz acGapts the idea 117 
implication when he argueo that religious symbols do not deal vith the 
transcendent, but describe the world of man. uamaey etresses the impor-
tance of peraonal commitment and discerJU11ent. In addition, he uses the 
logic of "!"-language as n basis for describing the logic of religious 
la~uago. Cloobury'a underlying idealism endorses th~ importance of the 
human personage in the formulation and use of religious language. ilorden 
takes note of the convictional element of religious language, and the 
aimilarities between the theological language game and the game ot personal 
language. Evans'; "onlook" and his emphases on self-involvement and rap-
portive elementa in religious language are essentially the marks ot a 
personaliat. Mil6s1 endeavor to avoid the "absolute mistake" is the obverse 
ot a streso on tho peroonal. He states that ultil!llltel7 peroonal conv1ot1on 
determines the worth ot one or another particular parable. 
, 
Ferre allova 
tor the creative powers ot the intelligence and the conceptual povers ot 
the Dind as important factors in religious language. Hutchi118on contends 
that the individual's active mind constructs expressive, 11eaningful imagee 
in the orientation statements ot religion. Zllurdeeg stres3Gs the !!2!2 
loguens, man.-who-speaka, as he who UNS convictional language. 
The general apathJ ot the men toward a cognitiYe element 1n religious 
language (ao "cognitive" is traditionally defined) is bound up with the 
endorse,aent of a particular logic tor religious langu•• Some make great-
er effort than others to retain or explain cognition. Two ot the ana~ogillta, 
Crombie and Hascall, deal ~t least obliquel7 "1th the problem. Crombie 
touches on the queation ot cognition 1n his discussion of 11unclifteiaentiated 
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theism." Mascall allows tor cognition (as he defines it) in tho argument 
concerning rational apprehension. ~mart attempts to retain aome semblance 
ot cognition in hia contention that reason(a) and taitb(s) are not at 
odds--although the underlying religious activitiea ceed not involve cog-
nitive eleruents. , Ferre aeeka to retain COIJZlition of aorta in his eMphasis 
on metaphysical synthesis, but he refers to "metaphysical'' facts in reli-
gion as different from empirical facts. Ramsey allows tor no verifiable 
deductions from theological a~sertions, but his covert idealism lllflkea 
religious statements no lesa cognitive than others. In this matter Cleobury 
ia in essential agreement with Ramsey. Evans contends that aometb.ing more 
than factual content ia involved in selt-performative language, but he 
does not dismiss the importance of factual content. Munz opposes the nat-
uralistic interpretation o! religious language. He suggeats instead that 
the task of the theologian io not deductive, and that the truth of theology 
1a to be taste~ onll against the aymbol picture. Hiles states that the 
parable is not concerned with literal truth or falsity; pttr6ocal dttcision 
determinea tho worth of a parable. Hordern defines "to know"--a cognitive 
ter111--in Bartllian sty.le in order to avoid the problem of traditional cog-
nition. Hutchinson offers a phenomenological definition of cognition, and 
contends that the nature of truth and knowledge is connected with the lite 
ot action. Finally, Zuurdeeg stresses the unity ot the man-who-speaks and 
the language h~ speaks, anct apparently rules out a strong cognitive eleme11t. 
The strands ot thinking are diverse and complex, and it is unfair to 
sWDmarize the thoughts out of context. All the men address tLe second 
major analytic challenge, but each in his own way--independently and 
2}l 
cohere?tly. Rigid olaosification has little appreciable value. Perhaps 
the moat appropriate conclusion is a directive to the ~ritings themoelveo. 
CHJ\Pl'ER VI 
AN EXAMiliNl' ION OF THE LOGIC OF l~ LIGIOUS DI.3COIJ16E \1rrH A VIt.."'W 
'.l.'O ASCEltl.'AINING 1'illi IMPACT OF LINGUL1TIC ANALYSIS UPOfi 
Coh~r EMPOHARY PHILOSOPHY UF RELIGION 
Chapter I 
'rhia study examines how linguistic analysis, together with its pre-
cursor logical poaitivism, has provoked a reassessment of the nature of 
religious discourse. The problem is accurately stated in the form ot 
two questions: (l) What are the challenges which analysis addresses to 
the philooophers of religion in the area ot religious language? (2) In 
what way do the answers ot the philoaophers ot religion illuminate and 
relate to thoae challenges? 
Chapter II 
Logical positivism ia the ideational precursor ot contemporary lin-
guistic analysis. The evolution of logical positivism in the environment 
of British idealism, and the role of new logic in the development ot 
logical positivism, are curoorily reviewed. The study assesses the im-
portance of logical atomism in the eraergence o! logical positiviaa, and 
then measures the intelloctual currents running in the scientitically-
orientated Vienna Circle. Logical positivism appears to haYe relied 
heavily on Kant and Comte, but it pushed beyond both in its concern tor 
proposition rather than knowledge. The verification principle moYed 
through five developmental stages as the positivists attempted to erase 
its impreci sion. In spite of continued reformulation, the principle 
, 
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contained inherent di!ficultie~. 
Positivism unleauhad an attack on metaph7aical and theological atate• 
ments wUh its dichotomy of analytic and synthetic propositions. :Che 
chapter revi ews the sta tus of t heological statements under positivistic 
scrutiny. While t ?gicul positivism agreed to the possibility o! mystical 
experience, it counted theological statements as meaninglessly emotive. 
The chapter concludes with an examination of logical positivism in 
the larger philoaophical context. While logical positivism was in s9me 
ways t he precur$or o! linguiotic analysis, positivism was also an irruption 
in the development of an analysis which chronologically preceded it. 
Chapter III 
'l'he third chapter studies contemporary linguistic analysis aud the 
challenges it hurls at theology. Analysis and logical positivism are 
related through two bridge characters, o. z. Moore and Altrod J. Ayer 
(and Ludwig Wittgenstein, aa explained below). The study seeks to offer 
a descriptive definition o! linguistic analysis. The logical-positivistic 
parentage of analysis, the e1111)hesis of analysis on "use" of .lallb"Uage, and 
the psychological approach-avoidance set of many analysts are used as 
characteristic elaments in three attempts to define analysis descriptivel)'. 
Although each !actor contributes to an understanding ot aiial.ysis, it is 
apparent that the ,aathodology ot philosophical analyais provided the most 
appropriate entree for an adequate descriptive description of the movement. 
On that account the chapter turns to the metap.o,aical therap1 o! Cambridge 
analysis as a concrete historical manifestation of anal7tic aethodologJ. 
The Cambridge analysts judged metaphysical state .. nts importaut tor their 
therapeutic value. The chapter moves from (;ambridge to Oxtor4 aa it .~ ·· 
2}4 
reviews t he trer1chant work of Ludwig J ittgeustein, the man who led Oxford 
philooophy to anal ytic conaideratione. The Oxford school studies the 
logics of l anguage. It a ssumes an organic view of lan~uage, and !orQulatea 
a mt,thodology to dis sect t he organism. The notion of. language games, the 
paradigm case technique, the sisnificant comparison, and the emphasis on 
contextual relations are all important ole1nenta of analytic methodology. 
In turn the chupter examines the challonges of analyai5 to the world 
of t heology. Two primary challengoa eraerge. The first derives from ana-
lysts who openly evidence t heir losical-positiviatic parentage. ,\lthougb 
they endors e in principle the notion of "logics" in langua6e, in practice 
t hose analy<>tu bracket tbe "logics" of ·1anguage with one "logic"--the 
"logic" of e111pirical anchorage. ·r he r esultant challenge to theology is 
a sharpened stuturnent of the logical-positivistic d.e,:iand for t.he verifiable 
or falsifiable e l emeut in religious utterance. In sum, the firat challenge 
requires either t he verifiability or the falsifiability of religious lan-
guage aa a prerequisite for admittctnce to the .realm of meaning. Tho sec-
ond aualytic clu:1llenge coucerna its elf with wethodolo{SY more 110 than the 
f i rat, and in that reapdct it more accurately mirrora the core of analysis. 
The lack of a supportive metaphysics, the appeal to the results of analyses, 
the refusal to accopt as valid the self-justifying nature of revelatory 
religious langunge, aud sharpened attacku on traditional arguments for 
the existe11ce of tiod--these four eleaenta contribute to the cethodological 
challenge of analysis. ~'ho second major challenge of analysis demands 
the "logic" of religious lant.,"U&ge. If it is granted (as it iu in thia 
challenge) that the "logic" of religious language does not piYOt on its 
verifiability or falaifiabilit1, the question reuinsz What sort ot 
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syntactical, ideation.al, contextual interrelation--wbat sort or '1logic"-
ia the caae when a meaningful religious statement is uttered? 
Chapter r.v 
Chapter IV exa1aines verifiability and falsifiability in propoeed 
theories of religious language. It investigates the works ot men who take 
up the first maJor c i·1allenge of anal1sis. In dealing with that challenge 
the men encounter the aegment of analysis which evidences a strong positiv-
istic parentage. 
Three charaoteriatics of t he first positiviatic-aoalytic challenge 
are affirmed, in general, by tho men who address it. (1) Tho men evidence 
a general disinclination to identify more than one language game in human 
language. (2) They admit to tho empirical anchorage of all meaningful 
statements. (3) They accept verifiability-falsifiability as the appropri-
ate logical tool for the apprehension of ~eaning in religious language. 
The chapter moves from a point of "strong(er)" poaitiviam to a point 
of "weak,(er)" positivism as it summarizes the views of men who meet, col-
lectively and individually, the !irat major analytic challenge on its own 
grounds. The works of John B. wilson and David Cox are reviewed under the 
title "Verifiability and Religious ~perienco. 11 Beu F. Kimpel, Richard 
B. Braithwaite, Paul van Buron, and Paul F. Schmidt come under inYestiga-
tion in "Verit'iability and Religious Propositions." The eection titled 
''Falsifiability and Religious Propositions" summarizes the nows ot 
William A. Christian and William T. Blackstone. John Hick's eschatologi-
cal veri!ication i o considered under ''Proleptic Verification and Reli-
gious Propositions." The chapter concludes with a brief re8Ull8. 
Chapter V 
The fifth chapter deals with the second analytic challenge, the de-
mand for an explication of the particular "logic" of religious language. 
It summarizes the worka ot men who isolate and describe the opecial logic 
of religious languago. The thinking of these Men coalesces in three areas. 
The men recognize the particular character of the logic ot religious lan-
guage as distinct from other "logics" in hwnan language. !lecond, they 
tend to omphuaize the role of individuality a~d personality in the formu-
lation and uao of that logic of religious languagec Third, they evidence 
some degree of apathy toward the elernent of cognition in religioua language, 
as might be expected. 
The chapter exacineo in detail the writings of thirteen men. ''The 
Logic of Authorityn reviews tho works of Alaadair MacIntyre, Ian MacHattie 
Crombie, and Eric Lionel Mascall--all three analogists o! a sort. The 
studies o! Ninian Smart and Peter Munz suggest the propriety o! the sub-
title "Logic of ,3ituation. 11 'l'he personal nature o! the logic of religious 
language, endorsed by Ian Hamaey, Frank Harold Gleobur:, irilliam Hordern, 
and Donald D. ~vans, comes under invoatigation in "Logic of Farticularity 
in Religious Language." b'inally, "~pressive Logic of Lite-Uirection" 
bringa togetber the thought of Thomas Miles, Frederick Ferre, John A. 
Hutchinaon, and 'dillem F. Zuurdeeg. The chapter closes with a brief re-
capitulation. 
APPENDIX A 
Here follow three reViews ot Hugo Meynell 'o denae1 Monsenae and 
Christianiti (London: Sheed and Ward, 1964). The first rev~ew, by Ian 
!Ulmsey, a.ppea~ed in Journal o! Theological !>tudiea, XVI (April 1965), 
270-271. The aocond, by A. H. Armstrong, appeared in Downside Review, 
LXXXII (July 1964), 256-258. The t t1ird, by George Vass, appeared in 
Heythrop Journal, VI (April 1965), 201-20}. 
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a metaphysical personalism whose attractions are at least as evident as 
any dangers, then or now. 
But, these queries aside, undoubtedly in this book Dr. Luce shows us 
where to set our sights so as to gain a better perspective on Berkeley, and 
one of the great merits of Dr. Luce's exposition is for example that, pace 
Hume, it gives Berkeley's attack on abstract general ideas the duly 
subordinate, and not primary, place it had in his thinking. Dr. Luce 
further notes and rightly that his account confirms broadly the interpre-
tation of Berkeley's philosophy reached independently by T,. E. Jessop 
and himself, and reflected in their edition of the Works. 
If some of us can still discern a few dark fish swimming in the stream, 
at least we can also delight in what Dr. Luce has displayed for us on the 
bank, and if the Boswells and Johnsons chance to come along with their 
sticks, they may yet be convinced 'that Berkeley teaches common sense' 
(p. 17). But Dr. Luce has no easy optimism. It is 'not easy to convince 
folk' of this, and therein 'lies the difficulty and the importance' of the 
present study (p. 17). All I can say is that if Dr. Luce does not convince 
the reader, no one will-though on this point and despite my heretical 
queries, I speak with the affection and gratitude of an old convert. 
I. T. RAMSEY 
Sense, Nonsense and Christianity: An essay on the logical analysis 
of religious statements. By Huco A. MEYNELL. Pp. vi+281. 
London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964. 12S. 6d. 
IN this essay on the logical analysis of religious statements which still 
bears some marks of its origin as a research thesis, the author approaches 
religious statements by first considering statements in general and their 
relation to 'facts', and next value statements, where he notes especially 
the bearing of religious beliefs on them. He then turns to statements of 
traditional Christianity which, as he significantly emphasizes, have a 
necessary 'commitment to matters of fact', so that any account of them 
which views them as 'merely or principally evincing present moral dis-
positions or an expression of present religious experience' is, as he rightly 
says, radically inadequate. In a chapter on 'Religion and Ontology' he 
argues that the statements of Christianity are allegations, whether true 
or false, of 'objective fact' though this phrase becomes a little slippery 
when we hear that belief in God can mean not only belief in 'that which 
will render to every man according to his works' (p. 161) but also belief 
'that cosmic justice will ultimately be secured' (p. 163). A concluding 
chapter contains a perceptive and helpful analysis of the truth-conditions 
of certain 'mysteries': (a) the inspiration of Scripture, (b) miracles, 
(c) visions, (d) Christology, (e) the Real Presence. 
This is an enterprising book which raises the right kind of questions, 
and points the way to profitable discussion. But in its legitimate and 
laudable desire to eschew all reductionisms, and to give an account of 
Christian statements which makes clear their factual' reference and their 
claim to be about 'objective fact', it only shows how very much more 
attention needs giving, in the first place, to talk about fact. Further, 
while Mr. Meynell clearly disclaims any present concern with truth or 
falsity, is he himself likely to have given an adequate account even of 
the meaning of Christian assertions, if it makes the 'traditional' kind 
of apologetic virtually impossible? For as Mr. Meynell points out on 
pp. 164-5, it follows on his view that in 'the establishment or refutation 
of the statement that Christ is Lord in the traditional sense, centrality 
of the truth-conditions is in inverse proportion to their availability as 
evidence'. Which comes near to saying that the most central doctrines 
are also the most incredible: which admittedly some believers and even 
some believing philosophers have liked to think. But fortunately not alI. 
Mr. Meynell is right to be concerned about questions of fact, objec-
tivity, and reference, but does not he himself take too prosaic a view of 
facts and objectivity ?-a suspicion which is fortified by what he says alI 
too briefly, for example, about Otto. Reductionism is no less reduction-
ism when it is reductionism in a ·good cause. I. T. ~SEY 
The Christian Beliej in God. By DANIEL JENKINS. Pp. 226. 
London: Faber & Faber, 1964. 25s. 
ALmoucH 'it is possible •• . to present the Christian faith in ways 
which drain it of all mystery', Mr. Jenkins wishes to reaffirm .the place 
of mystery in any study of the case for belief in God, and he censures 
excessively rationalistic and academic treatments. Where the traditional 
rational 'proofs' of God's existence are persuasive, they are so usually 
'only for those who have been led to believe in God on other grounds'. 
To learn reliably what God is like, 'philosophical speculation' must be 
'checked and controlled at every point by what God has said about 
Himself in Christ'. Study must focus upon ' the knowledge of God 
possessed by Jesus himself and the prophets and apostles': upon the 
testimony (of reliable witnesses) that the events recorded 'are explicable 
only on the basis of Someone not themselves, who stands over against 
them, (and] who controls all things': upon the character of the ex-





















THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW 
and it seems arguable that there is no meaning in speaking of what a 
man would do freely, when in fact he will never do it. Again, the argument 
is discussed that no man could avoid all sin throughout his life. What 
does not appear sufficiently allowed for is that, just in so far as some 
action or inaction is unavoidable, it cannot possibly be due to free choice. 
Again, a distinction is made between secondary liberty and autonomous 
liberty, apparently meaning liberty controlled by God and not wholly 
so controlled. But surely the very meaning of free choice is that the 
action is not wholly controlled by any power other than that of the 
chooser. And the baffiing problems connected with eternal punishment 
are left aside, though perhaps this may be explained as not essential to 
the subject under discussion. 
A review of this book might be prolonged indefinitely; it must be 
enough to repeat that it is indispensable for future study of the problem. 
MARK PONTIF.EX 
[It must oe added that the theory here recommended was put forward 
by Dom Mark Pontifex twenty-five years ago in this REVIEW ('Predestina-
tion', January 1939), and developed by him in his recent contribution 
to the Faith and Fact series Providence and Freedom, to which Fr Most 
makes suitable acknowledgements.-Eo.] 
Sense, Nonsense and Christianity by Hugo Meyell. Pp. vi + 281 ($heed 
and Ward: Stagbooks) 12s. 6d. 
IT will be ~teresting to see what professional philosophers, especially 
unbelieving ones, will make of this book: it is to be hoped that they will 
read it carefully, and that it will help to clarify their minds about religious 
statements. The present reviewer, who is not a professional philosopher, 
certainly found it helpful, enlighten~g and encouraging. It is not a book 
of apologetics or theology, but, according to its sub-title 'an essay on 
the logical analysis of religious statements'. This means, as Mr Meyncll 
makes clear in his Introduction, that it is not concerned with determining 
whether particular religious statements are true or false, or with that 
deepening of our understanding of a revelation, already accepted as true, 
which is the business of dogmatic theology. It is a preliminary attempt 
to show what religious statements are really trying to say, what makes 
them consistent or inconsistent, sense or nonsense, and by what means. 
if any, they can be verified or falsified. This does seem to be indispensable. 
Neglect of it, as Mr Meynell suggests, does a good deal to make much 
religious apologetic and anti-religious polemic so very wide of the mark. 
and to account for the rather disconcerting fact that, after serious and 
inlelligent discussions on the philosophy of religion between persons of 
opposing views, the participants are usually found to hold exactly the 
same. opinions with which they started: there has been no real contact 
ofmmds. 
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{ Mr Mcynell begins with two general chapters on 'Statements and 
facts' and 'The Nature of Value-Statements' which seem to a non-I professional refreshingly clear and sensible. His rejection of the dogma 
I that statements imply either strictly or not at all and his remarks on 'loose • implication' (which plays an important part in his later discussions of 
I religious statements) are particularly welcome (pp. 32-35). The main en-quiry into the logic of religious statements begins with chapter 3. A j particularly valuable feature of it is the clarity with which Mr Meynell 
I establishes the distinction between traditional Christianity and ·reductionist' theologies, of which he takes the treatments of Christianity 
l by Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel as his principal examples (Bultmann's rather different sort of 'reductionism' is dealt with in an Appendix). 
~Ir Meynell treats these distinguished thinkers with proper respect, but 
shows clearly that they are_ using Christian language in quite different 
ways from traditional Christians; ·they are Christians rather in the way 
in which ancient Greek philosophers were pagans, that is, they use the 
traditional religious ways of speaking freely in whatever sense they may 
I require for their own P,hilosophical purposes. It is necessary to make 
I this distinction as clear as possible. There is a great deal of 'reductionist' 
I Christianity about, and, especially for anyone engaged in a:cumenical dialogue, it is important to have reliable criteria for distinguishing it from traditional Christianity (neither Mr Meynell nor the present reviewer thinks that all the opinions of the 'reductionists' about religion and 
f morality are necessarily false and contemptible; but before evaluating 
I them one must be clear that one is dealing with something entirely different from the traditional faith). 
One general criticism of Mr Meynell's analysis which can be made is 
that, in understandable reaction from some forms of 'reductionism', 
he is inclined to play down very much the part of present experience in 
traditional Christian belief, and to talk as it if consisted almost exclusively 
in 'assent to statements of past (historical) and future (eschatological) 
fact', present religious experience ·being only a 'by-product of the resulting 
hope and thankfulness' (p. 136). We must agree with him on the necessity 
I of assent to historical (in principle now verifiable or falsifiable) and I eschatological (only verifiable or falsifiable in the future) statements i for traditional Christians. But it would seem very odd for God to leave 
th?se whom he calls to believe in him without any sufficient present 
evidence of himself, and very odd for us to believe in a number of remark-
able events. in the past; and hope for still more remarkable ones in the 
future, without some sort of present awareness (admittedly very difficult 
lo state satisfactorily) of God revealing them. 
On p. 161, when considering the meanings of the word 'God', Mr 
Meyn~ll says that it is proximate to nonsense to deny the existence of 
God 10 the sense of 'first cause'. This at least requires a good deal of 



























THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW 
most unbelievers nowadays would flatly deny that it was necessary to 
assume any single 'first cause' of events in any sense. On p. 225, in the 
summary of Bultmann's views, a 'not' seems to have dropped out of the 
sentence 'God must be regarded as an object for metaphysical sp~culation, 
as he is by Catholic theology, and his action must not be conceived as 
expressing itself in physical events'. A. H. A:RMSTRONG 
Logique de la Foi by H. Bouillard, s.J. Pp. 197 (Aubier) n.p. 
P. BoUJLLARD tells us in his Preface that he was hesitant about acceptino 
the suggestion of collecting these apparently disparate pieces into ~ 
single volume. They were also, he says, 'command performances' in each 
case and require to ~ seen in a context. But he need have had no anxiety. 
The fact that they are all animated, as he puts it, by the same intention: 
'to bring out the secret correspondence between the logic of human 
existence and the appeal of the Christian mystery' is of itself sufficient 
justification. But there is another consideration. The reader of this short 
book will be given a bird's-eye view of the ground covered by P. Bouillard 
in his longer works and will thus be encouraged to read them. 
The first part of the book consists of two papers on apologetics and an 
address on Christian liberty. Since the sort of apologetics which P. 
Bouillard advocates is Blondelian, the topic of liberty is quite naturally 
connected with it. 'I think', he writes, 'that no one has defined better 
than Blonde! what apologetics ought to be in the modem world. It is 
true that his work contains obscurities and is out of date in several 
respects. But it has touched the crucial point so precisely that it is s~ill 
illuminating for us today' (p. 30). P. Bouillard writes with great clarity 
and conciseness, and it would be necessary to quote at inordinate length 
in an attempt to bring out the importance of his conclusions in this (or 
in any) part of ·his new book. It is possible only to make a few refere?ces 
to certain passages of peculiar interest. On the certainty of faith ~e wnt~s: 
'God reveals himself to each of us, at the heart of the act of faith which 
he himself determines. Our awareness of this revelation has the character 
of a direct and personal apprehension, of an intimate experience, of a 
supernatural perception analogous to mystical knowledge. Many t~co· 
logians admit today that it is this experience of God on which the certatnty 
of our faith is founded.' 'But', he continues, 'it must be emphasized no 
less strongly that God always reveals himself in a mediate way, under 
the sign and the veil of objects distinct from himself, and that we always 
know him in this mediate way, through the signs . .. The sign is the 
human reality of Jesus Christ' (pp. 19-20). On this background, P. 
Bouillard presents the Blondelian thesis: 'To show the duty of believing. 
one must first show that the Christian faith conditions the achievement of 
our human destiny. No apologetic is of use unless, in some fashion, it 
takes that course. It would be fruitless to establish miracles and great 
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events· if one did not show that the Christian phenomenon of which they 
form a part gives the answer to the question of our existence' (p. 26). 
The second section consists of articles and conferences on "Kierkegaard, 
'dialectical theology' and Bultmann's 'demythisation' (to use P. Bouillard's 
term). It contains a resume of the first of his two volumes on Karl Barth, 
which alone would be enough to recommend it. But it is also an account 
of 'existential' theology which many might find the first fully intelligible 
account which they have read. It is a genuine 'dialogue'. The true insights 
of these thinkers are recognized, and their affinities with Catholic theology 
are clearly shown. The apparent irrationality of Kierkegaard is dis-
cussed in a way which seems most admirably balanced. Barth's rejection 
of a natural knowledge of God is treated in a really convincing way 
because P. Bouillard's account of this knowledge is not subject to the 
objections which can be rightly urged against conventional accounts of 
it. Bultmann's intentions receive a sympathetic treatment which gives 
added force to the conclusion that it is, fundamentally, Bultmann's 
Lutheran approach which leads him to attach so little importance to the 
historical personage, Jesus Christ (p. 144). The last section consists of 
an article on Gabriel Marcel and the magisterial discourse for the cen-
tenary of Blondel's birth delivered at Aix in 1961. Marcel's work is here 
considered in all its bearings; it is astonishing that so much ground could 
be covered with such apparent ease in so short a space. P. Bouillard is 
generous in his praise of Marcel, and the true value of his work emerges -
the criticism is made that his attitude to our time is a rather negative one 
('it is in our present world and from our historical situation that we must 
rejoin the eternal', p. 165). The discourse on Blonde} is undoubtedly 
the best introduction to his work and should gain more readers for P. 
Bouillard's great book B/011del el le Christia11isme. 
ILLTYD TRETHOWAN 
L'Eglise et /es fates by Jean_ Guitt<,m. Pp. 198 (Desclee de Brouwer) 
120 F.B. . 
As the first layman to be invited to attend the Council, first as an observer 
and then as an auditor, M. Guitton would seem to be well qualified to 
write on the subject of the role of the laity in the Church. He bases his 
~eflections on Newman's Rambler article 'On Consulting the Faithful 
tn matters of Doctrine' (July, 1859) which he reprints in a French trans-
lation; as a result, out of 189 pp. of text 131 pp. are taken up with the 
article, an introduction to it and some extracts from Newman's note to 
The Arians where these are relevant. So we are left with only some sixty 
pages of M. Guitton's own reflections on the subject of his book. In 
~Iity the pages of the book actually devoted to the subject and con-
tami?g fresh matter amount to exactly forty-six, since the last section 






~vv 11,Q Yl.&.I .. V.:, 
Tl,e My//, of Simplicity. By MARIO BUNGE. Pp. xii, 240, London, Prentice-Hall 
International, 1963, 48s. 
· The 'myth' which Bunge attacks in this book is the idea that the function of 
science is to simplify-to show that the apparent complexity of the world can be 
reduced to simple terms. While not denying that the search for simplicity has a 
place in science, he maintains that its importance has been overrated. The result 
has been thafmuch contemporary philosophy of science is guilty of oversimplifi-
cation: it fails to appreciate the true complexity of the physical world . . Among 
those modern trends which arc open to criticism on this score are reductionist 
theories which would reduce physical objects to colfections of sense-data; lin-
guistic analysis in so far as it seeks to make ordinary linguistic usage the general 
philosophical norm, ignoring the depth and subtlety of scientific language; and 
linguistic formalism which seeks to, impose a logically precise, purely formal 
language which, again, only achieves its end by means of a systematic impover-
ishment of scientific discourse. 
In a painstaking series of studies, Bunge examines a number of aspects of the 
general notion of simplicity, distinguishing between simplicity as a character-
istic of the physical world and as a characteristic of our descriptions of it and, 
within the latter field, between simplicity of terms, propositions, laws and theories. 
Some of the analysis may strike the reader as over-elaborate. For instance, more 
than seven dozen different types of ' law-like statement' arc distinguished (not all, 
admittedly, mutually exclusive) and it is by no means clear at the end that such 
a minute system of classification was really worth undertaking. Perhaps, though, 
it is as well that every possible distinction should be made at least once; in order 
to be sure that no significant differences have been overlooked. 
In the main, the author establishes his point that the world, and scientific dis-
course about it, have a depth and richness to which writers on the philosophy of 
science have frequently failed to do justice. His argument woul<l, however, have 
been greatly strengthened if his criticisms of false principles of simplicity had been 
counterbalanced by a more positive recognition of the genuine concepts of 
simplicity which science requires. In a true and important sens·~ it can be said that 
the scientist discovers an underlying simplicity in the structure of the world when-
ever he finds that a set of apparently unrelated phenomena can be described by a 
single law, or that several apparently distinct laws are particular instances of a 
more general one. A universe in which relatively brief and simple law-like state-
ments can convey large amounts of information about natural phenomena is, by 
any reasonable criterion, structurally simpler than one in which this is not the 
case. Bunge rig_htly stresses the difficulties which arise when we try to give precise 
definition to phrases such as 'simple statement• or 'structural simplicity'; never-
theless it seems impossible to doubt that they do have some significance. Modern 
developments in Information Theory could probably help to elucidate this 
question. 
The author docs not claim, however, to have given any final solution to his 
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treatment of the theme than he intended to give. The book, as ii stands, can be 
read with profit by all who arc interested in the logical structure of science. 
JOHN L. RUSSl:LL 
Sense, Nonsense and Clzristianity. By H. MEYNELL. Pp. 281 (Stagbooks), London, 
Sheed & Ward, 1964, 12s. 6d. 
The book is perhaps the first attempt by a philosopher of Catholic background 
to subject the statements of traditional Christianity to a kind of linguistic 
analysis. His task is not primarily to determine whether these statements are true 
or false, but rather to find the means by which they can be verified or falsified. 
The first chapter gives a very clear summary description of statements in general. 
A statement in order to signify facts has to fulftl certain conditions. By distin-
guishing between the necessary, the central and the peripheral conditions of 
meaningful propositions, the author explains the basic categories according to 
which he intends to analyse religious statements. Any statement that docs not 
fulfil its necessary condition ,vould "be nonsensical, whereas the non-fulfilment 
of central conditions r~nders our propositions logically odd. It is noteworthy 
that, when discussing this basic distinction of the conditions of meaningfulness, 
the author relinquishes one of the original tenets of Wittgenstein and Ay-:.r. 
According to him the necessary conditions of a statement, though strictly im-
plied in it, are not affirmed analytically of the same. The di!Tcrcncc between 
analytic and synthetic propositions is not one of kind but of degree. 
In the second chapter the treatment of religious statements is approached by a 
discussion of value-statements. Braithwaitc·s reduction of these latter to moral 
commitment falsifies the nature of religious statement!.. To be religious impli.:s 
not the use of a different set of criteria for valuation from that used by those who I\J 
are not religious: it is rather to hold that there obtains a different slate of affai rs °t5 
with an eye to which these criteria have to be employed. In other words religious 
statements are value-statements which necessarily depend on so,nc factual truth-
conditions and only secondarily on religious behaviour and moral a ttitm.lcs. 
The statements of tradition:.il Christian bdicf arc classified .1,: 11~,':::g to tl:c.:ir 
factual enta ilments. The propositions of our Creed refer to histori~1 I r.,cts oi the 
past (e.g. 'suffered under Pontius Pilate') to facts of present experience (' I believe 
in the Holy Catholic Church'), and to future facts ('who cometh to judge the 
living and the dead'). For traditional Christianity the factual content of relisious 
statements is kept in this threefold division and they are thus mutually irreducible. 
Modern theological thousht on the other hand strives to reduce past and future 
factual references to present Christian experience. Thus Kant, for example, b:;. 
translating its statements reduces traditional Christianity into moral imperatives; 
Schleiermacher's reductionism is founded on an acsthetical basis, where facts, 
past and future, arc resolved in the present feeling-experience of the religious 
individual. Hegel's attitude to Christian belief is characterized as a 'metaphysical 
re.ductionism': religion is absorbed in the philosophy of self-realizing Mind, the 
subject par exce/le11ce which can never become the factual object of our· religious 
statcmc1?,ts. It is only in the appendix that the author discusses the existentialist 
1'" 
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reductionism of Bultmann, and analyses the idea of demythologization. Briefly, 
'reductionist' theologies invert the proportion among the truth-conditions of 
traditional Christianity where past and future facts were the necessary conditions 
and present experiential facts only the central conditions. 
Chapter V proceeds to discuss the ontological implications of traditional 
religious statements. The common-sense ontology, which seems to be at the basis 
·of traditional belief, presupposes three irreducible types of beings: persons, 
sensations, material objects. Now just as a 'reductionist' theologian tries to 
eliminate past and future.facts as necessary truth-conditions of his statements, so 
analytic philosophy endeavours to reduce these three types of existence to one. 
The author argues that this reduction is not permissible. For instance, religious 
statements about the existence of God cannot be reduced to the affinnation of a 
certain pattern of natural phenomena, as Ayer suggested, and the 'God language' 
of the Bible naturally presupposes and affirms the personal element in God when 
it acknowledges his manifestation in nature. 'God is angry' is not reducible to the 
statement 'It thunders'. The truth conditions of religious statements are of wider 
range than the verifiable propositions of the analyst, already on the level of 
ontological implications. The ca!ie of this 'personal element' presupposed by 
traditional religious statements is well argued both against Professor Ayer and 
Professor Ryle. There are private facts about persons which are not equivalent 
to the public facts about them, by virtue of which persons may thus be said in a 
sense to transcend the public world. If this can be said meaningfully of any per-
son, all the more can the same be affirmed of the traditional idea of God in 
Christian belief. The Christian acknowledges God not only as the First Cause or 
the object of man's worship or the sanction of man's works, but as a free personal 
agent who brought about striking events in past history. This view and its im-
plications can be denied by atheists or deists, but whether one believes it or not, 
the traditional Christian's affirmation can claim the support of facts which are at 
least in principle verifiable. Thus the statements of traditional Christianity arc 
allegations, whether true or false, of public or private facts. Chapter VI gives us 
some examples of how the principles previously stated can be used in the analysis 
of religious mysteries. For mysteries, too, are religious statements in so far 
as some of their truth-conditions within the system of a religious doctrine can 
be pointed out. Thus the truth conditions, necessary central and peripheral, 
of the Inspiration of Sacred Scripture, of Miracles and"Visions, of Christo logy, of 
the Real Presence arc discussed in turn. The author's presentation of these latter, 
though rather sweeping, cannot fail to arouse the interest of Christian apologists 
and systematic theologians. 
Some reflections may be added to this interesting attempt by Mr Meyncll. The 
first is concerned rather with the structure of the whole book than with its con-
tents. In his introduction the author forecasts the general trend of his argument: 
•of the logical positivist's criteria of meaningfulness some arc fulfilled by the doc-
trines of traditional Christianity, while the others are themselves invalid'. To tell 
the truth, after re:1ding carefully the ensuing discl!ssions, I am still unable to say 
wlzic/z criteria of meaning arc fulfilled by Christianity and whid1 arc in themselves 
REVIEWS 203 
invalid. Secondly, without sharing the somewhat sanguine views of Professor 
I. Ramsey, who seems to expect from an analytic approach to theology a 
revolutionary renewal of this disciP.line, I had_ anticipated a more positive c,•alua-
tion oflinguistic analysis as applied toChristinn doctrine. To use the language of 
certain philosophical method means a commitment to the basic intuitions of the 
same, whether in their original sense or in their reasonably revised perspectives. 
For either, one accepts the basic tenets of logical positivism along with its jargon 
and admits that they arc inapplicable to Christian mysteries, or else one enters 
into~ dialogue with the an~lyst in order to grasp in his very method those basically 
true intuitions which, correctly understood, not only do not prove our religious 
statements to be meaningless, but rather throw a new light on them. I believe that 
this latter alternative is possible without altogether sacrificing the basic tenets of 
linguistic analysis. There is no half-way house between these alternatives, where 
we could pick and choose among the ideas of a philosophical method at our 
pleasure. (Perhap.; the author's attitude to the strict division of statements into 
analytical and synthetic, is an example of this point. It is true, some analysts have 
already abandoned Aycr's and Wittgenstein's strict division, but to me none of 
their arguments are altogether convincing.) Thirdly, the most·valuablc result of 
the author's investigation is the clear distinction between the 'traditionalist' 
and 'reductionist' versions of Christian religious statements, and this corresponds 
with what has happened in the so-called 'reductionist' tendencies in thc field of 
ontology. From a philosophical point of view I found the author's arguments 
more or less convincing. I am not convinced, however, about their straightfonmrd 
application to the truth-conditions of traditional Christianity. Mr Mcyncll ' 
affirms on the one hand that the necessary truth-conditions of traditional ~ 
Christianity are those referring to historical facts of p:1st and futurc, wherc:is "' 
present Christian experience is only a central condition of the same. But, on the 
other hand he seems to maintain that the relationship of the latter to the former 
conditions is a necessary one (cf. p. :!4S). But is the necessity of this relationship 
reciprocal? fn other words: do th:: factual conditions of p:ist and fucurc strictly 
imply some present Christian expcriencc? And vice vcrs:i t C:111 we not ask 
whether this present Christian experience docs not turn statements about past 
and future events into meaningfully religious statements? Whatever this'Christian 
experience is, and however one sets about its 'thematization', is it not our task 
also to explain? The attempts of 'reductionist' theologians have the merit of 
emphasizing (even if unduly) the importance of the 'experience' in question. Any 
Christian religious statement that did not refer to the event of Christ would bt 
admittedly nonsensical. But equally, any Christian statement that did not strictly 
imply a present Christian experience of the individual who professes it, would be 
not only odd, but irrelevant from the point of view of traditional Christianity. 
Not even Catholic apologists can dismiss summarily Paul Tillich's statc1111:nt: 
'Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately . . • ·. Without t{1e 
element of Ultimate concern no assertion is a thcologic.11 one' (The Piotcsta111 
Era [London 1951), p. 9S). 
GEORGE VASS 
"' 
_.._..._._ __________  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Primary Sources 
Ayer, Alfred Jules. "The Criterion of Truth, 11 PhiloeopbY and Anal.zeia. 
Edited by Margaret MacDonald. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19§4. Pp. 
237-241. 
-----. Language, Truth and Logic. Second edition. New York: Dover 
Publications, (!946]. 
-----. "Philosophy and Language," The Concept of a Person and Other 
Essays. New York: St. Martin's Press, c.1963. Pp. l-35. 
-----. "Verification and Experience," Logical Positiviaa. Edited by 
Alfred Jules Ayer. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1959. Pp. 
228-243. 
-----. "The Vienna Circle," The Revolution in PhilosopbY. Edited by 
Alfred Jules Ayer. London: Macmillan and Compaey, c.1956. Pp. 
70-78. 
-----, editor. Logical Positivism. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Preas, 
e.1959. 
-----, editor. The Revolution in PhiloeophY. London: Macmillan and 
Company, c.1956. 
----- and F. c. Copleeton. "Logical PoeitiviS11-A Debate, 11 Modern Intro-
duction to Philosophy. Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap. 
Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1957. Pp. 586-618. 
----, et al. Reli ion and the Intellectuals: a S siua. New York: 
fJartisa.n Review , c.1950. Pp. 31-3 • 
Blackstone, William T. The Problem of Religious Knowledge. Englewood 
Cliffe, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, c.1963. 
----. "Religious Language, :Einotivisa, and Cognitivity," Iliff Review, 
XVIII (Winter 1961), 41-44. 
Braithwaite, R0:char4) B(;va:q). "An F.mpiricist•a View of the Nature of 
Religious Belief, 11 The Existence of God. F.dited » John Hick. Nev 
York: Macmillan Company, c.1964. Pp. 229-252. ~dington Lecture 
of November 22, 1955. Callbridge: University Presa, 1955;} 
Carnap, Rudolf. "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis 
of Language," Logical Poaitivisa. Edited by Alfred Julee 4er. 
Glencoe, Illinois: Free Presa, c.1959. Pp. 6o-81. 
244 
-----. "The Old and the New Logic," Logical Positivis. F.dited b7 Alfred 
Jules Ayer. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Presa, c.1959. Pp. 133-146. 
Christian, William A. Meaning and Truth in Religion. Princeton, Nev 
Jersey: Princeton University Presa, c.1964. 
Cleobury, Flrank]H{;.ro1ci). Christian Rationalisa and Philosophical Analy-
~. tondon: James Clarke and Company, c.1959. 
Coburn, Robert C. "A Neglected Use of Theological Language," Mind, LXXII 
(July 1963), 369-385. ----
Cox, David. "The Significance of Christianity," Readings in Religious 
Philosophy. Edited by Geddes MacGregor and J. Wesley Robb. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, c.1962. Pp. 356-363. {pind, LIX (1950), 
209-218~ -
Crombie, I [an] M (;cHatti~. "The Possibility of Theological Statements," 
Faith and Logic. Edited by Basil Mitchell. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 31-83. 
-----. "Theology and Falsification," New Essays in Philosophical Theo-
~ Edited by Antony G. N. new and Alasdair MacIntyre. Nev York: 
Macmillan Company, 0.1955. Pp. 109-130. 
Edwards, Paul, and Arthur Pap, editors. A Modern Introduction to Philo-
sophy. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1957. 
Evans, Donald D. 
Eve da 
Feigl, Herbert, and Wilfrid Sellars, editors. Readings in Philosophical 
Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, c.1949. 
Ferr,, Frederick, and Kent Bendall. Exploring the Logic of Faitha a 
Dialo eon the Relation of Modern Philoso to Christian Faith. 
New York: Association Preas, 
----. Language, Logic and God. First edition. Nev York: Harper and 
Brothers, c.1961. 
---. "Verification, Faith, and Credulity-," Religion in Life, XXXII 
(Winter 1962-63), 46-5?. 
new, Antony G. N. "Can a Man Witness His OWn Funeral?," Hibbert Journal., 
LIV (April 19.56), 242-250. 
--. "Divine Omnipotence and Huaan Freedom," Nev Essays in Philosophi-
cal Theolo151. Edited by Antony- G. N. new and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
New York: Macmillan Company, c.1955. Pp. 144-169. 
-----. "Theology and Falsification," New Essays in Philosophical Theo-
12.sz. New York: Ma.cir.Ulan Compruiy, c.19;;. Pp. 96-99. 
-----, editor. Logic and Language, with Introduction. First Series. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952. 
----, editor. Logic and LangUage. Second Series. Oxford: Baell 
Blackwell, 1953. 
-----, and Alasdair MacIntyre, editors. Nev Essays in Philosophica.1 
Theology. New York: Macmillan Company, c.19;;. 
Hempel, Carl G. "Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," Logical Positivism. 
Edited by Alfred Julee Ayer. Glencoe, Illinois& Free Press, 
c.1959. Pp. 108-129. 
Hick, John. Faith and Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problea of 
Religious Knowledge. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
0.1957. 
-----. Philoaoghy of Religion. Englewood Cliffe, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, c.19 3. 
-----. "Theology and Verification," The Existence of God. Edited by 
John Hick. New York: Macmillan Company, 0.1§64. Pp. 253-274. 
(i'heology Today, XVII (April 1960), 12-31~ 
-----, editor. The Existence of God. New York: Macmillan Coapany, 
c.1964. 
ose of Theolo cal 
Hutchinson, John A. language and Faith. Philadelphia: 'Nestllinster Preas, 
c.1963. 
Kimpel, Ben F. Language and Religion. New York: Philosophical Library, 
c.1957. 
MacDonald, Margaret, editor. PhilosopbY and Analysis. Oxford& Baell 
Blackwell, 1954. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. "The Logical Status of Religious Belief,"!!!!!-
phYsical Beliefs. Edited by Alasdair MacIntyre. London: SCM Preee, 
1957. Pp. 16?-2ll. 
----, editor. MetapbYsical Beliefs. Londont SCM Presa, 1957. 
McPhereon, Thomas. "Religion as the Ine:,cpreseible," New Esag;s 1n Philo-
sophical Thec;logy. F.dited by Anto~ G. N. Fl.ev and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
New York: Macmillan Company, c.1955. Pp. 131-14:,. 
246 
Mascall, Eric Lionel. Words and Images; a Study in Theological Discourse. 
New York: Ronald Press Company, c.19.57. 
Miles, T. R. Religion and the Scientific Outlook. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, c.1959. 
Mitchell, Basil, editor. Faith and Lodci Oxford Essays in Philosophical 
Theologz. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957. 
Munz, Peter. Problems of Religious Knowledge. London: SCM Press, 
c.1959. 
New Essays in Philosophical Theology. Edited by Antony G. N. new and 
Alasdair MacIntyre. New York: Macmillan Company, c.1955. 
Popper, Karl R. "Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report," British 
Philosophy in the Mid-Century. Edited by c. A. Mace. New York: 
Macmillan Company, c.1957. Pp. 155-191. 
Price, H. H. "Logical PositiviS11 and Theology," Philoso:pbz, X (July- 1935), 
313-331. 
Ramsey, Ian T. ~'reedom and I1D1Dortality. London: SCM Press, ~.1960. 
-----. "Logical Character of Resurrection-belief," Theolop, LX (May-
1957), 186-192. 
-----. Reli ion and Science: Conflict and S thesis Some Philoeo hical 
Reflections. London: s. P. c. K., o.19 • 
-----. Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrasee. 
London: SCM Press, 1957. 
-----. "Towards the Relevant in Theological Language," Modern Churchllan, 
VIII (October 1964), 46-58. 
Reichenbach, Hans. The Rise of Scientific Philooopby. 
Angeles: University of California Press, c.1951. 
Revolution in Philosop~. Edited by Alfred Jules Ayer. 
and Company, c.19 • 
Berkeley- and Loe 
London, Macllillan 
Ryle, Gilbert. Dilemmas. Cambridge: University Pre88, 1954. 
-----. "Introduction," The Revolution in Philosophy. Edited by Alfred 
Julee Ayer. London: Macmillan and Company, c.19.56. Pp. 1-ll. 
-----. "The Theory of Meaning·, II British Philosophy in the Mid-Centurz. 
Edited by c. A. Mace. Nev Yorki Macaillan Company, c.19.57. Pp. 
239-26Z.. 
Schlick, Moritz. "Meaning and Verification," Philosophical Renew, XL'/ 
(July 1936), 336-369. 
247 
-----. "Positivism and Realism," Lofdcal Positivism. Edited by Alfred 
Jules Ayer. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1959. Pp. 82-107. 
Schmidt, Paul F. Religious Knowledge. ~lencoe, Illinoi~ Free Presa, 
c.1961. 
Smart, J. J. C. "The Existence of God, 11 New Essays in Philosophical Theo-
!gsz. Edited by Antony G. N. Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre. New York: 
Macmillan Company, c.1955. Pp. 28-46. 
-----. "Metaphysics, Logic, and Theology," New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology. Edited by Antony a. N. Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre. New 
York: Macmillan Company, c.1955. Pp. 12-27. 
Smart, Ninian. Reasons and Faiths: an Investigation of Religious Discourse, 
Christian and Non-Christian. London: Routle!ige and Kegan Paul, 
c.1958. 
van Buren, Paul M. "The Secula_r Meaning of the Gospel," Communio Viatorwa, 
VI (1963), 175-185. 
-----. The Secular Meaning of the Goepel. Based on an Analysis of Its 
Language. New York: Macmillan Company, c.1963. 
Waismann, Friedrich. "How I See Philosophy," Logical Positivism. Edited 
by Alfred Jules Ayer. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, c.1959. Pp. 
345-380. · 
---. "Language Strata," Logic and Language. Second Series. F.dited by 
Antony G. N. Flew. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. Pp. ll-31. 
---. "Verifiability," Logic and Language. First Series. Edited by 
Antony G. N. Flev. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952. Pp. ll7-144. 
Warnock, o. J. "Analysis and Imagination," The Revolution in Phi1osophY. 
Edited by Alfred Jules Ayer. London: Mac•:Jllan and Company, 
c.19.56. Pp. 111-126. 
Wilson, John.Language and the Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge: University 
Press, 19.56: 
--. "Religious Assertions," Hibbert Journal, LVI (19,S), 148-160. 
Wisdom, John. "Gods," Logic and Language. First Series. Edited by 
Antony G. N. Flew. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19.52. Pp. 18?-206. 
---. ''Metamorphoses of the Verifiability Theory of Meani.Dg," ~. 
LXXII (July 1963), 33.5-347. 
248 
-----. 
11Metaphysics and Verification," PhilosophY and Psycho-Analysis .. 
New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 51-101 .. 
----. "The Modes of Thought and the Logic of God," The Existence of 
~. Edited by John Hick. New York: Macmillan Company, c.1964. 
Pp• 275-298. 
--. ''Philosophical Perplexity," Philosop\and Psycho-Analysis. New 
York: Philosophical Library• 1953. Pp. -.50. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosopbical In-
vestigaUona. Translated by a. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1953. 
Zuurdeeg, Willem F. An Analytical Philosophy of Religion. New York: 
Abingdon Press, c.1958. 
B. Secondary Sources 
Alston, William P. "Elucidation of Religious Statements," Process and 
Divinity. Edited by William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman. LaSalle, 
Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, c.1964. Pp. 429-444. 
Beckwith, BuI';Ilham P. Religion, Pbilosoph.Y, and Science: An Introduction 
to Logical Positivism. New York: Philosophical Library, c.1957. 
Bergmann, Gustav. The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. First edition. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, c.19§4. 
----- .. "Revolt Against Logical Atomism," Meaning and .Existence. Madison: 
University of \iisoonsin Press, c.1959. Pp. 39-72 .. 
---. "Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy," The MetaphYsics of Logical 
Positivism. First edition. New York: Longmans, Green and Comp&D1', 
c.19§4. Pp. 1o6-131 .. 
Blackstone, William T. ''MacIntyre• s Analysis of Religion," Iliff Review, 
XIX (Fall 1962), 27-32. 
Blanshard, Brand. Reason and Analysis. London: George Allen and Unvin, 
c.1962. 
Caemmerer, Richard R. "Current Contributions to Christian Preaching~" 
Concordia Theological Monthly, XXXVII (January 1966), 38-47. 
Calhoun, Robert L. "The Place of Language in Religion," Philosophy of 
Religion. Edited by George L. Abernet~ and Thomae A. Langford. 
New York: Mo.cmillan Company, c.1962. Pp. 296-305. 
Charlesworth, Maxwell John. "Linguistic Ana11eie and Language about God," 
International Philosophical Quarterly, I (February 1961), 139-167. 
249 
-----. Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. Vol. IX of Duquesne Studies, 
Philosophical Series. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univerait1, c.1959. 
Christensen, Niels Egmont. On the Nature of Meanings: A Philosophical 
Analysis. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1961. 
Cox, Harvey. The Secular City. New York: Macmillan, c.1965. 
Erling, Bernhard. Nature and History: A Study in Theological Methodolop 
with Special Attention to the Method of Motif Research. Vol. XIX 
of Studia Theologica Lundensia. Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1960. 
Farrell, B. A. "An Appraisal of Therapeutic Positivisn," Mind, LV (Januar,r 
1946; April l946), 2.5-48, 133-1.50. ---
Farrer, Austin. 11A Starting-Point for the Philosophical Examination of 
Theological Belief," Faith and Logic. Edited by Basil Mitchell. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 9-30. 
Findlay, John Niemayer. "Can God's Existence be Disproved (1948)?," 
Languageb4Mind and Value. New York: Humanities Preas, c.1963. 
Pp. 96-1 • 
----. "The Methodology of Normative Ethics (1961)," LanfiUB.;!e' Mind and 
~. New York: Humanities Press, c.1963. Fp. 248-2 • 
-----. "Some Reactions to Recent Cambridge Philosophy (1940-D," Language, 
Mind and Value. New York: Humanities Press, c.1963. Pp. 13-38. 
Footer, Michael B. Mystery ·and PhilosopbY. London: SCM Press, 1957. 
-----. "'We' in Modern Philosophy," Faith and Logic. Edited by Basil 
Mitchell. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 194-220. 
Garvin, Paul L., editor. Natural Language and the Computer. New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Company, c.1963. 
Gill, Jerry H. "The Meaning of Religious Language," Christianity Today, 
IX (January 1965), 384-389. 
Green, v. H. H. Religion at Oxford and cambridge. London: SCM Presa, 
c.1964. 
Hare, R. M. "A School for Philosophers,"~, II (February 1960), 107-
120. 
Hepburn, Ronald w. Christianity and Paradox. London: c. A. Watts and 
Company, c.1958. 
----. "From World to God," ~, LXXII (January 196)), 40-,0. 
---. "Poetry and Religious Belief," MetaphYsical Beliefs. F.dited b7 




HodgcE,, H. A. "What is to Become of PhiloElophical Theology," Conte11porarz 
British Philoso~. Edited by R. D. Lewis. London: Gecrge Allen 
and Unwin, c.19 • Pp. 209-234. 
Hughes, G. E. "Can God's Existence be Disproved - B, 11 New E&saya in Philo-
sophical Th&oloey. Edited by An tony G. N. new and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
New York: Macmillan Compari.y, c.1955. Pp. 56-6?. 
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understai.ding. Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Company, 1930. 
Jlnoaka, Georg;. Dies rachlichen Grundla ender Philoso hie. Grazi 
Akademische Druck- und Verlagsar.stalt, l 2. 
Joad, c(lr1y E[dwi~ M(itchinao~. A Critique of Logical Positivism. 
London: V:f.ctor Gollancz, c.19.50. 
-----. "Philosophy Today," PhilosopbY, X (July 1935), 259-26:,. 
Joergensen, Joergen. The Development of logical Empiricisa. Vol. II, 
No. 9 of International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Chier.go: 
University of Chicago Press, 0.1951. 
Kraft, Victor. Der Wiener Kreis: Der Ursprung dee Neopositivismus. Wien: 
Springer-Verlag, c.1950. 
KUng, Guido. Ontologie und logitieche Analyse der Sprache. Wien: Springer-
Verlag, c.1963 .. 
Levi, Albert \·lilliarr... Philosophy and the !1odern World. m.oomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Presa, c.1959. 
Lewis, H. D., editor. Clarity ie Not Enough: Essays in Criticism of Lin-
guistic Philosope,y. London: George Allen and Unwin, c.1963. 
-----, editor. Contemporary British Philosophy. Third Series. London: 
George Allen and Unv.ln, c.1956. 
Lossky, Vlad:: .l r . The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. London: 
James Clarke and Compauy, 1957. 
Lueke, Richard. New Meanings for New Beings. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1964. 
Lueker, F~win L. "Jesus Christ: Conservative and Liberal," Concordia 
Theological Monthly, XXXV (July-August 1964), 403-406. 
Mace, c. A., aditor. British PbilosopbY in the Mid-CentUl"Y; A Cambridge 
Symposiwa. New York: Macmillan C<>11pany, c.19.57. 
MacKinnon, D. H. "Metaphysical and Religious Language," Proceeding• of 
the Aristotelian Society, LIV (1953-54), ll.5-130. 
251 
Malcolm, Norman. "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," The .Existence of God. 
Edited by John Hick. New York: 1-taomillan Company, c.1964. ~1l• 48-70. 
Mascall, Eric Lionel. The Secularisation of Christianity. London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, c.1965. 
Mitchell, W. Fraser. "The Language of Religion," Readings in Religious 
Philosophy. Edited by Geddes MacGregor and J. Wesley Robb. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, c.1962. Pp. 392-398. 
Montgomery, John Warwick. "The Theologian' a Craft," Concordia Theologica1 
Monthly, XXXVII (February 1966), 67-98. 
Paton, H.J. "Fifty Years of Philosophy," Contemporary British Philosophy. 
Third Series. E-dited by H. D. Lewis. London: George Allen and 
Unwin, c.1956. Pp. 335-354. 
-----. The Modern Predicament: A Study in the Philoso~hy of Religion. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, c.1955. 
Piepkorn, Arthur Carl. "What Does 'Inerrancy' Mean?," Concordia Theo-
logical 1fonthly, XXXVI (September 1965), 577-593. 
Pound, Ezra. Litera Essa s of Ezra Pound. Edited by T. s. Levis. 
~orfolk, Connecticu : New Directions, 1954. 
Qadir, c. A. "Contemporary Philosophy and Religion," International Philo-
sophical Quarterly, V (September 1965), 361-378. 
Stead, G. c. "How Theologians Reason," Faith and Logic. Edited by Basil 
Mitchell. London: George Allen and Unvin, 1957. Pp. 1o8-131. 
"Symposium: Linguistic Philosop~ and Christian Education," Religious 
Education, LX (January-February 1965), 3-42. 
Urmson, J. o. Philoso hical Anal sis: Its Develo ent Between the 'lvo 
World Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 
Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy Since 1900. London: Oxford University 
Press, 0.19.58. 
Wdnberg, Julius R. An Examination of Logical Positivism. Pateraon, 
New Jersey; Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1960 Q'.93i! • 
Weitz, Morris. "Oxford Philosophy," Philosophical Review, LXII (April 
1953), 18?-233. 
Williams, Bernard. "Tertullian'e Paradox," New Essays in Philosophi.cal 
Theology. Edited by Antony G. N. Flew and Alasdair Macintyre. Hew 
York: Macmillan Company, c.1955. Pp.. 187.211. 
Woelfel, James w. "'Non-Metaphysical• Christian Philosop~ and Linggiatic 
Philosc.,phy," N6w Th&olo& No. 2. Edited by Martin E. Marty and Dean 
252 
G. Peerman.. New York: Macmillan Company, c.1965. Pp. ~-61. 
(§sottish Journal of Theology, XVII (March 1960), 10-20:1 
Zabeeh, F. "Oxford and Metaphysics: A New Page in Contemporary Philosopb1'," 
International Philosophical Quarterly, III (May 1963), 307-320. 
Zinkernagel, Peter. Conditions for Description. Translated from Danish 
by Olaf Lindum. London: Routledge and Kegan ·Paul, 0.1962. 
